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Emerging from strong capitalist base, the Zimbabwean economy from 1980 adopted 
a dual model characterised by a co-existence of capitalism and socialism. An 
economic identity crisis ensued with socialism largely in rhetoric and capitalism 
remaining the main economic system. Socialism was conveniently applied where the 
government stood to benefit, for example keeping already existing state owned 
enterprises while nationalising those deemed strategic. An economic crisis that was 
already evident in 1980 intensified in the following decades and still persists. The crisis 
has only taken different shapes and intensity over the years. The press being an 
indispensable part of the capitalist system has been there to interpret the economic 
identity crisis and the economic crises. Surprisingly there is a dearth of studies 
interrogating how the Zimbabwean financial press has interpreted Zimbabwe’s 
economic identity crisis and the various economic crises the country has gone through. 
This study analyses how two financial newspapers, state controlled the Business 
Herald and privately owned the Financial Gazette, represented the economy from 
1980 to 2018. It interrogates how the dual nature of the economy, capitalist and 
socialist at the same time, has influenced how journalists report the economy. It further 
interrogates how the wider contextual realities precipitated by the economic 
schizophrenia influenced news production practices at the two newspapers. The thesis 
argues that there are unique circumstances that apply to the production of economic 
news that have been ignored in studies of the Zimbabwean press. It establishes that 
the usual dichotomy of publicly owned press versus privately owned is not as clear-
cut in the production of financial and economic news. Allegiance to the capitalist 
system is key to financial and economic news production at the two newspapers. While 
other influences play a role, the very nature of the financial press as a key capitalist 
enabler has a hegemonic influence on how financial and economic news is produced 
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Contextualising the Study 
Reliable and efficient market data, economic news, business intelligence and financial 
information, which fall under so-called “economic, business and financial (EBF) 
journalism” (Merrill 2019: v), are considered to be a core requirement of how capitalist 
systems work (Parsons 1989). The subject matter of EBF journalism is important 
because it affects “every consumer, employee, investor and citizen” (Merrill 2019: 2).  
Traditionally economic, business and financial journalism has received little attention, 
but came to the fore in the years following the 2008 financial crisis. Such was “the 
impact, reach and severity of the Crisis that researchers were prompted to turn the 
spotlight onto these interrelated spheres.” (Merrill 2019: v). The consensus among 
scholars and practitioners alike was that “journalists somehow failed to sufficiently 
warn the public of looming danger” (Merrill 2019: v). Some scholars have gone so far 
as to assert that “business and economic journalism is arguably the most exciting 
branch of journalism today” (Hayes 2014: 1). Indeed, the biggest recent growth in 
media has been “in business and economic news, especially since the financial crisis 
in 2008 and the ensuing problems experienced by almost every country around the 
world.” (Hayes 2014: 4). Nevertheless, despite the prominence brought about by the 
2008 crisis, the corpus of EBF journalism “remains underdeveloped and there are 
many opportunities for scholarly analysis” (Merrill (2019: 1). This study, for instance, 
acknowledges that there is a paucity of studies on Zimbabwean EBF journalism, and 
thus contributes to filling this gap. Furthermore, a problem arises in developing 
countries such as Zimbabwe where there is acute ambivalence and “identity crisis” 
about whether the country is under a capitalist, socialist, or even hybrid ‘command’1 
economy, and where there have been marked recent economic crises (cf. Kanyenze 
2017) that appear to have reshaped how the world of business is understood.  
 
                                                           
1 The term has been used to refer to government assisted programmes particularly to do with agriculture. There is 
command agriculture where commercial farmers are given inputs which they have to pay back in the form of 
grain after harvest. There is also command livestock where the government is giving breeding and dairy cattle to 
farmers. However, the programme has been blamed by some for serving to enrich a few individuals who have 
become cartels in the country.  
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Zimbabwe has an economic “identity crisis” dating back from 1980 when the country 
got independence under a socialist flag, whilst taking over a capitalist economy (cf. 
Mbeki 1980; Mazrui 1981; Riddell 1984; Meisenhelder 1994). This crisis has been 
further exacerbated by the extended economic crisis of the last almost two decades 
(2000 to the present) (Raftopoulos 2004; Kanyenze 2017). It goes without saying that, 
prior to 1980, Rhodesia, had no confusion either about its economic system or 
economic discourse: it was firmly established on a capitalist basis, albeit some of it a 
hybrid of state capitalism, welfare capitalism and racial capitalism (Vambe 1972). The 
capitalist nature of Rhodesia, particularly after the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence (UDI), was expressed in the rather rabid ideological opposition to 
socialism and communism (cf. Msindo 2009), whereby Smith’s government saw itself 
as the defender of “civilisation” against majority rule sponsored by the Soviet Union 
and China (cf. Smith 1964; Henderson 1972). But Rhodesia had always been 
avowedly capitalist from its founding. Essentially, Rhodesia was established by a 
Company – Cecil John Rhodes’ British South Africa Company (BSAC) – as an 
economic venture on behalf of the British Empire (Arrighi 1967; Phimister 1974, 1976). 
The early economic and political trajectory of Rhodesia was shaped largely by the 
BSAC’s estimation of deposits of mineral resources, particularly gold, which it thought 
could be similar to those of South Africa (Arrighi 1967; Phimister 1974, 1976; van 
Onselen 1976). Unlike many other countries north of the Limpopo where capitalist 
interests were not avowedly permanent, Rhodesia developed a vibrant white settler 
bourgeoisie in a quest to increase the value of the BSAC assets in the country 
including the railway system, mine claims and land (Arrighi 1967; Phimister 1984; 
Bonello 2010). However, Rhodesia’s economy was not a completely free market 
system (if there can be said to be a completely “free” market system anywhere in the 
world) as demonstrated by state capitalism which saw various state-owned enterprises 
being set up from the 1930’s onwards (cf. Smith 1964; Arrighi 1967; Phimister 1991) 
and an economy narrowly based on mining and agriculture dependent on the migrant 
labour system (Scott 1954). Some of the enterprises set up in the 1930s and 1940s 
include the Electricity Supply Commission, the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Commission 
(RISCOM) and the Cotton Industry Board (Arrighi 1967: 31). This economy was, like 
South Africa’s apartheid economy, a form of “affirmative action” that used monopolies 





The gathering, interpretation and distribution of economic data which dates back to 
the early days of colonial Rhodesia (Arrighi 1967) – first mediated through a 
handwritten newspaper, The Mashonaland and Zambezian Times – faithfully reflected 
the unambiguously settler capitalist nature of Rhodesia. This “colonial” and “settler 
capitalist” pattern continued for nearly a century, up to 1980, when Zimbabwe got 
independence. Independent Zimbabwe, however, sought to take a different trajectory 
from that of Rhodesia, at least in rhetoric. For instance, the country professed to be 
Marxist-Leninist (Mazrui 1981; Parsons 2007). In practice, however, much of 
Rhodesia’s capitalist foundation was retained. Mugabe himself had this to say in 1983: 
 
We realise that we have inherited an infrastructure which 
is principally capitalist, and that whatever socialist policies 
we would want to implement, these policies had to take 
into account the economic background of the country, and 
that it wouldn’t serve any purpose if we overthrew the 
system and tried to build on a completely new social basis. 
We have not hidden our beliefs. We have said we derive 
our socialist principles basically from Marxist-Leninist 
thinking, and we feel that there is a link between Marxist-
Leninist thinking and some of our traditional collective 
ideas, and we are linking these together. But we also 
accept the Christian principles that have come into it, the 
love that we should have for each other, good 
neighbourliness, charity and that kind of thing, and on the 
basis of that we evolving a philosophy which we believe 
will be acceptable to our people. There is of course 
individualism in our traditional society, but I think we would 
want to emphasise more the collective aspect, leaving 
room for individualism of course. This is how we look at it.2 
 
The official claim, at the very least, was that Zimbabwe was operating a centralised or 
planned economy, on a “nationalised” basis, to achieve gutsaruzhinji (“feed-
everyone”, or socialism) and turning its back on Rhodesian capitalism (Shamuyarira 
1975; Mazrui 1981; Ushewokunze 1982; Sklar 1985; Mengisteab 1992; Zinyama 
1989; Muzondidya 2009; Masaka 2013). Muzondidya (2009) notes that the “socialist” 
government made efforts to “Africanise” the public service, address rural poverty, 
redistribute land, widen the provision of healthcare and education. Ali Mazrui 
                                                           
2 Jenny Barraclough (1983). Not In A 1000 Years, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cikU1J_oIZ4 
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memorably referred to the ambivalence by labelling the country a “dual Zimbabwe” 
(Mazrui 1981). Masaka (2013) regards the contradistinction of a market economy 
against a planned economy in Zimbabwe to be a false dichotomy. Rather, socialist 
rhetoric aside, Zimbabwe has remained avowedly capitalist – largely due to the fact 
that policy is influenced by regional and global factors and cannot be implemented in 
isolation.  
 
Interestingly, in the 1990s, Zimbabwe made a dramatic about turn, dumping socialism 
and a planned, central economy to adopt free market capitalism when it adopted the 
IMF’s Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) (Mlambo 1995). Even more 
significantly, a decade later, Zimbabwe again seemed to make another about turn and 
go back to socialism, by adopting the “Look-East” policy (Youde 2007; Masaka 2013) 
as well as price controls (Bond 2000). Mugabe, criticising his then finance Minister 
Simba Makoni (2000-2002), famously deemed Western “textbook economics” not fit 
for what the country was going through. Improvisation, albeit with disastrous 
consequences, became the order of the day as captured in the former central bank 
governor, Gideon Gono’s book, Zimbabwe’ Casino Economy. By 2010, Zimbabwe no 
longer seemed to have a particular formal economy, as explained by Jones (2010) in 
his seminal essay “Nothing Is Straight in Zimbabwe: The Rise of the Kukiya-kiya 
Economy”. In terms of what was left of the formal economy, the move to the US dollar 
currency in 2009, and the seeking of IMF assistance, seemed to signal a second return 
to capitalism, and a retreat from the Look East policy.  
 
As of 2017-18, when Mugabe fell from power and, as such, this study concludes, it is 
not clear which economic model is in use. Zimbabwe has apparently adopted some 
kind of militarised central command economy, signified by the buzzword “Command 
Economy” which is at its most visible in the agricultural sector but is being expanded 
to housing and other subsidies such as transport3. Indeed, the ruling ZANU-PF in the 
run up to the coup that removed Mugabe seemed split into factions supporting the 
“Command” economy and those against it – or those who claimed that the Command 
economy was a brainchild of Mugabe and the then First Lady or Mugabe’s Deputy, 
                                                           
3 This remains the case in 2020 even though there has been a change in government after the ouster of Robert 




Emerson Mnangagwa. Interestingly, the country continues to adhere to an IMF staff 
monitored programme. Mnangagwa, interviewed by the Financial Times in January 
2018, said that “We introduced the Look East policy but that was a survival policy. The 
east stood by us through thick and thin.”4 The new President also has a favourite new 
slogan, “Zimbabwe is Open for Business”, which he says is an open invitation to all 
comers, from China to the US to Russia, Belarus and Khazakhstan, to do business 
with Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe is thus a mishmash of economic ideologies, some 
capitalist, others socialist, some kukiya-kiya, and still some that seem to be a hybrid 
or to be none of the above. Thus, if, for instance, “recent EBF journalism research has 
tended to revolve around issues raised by the 2008 Financial Crisis” (Merrill 2019: 9), 
Zimbabwean EBF journalism has had to deal with a nearly forty-year old economic 
crisis and identity crisis. 
 
Despite the economic identity crisis and duality that Zimbabwe appears to suffer from, 
and the widely reported economic crisis of the last two decades, precious little 
research has focused on how these ambivalences and crises are reported and 
reflected, particularly in media discourse. The mediation of this economic flux in 
Zimbabwe by financial, business and economic journalism, or how this flux constrains 
– and is constrained by – both official and everyday economic discourse has not been 
systematically studied. This study aims to fill this gap. It aims to contribute to this 
understudied area by reading Zimbabwe’s historical economic identity crisis (1980 to 
the present) and its economic crises of the last over two and a half decades as 
reflected in the mainstream media. I do this through exploring finance and economic 
news production patterns and practices in this period. Most extant media studies of 
Zimbabwe tend to focus on the mediation of Zimbabwe’s political crisis, human rights, 
elections, and the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). A large corpus of 
economic reporting, business journalism and financial news production remains 
largely and surprisingly ignored in the reading of the “Zimbabwean crisis”.  This study 
thus traces the various political and economic policies that Zimbabwe adopted from 
independence and analyses how these unfolded and how they shaped and/or were 
shaped by the practice of financial and economic journalism. By providing a four-
                                                           





decade analysis, the study maps trends and changes in newsroom practices, including 
the practical realities of the practice of financial and economic journalism in a country 
characterised by both an economic identity crisis and economic crises from its birth to 
the beginning of 2018. 
 
The study sought to address three interrelated research questions: 
 
1. How have Zimbabwe’s “economic identity crisis” and “economic crises” been 
represented in selected mainstream Zimbabwean print media from 1980 to 
2017?  
2. Why do finance and business journalists in Zimbabwe report about the 
economy, business, and the world of finance, the way they do? 
3. How has Zimbabwe’s “economic identity crisis” and “economic crisis” shaped 
and constrained institutional and newsroom practices, professional 
imperatives, journalistic agency and their wider socio-economic and political 
context? 
 
Significance of the study 
The study seeks to contribute to an understudied area of understanding the 
“Zimbabwe Crisis” through the mediation of financial and economic news by the 
country’s mainstream newspapers and reporters over nearly three decades. 
Zimbabwe has arguably been in crisis – or at least has been lurching from one crisis 
to the other – from its birth in 1980 (cf. Bond 2000; Masaka 2013). In fact, the crisis 
can be traced to the colonial state which had endured the spectre of illegitimacy in the 
face of Africans since the 1890s and international sanctions and isolation in the UDI 
period from 1965. By the time the Ian Smith government agreed to negotiations with 
nationalists at the Lancaster House conference, the country was feeling the impact of 
a guerrilla war, a global economic recession, sanctions and an outward immigration 
by whites feeling the insecurities posed by the protracted war (Shumba 2018). 
Saunders (1999) argues that the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) 
government inherited a press that was already in crisis exerted by the Rhodesian Front 
(RF) government. The press had been subjected to censorship, bans, harassment of 
journalists and deportation of those that defied RF instructions. By 1984, only a mere 
four years after independence, there was no clear distinction between the ZANU party, 
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government, state, nation and the public media (Saunders 1991). In this crisis ridden 
context multiple studies have been carried out on the continuities of the media 
environment from the colonial period to the post- colonial (Saunders 1991; 1999; 
Mukasa 2003; Moyo 2003; Moyo 2004).  
 
Studies done concerning media coverage of elections in Zimbabwe (Cf. Cliffe 1979; 
Sachikonye 1990; Waldahl 2005; Chuma 2006, 2008; Ranger 2002, 2005; 
Chikwanha-Dzenga, Masunungure and Madingira, 2005; Ogenga 2011; Chitagu 
2018) interrogate how the publicly owned but state controlled as well as privately 
owned press has performed in the period leading to elections. Some of these studies 
argue that due to the strict control of the political space and especially state-controlled 
media by the ZANU PF government, three kinds of journalism arose in the early 2000s: 
‘patriotic journalism, ‘oppositional journalism’ and ‘independent nationalist’ (Ranger 
2005; Chuma 2006, 2008). How the media covered the land reform programme has 
also been given attention (Ndlela 2005; Willems 2005; Chari 2013). Ndlela (2005) 
focused on how journalists responded to the adoption of the Fast Track Land Reform 
programme in Zimbabwe, noting that some journalists reported that the land seizures 
that characterised the programme would lead to mass starvation in the country. Such 
predictions in the year 2000 led to the then minister of agriculture, Dr Joseph Made, 
refusing to grant any interviews to journalists from the privately- owned press (Ndlela 
2005). In September 2003, a story by the Financial Gazette revealed that while the 
officially communicated policy position was “one man one farm”, several ruling party 
officials had received more than one farm under the land reform programme (so-called 
multiple farm ownership). The revelation led to the then minister of information and 
publicity in the president’s office, Jonathan Moyo, suing the Financial Gazette for Z$50 
million, “a then record amount for any known lawsuit against a newspaper (Ndlela 
2005: 84). Ndlela (2005) also observed that while journalists recognised that reporting 
on the many negatives about the economy could lead to negative investor sentiment, 
the rule of public interest compelled them to continue reporting on such issues. 
 
All these studies notwithstanding, no research has attempted to read Zimbabwe’s 
political and economic crisis through financial and economic news production patterns 
and practices. I propose that it is important to understand the complex feedback loops 
that link mediation and reality. In this case, the interest is in the relationship between 
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news production and the wider socio-economic and political contexts, how journalists 
interpret and describe financial and economic news, how such interpretations and 
descriptions frame official and public perception, and how official and public perception 
constrains what journalists report (cf. Doyle 2006). I contend, and demonstrate, that 
Zimbabwe’s history and wider socio-economic and political context have a degree of 
influence on how business and financial news are reported, while the reporting itself 
influences official economic discourse in some way. The study explored and showed 
to what degree this happens, why and how it exactly happens. The study goes beyond 
a focus on a single period or policy and interrogates the practice of business journalists 
over a longer period from the onset of independence to 2017. Several policies have 
been pronounced over this period and it is important to establish how such policies 
influenced the production of business news and vice versa. Furthermore, financial, 
business and economic news is also political and can be read for its significant political 
content. This is very demonstrable in the case of Zimbabwe during a prolonged crisis 
that has social, political and economic dimensions. Finally, during that time, newsroom 
practices and cultures have also gone through change and transition, mirroring the 
wider economic crisis. 
 
Mare (2010) argues that there are three distinct periods in Zimbabwe’s history that can 
be used to map out how the media in the country have operated. These are the colonial 
period (1887 – 1980), postcolonial period (1980 – 2000), and the “Third Chimurenga” 
phase (2000 – 2010). Of course, these phases are only for theoretical purposes. 
Economic reality in Zimbabwe showcases a lot more continuity than this. While the 
development of the media in general in these phases have been highlighted (cf 
Saunders 1991; Ronning and Kupe 2000; Moyo 2003), my study intersects both the 
“postcolonial” and “Third Chimurenga” phase and adds a third post-Third Chimurenga 
phase. Due to the significance of financial and economic news not only in revealing 
historical trends (such as in the study of recessions, depressions and economic 
“booms” and “busts”) but also in “predicting” the future (cf. Starkman 2014; Lischka 
2016), it is important to map out the practices that have shaped it over the years and 
how these practices shaped and were shaped by economic policies and development, 
in this case focusing on the extended postcolonial period up to the end of the so-called 
First Republic (1980-2017). Lischka (2016) sees a relationship between economic 
news, sentiment, and behaviour. In her view, economic and business news affects the 
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economy in significant ways that reward both study and understanding. Starkman 
(2014) is convinced that the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath have partly been 
enabled by a failure of investigative reporting. Mare (2010) posits that the growth of 
economic journalism in Zimbabwe in the normative sense can be traced back to its 
mediation of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the 1990s, 
initially, and the crisis that followed the land redistribution programme from 2000, 
subsequently. In general, as Straub (2018) argues, the practice of business journalism 
itself, and the practices of business journalists, received little scholarly attention until 
the great financial crisis of 2008.  
 
A core assumption in this thesis is that periods of crises have a more observable 
influence on financial and economic news production. In this thesis I argue that 
Zimbabwe has been in crisis since independence, a proposition that justifies the 
periodisation. Scholars such as Doyle (2006), Durham (2007), Tracy (2012) have 
specifically paid attention to the practice of producing financial and economic news 
after or during a crisis. In Doyle’s (2006) case, the practice of financial and economic 
news production is interrogated in the aftermath of the collapse of Enron in the USA. 
Durham (2007) analysed how the Financial Times reported the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, whilst Tracy (2012) interrogated how the American media covered the Greek 
financial crisis. Zimbabwe is a ready-made case study in crisis. In view of the various 
economic crises that the country has gone through, the practice of financial and 
economic news production rewards particular attention. The fact that the post-2000 
crisis led to acute binaries in the journalism fraternity, with state owned media 
journalists largely playing the role of ‘cheerleaders’ of ZANU PF economic policies 
while privately owned media journalists provided stinging criticism of the same policies 
(cf. Mare 2010), suggests that even economic journalism had a political dimension – 
one that was also highly contextualised. The study echoes Mabweazara’s (2011: 102) 
argument that “perhaps the established and prevalent Anglo-American normative 
ideals of journalism are far too general to warrant a universal characterisation of 
journalism practice.” Clausen (2003: 38) opines that “news output draws on cultural 
symbolism, is produced with an imagined (very important) audience in mind in a 
popular cultural style and that the output is differentiated as a result of subjective 
communication practices.” This study delves into this highly contextual nature of 
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Zimbabwe’s economic journalism, showing how local conditions have produced a 
unique way of reporting in a time of prolonged economic crisis. 
 
Business News in Zimbabwe: A Brief Early History 
The history of financial and economic news in Zimbabwe is inextricably linked to South 
Africa. This is because the present-day Zimbabwe was established as a capitalist 
venture with Cecil John Rhodes’ British South Africa Company (BSAC) searching for 
a second Rand as well as setting into motion his Cape to Cairo dream (Arrighi 1967). 
Brand (2010) notes that the earliest newspapers in South Africa were in the business 
of business intelligence. When the first newspaper in South Africa in 1800, The Cape 
Town Gazette and African Advertiser, was established, its mission was to publish “all 
government proclamations, orders etc.; a weekly report of the Cape Town Market for 
all colonial productions; the arrivals and sailings of ships; with such colonial 
occurrences as may be deemed interesting to the public (De Kock cited in Brand 2010: 
25-26).  
 
Mining capital certainly played a key role in the establishment of many English 
language newspapers in South Africa (Brand 2010). The idea to start a financial 
publication in South Africa came from Laurence Gandar, a man who was the deputy 
public relations officer for Anglo American. He pitched the idea to the mining company 
in May 1957, but the mining company did not take up the idea (Mervis 1989). However, 
it was only when he became the editor of the Rand Daily Mail that he managed to 
convince the managing editor of the paper that there was a gap in the market for a 
financial paper in the mould of The Economist (Mervis 1989). When the Financial Mail 
started in 1959, it was 50 percent owned by the Financial Times of London and 
recruited John Marvin, assistant editor of The Economist, as its first editor deputised 
by George Palmer, a merchant banker (Mervis 1989). That George Palmer would go 
on to make editor in two years time emphasises, just as in the British and American 
cases, the close relationship between the world of business and financial journalists.  
 
There has always been an intricate relationship between Rhodes’ British South Africa 
Company (BSAC) and the Argus Printing and Publishing Company (APP) that 
established the first newspaper in Zimbabwe. Rhodes and Francis Joseph Dormer, 
the man who started APP, met on a ship from London in 1875 and established a 
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friendship (Gale 1962). When Dormer wanted to buy the Cape Argus after having been 
an employee, Cecil John Rhodes who had made his money in diamond mining, helped 
him with £3000 cash that was needed as down payment and guaranteed the remaining 
£3000 that would be paid in instalments (Gale 1962). Thus, Rhodes became a 
shareholder in the Argus Printing and Publishing Company. When Rhodes got the 
Royal Charter to establish a business up North “he was wise enough to know that 
establishing newspapers is a job for experts” (Gale 1962: 3). He turned to the APP 
which decided to send an “agent”, William Ernest Fairbridge, in the wake of the Pioneer 
Column which had already established Fort Salisbury in the present-day Harare. 
Fairbridge produced the first issue of The Mashonaland Herald and Zambesian Times 
on 27 June 1891 (Gale 1962). It was a handwritten paper produced using cyclostile. 
While Fairbridge argued that the paper was not produced as an economic or political 
proposition (Gale 1962), the fact that it was part of Rhodes’ plan for the new territory 
makes it an inseparable part of the capitalist venture that established the present-day 
Zimbabwe. Moyo (2003: 3-4) notes that the paper shared the same mission as the 
BSAC of “Justice, Freedom and Commerce.” He further asserts that “this shows how 
the print media was enmeshed in political and economic power structures (Moyo 2003: 
4). When APP decided to send a printing plant to Salisbury, Dormer decided to have 
the name of the paper changed to the Rhodesian Herald (Gale 1962). The new title 
appeared on the streets of Salisbury on 29 October 1892. This is the same paper that 
would later change to simply The Herald at independence and is part of the three 
newsrooms from which data is collected to understand the practices that shape the 
production of financial and economic news in postcolonial Zimbabwe.  
 
Setting the Scene: Political Economy of the Media in Zimbabwe 
The media in Zimbabwe can be categorised into colonial and postcolonial. While this 
study does not venture into colonial discourses, it is important to note that postcolonial 
media practices were shaped by those of the colonial era. Ian Smith and his Rhodesia 
Front (RF) maintained a vice-like grip on the media before independence (Frederikse 
1983). There was heavy censorship of the media to the extent that in a number of 
cases the Rhodesian Herald would leave blank pages in the paper to demonstrate that 
the stories had been censored (Dombo 2014). Other newspapers such as the Central 
African Examiner were completely banned (Saunders 1991). Print media in colonial 
Rhodesia was dominated by the Rhodesia Printing and Publishing Company, a 
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subsidiary of the Argus Group of South Africa (Dombo 2014). Major titles included the 
Rhodesia Herald, Bulawayo Chronicle and the Sunday Mail. At independence the 
Rhodesia Herald was renamed The Herald and the Bulawayo Chronicle simply The 
Chronicle. The Sunday Mail did not change its name. In 1980 these titles made efforts 
to change their editorial policies, but the government felt they still served white minority 
interests (Saunders 1991). The government made it clear that it wanted “a free press 
responsible to the national interest and should in principle be mass-oriented, nationally 
accessible, and nonpartisan in content” (Ronning and Kupe 2000: 139).  
 
It is against the stifling Rhodesian media background that the majority government in 
1980 sought to transform and reform the media. The new minister of information, 
Nathan Shamhuyarira, summed up the need thus: 
 
We are now entering the ‘black north’. This is no longer a 
European country. It is going to be a black man’s country. So I 
urge the press to look to the north and not to the south…We 
have to move very rapidly and drastically reorient ourselves; We 
are now part of black Africa and no longer part of a white 
Southern Africa and this must be reflected in our media 
(Saunders 1991: 130). 
 
The expectation was for the new government to repeal a plethora of laws that the Ian 
Smith government had used to stifle and censor the media. Some of the laws targeted 
for repealing included the Defence Act, the Official Secrets Act, the Powers, Privileges 
and Immunities of Parliament Act, the Prisons Act and the Law and Order Maintenance 
Act (LOMA) (Dombo 2014). In particular, LOMA, which was promulgated in 1960, was 
used to criminalise publication of any information that the government thought would 
cause alarm and despondency. However, despite Shamuyarira’s tough talking and 
optimism, the new ZANU government did not repeal these laws, setting the stage for 
an uneasy side-by-side dwelling of restrictive laws and a putative ‘for-everyone’ 
democracy. 
 
It is the stated desire by the ZANU-PF government to transform the media space that 
led to the creation of the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust (ZMMT). The trust was created 
in January 1981 and it was the first media policy of the new government (Saunders 
1991). The government bought, with help from the Nigerian government, the 43.2 
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percent of Zimpapers (formerly RPPC) stock held by South African investors and 
placed it under the trust (Ronning and Kupe 2000). The creation of the ZMMT served 
the government in that it provided a smart way of indigenising the print media while 
getting a national stake in it but with a buffer to guard against state interference 
(Ronning and Kupe 2000). “The ZMMT was thus constituted as a nongovernmental, 
nonparty, not-for-profitmaking trust, with a constitutionally prescribed nonpartisan 
board of trustees” (Ronning and Kupe 2000:140). However, as noted by Saunders 
(1991) the ZMMT experiment was imperilled from the start. The trust’s role as buffer 
between government/party and the public was compromised by it being housed under 
the ministry of information and getting its funding requirements from the government 
(Saunders 1991; Ronning and Kupe 2000). Thus “its roles of media owner, watchdog, 
and national policymaker was cast in doubt, as the MOI (Ministry of Information) and 
ruling party came to play a more decisive role in the running and supervision of the 
MMT media” (Saunders 1991: 162). As an indication of the direction the government 
was taking, a New York Times story on 16 October 1981 reported that the Director of 
Information, Justin Nyoka, declared that “positivity is news, negativity is not news.”  
The ZMMT could not prevent skewed coverage by Zimpapers especially when it 
related to opposition parties and the ruling party. The ruling party was largely covered 
positively while opposition was covered negatively. Those who dared report the ruling 
party negatively were dismissed. As reported in the New York Times, the Umtali Post 
(now Manica Post5) was the first to deviate by reporting the arrival of North Korean 
soldiers to train some local army brigades, calling it a “Sinister Trend”. Two days later 
the editor and reporter who wrote the story were picked up by the Central Intelligence 
Organisation (CIO) and brought to the Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, who 
reprimanded them pointing out that the story was racist. Thereafter, the white editor, 
Jean Maitland-Stuart, was fired. 
 
One could say that the tone for the operation of the media in the country was therefore 
set. Mukasa (2003: 171) argues that the media “depicted the revolutionary fervour of 
the emergent black political regime.” The environment was where the government 
made it clear that you were either with them or against them (Mukasa 2003). 
                                                           




Broadcasters were, for example, required to produce five-year plans in line with the 
government’s broader five-year development plans (Mano 2008). ZANU officials often 
demanded the presence of journalists when giving speeches but would not tolerate 
being asked critical questions. The first black editor of the weekly, Sunday Mail, Willie 
Musarurwa, called such uncritical journalism, “sunshine journalism” (Saunders 1991; 
Mano 2008). As the publicly owned press was transformed into “an ideological 
apparatus” (Chuma 2005), a void was created in the information space that was to be 
filled by the privately-owned press. 
 
The privately- owned press had not developed much in the colonial period, largely due 
to an unconducive environment created when Ian Smith made the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Britain in 1965 (Chuma 2005). The privately-
owned press consisted largely of the Financial Gazette, Parade and the newly re-
launched Moto magazine (Saunders 1999; Chuma 2005). “The Financial Gazette 
emerged as an effective articulation of Zimbabwean capital-in-general by combining a 
rich mixture of cross-sectional business news, fresh reportage and political analysis. 
In the black press sector…Moto and Parade were distinguished by their critical 
content, national reach and popular political influence” (Saunders 1991: 347). The 
government seemed to tolerate such criticism in the first decade of independence 
because it wanted to be seen to be living to its policy of reconciliation with the white 
community as well as its rhetoric of upholding media freedom, so as not to antagonise 
donors from the West who were funding some of its programmes (Chuma 2005). 
 
The adoption of market reforms and liberalisation in the 1990s created conditions for 
growth of privately-owned press (Chuma 2005). Where the publicly owned press did 
not experience any growth in the 1990s, both in terms of circulation and titles, there 
was a surge in black capital participation in the private press (Chuma 2005). In 1989, 
a former chief executive officer of the Zimbabwe Newspapers, Elias Rusike, combined 
with two black businessmen to buy Modus Publications, publisher of the Financial 
Gazette as well as other trade publications (Saunders 1991; Dombo 2014). In 1990 
the Financial Gazette appointed Geoffrey Nyarota editor (Saunders 1991). Modus 
Publications went on to launch the first privately-owned daily newspaper, the Daily 
Gazette, in 1992. Where government had previously accused the Financial Gazette of 
serving white minority interests, it was left with no such excuses when the newspaper 
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was now in black hands (Chuma 2005). According to Rusike (1990) the government 
was not happy with his purchasing of Modus Publications, they wanted it for 
themselves. Saunders (1991) notes that while the Financial Gazette increased in its 
criticism of government under black ownership, surprisingly it was in favour of the 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). 
 
In 1991, a new magazine, Horizon, was launched by Andrew Moyse, a former editor 
of Parade. He had been dismissed over what was officially announced as an industrial 
dispute although it was widely speculated that under his editorship Parade had 
become too critical of government (Chuma 2005). It was speculated that this did not 
go down well with the magazine’s shareholders who were after making a profit and did 
not want to antagonise government. Dombo (2014) argues that the government is 
suspected of having pressured the owners of Parade to fire Moyse. Horizon soon 
invited the ire of government officials because of its cutting- edge investigative 
journalism (Chuma 2005). However, unlike Parade which could attract good 
advertising revenue, Horizon suffered from lack of advertising, perhaps because of it 
being viewed as too critical of government, leading to its demise in 1999. 
 
In 1996, former Modus Publications personnel, Trevor Ncube, Clive Murphy and Clive 
Wilson, partnered to launch a business weekly newspaper, the Zimbabwe 
Independent (Chuma 2005). They followed that up with a Sunday title, The Standard, 
a year later. Just like the Financial Gazette, this combination of black and white capital 
took a critical approach towards the government. Such an approach was perhaps not 
surprising considering the devastating effects ESAP was having on the populace and 
increasing corruption in government. Some middle of the road newspapers were also 
launched in the late 1990s. These largely belonged to ZANU PF officials. Ibbo 
Mandaza, a former civil servant and ZANU PF technocrat, launched the Zimbabwe 
Mirror in 1997 under his publishing house, the Southern Africa Printing and Publishing 
House (Sappho) (Chuma 2005). It chose to be unconventional by publishing mostly 
analyses written by academics and researchers (Chuma 2005). Its stated approach to 
news was “nationalist” and anti-imperialist. 
 
One of the key moments in the development of the press in Zimbabwe post- 
independence was the launch of the Daily News in 1999. The Daily News was owned 
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by Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (ANZ) which was majority owned by British 
based Africa Media Investments (AMI) (Chuma 2005). British shareholders made the 
government uneasy because of the frosty relations that had developed between the 
two countries (Moyo 2005). To add to that uneasiness was that the editor of the 
newspaper was Geoff Nyarota, who had come to be known as a fierce government 
critic from the days of his exposure of the Willowgate6 scandal. According to Moyo 
(2005), at its launch the Daily News became the most resourced newspaper in the 
country bringing state of the art technology in printing and the newsroom. It also 
offered highly competitive salaries making it attractive to journalists already working in 
other newsrooms.  
 
If the late 1990s are known for the rapid development of the press in Zimbabwe, then 
the period 2000 to 2009 is the opposite. It is a period most known for the enactment 
of draconian laws to regulate the media in Zimbabwe. Arguably the establishment of 
the Daily News and its popularity jerked the government into action. After Jonathan 
Moyo, a former political science professor, was appointed the new minister of 
information in 2000, he made it his task to take privately-owned newspapers, 
particularly the Daily News, to task for being agents of regime change (Moyo 2005). 
Jonathan Moyo is credited for crafting laws such as the Broadcasting Services Act 
(BSA), Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Public 
Order and Security Act (POSA). AIPPA and POSA are still a thorn in the flesh for 
media practitioners up to today. While presenting the AIPPA bill in parliament, Moyo 
singled out the Daily News for attack declaring that: 
 
Clearly the foreign ownership and white patronage 
arrangements have had a direct bearing on the editorial outlook 
and control of the ANZ. For how else can we explain the editorial 
behaviour of peasant-born African playing a willing host to such 
racial stereotypes, while denying the immediate interest of his 
own people defined by land? (Moyo 2005: 118). 
 
AIPPA requires all media houses and journalists to get accreditation from a 
government appointed Media and Information Commission (MIC). This gives the 
                                                           
6 It was the exposure of a corrupt practice by some government ministers who abused a facility where they could 
buy cars that were in short supply because of lack of foreign currency from a government- controlled car 
assembler, Willowvale Motor Industries. Instead of buying one car, they bought several and sold them at highly 
inflated prices because they were in demand, thus making a fortune overnight. 
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commission sweeping powers to deny anyone registration and many foreign media 
houses including the BBC and CNN, as well as journalists were barred from operating 
in Zimbabwe when it became law (Moyo 2005). The Public Order and Security Act 
(POSA) on the other hand criminalises the publication of false statements or 
statements that engender feelings of hostility towards the president (Munyoro et al 
2016). Many journalists were charged under these two laws but none from the state-
controlled media (Ndlovu 2015). A number of newspapers were shut down under 
AIPPA, the most notable being the Daily News in 2003. The paper had refused to 
register as required under AIPPA, choosing instead to file a constitutional challenge. 
It was found to have approached the court ‘with dirty hands’ by the Supreme Court 
leading to its closure by heavily armed police (Moyo 2005). The Tribune was shut 
down in 2004 by the MIC following utterances in parliament against repressive media 
laws by its owner, then ZANU PF legislator Kindness Paradza (Chuma 2005). 
 
The persecution of the media coincided with an acute deterioration of the economy. 
The consummation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2009 brought relief 
to the economy and the media space. Under a Global Political Agreement (GPA) that 
gave rise to the GNU, media reforms were placed as important. This included the 
licensing of new newspapers. Article 19 of the GPA recognised, “…the importance of 
the right to freedom of expression and the role of the media in a multi - party 
democracy” (VMCZ 2013). This gave rise to the licensing of several privately-owned 
newspapers such as Newsday, a sister publication to the Zimbabwe Independent and 
The Standard, and the previously banned Daily News. From 2009 to present, there 
has been little hindrance to the establishment of privately-owned newspapers. 
However, the same cannot be said of broadcasting where the few radio licenses that 
have been given have largely gone to entities with close links to the ruling ZANU PF 
party. The country still has only one television station which is heavily controlled by 
the state.  A recent case exposes how little has changed in newsroom practices of the 
last thirty years. Tichaona Zindoga, former deputy and acting editor of The Herald, left 
his post in late 2019 and had a few interesting things to say. I shall quote his statement 
in some detail firstly because he was an insider and secondly because of the light they 




Three months ago, I left my position as Deputy and Acting 
Editor of The Herald, Zimbabwe’s largest newspaper and 
State-controlled daily where I had spent nine months in the 
“hot seat”. It has apparently become hotter lately, due to 
increased interference and the fluidity of politics among the 
ruling elites.  The evolving politics, and the maddening 
dynamics within the ruling Zanu-PF and the securocratic 
State have made the job difficult, especially when one has 
to continuously be on the good graces of a controlling 
faction. And, oh, there is also the wife of the President 
demanding coverage and beautiful pictures of her face in 
the paper at every turn lest she descends on you like a 
tonne of bricks! Needless to point out, the conflation of 
Zanu-PF politics and the dynamics within the securocratic 
State, with Government affairs is quite manifest at The 
Herald as a heady function of hegemonic control and elite 
self-preservation. I do not need to point out that both my 
elevation and removal from The Herald had a good deal to 
do with these. As fate would have it, when I was thrown in 
the deep end in the night of January 22, 2018, following 
the brutal sacking of Joram Nyathi, I was unfazed. I quickly 
commandeered the ship and led a mini-revolution that 
comprised changing personnel and rebranding the paper. 
I was, in a large part Nyathi’s understudy. And the good-
natured Nyathi, an extremely great and sagacious 
individual, gave me lots of support and relied on both my 
skills, judgment and politics to get by daily. Until that fateful 
day when he made an editorial decision (I was away on a 
personal errand) that led to his unceremonious sacking at 
the behest of President Mnangagwa. Mnangagwa was 
unhappy that a picture of his return from Eurasia had been 
“buried” on page 2.7 
 
It is this sort of news room environment, broadly, that the business press has operated 
in for the period under review. This study argues that while we are aware of how 
political news has been produced in this environment, little has been done to 
understand how the business press has fared and how business journalists interpret 
the work they do and the pressures they face in producing business news.  
 
                                                           






This thesis comprises of 7 chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the thesis spelling out the 
research objectives. It provides a brief background of the development of the press in 
post-independence Zimbabwe. The chapter also gives a political and economic 
background in which the press developed. Chapter 2 reviews literature related to the 
study. The review first provides a historical development of the financial press globally. 
An Anglo-American bias is evident due to Zimbabwe’s own financial press taking after 
this model. The development of the financial press is further traced from its arrival in 
South Africa until it reaches present day Zimbabwe. Literature related to news 
production is reviewed as well as the conceptual framework of sociology of news 
production. Chapter 3 is about the methodology used to carry out the research. The 
steps I took and the challenges I faced in doing the field work are chronicled in this 
chapter. Chapter 4 is the first chapter where I discuss findings. Analysis in this chapter 
focuses on how the Business Herald and the Financial Gazette represented the 
economy in the first decade of independence from 1980. Chapter 5 analyses how the 
two newspapers represented economic developments in the 1990s. This is a period 
where economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP) was implemented and the 
economy became wholly capitalist. Key developments include unbudgeted hefty pay-
outs to war veterans, Zimbabwe’s involvement in the DRC war, and dramatic fall of 
the Zimbabwe dollar against major currencies. Chapter 6 analyses representation of 
the economy from 2000 to 2018. Key developments such as the fast track land reform 
programme, Zimbabwe’s record hyperinflation, Government of National Unity (GNU), 
and a military coup happen in this period. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis. It 
summarises the main insights from the discussion of the findings. A reflection of what 
the findings contribute to an understanding of Zimbabwe’s financial press is given as 











CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of literature related to the production of news generally 
as well as the Zimbabwean context. The multidimensional nature of this study requires 
that literature be reviewed through multiple lenses. Its historical nature requires that a 
historical perspective be given in order to capture some of the developments that have 
happened through the years. To provide a context to the central role and significance 
of financial, business and economic news, the study traces the development of this 
genre of news as a symbiotic partner of the capitalist system. The review traces the 
development of the business press in the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America. The focus is on these two countries because they have a huge influence on 
the development of business news in former British colonies such as Zimbabwe. 
Arguably, they continue to do so. A historical context of the Zimbabwean economy is 
provided to shed light on the environment in which financial and economic news 
production in the country takes place. Literature on economic developments from 1980 
to the present is reviewed because economic news is shaped by these developments.  
 
Further, the chapter reviews early studies on the production of news in general in order 
to situate the study within the overall context of news production research. Early 
literature discussing various issues concerning the nature of business news over the 
years is also reviewed in order to further understand how different scholars have 
interpreted the practice of business news production. Finally, the sociology of news 
production is discussed from the angle of three approaches advanced by Schudson 
(1989, 2000), namely, political economy, social organisation of newswork and 
culturological approach. The sociology of news production is used as the theoretical 
lenses through which the financial and economic news production practices in 
Zimbabwe is analysed. It is also important because the study deals with the newsroom 
environment, newsroom practices and editorial policy. As such, literature on what goes 
in standard and non-standard newsrooms was reviewed to throw light on the everyday 
reality and beat of business news journalists. The newsroom, it turns out is a hothouse 
of politics, intrigue, ideology, hegemony and other unique constraints. As Ainamo, 
Tienari and Vaara (2006: 611) point out “the media both reflect more general societal 




Financial and economic journalism’s main focus is the economy and economic activity 
as well as other influences on the economy such as politics (Doyle 2006). Business 
news is regarded as a precondition for capitalism considering that it is the 
underpinning for the price system (Parsons 1989). That is, EBF journalism is one of 
the most essential in the whole media ecosystem due to its importance, for instance, 
in how market movements are interpreted. For instance: 
 
On one occasion a journalist at a major newswire agency 
reported that UK interest rates had been raised. The 
markets were thrown into a panic because there had been 
no indication from any reliable source that this was about 
to happen. In fact, the news was about Irish interest rates 
and the reporter had made a simple error. The mistake was 
corrected after about 60 seconds; but in that time, millions 
if not billions of pounds had shifted on global markets, 
stock prices went haywire, and directors had been ordered 
to assemble for urgent meetings in head office 
boardrooms. This simple journalist error had monumental 
consequences (Hayes 2014: 11). 
 
Newspapers thus play a key role in “how economic culture is communicated and its 
myths and discourse sustained and propagated” (Parsons 1989: 2). One of the 
normative functions of economic news, says van Dalen, de Vreese, and Albæk (2017: 
1), is “surveillance, making monitorial citizens aware of significant economic 
developments”. The importance of financial journalism is demonstrated in that while a 
sports editor can run exaggerated headlines, no financial harm will befall anyone. In 
contrast, financial misrepresentations by financial editors can have negative 
consequences on market behaviour and financial loss for millions of people. This is 
because many businessmen and investors trust what they read in financial 
newspapers that are considered responsible.  
 
Economic news coverage, in this regard, can affect “individual citizens’ economic 
perceptions as well as consumer confidence on the aggregate level. This places a 
large responsibility on economic journalists and business reporters” (van Dalen, de 
Vreese, and Albæk 2017: 1). The media’s role on policy formation debate, and 
crucially “to determine who controls public policy debates” (Rafter 2014) is widely 
acknowledged. The financial press routinely covers, interprets and announces data on 
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economic indicators (Barrett et al 2004). Changes and surprises in those 
macroeconomic data are said to be part of the reason why stock and bond prices move 
up or down the way they do – and the release of late, early or unintended data could 
cause markets to react in a certain way. However, it is also the case that the movement 
of a firm’s stock price move on days with public news about the firm tends to be what 
happens in developed markets (cf. Griffin et al 2011). In Zimbabwe, a developing 
market, a different set of contextual factors must also be attended to in our 
consideration of what ultimately drives the “markets”.  
 
The Development of Business Journalism: A Brief Historical Overview  
The business press originated, in the very beginning, to serve the interests of shipping 
and trade (Starkman 2014). The earliest newspapers can be traced to the 1580s with 
the publication of bills of entry, and then price currents in the 1620s and 1630s 
(Parsons 1989). Bills of entry were lists of exports and imports of commodities at 
various ports while price currents were details of the market prices of commodities. In 
economic terms this period is known as the mercantilist period which, according to 
Froyen (2002), is associated with the rise of the nation-state in Europe. The key tenets 
of mercantilism are the accumulation of gold bullion and treasure of every kind and 
maintaining a favourable balance of trade. Blaug (1985: 10) notes that mercantilism 
promoted “regulation of foreign trade to produce an inflow of gold and silver, promotion 
of industry by inducing cheap raw material imports, protective duties on imported 
manufactured goods, encouragement of exports particularly finished goods….” In this 
sort of economic environment there was need for bills of entry, price currents, marine 
lists (published information on shipping) and exchange currents (provided information 
on foreign bills of exchange and stock market prices) (Blaug 1985). 
  
It is believed that the first business news entrepreneur was Joseph Fugger, a German 
financier, who in the seventeenth century began selling market information to clients 
on the side (Parsons 1989, Starkman 2014). By the middle of the seventeenth century 
economic news was already influencing markets (Parsons 1989). In Europe, the 
commercial press predated the political press, being prevalent in trading cities such 
as London, Amsterdam, Hamburg among others (Parsons 1989, Starkman 2014). It 
evaded strict censorship because its content was regarded as less controversial 
(Starkman 2014). In 1734, Lloyd’s List, a paper published by Edward Lloyd, was 
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established as a source of shipping and pricing news for shipping insurance 
underwriters who met at his Lloyd’s Coffee house (Starkman 2014). The paper also 
provided stock and commodity prices. It is noteworthy that the paper came to be 
regarded as a reliable source of information by both the British and French 
governments (Parsons 1989). Another paper of note that was published around the 
same time was the Course of Exchange which was published by John Castaing 
(Parsons 1989). 
 
The market for financial information is as old as financial markets themselves 
(Starkman 2014).8 A revolution in the business press in the late 18th century coincided 
with a revolution in economic ideas led by Adam Smith (Parsons 1989). Newspapers 
thus morphed from just providing stock and market prices and shipping news into 
articulating consumer demand, commercial opinion and sentiment as well as 
spreading panic at times (Parsons 1989). When The Wealth of Nations was published 
in 1776, newspaper proprietors played a significant role in its distribution, enabling 
Smith’s ideas to permeate large populations of provincial England (Parsons 1989). 
Smith and others of the classical economic persuasion such as David Ricardo and 
John Stuart Mill considered, in a clear break from the mercantilists before them, 
argued that the wealth of nations was determined by real factors and that a free market 
without state control was capable of optimising economic efficiency (Froyen 2002). In 
particular classical economics stressed: 
 
the role of real as opposed to monetary factors in 
determining real variables such as output and 
employment. Money had a role in the economy only as a 
means of exchange. Classical economics stressed the 
self-adjusting tendencies of the economy. Government 
policies to ensure adequate demand for output were 
considered by classical economists to be unnecessary and 
generally harmful (Froyen 2002: 39). 
 
                                                           
8 The first financial publication in the United States of America came in 1795, three years after the formation of 
the New York Stock Exchange (Rosenberg 1982). The paper was started by James Oram, a printer who titled it 
The Shipping and Commercial List and New York Prices Current. It was exclusively devoted to issues to do with 
commerce, finance and shipping (Rosenberg 1982). When James Oram died the paper was taken over by the 
Commercial Advertiser and in 1827 both papers were absorbed by the Journal of Commerce (Rosenberg 1982). 
The Journal of Commerce was founded by Samuel Morse, the telegraph inventor, together with Arthur Tarpan, 
who later went on to help form the Associated Press (Starkman 2014). 
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The analysis of real factors was based on the idea that “the growth of an economy 
was the result of increased stocks of the factors of production and advances in 
techniques of production” (Froyen 2002: 38).  Incidentally, the classical economists 
(also known as political economists) were also journalists. The likes of Mill and Ricardo 
published their economic ideas in journalistic form (Parsons 1989). Ricardo, for 
instance, wrote letters to the Morning Chronicle in 1809 while John Ramsey McCulloch 
wrote for the Scotsman and the Edinburgh Review (Parsons 1989). In terms of 
journalism therefore, the biggest impact the political economists had was shaping the 
discourse of economic opinion rather than the enunciation of economic theories 
(Parsons 1989). 
 
As banking expanded in both London and New York, a new kind of entrepreneur 
emerged who was seeking to make a profit from the stock market. There emerged, 
thus, a new kind of ‘City’ and ‘Wall Street’ journalism that was different from that of the 
political economists (Parsons 1989: 22). This form of journalism which was financial 
in nature was first rife among Sunday papers such as The Observer and The 
Englishman, as well as evening papers such as the Courier in 1818 (Parsons 1989). 
In the economic boom of 1825, City journalism became more established with The 
Times introducing a ‘money column’ which provided money market and City 
intelligence. Thomas Massa Alsanger, the financial editor of the The Times can be 
regarded as the father of financial journalism as he became an authority on money 
matters and would often offer advice to the Bank of England (Parsons, 1989). Another 
notable publication during this period was the Economist. Parsons (1989) notes that 
while daily papers such as The Times sought to make money through advertising, the 
Economist sought to advance the idea of free trade and political reform. The weekly 
magazine can be credited with spreading the idea of laissez fair across Europe. As 
Parsons (1989: 25-26) notes, “The paper was successful in diffusing ideas largely 
because it brought together the two strands of economic journalism which had 
emerged up to that point: the reporting of facts and the discussion of opinions. It was 
a great advocate of free trade and political economy and also of better information for 
the businessman.” By the end of the eighteenth century, the commercial press had 
spread to the United States of America where one of the early news cooperatives, the 
New York Associated Press, would meet ships entering New York harbour and then 
convey information regarding their freight using speed boats (Starkman 2014). Hence 
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the value of the early commercial press was in its dissemination of the capitalist culture 
(Parson 1989). 
 
In 1825 the Erie Canal was opened, and New York City increasingly became the 
nation’s financial capital (Rosenberg 1982). Wall Street and its environs also assumed 
greater importance as many of the country’s major banks, brokerage houses, 
insurance companies, and commodity exchanges established their headquarters 
there. Thus, the need for business news became more acute. This need was quickly 
noticed by a Western Union delivery boy, John J. Kiernan who, because of his work, 
had developed a passion for the latest information (Rosenberg 1982). He started the 
Kiernan News Agency shortly after the civil war. It was a subscription- based agency 
which offered latest information about shipping, foreign financial developments, and 
corporate earnings and dividends (Rosenberg 1982). What went into the production 
of the news at this agency is described by Rosenberg (1982) thus: 
 
Until the Atlantic Cable was completed in 1866, Kiernan got his 
overseas news by rowing out to meet incoming vessels. He 
would buy any foreign newspapers they carried and pay 
sailors, and occasionally passengers, for last-minute 
information they might have picked up before sailing. Rushing 
back to his office, Kiernan would write up the news he had 
collected on short white sheets of paper and send his team of 
fleet-footed messenger boys dashing around Wall Street to 
drop off their bulletins at each subscriber’s desk (Rosenberg 
1982: 3).  
 
The rise of financial markets in the mid nineteenth century, driven by the railroads, 
gave rise to a new kind of financial journalism (Starkman 2014). As railroad bonds and 
finance capitalism expanded, so did the importance of journalism focusing on the 
happenings in the railroad business (Starkman 2014).  
 
Railroad moguls naturally sought to influence what journalists reported, and they often 
succeeded (Starkman 2014). However, some journalists resisted, such as Henry 
Varnum Poor. He is said to have declared that he was not going to be an advocate for 




It is now our duty, as it is equally for the interests of 
railroads and the public, to point out the dangers to which 
we are exposed from an excessive investment in these 
works, to expose merely speculative schemes, which are 
encouraged by the ease with which money is had for 
anything like a railroad (Starkman 2014: 58).  
 
Together with his son, Poor formed a securities ratings business called H. V and H. 
W. Poor Co. which in 1941 merged with Standard Statistics Bureau to form the 
predecessor company to the present-day Standard and Poor’s Ratings Services 
(Starkman 2014).  
 
As New York grew as a global financial centre driven by the New York stock exchange 
and the growth in railroad bonds, individuals such as Charles Dow, Edward Jones and 
Charles M. Bergstresser emerged with the formation of the Dow Jones company in 
1882. The company was and still is committed to “gathering news about and affecting 
the world of business and reporting that news in a lucid, lively, and level-headed style” 
(Rosenberg 1982: 1). Dow Jones was in the business of producing corporate 
information that was of use to Wall Street investors and in 1884 created the first list of 
stocks and compiled their prices into an average, that would become the present-day 
Dow Jones Industrial Average (Starkman 2014). The daily bulletins that Dow Jones 
produced were eventually, with a printing press investment, turned into a daily 
summary called the Wall Street Journal, whose first issue appeared on 8 July 1889 
(Starkman 2014). The printing press enabled the Wall Street Journal to be distributed 
by quarter past three in the afternoon which was only fifteen minutes after the close of 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), which was a good hour before rivals could 
distribute their own papers (Starkman 2014). To emphasise the close relationship 
between financial journalism and financial markets, Starkman (2014) highlights that 
Dow Jones as a source of financial news was more of an intermediary among market 
participants rather than an outsider reporting on the financial markets. Its key strength 
was in gaining access to insiders and then being the first to break the news to the 
market.  
 
The Wall Street Journal was bought by Clarence Barron in 1902 (Starkman 2014). 
According to Starkman (2014), Barron viewed himself not as someone who reports 
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about capitalism, but rather as its defender as well as a defender of the individuals 
involved in the capitalist enterprise. Barron is said to have declared that:  
 
In the Wall Street Journal, I have sought to create a 
service. I have striven for a creation so founded in 
principles that it can live as a service- live so long as it 
abides in the laws of that service. I believe there is no 
higher service from government, from society, from 
journalism than the protection and the upbuilding of the 
savings of the people… The Wall Street Journal must 
stand for the best that is in Wall Street and reflect that 
which is best in United States finance (Cited in Starkman 
2014: 76).  
 
This kind of reporting where a newspaper was part of the market consequently led to 
failures in critically scrutinising the same market when risky practices were going on 
leading to the Journal being as surprised as many ordinary people by the market crash 
of 1929 (Starkman 2014). His reporting was based on gaining access and the trust of 
powerful people in the capitalist system (Starkman 2014). As a demonstration of how 
powerful his kind of reporting was, Barron was a trusted advisor to president 
Roosevelt, Taft and Wilson. 
 
After peaking to circulation figures of 50 000 copies, the Wall Street Journal struggled 
in the 1930s under the editorship of Kenneth C. Hogate (Starkman 2014). However, 
the tide was to be stemmed by a man credited with starting a business news journalism 
revolution at the Wall Street Journal, Leslie Bernard “Barney” Kilgore (Starkman 2014). 
Having started at the Journal in 1929 as a twenty- year old holder of a college degree, 
Kilgore was appointed managing editor by Hogate at the age of thirty-two in 1941. He 
experimented with new forms such as what can be regarded as a pre-internet blog he 
called ‘Dear George’, a column of fictional letters written by a correspondent called 
‘C.W.’ Starkman (2014: 91) states that “the Kilgore revolution emphasised narrative 
over inverted pyramids, depth over briefs, words before numbers, context over 
incremental news, original reporting over press releases from institutions, and, above 
everything else, clarity.” Kilgore invented the ‘leder,’ the long form of journalism (2000 
– 3000 words) to cater for an increasingly non-specialist audience (Starkman 2014). 
He sought to appeal to more people who were not necessarily the traditional financially 
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literate. Asked why, he stated that “Financial people are nice people and all that, but 
there aren’t enough of them to make this paper go” (Starkman 2014: 92).   
 
Thus the Wall Street Journal epitomises the post war growth of business journalism 
from reliance on institutions it served to introduce a broader approach that appealed 
to both Wall Street and non- financial readers. Starkman (2014) captures the 
revolution brought about by Kilgore, stating that: 
 
In emphasising depth, writing, careful editing, and context; 
by broadening business journalism’s field of vision to 
include social issues, urban affairs, investigations, and 
foreign policy, as well as business news staples like 
earnings, government reports, tips from insiders, and 
official pronouncements from institutions; by quieting the 
front page and relaxing the requirement to report only what 
happened “yesterday”; and by emphasising the 
importance of storytelling, Kilgore played a big role in 
democratising the news (Starkman 2014: 97).   
 
Even with the advent of television in the post-war period, Kilgore believed that readers 
would still choose to read a story with breadth and depth as long as it was well told. 
His emphasis was on journalistic quality and believed business news needed to 
change from just focusing on institutions and what executives said yesterday 
(Starkman 2014). Even the architecture of the paper was changed to appeal to more 
non-financial readers. Initially Kilgore was frustrated as the circulation figures did not 
immediately go up but by 1943 the figures started to go up and by 1959 circulation 
had reached 145 000 copies (Starkman 2014). Circulation exceeded 1 million in 1966.  
 
News Production Practices: The Early Years 
Early studies of news focused on news selection processes (Cottle 2003; Fishman 
1980). Some of the studies investigated the variables which determined how editors 
selected what to include in the news. This is known as the gatekeeping process (see 
White 1964). Such studies highlighted, among other things, that news selection is a 
highly subjective process based on the gatekeeper’s “experiences, attitudes and 
expectations” (White 1964: 165). There were also studies on how individual journalists 
were truly subjective in the face of organisational bureaucracies, source and audience 
influences (see Gieber 1964). Other studies tried to identify how organisations 
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thwarted journalists’ objectivity leading to biased news (see Warner 1971). These gave 
way to ethnographic studies of news production in the 1970s and early 1980s which 
covered what Gans (2004) calls a golden age of journalism. 
 
Ethnographic studies of news production practices highlighted the fact that news is 
never a reflection of reality but rather always a constructed reality (Tuchman 1978; 
Gans 1980; Fishman 1980). Journalism may be a profession with laid down 
orthodoxies about how to achieve (the ideal) of accuracy and objectivity (Altheide 
1976; Gans 1979), but journalists are ultimately human beings who create stories from 
their observations and interpretations of events, and who select what to report from 
the interviews they carry out concerning particular events (Gans 1980). From the many 
millions of activities and actors that journalists can possibly select every day, only a 
few are selected and only aspects of them reported on, thus aiding in the construction 
of a reality that is presented as news (Gans 1980).  Fishman (1980: 3) boldly declares 
that “I want to explain how what we read in newspapers today is constructed…” By 
engaging in the very exercise of disseminating information that is needed or wanted 
by audiences, news organisations both circulate and shape knowledge (Tuchman 
1978). “News, like knowledge, imposes a frame for defining and constructing social 
reality” (Tuchman 1978: 180). The construction of reality was sometimes even equated 
to distortion. Altheide (1976: 24) argued that “the organisational, practical, and other 
mundane features of newswork promote a way of looking at events which 
fundamentally distorts them.” Events are complicated and the process of making news 
necessarily demands that complex events be simplified, a process that leads to 
selection as much as to distortion (Altheide 1976). 
 
The process of creating reality is conditioned by a number of factors that the early 
ethnographic studies highlighted. Many of the researches highlighted that 
organisational practices are major contributors to the construction of what we get as 
news (Tuchman 1978; Epstein 1973; Altheid 1976; Gans 1979; Fishman 1980). 
Altheid (1976) argued that organisations adopt processes for practical reasons which 
then consequently leads to a complex way of simplifying events. Journalists work 
within organisations that only allow them limited freedom to select what to include in 
the news (Gans 1979). News is therefore a product of individuals who work in the news 
who follow laid down procedures and necessarily have to conform to institutional 
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practices (Tuchman 1978). Furthermore, news itself is a social institution because of 
the public character it brings to certain occurrences (Tuchman 1978). This social 
institution is a product of newsworkers who belong to a social institution which itself 
operates within a web of relations with other institutions, all working together to shape 
the news (Tuchman 1978). In this regard it is important to consider the kind of country 
that Zimbabwe has been from independence through the structural changes of the 
1990s, and the “decade of crisis” to the fall of Mugabe.  
 
The hierarchical arrangement of news organisations makes news become a product 
of power and other contestations (political, economic, racial, gendered, ideological and 
so on) over what is interpreted as reality (Gans 1979). However, Gans (1979) was 
quick to assert that power cannot be located in news organisations alone but should 
be considered to be exercised by other actors including news sources and audiences. 
He asserts that the interaction between sources, journalists and audiences can be 
considered as a system of coexistence. The news organisation, like a market of sorts, 
is composed of sellers and buyers (Gans 1979). In what he calls a quasi- commercial 
transaction, story suggesters or reporters are sellers who bring to the table their story 
ideas, to buyers who are the story selectors or editors (Gans 1979). Every story 
selector or anyone involved in news production applies one overriding organisational 
consideration of paying attention to suggestions from superiors (Gans 1979). Referring 
to network television in the United States of America (USA) Epstein (1973) asserts 
that it is the rule rather than the exception that producers or assistant producers 
intervene on decisions concerning what makes it into the news for the day.  
 
Some journalists interviewed by Gans (1979) even viewed their organisations as 
assembly lines. This is because the operation of deadlines breeds routinised 
processes of story selection and production that have more or less remained 
unchanged over the years. News organisations generally discourage any bureaucratic 
practices that deviate from the norm so that they may maintain a sustainable use of 
available scarce resources (Tuchman 1978). News personnel must therefore 
anticipate the demand upon organisational resources of any potential occurrences 
(Tuchman 1978). Thus, certain consistent routines of selection, coverage and 
reformulating occurrences over the long term are largely in tandem with organisational 
needs (Epstein 1973).  Correspondents are therefore always under pressure to 
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construct narratives that best fit the needs of their organisation even when they 
contradict their own “news values” (Epstein 1973). To outsiders, news executives 
largely boast that the news division is autonomous from the rest of the network, but in 
reality, it operates within the economic confines of the rest of the network (Epstein 
1973).   
 
Whilst journalists’ professional imperatives were normatively acknowledged, they 
were noted to still fall in line with organisational imperatives (Altheide 1976; Gans 
1979). Altheide (1976) argues that journalists are always aware of journalistic values 
and ethics but the fact remains that there are other considerations that may override 
these values and ethics. Such overriding factors include personal and organisational 
economic reasons as well as political, particularly in countries with questionable 
democratic cultures such as Zimbabwe. Gans (1979) has argued that journalists 
exercise news judgement and that a journalist-centred view of story selection suggests 
that professional judgement shapes the news. Professional practice serves 
organisational needs, but it is not clear how journalists interpret what is or is not an 
organisational need. Tuchman (1978), for instance, found some reporters and editors 
who resisted running stories at the behest of friends of news executives and other 
influential managers. Interestingly, Tuchman (1978) argues that it is due to the fact 
that news making is a profession and news a product of professionalism that 
journalists consider to be the source of the right that they arrogate to themselves to 
interpret daily occurrences to on behalf of, and for the benefit of, citizens, firms, and 
even other professionals. In part, professional autonomy is exercised by reporters who 
choose to do “what they want” with their sources, including sharing them with reporters 
from competing media organisations (Tuchman 1978). Reporters are not merely 
bureaucratic employees whose work is dictated by the needs of their organisation 
(Tuchman 1978). Professional autonomy itself is exercised within largely flexible 
organisational constraints because of the different varieties of events journalists have 
to consider every day. However, news workers still have to anticipate how happenings 
may fall within or without their organisation’s resource availability since the variability 
of available news, organisational flexibility, and professionalism are interrelated 
(Tuchman 1978). In the end, the sense of autonomy valued and enjoyed by individual 




Journalists, according to Gans (1979) have to be able to make reality judgements. 
This means that they constantly have to be able to detect events that stand out among 
many that occur daily. An example of a “reality judgement” in the Zimbabwean 
economic context would be impromptu currency reforms or a new statutory instrument 
to deal with ‘economic saboteurs’. Fishman (1980) observes that it is important that 
researchers investigate how reporters come to recognise that something is an event 
in the first place, rather than ignore this process. When Epstein began his research at 
NBC News journalists told him that the decisions they make on story choices are 
hardly driven by formal or objective criteria, otherwise they would not be able to 
complete their work (Gans 1979). Instead, journalists “act on the basis of quick, 
virtually intuitive judgements, which some ascribe to feel” (Gans 1979: 82). In fact, it 
appeared that journalists in the field detect events that they think constitute news in at 
least five specific ways (Fishman 1980). Firstly, events are assumed to be self-evident 
to reporters and there is no practical or specific way of detecting events. Secondly, 
events are assumed to exist independently of their knowers. Thirdly, journalists’ ways 
of detecting events do not influence events. Fourthly, events are assumed to happen 
before journalists detect them, that is, journalists do not know what has happened 
before it has actually happened, nor do they know it as it is simultaneously happening. 
Fifthly and finally, all the above assumptions hold only in so far as the journalist is 
professionally and socially competent and is not corrupt or defective in any way 
(Fishman 1980).  
 
Story selection can be said to start with journalists/reporters who relate with sources 
and ends with editors whose mandate is to create news for the audience (Epstein 
1973; Gans 1979). A binary reality thus exists within the profession where reporters’ 
story judgement is done from the perspective of sources while that of editors and 
producers is done from the perspective of audiences (Gans 1979). For reporters, 
knowing sources brings professional status because it is having a relationship with 
enough sources that they can be able to file a story everyday (Tuchman 1978). Indeed, 
professional status is enhanced by having sources considered to be of higher status 
(Tuchman 1978). Furthermore, journalists routinely make decisions about whether 
given events are worth to be selected as stories. Gans (1979) prefers to refer to 
journalistic “considerations” rather than “decisions” since the latter may imply that the 
process is formal when in reality it is not. From this point of view, considerations in 
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story selection tend to be informal because they often have to be made quickly without 
much deliberation considering the endless variety of available news (Gans 1979).  
 
Financial and Economic News Through the Decades 
In this section I give a timeline of literature on business news. While this review is not 
exhaustive, it gives a peek into the issues that have been found by other researchers 
over the years. I conveniently start in the 1930s because of the literature that I could 
access – a period that also coincides with the Great Depression.  Carswell (1938) 
argued that business and financial news prior to the crash was not capable of capturing 
much advertising revenues. The public did not find business and financial news 
sections interesting hence advertisers also found them little attractive. Their narrow 
reader appeal was limited to those interested in banks and securities. Carswell (1938: 
615) argued that business and financial news editors were out of touch with needs of 
the general public and “emphasis is on Wall Street and upon news which directly 
concerns bankers, brokers, investors and speculators. To explain the narrow editorial 
interest, Carswell (1938) suggested that business and financial news was a relatively 
new branch that emerged as the economy prospered in the 1920s. Prior to the boom 
of the 1920s business news was dominated by commodity and security reports which 
appeared at the back of the newspaper. The problem with the kind of business and 
financial news available was that it did not take time to properly explain to the public 
complex industrial and banking economics. He argued that “if science which is very 
technical is given serious and respectful attention by the press, and is covered by 
trained writers who give it factually correct, yet popular, treatment, business and 
industrial technology and research could, and should, be given similarly popular 
treatment” (Carswell 1938: 619). There was also concern with lack of investigative 
journalism in business and financial news reporting (Loeb 1966). The lack of 
investigation was leading to a prevalence of errors in business and financial news. The 
argument given by one editor was that there was lack of enough qualified people to 
take the time and meet deadlines, leading to an over reliance on press releases (Loeb 
1966). However, he argued that if financial reporters were to make efforts to go beyond 
the surface, then even press releases would find it difficult to give unrealistic rosy 
pictures of businesses. Unlike the early thirties where Dow Jones and the New York 
City News Bureau used to compete to break important news first, now “a major 
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brokerage house frequently flashes spot news on its own private wire ahead of the 
public news services” (Loeb 1966: 38).  
 
The coverage of business and financial news on a surface level was also lamented by 
Welles (1973). He noted that despite the influence that major corporations have on 
society, there was no effort from business and financial reporters to venture out and 
interrogate how and why that power is exercised. The business press further did not 
do much to investigate corporate malfeasance. Even when it comes to economic 
stories “the media seldom investigate beyond immediate superficialities” (Welles 
1973: 41). Rather than pursuing public interest, it appears business media considered 
its foremost duty as to “protect, defend and enhance the industry they cover” (Welles 
1973: 42). This lack of interest in the general public had resulted in consumers being 
more knowledgeable about issues such as sports and its personalities rather than 
business and its personalities. Another issue raised by Welles (1973) was the blurring 
of the lines between editorial and advertising. He lamented that editors were frequently 
involved in selling adverts while advertising salespeople were getting involved in copy 
editing. With time, advertising had become such a big issue to the extent that 
publications were refusing to run stories on organisations that did not advertise while 
in some instances corporations were charged for editorial space. Advertiser influence 
was particularly intense for publications whose advertising base was narrow. Welles 
(1973) also noted that many journalists did not want to rile large corporations because 
they considered public relations as a fall-back career option and did not want to 
jeopardise their chances. Furthermore, business desks were staffed with mediocre 
journalists rejected by more prominent desks. 
 
Stein (1975) was concerned by the flawed reporting on the macro economy by the 
media. He argued that the media did report on economic matters but there was a 
notable lack of understanding exhibited in the reports. Journalists were more likely to 
write about some impending catastrophe in the economy without providing any 
adequate information as the basis for their predictions. They put more emphasis on 
short term aspects of the economy, which they dramatised to give an exaggerated 
picture. Stein argued that “the data the media cite concerning the unemployment rate, 
inflation rate, the Gross National Product (GNP), and so on, are generally accurate. 
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But their selection of these data and the comment upon them combine to create a one-
sided picture” (Stein 1975: 38).  
 
Jensen (1987) has studied the process of commodification of news. He argued that 
the operation of the market had taken over television network news such that what 
was available for the public as well as its structure was now dependent upon economic 
factors. Jensen argued that the media therefore could no longer be viewed as neutral 
in their coverage of both the state and private enterprise. He asserted that “rather than 
being a neutral realm from which we may observe and judge the activities of the state 
and of private enterprises, the mass media are structured as an integral part of the 
corporate economy, and as such they are likely to reproduce the prevailing social 
order” (Jensen 1987: 11). Goozner (2000), like Jensen, expressed concern with the 
way business and financial journalism was being blinded by the prosperity prevailing 
in the economy. He noted that “coverage of the current prosperity can read like a 
sports page when the home team is on a roll: cheerleading can drown out the 
occasional story pointing out weaknesses in the squad or the challenges coming up in 
the schedule” (Goozner 2000: 23). He argued that there were some reports that 
highlighted some weaknesses in the economy, but these were too few and did not 
engage in sustained coverage. Many economic journalists had taken on the role of 
cheerleading the liberalisation of international trade. Those who opposed such 
liberalisation were reported as rogues. Goozner quoted a New York Times journalist 
who described protesters at the World Bank and IMF meetings in Prague in September 
2000 as “rogues’ gallery of Communists, anarchists, protectionist unions and over-fed 
yuppies out for their 1960s fix” (Goozner 2000: 24).  
 
The Sociology of News Production 
Three approaches to the study of news production were identified by Schudson (1989, 
2000). These are political economy, social organisation of newswork and culturological 
approaches. This section reviews literature according to these approaches with 
special attention being given to the production of financial and economic news. 
 
Political Economy Approach 
This approach gained popularity in British media studies (Schudson 1989). The 
approach holds that the production of news is determined by the economic structure 
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of news organisations (Schudson 1989). It is an approach that Schudson (1989) 
regarded as simple-minded in its belief that there is a capitalist class that controls the 
news production process. However, Schudson (2000) argues that the relationship 
between media ownership and market structure on the one hand and what is produced 
as news on the other hand is not always as straightforward as some scholars have 
made it to be. Some of these scholars (see Herman and Chomsky 1988, McChesney 
2000) have argued that corporate ownership of the media compromises the 
democratic function of the media.  
 
Davis (2002) argues that states and corporates try to manage the media through 
ownership and management of news organisations. In Zimbabwe, it has been 
observed that state- controlled media tend to report the long ruling ZANU PF party 
positively while denigrating the opposition (Ranger 2005; Waldahl 2005; Chuma 2005, 
2008; Mano 2005). This state of affairs has evolved from the time the country got its 
independence in 1980 to present (Rusike 1990). When the ZANU PF government took 
control of the present day Zimpapers, a publicly owned media organisation in the early 
1980s, it became an ideological weapon for the ruling party hegemony (Moyse 2009). 
There was a drive to delegitimise any political activity outside ZANU PF (Onslow 
2011). As noted by Davis (2002: 56) “ownership power is wielded in the allocation of 
resources, the appointment of senior editorial and management staff, and the directing 
of editorial agendas.”  
 
In publicly owned but state-controlled media in Zimbabwe, Rusike (1990) noted that in 
the first decade of independence, personnel, particularly editorial, was appointed from 
within ZANU PF ranks and any editor that tried to exhibit independent decisions were 
dismissed. This has continued to this day with some editors coming out in open 
support of the ruling ZANU PF party. In a study by Mabweazara (2011) one political 
editor from a state- controlled newspaper revealed that he was a strong supporter of 
the ruling ZANU PF party to the extent he at some point declined a lucrative offer from 
a privately-owned newspaper because of his strong belief in the ruling party. The 
private press on the other hand has been known to support the opposition while 
exposing the ills of the ruling party. Chibuwe and Nwafor (2012) argue that the private 
press support for the opposition MDC party may be due to its liberal policies and ZANU 
PF is viewed as a threat to business due to its indigenisation policies. It should be 
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noted though that since Robert Mugabe was removed as the party and country’s 
president in November 2017, there has been a pro-business rhetoric from the new 
regime. 
 
Non-media elites also have some influence on how journalists go about their business 
through shareholdings, board appointments and advertising (Davis 2007). In the first 
decade of Zimbabwe’s independence private ownership of the media was dominated 
by whites (Chuma 2004). Their fear of retribution from the ruling party resulted in the 
privately-owned press largely steering clear of ruling party attacks (Chuma 2004). 
However, some of them such as Motto and the Financial Gazette were critical of the 
government and its policies (Rusike 1990).   At the Financial Gazette there was change 
of the editorial team when a consortium led by Gideon Gono took over (Mukasa 2003). 
 
Schudson (2000: 180-181) contends that “the ability of a capitalist class to manipulate 
opinion and create a closed system of discourse is limited…” There are bottom-up 
forces that are always rising to challenge control from those who seek to dominate the 
media (Davis 2007). A caveat should be placed though on countries such as 
Zimbabwe that still have systems in place that give the government and ruling party a 
lot of latitude to exercise control. Thus Davis (2007) argues that it is in post-industrial 
democracies that state control of the media has dwindled. The same can be said of 
media moguls who are fast giving way to manager-led conglomerates (Davis 2007). It 
is reported that one of the last well- known media moguls, Rupert Murdoch, is in a 
process of disposing his Fox media assets to Walt Disney. 
 
Furthermore, journalism has become more subversive and critical of those that seek 
to exert control, in the process becoming more responsive to wider audiences (Davis 
2007). In Zimbabwe, journalists are aware of the limitations placed upon them by 
proprietors and those who control the newsroom, and this awareness leads to them 
exchanging stories with peers from other newsrooms where a particular story may be 
acceptable (Mano 2005). There has also been an increase in the practice of 
moonlighting (Mano 2005; Mabweazara 2010, 2011). Repressive media laws such as 
the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) created an 
environment that was hostile to journalism that critiqued government and many foreign 
journalists and media houses were banned from the country in the period between 
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2002 and 2009 (Mabweazara 2010). This led to some journalists in the country 
becoming ‘underground’ correspondents for the banned med ia houses in a bid to 
primarily augment their meagre salaries (Mabweazara 2010, 2011), but also to take 
their stories to a wider audience. 
In relation to business news, Usher (2017) notes that the political economy approach 
has been used to explain how business journalism serves the interests of investors 
and big businesses. Interests of big businesses and investors have been argued to 
override the interests of the public (Usher 2017). Early business news fell short in 
helping the broader public to have a grasp of the economic issues of the time and this 
appears to still be case (Starkman 2014). Thus, financial and economic journalism 
takes a top-down approach where it largely relies on powerful business interests to 
provide the necessary information for the story (Starkman 2014). Financial and 
economic journalism “is communication between and among elites without reference 
to broader public interests” (Starkman 2014: 52). 
 
The news media operate within particular relations of power and control (Allan 2004). 
The scrutiny of business and finance issues is limited by the closeness of journalists 
to business institutions which leads to them acting in the interests of such institutions 
(Picard; Selva and Bironzo 2014). It is not only business, but political interests also 
tend to influence news media’s framing and interpretations, in the process 
marginalising counter-hegemonic voices (Doudaki 2015). Hence Lewis (2010) argues 
that the field of economic reporting tends to reflect a specific worldview. This, however, 
has to be done in a subtle way because as Davis (2007) argues, a commercial news 
product that is not viewed by consumers as legitimate, soon loses sales and 
consequently advertising. 
 
Other scholars (Pickard et al 2014) have argued that business journalists are too 
involved in the capitalist enterprise such that they cannot always point out when things 
go wrong in the capitalist system. Doyle (2006) argues that often informational needs 
of investors dominate journalists’ interpretation of events. Corporations are in constant 
competition with one another to attract a target audience hugely made up of investors 
and the media play a big role in disseminating favourable information to this target 
audience (Doyle 2006). In a study on the relationship between news reports and 
volume of trades, Englebert and Parsons (2009) observed that local media coverage 
39 
 
of earnings announcement of firms on the S&P 500 index leads to an increase in trade 
volumes of the stock. Some journalists view their work as that of providing vital 
information for investors and helping them make successful investment decisions 
(Tambini 2008). In the Greece bailout discourse, Doudaki (2015) observed that 
mainstream media were accused of serving the interests of political and economic 
elites while largely ignoring alternative voices. However, Schudson (2000) notes that 
it would be too simplistic to take Herman and Chomsky’s (1988: xi) argument that 
media “serve to mobilise support for the special interests that dominate the state and 
private activity.” Rather it is noteworthy that the media is a ‘highly contested territory’ 
(Dreier 1982). Tambini (2008) countered that there are some business journalists who 
view their role as that of holding to account business and public authorities. In this 
study it was important to establish the extent to which journalists in Zimbabwe catered 
for particular interests in their financial and economic news reporting. It was also 
crucial to establish whether and to what extent they resist the influence of these 
interests and the ways in which they do it without jeopardising their employment. 
 
The Sociological Approach 
This approach is concerned with how occupational and organisational routines 
influence the way that journalists make decisions about what constitutes news 
(Schudson 1989). Schudson (1989: 271) cites Molotch and Lester who in their study 
argued that newspapers reflect “the practices of those who have the power to 
determine the experiences of others.” Journalists’ day to day activities are filled with 
interaction with official sources from whom they get their stories (Schudson 1989). 
Schultz, Suddaby and Cornelissen (2014: 20) point out that: 
 
The production of news content typically involves two 
levels: (1) journalists who, on an individual basis consult 
sources, decide what to write about, and finally write these 
news stories; and (2) other parties within the news 
organisation (eg sub-editors) who, based upon their news 
routines, edit stories before they make it into print. 
 
The most important tool for journalists therefore is sources (Schudson 1989). Sourcing 
involves who gets to speak on what (Van Hout, Maat and De Preter 2011). In addition, 
Van Hout et al (2011) argue that sourcing is particularly important for business 
journalists because most of what is regarded as newsworthy stems from the constant 
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flow of corporate news releases. These sources may include business executives, 
economists, politicians and analysts. It has been argued (see Usher 2015) that there 
is a coalition of economists, politicians and media that innocently defraud audiences 
through their interpretation of financial and economic developments.  
 
Such interpretation is meant to hide from the public the influence that big businesses 
have over their lives. It has also been observed that while warnings were there prior 
to the 2008 financial crisis, these largely came from sources that were not from the 
circle favoured by mainstream media outlets (Lewis 2010). Sources from banks 
managed to manipulate the press to pay less attention to the impending financial crisis 
(De Landtsheer and Van Voorde 2015).  The problem is that often the interested 
parties that may include corporate executives and analysts are the only viable sources 
of the data that journalists need to write their stories (Tambini 2010). A herd mentality 
of financial journalists was noted as being partly responsible for the failure by 
journalists to warn the public about the impending collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
2009 (Marron, Sarabia-Panol, Sison, Rao and Niekamp 2010). Usher (2015: 365) 
notes that Jon Stewart on Comedy Central criticised the “irrational cheerleading that 
the financial channel CNBC engaged in” in the period before the 2008 financial crisis. 
There was also criticism of the CEO glorification that many journalists engaged in 
during this period (Usher 2015). 
 
It appears that such cheerleading and CEO glorification may be because “businesses 
pay for all advertising, dominate as sources, have a monopoly in the supply of 
information subsidies and are the main consumers of business and financial news” 
(Davis 2002: 60). Thus, Peterson and Anand (2004: 311) argue that “the symbolic 
elements of culture are shaped by the systems within which they are created, 
distributed, evaluated, taught and preserved.” In their study, Peterson, Albaum, 
Kozmetsky and Cunningham (1984), observed that according to business journalists 
and broadcasters, business executives were the most influential of seven institutions 
that competed for societal influence in America. However, business executives in the 
same study argued that the media had the most influence. Such perceptions can easily 
lead to journalists seeking more of the business executives as sources, as Berry 
(2013) found out that City sources dominated BBC Radio 4’s Today programme in its 




The difficulties financial journalists experience to obtain access to business executives 
often leads to these business executives being given more value when they do avail 
themselves (Peterson et al 1984). According to Fahy, O’Brien and Poti (2009), from 
the 1980s business executives assumed greater prominence in news reports and were 
increasingly covered in the same manner as politicians and celebrities. In recent years 
corporates have taken a more proactive role to try and influence business news and 
this is demonstrated by the increase in financial public relations (Davis 2002). Such 
efforts have led to needs of corporates eclipsing those of regulators and the general 
public in financial news production (Davis 2002). The influence of corporates is further 
aided by their being regarded as credible sources. As argued by Reich (2011), a key 
determining factor regarding individuals’ chances of becoming news sources is how 
much journalists perceive them to be credible. In a study on the coverage by the 
Financial Times of the 1997 Thai financial crisis, Durham (2007) observed that the 
newspaper relied on elite sources in its news coverage. In the study the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and its free market principles was given prominence in news 
coverage. The IMF can be regarded as a credible source on economic matters due to 
its standing in world economic matters. 
 
Corporate communication imperatives have contributed much to the nature of 
business news obtaining (Davis 2002). As noted by Davis (2007) many organisations 
spend a significant portion of their communication budgets on efforts to avoid 
mainstream news coverage. Corporates want to avoid mainstream coverage because 
often it is negative, focusing on such issues as scandals, financial losses and fraud 
(Davis 2007). Hence corporate releases are known for their self-promotional content 
in line with one of the key mandates of public relations – generating positive news 
coverage (Van Hout, Pander Maat and De Preter 2011; Verhoeven 2016). Financial 
journalism on its part is a genre that is known for its reliance on financial public 
relations (Van Hout et al 2011). It was observed by Lewis et al (2008) that about 70 
percent of print news articles in the UK were derived partially or wholly on press 
releases and press agency copy. 
 
Public relations professionals consider it very important to be in good books with 
journalists. According to Verhoeven (2016), 75 percent of European communication 
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professionals consider print newspapers and magazines as the fifth most important 
communication channel, while in North America they are seventh. Such valuing of 
each other has led to “a closed circle developing between financial public relations 
practitioners, City editors, analysts, institutions and top management” (Davis 2000: 
286). The relationship between public relations practitioners and business news 
journalists has been labelled symbiotic by some scholars (see Macnamara 2014). 
Indeed, some scholars (Grunberg and Pallas 2012) have asserted that the production 
of business news is a collaborative effort between corporations, financial analysts and 
journalists. They argue that “organisations involved in news production are staffed with 
well-educated and experienced public relations practitioners who are active in 
generating and disseminating their ideas about what news should be produced and 
how, and how it should be disseminated” (Grunberg and Pallas 2012: 219). In what 
they call the embeddedness of news production perspective, Grunberg and Pallas 
(2012) argue that there are organisational and technological interdependencies in 
news -producing organisations. They argue that “the embeddedness of news 
production is an institutionally embedded process where professional, organisational 
and technical interdependencies constitute the environment in which business news 
is initiated, produced and re-produced” (Grunberg and Pallas 2012: 219).  
 
In Grunberg and Pallas’ (2012) view, the company should be regarded as the starting 
point in the cycle of business news production considering that it is the one that feeds 
the marketplace with information intended to project its image. Financial analysts get 
into the mix as they provide relevant information to investors, in a bid to attract trade. 
Corporate public relations professionals get involved as their duty is to construct texts 
informed by externally generated texts from players such as “public relations 
consultants, business analysts and business journalists, as well as other organisations 
that have their own interest in the corporation” (Grunberg and Pallas 2012: 220). Public 
relations professionals ensure that the texts they produce fit formalised templates to 
which media organisations as well as financial organisations are connected. In 
addition, public relations professionals are in constant contact with business journalists 





This closed circle is termed “elite discourse network” by Davis (2000: 287). Referring 
to the 1995/1996 bid by Granada Group to take over Forte in the United Kingdom, 
Davis (2000) noted that news reports of the deal were dominated by City sources. The 
network is also evident when public companies are preparing to release their financial 
results. Grunberg and Pallas (2012) observed Swedish corporations and noted that 
while during the ‘silent’ or ‘closed’ period corporations do not release any information 
publicly, they provide selected or preferred journalists with hints regarding what to 
focus on when the report is released. This demonstrates that the news agenda 
regarding such corporations is pre-set through the informal liaisons between public 
relations professionals and journalists (Grunberg and Pallas 2012).   
 
It is not enough to just focus on the gathering of news, but also on the writing and re-
writing of news in the newsroom (Schudson 1989). Journalists are compelled to 
quickly adjust and adhere to the values and routines in the news organisation they 
work for (Schudson 1989). News production should be viewed as “the social 
manufacture of an organisational product” (Schudson 2000: 186). It is inevitable that 
there is construction of reality in the news production system (Tuchman 1978, 
Schudson 1989). To this end, ideological and institutional biases influence the choices 
made regarding the final news product and should be accounted for (Knowles, Phillips 
and Lidberg 2015). Writing on the early days of Fortune Magazine, Starkman (2014: 
84) cites one of the journalists who stated that the owner, Henry “Luce knew what he 
wanted that Fortune, without compromising its role as a critic of American business, 
should explicitly accept and support the private enterprise system.” Thus, the political 
or economic leaning of a news organisation can have an influence on how it reports 
economic and financial news (Van Dalen, de Vreese and Albaek 2017). “If the media 
are understood as a central site for the production of meaning, that is, if that is where 
existing relations of race, class, and gender are articulated and solidified – it is also 
where the relations of power among media managers and professionals can be, and 
are, challenged (Byerly and Warren 1996: 2).  
 
There is anecdotal evidence, as argued by Schultz et al (2014), that sometimes 
journalists fail to recognise their own stories after they have been printed. This is 
because news routines in the newsroom involve other people who engage in a process 
of writing and re-writing the story. These may include copy editors, editors of certain 
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news desks such as business editors, and they evaluate whether a story adheres to 
the style and format of the paper as well as judge whether the story is attractive for 
their readers (Schultz et al 2014). Altheid (1976) argued that such organisational 
routines promote a way of looking at events leading to their distortion.  
 
Organisational routines were particularly cited by ethnographic researchers of the 
1970s and early 1980s as shaping the nature of news that audiences receive. Fishman 
(1980) argued that news organisations give events a determinant form and content. 
We may look at news as “a product of newsworkers drawing upon institutional 
processes and conforming to institutional practices (Tuchman 1978: 4). To put it 
bluntly according to Tuchman (1978), professional practices serve organisational 
needs. Gans (1979) also argues that news organisations are not democratic. In his 
study Gans (1979: 85) recorded journalists describing the newsroom as militaristic, 
where the top editor and his assistants “have the power to decide what gets into print 
or on the air, at what length, and in what order, subject only to suggestions or vetoes 
from news and corporate management.” He concludes that news organisations are 
hierarchical, with the division of labour being one of power. 
 
In Zimbabwe it has been noted (see Mano 2005) that when journalists join a 
newsroom, they have to go through some ideological repositioning so that they may 
align with proprietors’ policies and politics. Journalists in Zimbabwean newsrooms 
have acknowledged that there are subtle pressures from their immediate managers 
who also get these pressures from those above them (Mano 2005; Mabweazara 
2011). Socialisation in the newsroom leads to journalists knowing what kind of news 
stories are acceptable considering that there is media polarisation in the country with 
state- controlled media reporting the ruling government officials favourably while 
privately owned newspapers point out the shortcomings of government officials while 
reporting the opposition in positive light (Mano 2005). 
 
In his study on newsmaking practices and professionalism in the Zimbabwean press, 
Mabweazara (2011) argued that there is need to rethink the usual Anglo-American 
epistemological imperatives of journalism, considering the unstable political and 
economic conditions prevailing in the country. In a country marked by media 
polarisation, the editorial content of the two main sectors of the press gives away 
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evidence of proprietary interference (Mabweazara 2011). Newsroom editors 
sometimes arbitrarily re-write stories without the knowledge of the concerned reporters 
who only get surprised when they see an unfamiliar story with their by-line after 
publication (Mano 2005). Furthermore, there are times when headlines appear in the 
newspaper which would not have been discussed at all in the newsroom (Mabweazara 
2011). During elections journalists can be called after working hours to go cover 
particular candidates or events which may not have been discussed earlier 
(Mabweazara 2011). Contrary to the norm that journalists are watchdogs of society as 
a whole, in Mabweazara’s study journalists from the privately- owned media pointed 
out that they were being restricted to being watchdogs only of government. The 
pressure to do so does not only come from their editors, but from the larger society 
from where they would receive calls telling them that they were now sounding like The 
Herald, a state- controlled newspaper. 
 
In a study on press freedom, professionalism and proprietorship in Zimbabwean 
newsrooms, Mano (2005: 56) notes that the Zimbabwean press has increasingly 
become “an antidemocratic force owing to the political, economic and professional 
problems that are continuously bedevilling the profession.” Sometimes journalists find 
themselves working in newsrooms whose editorial policies are in conflict with their 
sense of professionalism due to the need to earn ‘decent salaries’ and ‘attractive 
benefits’ (Mano 2005: 63). Proprietors were found to exercise undue interference in 
the newsroom and they largely appointed likeminded editors. Some examples were 
given by journalists interviewed in the study: When Strive Masiyiwa, founder and 
majority shareholder in Zimbabwe’s largest mobile telephone company, bought 60 
percent of Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (ANZ), publishers of the Daily News, 
he appointed his own man, Samuel Sipepa Nkomo as Chief Executive Officer, and 
fired the founding editor, Geoffrey Nyarota, to replace him with his own choice, Francis 
Mdhlongwa. A similar scenario unfolded when Trevor Ncube became the majority 
shareholder in the The Standard and the Zimbabwe Independent. Previously the 
papers had a critical editorial stance that was largely interpreted along racial lines but 
afterwards there was a feeling it had taken a tribal line “considering Ncube is originally 
from the ‘aggrieved’ Ndebele tribe” (Mano 2005: 66). When former Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe (RBZ) governor, Gideon Gono, took over the Financial Gazette, he 
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appointed his former spokesperson, Sunsleey Chamunorwa, the editor in chief and 
the editorial stance became pro-RBZ. 
 
This is not to say journalists do nothing about the newsroom control though. Mano 
(2005: 56) observed that “Zimbabwean journalists have ‘resisted’, ‘rebelled’ and are 
developing sophisticated ways of negotiating the pressures exerted on them by private 
and public media proprietors.” Those who rebelled however do not do it brazenly but 
develop sophisticated ways of manipulating while playing along to the dictates of the 
proprietors. Where subtle rebellion ceases to work, journalists sometimes leave for 
other media houses even for a lesser salary. Shepherd Mutamba was criticised by the 
then minister of information, Jonathan Moyo, for resigning as editor of the state 
controlled, Manica Post, to become news editor of the Daily News, a junior post (Mano 
2005). Such an acknowledgement of the agency of journalists is in line with Cottle’s 
(2007: 10) argument that journalists are “more consciously, knowingly and 
purposefully productive of news texts and output than they have been theoretically 
given credit for in the past.” 
 
Culturological Approach 
Whereas the social organisation of newswork approach refers to relations among 
individuals as determinants of news, the culturological approach refers to symbolic 
determinants of news as a result of relations between ideas and symbols (Schudson 
1989). It “emphasises the constraining force of broad cultural symbolic systems 
regardless of the details of organisational and occupational routines (Schudson 1989: 
275). Benson (2004) has argued that there has not yet been much convincing 
evidence that culture should be regarded as an independent causal factor in the 
production of news. He argued that it should be included in the social organisation of 
newswork. The argument seems plausible when it is considered that “news is a social 
institution and a cultural discourse which exists and has meaning only in relation to 
other institutions and discourses operating at the same time” (Hartley 1982: 8-9). The 
people who make the news keep in mind and consider how their product fits in with 
other institutions even when these institutions are different and even hostile (Hartley 
1982). These institutional relationships can indeed be explained under the social 




However, it appears that Schudson’s (1989) argument that it should be regarded 
separately is convincing. He argued that “while these cultural givens may be 
uncovered by detailed historical analysis, they cannot be linked to features of social 
organisation” (Schudson 1989: 275). This is because the cultural givens are often 
“unstated and unstatable criteria of the significant” Hall (1973). Thus the production of 
news rests on inferred knowledge about the audience (Hall 1973). It is this 
foregrounding of the audience that is often missing in a social organisation of 
newswork analysis. Carey (2009: 16) argues that “reading a newspaper [is] less… 
sending or gaining information and more…attending a mass, a situation in which 
nothing new is learned but in which a particular view of the world is portrayed and 
confirmed.” For this to happen, it can only mean that when the news is produced, there 
is an intuitive consideration of the unstated and unstatable but intuitionally 
recognisable significant by the audience (Hall 1973). Stuart Hall argues that: 
 
These configurations of meaning are forms of social 
knowledge, derived from the social practices, the 
knowledge of institutions, the beliefs and the legitimations 
which exist in a diffused form within a society, and which 
order that society’s apprehension of the world in terms of 
dominant meaning-patterns (Hall 1973: 176).  
 
The news can be said to contain expressive codes which are recognised and shared 
by the audiences. Expressive codes “depend on our competence to resolve a set of 
gestural, non-linguistic features (signifiers) into a specific expressive configuration 
(signified) – an accomplishment which is cultural, not technical” (Hall 1973: 177). To 
this end news producers must always infer to what is already known or the common-
sensical constructions and interpretations about the world (Hall 1973). 
 
Schudson (1989: 275) argued that the cultural givens that should be analysed in the 
production of news “are a part of culture – a given symbolic system, within which and 
in relation to which reporters and officials go about their duties.” This kind of analysis 
recognises that the production of news is not just about imparting information “but the 
representation of shared beliefs” (Carey 2009: 15). There is a drawing together of both 
the producers of news and audiences in fellowship and commonality (Carey 2009). 
Carey (2009: 17) amplifies this point, stating that, “newspapers do not operate as a 
source of effects or functions but as dramatically satisfying, which is not to say 
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pleasing, presentations of what the world at root is.” Raymond Williams argued that 
the analysis of the press and other media cannot be done without reference to a way 
of life (Turner 1992). In The Long Revolution, (cited in Turner 1992: 56), Williams 
argued that:  
 
Culture is a description of a particular way of life, which 
expresses certain meanings and values…in institutions 
and ordinary behaviour. The analysis of culture, from such 
a definition, is the clarification of the meanings and values 
implicit and explicit in a particular way of life, a particular 
culture (Turner 1992: 56).   
 
An analysis of financial and economic news production practices in Zimbabwe 
therefore has to be done in the context of the meanings and values inherent in the 
country’s particular way of life, that is, its culture. Zimbabwean journalism has been 
shaped by historical processes in which it developed as well as “the contemporary 
political and economic conditions in which it is entrenched” (Mabweazara 2011: 102). 
In a study on the power of patriarchy and gender discrimination in Zimbabwean 
newsrooms, Radu and Chekera (2014) noted that gender discrimination has become 
part of the daily lives of media workers. Some respondents in the study highlighted 
that newsrooms in the country were highly patriarchal. Female journalists are often 
given ‘soft’ beats such as the Arts, while their male counterparts get the ‘hard’ beats 
such as Politics. There was also a sentiment that often female journalists have to give 
sexual favours to male bosses for them to secure their jobs as well as get promotion. 
This state of affairs can be linked to the society in general where traditionally women 
were relegated to lighter tasks and being regarded as weaker as well as being there 
for the pleasure of men.  
 
Schmidt (1991: 734) argues that when colonialism came to Zimbabwe, “indigenous 
and European structures of patriarchal control reinforced and transformed one 
another, evolving into new structures and forms of domination.” African women were 
regarded as too weak to engage in any important social, economic and political 
activities. Schmidt (1991: 736) noted that one Jesuit missionary at Chishawasha 
Mission argued against African women taking up jobs as teachers of catechists partly 
because “they would not be listened to with any respect even by the natives 
themselves.” In addition, women were regarded by both missionaries and colonial 
49 
 
officials as immoral and being responsible for tempting men into adulterous liaisons 
(Schmidt 1991). It is not too far- fetched to argue that such sentiments are still part of 
a way of life of Zimbabweans and tend to manifest in newsroom practices as observed 
by Radu and Chekera (2014): By analysing the production of news from such everyday 
issues, we attend to Reese’s (2011) assertion that the meaning of professionalism 
needs to be understood in relation to its specific cultural context.   
 
However, Schudson (2000) observes that there is sometimes a tendency to regard 
journalists who operate in a given territory as having a similar news standard. 
Zimbabwe is an example of a country where different standards apply to journalists 
who work for the state-controlled media and those who work for privately owned media 
(see Mano 2005; Waldahl 2005; Chuma 2008; Chibuwe 2013). In a study by 
Mabweazara (2011), a journalist from the Zimbabwe Independent, a privately- owned 
newspaper, stated that when they write negatively about the opposition they receive 
phone calls accusing them of reporting like The Herald, a state- controlled newspaper. 
It may therefore be interesting in this study to establish how different, if they are, 
cultural givens in the Zimbabwean society play out in state-controlled and privately- 
owned business press. 
 
The Zimbabwe Economy: The First Decade of Independence 
For a better understanding of the financial and economic news production practices it 
is necessary to understand the economic developments Zimbabwe has undergone 
from its birth in 1980 to 2017. It can be argued that certain economic and political 
discourses shaped the news production practices that this study aims to establish. As 
Foucault (1980) notes, practice is “the point of linkage of what one says and what one 
does.” Foucault also argues that discourse permits what can and cannot be said or 
done. It is therefore crucial to have an appreciation of the economic and political 
discourses that have obtained and helped shape what financial and economic news 
journalists say and do since 1980. Resistance to white minority rule in the then 
Rhodesia was framed as a socialist versus capitalist struggle. ZANU-PF had always 
modelled itself as socialist, having received much of its military aid, support and 
training from China. It used the trappings of communism in its organisational hierarchy, 
such as members referring to each other as Comrades (a practice which persists to 
this day), a leadership hierarchy consisting of the Central Committee and the Politburo 
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(something which persists to this day), an economic structure that is centralised and 
centrally planned (command economy), price controls, welfarism and subsidies (some 
continue to this day), rhetoric of nationalisation, and emphasis on revolution, the 
masses and the “people” (see Fig 1 below) (some of this rhetoric still persists). In 
relation to the socialist revolution of the masses, the year 1978 was dubbed “The Year 
of the People” (see Fig 1). Mugabe was quoted as saying that “basic power to our 
revolutionary struggle must be vigorously and systematically cultivated. The basic 
power of any revolutionary armed struggle is the People. A struggle which enjoys the 
support of the struggling masses can never fail no matter how protracted it may be” 
(ZANU PF, 1978: 1). The identification with the masses was partly borrowed from Mao 
Zedong’s dictum that the people were the water within which the guerrillas swam. The 
framing of the struggle in Zimbabwe in such stark terms led to some in the international 
community fearing the country would adopt socialism in managing the economy when 





Fig 1: As part of its socialist rhetoric, ZANU PF before independence framed itself as a 
party based within “the masses” and the “people”. 
 
Upon gaining power, the government, whilst speaking about the masses, also further 
differentiated them as “workers” and “peasants”, who it identified as its base. Thus, 
three issues of ZANU PF’s official mouthpiece in 1986, 1987 and 1988 (see Fig 2) 
were dedicated to workers. The 1986 issue was titled “Workers: The Pillar of the 
Nation”. The 1987 issue carried images of Karl Marx and Lenin, with the words 
“Workers of the World Unite: He Who Does Not Work Neither Shall He Eat”. The 1988 
issue stated “Workers: The Backbone of a socialist revolution”, and also “Workers of 
the World Unite”. The first issue of the 1986 Zimbabwe News carried Mugabe’s picture 




   
Fig 2. ZANU-PF in its official pronouncements drew on socialist rhetoric 
 
In 1985, the ZANU PF government embarked on its first 5-year Plan (1986-1990) for 
“socialist” development known as the National Development Plan (NDP). Mugabe 
described the NDP thus: 
 
(T)he Plan is designed to change the ownership and 
production relations of the structures of the existing 
economy as a strategy for creating a national and socialist 
economy. This means, of necessity, that the proportion of 
the means of production owned by Zimbabweans and the 
State will be progressively increased at the same time as 
we shall endeavour to establish a self- sustaining 
production system with respect to provision of capital 
goods and industrial raw materials (ZANU, 1986: 1). 
 
The rhetoric was clearly from the socialist playbook, designed to identify Zimbabwe’s 
economy as avowedly socialist, and the country as an avowedly socialist nation. 
Mugabe, it has been said, had always been “a disciple of the command economy” 
since 1980 (cf. Chimakure, 2007).9 By 1991, however, the headlines were changing 
and had become more mixed. For instance, the cover of the Zimbabwe issue of 1991 
asked “11 Years On: Whither Zimbabwe?” (see Fig 4) signalling that a change of 
direction was in the cards. By 1994, the publication was openly talking about ESAP 
and what it called “A New Economic Chapter” (see Fig 5). The NDP was quietly 
dropped, and there was no second 5-year plan as there had been in China and Russia. 
                                                           





Fig 3: Volume 17, No. 2, 1986 issue of ZANU PF’s official organ, Zimbabwe News, 
clearly shows that the ruling party saw itself as socialist. 
 
Scholars have argued that instead of adopting a socialist economic policy, Zimbabwe 
in fact had always had a dual economy in the 1980s (Mazrui 1981). “Zimbabwe is 
caught up in a dual economy, in racial bipolarity, in ethnic dualism, in a dual culture 
under a dual political process” (Mazrui 1981: 5) (Emphasis added). This early analysis 
of the duality of many facets of the Zimbabwean socio-politico-economic character is 
particularly true when it comes to the economy as the ruling ZANU party stated 
(perhaps true to the Hegelian-Marxist “dialectical” approach) that it had to maintain the 
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obtaining capitalist economy while pursuing its socialist agenda. Mengisteab (1992) 
argues that despite the socialist rhetoric from the ruling elite, Zimbabwe had pursued 
a mixed economic system because most of the production was being done by private 
capital. This approach by the ruling ZANU party during the first decade can partly be 
explained by what Raftopoulos (2006: 205) calls a “shallow internalisation of Marxism-
Leninism.” The stated adoption of a socialist programme was more of a calculated 




Fig 4: By 1991, even ZANU PF itself was asking: Wither Zimbabwe? 
 
That the country did not engage in a radical socialist programme at independence can 
also be explained by the fact that the new regime found an economy that had largely 
been driven by private capital with foreign firms dominating the economy (Anglin 
1980). Faced with this scenario, Robert Mugabe and his ZANU party felt that the 
transition to socialism had to be gradual (Drakakis-Smith 1987). There was a 
recognition within the ruling party that the transition to socialism would be long and 
difficult since the country was dependent upon a capitalist productive sector including 
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white commercial farmers (Anglin 1980; Meisenhelder 1994). Hence even in its 
manifesto for the 1980 elections ZANU declared that “in working towards the socialist 
transformation of Zimbabwean society, a ZANU government will nevertheless 
recognise historical, social and other existing practical realities of the capitalist system 
which cannot be transformed overnight. It is recognised that private enterprise will 
have to continue until circumstances are ripe for socialist change” (cited in Anglin 
1980: 689). As if to vindicate the gradual approach adopted by the ZANU government, 
the economy grew at over 10 percent in the two years after independence 
(Meisenhelder 1994).  
 
 
Fig 5: “A New Economic Chapter for Zimbabwe” 
 
Brett (2005) argues that Zimbabwe adopted a corporatist programme between 1980 
and 1990. Corporatists argue for government intervention in the market to ensure that 
there is no unequal development in the country (Brett 2005). In fact, even the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) noted in 1998 that Zimbabwe was “a corporatist 
state that permitted fairly democratic participation” (Brett 2005: 92-93). Zimbabwe’s 
situation was complicated in that in the years prior to independence the economy was 
dominated by foreign companies with direct state intervention largely restricted to loss-
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making but critical sectors such as iron and steel as well as bailing out companies in 
financial distress (Zinyama 1989).  
 
There has also been the view that the little commitment to socialist ideals by many in 
the ruling party is because some party officials went on a wealth acquisition spree. 
Davies (2004: 22) argues that economic evolution in Zimbabwe can be understood as 
“a process of acquisition of private wealth.” By the late 1980s many senior politicians 
in the country had already invested heavily in land, housing and companies 
(Mengisteab 1992). Socialism was used to create a strong state with the justification 
that it was necessary for development (Davies 2004). The centralisation of state power 
could be seen in how the government was imposing its influence in trade union 
matters, transferring land title from private hands to the state, and its involvement in 
many sectors of the economy such as banks, newspapers, industrial businesses and 
some mines (Davies 2004). Such involvement was not empowering the people but 
rather some leaders of ZANU as evidenced by corrupt schemes such as the 
‘Willowgate’ scandal (Davies 2004). 
 
There were some notable strides in the empowerment of the people in the name of 
socialism. Free education and health care saw these services expanding in the 1980s 
(Meisenhelder 1994; Davies 2004). Minimum wage legislation was introduced, and 
workers’ unions were encouraged (Meisenhelder 1994; Davies 2004), although as 
noted above, there was interference from the government in its leadership. Efforts 
were made to enable the participation of previously disadvantaged blacks in the 
mainstream economy through the Africanisation of the public service and the active 
development of the black middle class (Muzondidya 2009). Rural agriculture was 
aided through offering positive prices for produce and access to markets such that 
within a few years after independence communal farmers became the biggest 
producers of maize and cotton (Muzondidya 2009). However, according to 
Meisenhelder (1994) the ‘masses’ were helped rather than empowered. Davies (2004) 
argued that all the gains could easily be reversed because they were based on a 
redistributive programme instead of growth. The fact that these redistributive 
programmes were introduced without any sustainable growth programmes meant that 
they became a burden on the budget, thus planting their own seeds of destruction 




The unsustainable social expenditure and private wealth accumulation by the ruling 
elites reached a limit in the late 1980s with the government admitting that there was 
need for economic structural reforms (see Fig 4 and Fig 5). The then finance minister, 
Bernard Chidzero, is said to have stated that “social spending and the growth of the 
state expanded public deficits and became a drain on the economy producing rising 
unemployment, falling investment ratios and a fiscal nightmare” (cited in Meisenhelder 
1994: 90). While the IMF had left the country in 1984 claiming the country faced an 
impending economic disaster from unwise government spending (Meisenhelder 
1994), the government turned to the same IMF for assistance in the restructuring of 
the economy.   
 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAPs) 
There are debates as to whether it was necessary for the government to turn to the 
IMF by the end of the 1980s (see Coltart 1992; Kawewe and Dibie 2000; Brett and 
Winter 2003). What is not in dispute though is that the economy was in a bad shape 
by the end of the 1980s. External debt of the country had risen from 14.9 percent of 
GNP in 1980 to 48.4 percent in 1989 (Compagnon 2011). In GDP terms government 
debt had ballooned to 71 percent of GDP by 1989 with 36 percent of that being external 
(Sachikonye and Sachikonye 2011). Socialism was collapsing the world over and the 
then finance minister stated that “Zimbabwe had no choice but to follow” (cited in 
Meisenhelder 1994). Some scholars (Meisenhelder 1994) argue that Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) was prescribed by the IMF. Others 
(Compagnon 2011) dispute this, arguing that it was largely a homegrown programme. 
Compagnon (2011) argues that although the country’s debt was quite high, it was still 
manageable especially when compared to other African countries at this time, and the 
balance of payments situation was not a major crisis. The founding document of ESAP 
stated that the country needed to move away from a regulated economy to one that 
was controlled by market forces (Meisenhelder 1994). The programme was adopted 
in July 1990 and its implementation was from 1991 to 1995 (Compagnon 2011). 
 
The government of Zimbabwe’s stated objective of ESAP was to “reduce budget 
deficit, reform fiscal and monetary policy, trade liberalisation, public enterprises 
reforms (including privatisation), deregulation of investment, labour and price controls” 
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(cited in Sachikonye and Sachikonye 2011: 93). It was envisaged that such “measures 
would lead to five percent annual growth, a reduction of the budget deficit to five 
percent of GDP by 1995, a reduction of the external current account deficit to four 
percent of GDP, reduction of the debt service ratio to 20 percent by 1995” (Sachikonye 
and Sachikonye 2011: 93). Other objectives of the programme included a reduction of 
subsidies to state owned enterprises from ZWD629 million to ZWD40 million by 1995, 
the creation of 100 000 new formal jobs between 1992 and 1995, an increase in 
investment flows to 25 percent of GDP by 1995, foreign exchange rates would be left 
to market forces and most imports would fall under the Open General Import License 
(Sachikonye and Sachikonye 2011). 
 
Things did not turn out as planned though. Compagnon (2011) contends that there are 
several factors that led to the failure of ESAP. These include: the defective design of 
the programme leading to implementation inefficiencies, a sharp increase in imports 
due to speculation, donors such as the World Bank and IMF did not timeously provide 
funds, too high interest rates, dwindling foreign direct investments, a severe drought 
in the 1990-91 season which led to more food imports (Sachikonye and Sachikonye 
2011). GDP growth averaged 1.2 percent in the years 1991-1995 with the exception 
of 1994 when it was 5 percent (Bond and Manyanya 2002). Inflation remained high 
hovering around 30 percent over the period while the budget deficit also remained high 
around 10 percent of GDP (Bond and Manyanya 2002). Compagnon (2011) argues 
that Robert Mugabe’s hostility towards market reforms that reduced his control over 
the economy led to half- hearted implementation of the programme. Notably parastatal 
reform only saw three loss making companies being commercialised, that is, Cotton 
Marketing Board, Cold Storage Commission and Dairy Marketing Board. The 
continued dismal performance of parastatals therefore led to a drain on public finances 
increasing government domestic debt and crowding out private sector investment 
(Sachikonye and Sachikonye 2011). The government, though, claimed success in 
some aspects of ESAP (Bond and Manyanya 2002). These included a reduction in the 
civil service wage bill from 15.3 percent of GDP in 1990 to 11.3 percent in 1994, 
removal of foreign exchange controls, liberalisation of regulations relating to foreign 
investment, elimination of price controls, and liberalisation of the labour market (Bond 




There arose widespread discontent with ESAP from various social groups including 
workers, commercial farmers, business leaders and war veterans (Sachikonye and 
Sachikonye 2011).  In 1996 the largest strike by public sector employees since 
independence rocked the economy, with health workers and teachers largely being 
involved (Sachikonye and Sachikonye 2011). The year 1997 recorded the highest 
number of strikes in a year with 232 recorded (Sachikonye and Sachikonye 2011). 
Even the Employers Confederation of Zimbabwe (EMCOZ) and the Zimbabwe 
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) coalesced around an acknowledgment that the 
Mugabe government’s fiscal policies were reducing the standard of life for 
Zimbabweans (Sachikonye and Sachikonye 2011). 
 
Lack of fiscal prudence was demonstrated with the unbudgeted compensation to over 
50 000 war veterans in 1997 precipitating a sharp economic descent for the country 
(Bond and Manyanya 2002; Masaka 2011; Sachikonye and Sachikonye 2011; 
Compagnon 2011). The compensation of ZWD50 000 each and a monthly pension of 
ZWD2 000, led to the World Bank suspending balance of payments support 
immediately (Bond and Manyanya 2002). The pay-outs in August triggered a 75 
percent fall in the Zimbabwe dollar over a four- hour period on 14 November 1997 
(Bond and Manyanya 2002; Compagnon 2011). In 1998 the government further 
exacerbated the country’s economic decline by its military intervention in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a mission that gobbled USD1 million per day 
or USD30 million a month (Mashingaidze 2006; Sachikonye and Sachikonye 2011).  It 
is argued that the DRC mission benefited Mugabe’s inner circle and military generals 
at the expense of the economy and Zimbabweans (Compagnon 2011). 
 
Faced with mounting economic pressures the government adopted a successor to 
ESAP, the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation 
(ZIMPREST), in 1998 (Bond and Manyanya 2002; Sachikonye and Sachikonye 2011). 
While the policy maintained most of ESAP’s tenets, it sought to re-introduce some 
control in the economy including “selective price controls, increased tariffs, import 
licensing on some goods, procrastination in meeting regional liberalisation targets, 
pegging of the exchange rate, suspension of foreign currency accounts, introduction 
of new export incentives and application of new levies on tobacco and consumer 
goods” (Bond and Manyanya 2002: 40). It was stillborn due to lack of funding. While 
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the IMF had lined up funding, first with a USD53 million in 1998 and later increased to 
USD200 million in 1999, the conditions attached to it proved too much for the 
Zimbabwean government leading to an abandonment of the programme (Bond and 
Manyanya 2002). 
 
Land Redistribution and the ‘Casino Economy’ years (2000 to 2008)  
After Zimbabwe launched its often- violent land redistribution programme in 2000 (elite 
agitation within ZANU to embark on land reform had begun to be voiced as early as 
1996 – see Fig 6), international financial institutions withheld financial aid to the 
country citing the lack of upholding rule of law and disregard of property rights 
(Sachikonye and Sachikonye 2011). This period was marked by a shift by the ZANU 
PF government from state capture to predatory state (Sachikonye and Sachikonye 
2011). A predatory state disregards conventional macroeconomic policy as those in 
power seek to exercise direct control over markets and economic actors (Sachikonye 
and Sachikonye 2011). The Millennium Economic Recovery Programme was mooted 
in 2000 as a successor to previously failed economic policies (Raftopoulos and 
Phimister 2004, Sachikonye and Sachikonye 2011). This was soon followed by a 10- 
Point plan in 2001 that sought to anchor economic recovery on compulsorily acquired 
land and indigenous participation (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004). Nothing much 





Fig 6: By the beginning of 1996, with ESAP not bearing fruit, ZANU-PF had started to 
talk impatiently and imperiously about land reform – a demand that had been 
postponed for 15 years due to the nature and structure of the Lancaster House 
agreements. 
 
Jones (2010) describes the period 2000 to 2008 as the rise of the kukiya kiya 
economy. It is a period where citizens resorted to doing anything to get by as the ‘real 
economy’ was replaced by a kukiya kiya economy. Political appointments were made 
to key institutions such as the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) where Gideon Gono 
was appointed in 2003. When Gono came into office, he stated famously two things: 
that “failure was not an option” and “inflation is enemy number one”. By the time he 
stepped down in 2013, he had failed, and inflation had defeated him. In a 2011 
classified cable, the IMF described Gono as the world’s worst central banker. 
Sachikonye and Sachikonye (2011) note that Gono soon assumed authority and 
power of the minister of finance. This led the RBZ to engage in quasi fiscal activities 
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including providing funding for agriculture, health and even national examinations in 
2008 (Sachikonye and Sachikonye (2011). Subsidised basic commodities were also 
provided by the RBZ under the BACOSSI (Basic Commodities Supply Side 
Intervention) as well as the funding of imports such as electricity, fertiliser and grain 
(Sachikonye and Sachikonye 2011). Parsons (2007) remarked that the RBZ must be 
the only central bank in the world that imports tractors. Gideon Gono characterised the 
economy of this period as a casino economy. 
 
In his book, Zimbabwe’s casino economy: Extraordinary measures for extraordinary 
challenges, Gono argues that the quasi fiscal activities were implemented as an 
economic stimulus in the context of a depressed economic environment which he 
attributes to the ‘illegal economic sanctions imposed on the country by the West. Gono 
(2008: 147) argues that “…my team and I at the central bank had to take extraordinary 
and innovative measures to improve the availability of fuel and energy, spare parts 
and capital components, chemicals and equipment as ways of stimulating economic 
activity”. However, in getting involved in these quasi fiscal activit ies, the RBZ had to 
resort to printing money leading to more economic chaos (Mawowa and Matongo 
2010; Kavila and Le Roux 2017). Further, the printed money was used by the apex 
bank to buy hard currency on the parallel market leading to more acute distortions in 
the market (Mawowa and Matongo 2010). Gono (2008) provides a typical scenario of 
the casino economy that emerged after his appointment and subsequent adoption of 
quasi fiscal policies. 
Take the case of an unscrupulous and corrupt foreign 
exchange trader. He starts in the morning with US$100 
which he uses to prey on a hospital patient suffering from 
a chronic disease and who desperately needs to import 
some critical medical drugs. In order to purchase the 
US$100 from the forex trader, the desperate patient writes 
a cheque worth Z$200,000,000,000.00 (two hundred 
billion dollars) at the “burning” (parallel or black market) 
cheque exchange rate of Z$2,000,000,000/1US$. Two 
days later when the cheque has cleared, the foreign 
exchange dealer bribes a corrupt bank teller, and there are 
usually many such corrupt bank tellers in a casino 
economy, and gets the Z$200 billion in cash, 
notwithstanding that there is a law setting maximum cash 
withdrawal limits per day at Z$50,000.00 (fifty thousand 
Zimbabwe dollars) or Z$500,000.00 (five hundred 
thousand Zimbabwe dollars). Armed with the cash loot of 
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Z$200 billion, the forex dealer now preys on desperate 
grandmothers who need to change their free funds sent 
from hardworking grandchildren in the diaspora. The cash 
rate on the day is a mere Z$40,000/1US$. So for the Z$200 
billion, the grandmothers must part with a total of US$5 
million (Gono 2008: 63). 
 
What Gono does not state in his account though is that the RBZ was heavily involved 
in transactions such as these, as Mawowa and Matongo (2010) note. It is money 
generated this way that was used to fund the apex bank’s quasi fiscal activities and 
other murky activities by the ZANU PF government. 
 
 
Fig 7: It seemed that, already, in 1996, the blue print for FTLRP was being laid down. 
This was before Tony Blair had come into office. Blair only came to power in 1997, 
before his government reneged on the Thatcher government’s promises to fund land 




Official figures indicate that the GDP of the country contracted between 1998 and 2006 
by about a third (Parsons 2007). Manufacturing sector contracted by about 14 percent 
between 2000 and 2006 (Parsons 2007). By mid- 2009 the country was running at 10 
percent of its industrial capacity (Mawowa and Matongo 2010). Official figures 
indicated that inflation rose from 55 percent in 2000 to 1 300 percent in 2006 (Parsons 
2007). It had grown to 89.700 trillion percent by the time the Government of National 
Unity (GNU) was consummated (Mawowa and Matongo 2010). Robertson (2011) 
stated that the rate of inflation in 2008 had gone up to seven sextillion percent. The 
country’s GDP had contracted to half the size of its 1997 level by 2009 (Mawowa and 
Matongo 2010). In a bid to remain in power the ZANU PF government entered into 
agreements that mortgaged the country’s resources such as agricultural land and 
mining rights to countries as Libya and China (Parsons 2007; Sachikonye and 
Sachikonye 2011). Availability of foreign currency deteriorated acutely in this period 
resulting in a flourishing black (parallel) market that was said to be fuelled by the state 
itself (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004, Mawowa and Matongo 2010). Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) decreased from USD440 million in 1997 to USD9 million in 2004 
(Raftopoulos and Phimister 2004, Mashingaidze 2006). In 2005 the average 
purchasing power of a Zimbabwean had shrunk to the same level as 1953 
(Mashingaidze 2006). From 2000 to 2006 more than 400 companies were officially 
acknowledged to have closed down leading to four out of five people being 
unemployed (Mashingaidze 2006). By 2008, Zimbabwe had – since 1980 – received 
US$522 million from the International Monetary Fund, US$1, 34 billion from the World 
Bank and US$524 million from the African Development Bank (Gono, 2009). But most 
of it had been looted and plundered. 
 
Government of National Unity (GNU) Period (2009 – 2013) 
After a disputed 2008 election, a unity government (GNU) was formed in February 
2009 in Zimbabwe involving the long ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – 
Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) 
parties (Besada and LaChapelle 2011). The new unity government ushered in a raft 
of measures aimed at stabilising the economy beginning with abandoning the 
Zimbabwe dollar that had become worthless, and introducing a multicurrency regime 
dominated by the American dollar and South African rand (Makochekanwa and 
Kambarami 2011). While arguing that the adoption of a multicurrency regime was 
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initiated before the consummation of the GNU, Kanyenze, Chitambara and Tyson 
(2017), note that the partial dollarization immediately arrested the runaway inflation 
and stabilised the macroeconomic environment. 
 
The GNU adopted partial dollarisation because full dollarisation would have required 
external support with the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) buying all the deposits in 
the financial system and converting them to US dollars (Kanyenze et al 2017). A new 
economic framework, the Short-term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP 1), 
was adopted in March 2009 to run until December 2009 (Kanyenze et al 2017). The 
programme had three main goals, that is, “stabilise the macro and micro-economies, 
recover the levels of savings, [and] lay the basis for a more transformative mid-term 
to long-term programme that would turn Zimbabwe into a developmental state” 
(Kanyenze et al 2017: 4). Furthermore, in the words of the then Finance Minister, 
Tendai Biti: 
 
STERP was articulated around four main areas. First, 
macroeconomic reforms were developed to contain 
hyperinflation, negative interest rates and a runaway 
budget deficit. Second, supply side measures were 
designed to kick start production and stimulate capacity 
utilization. Third, establishing social safety nets to support 
the most vulnerable would address poverty. The final area 
dealt with interventions promoting peace and 
democratization, including financial support for 
constitutional reform (Biti 2015: 9). 
 
To reign in fiscal indiscipline, the GNU, through the ministry of finance, introduced 
cash budgeting which the minister referred as a policy to “eat what we kill” (Biti 2015: 
10). The measures adopted by the GNU began to restore confidence in the economy. 
In January 2009 the government only managed to collect US$4 million, but by June 
2009 the revenues had gone up to US$90 million a month (Biti 2015). 
 
STERP I was followed by the Three Year Macro-Economic Policy and Budget 
Framework (STERP II) which was launched on 23 December 2009 (Kanyenze et al 
2017). On 7 July 2011 the Medium Term Plan (MTP) was launched. These measures 
led to average GDP growth of 10 percent between 2009 and 2012 (Kanyenze et al 
2017). Even when the global financial crisis of 2009 hit, Zimbabwe’s GDP grew at the 
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rate of 6 percent. The GNU is credited with bringing back normalcy into the economy 
as basic goods became available in shops, the transport system became normal again 
as fuel became available and services that had become defunct were revived such as 
medical aid and insurance and pension schemes (Mukuhlani 2014). The Medium Term 
Plan was however interrupted by the July 2013 elections which brought to an end the 
GNU. It was then unilaterally abandoned by the winning ZANU PF party (Kanyenze et 
al 2017). 
 
The Economy Post GNU 
After the ZANU PF government won the elections in 2013, it immediately abandoned 
the Medium Term Plan that had been spearheaded by the former finance minister, 
Tendai Biti. It set into motion its own economic blueprint titled the Zimbabwe Agenda 
for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (ZimAsset). According to Reeler and 
Chitsike (2015) several commentators argued that the new economic blueprint was 
incoherent and would unlikely result in significant FDI flows. The economy resumed a 
downward trend almost reminiscent of the 1997 – 2008 slide (Moretti 2017). Kanyenze 
et al (2017) argue that the re-election of Robert Mugabe and ZANU PF coincided with 
a weakening of international commodity prices which negatively impacted the country 
since its main exports are primary commodities. There was also a drought that led to 
decline in Agricultural output. In addition, policy inconsistency and contradictions led 
to negative investor sentiment, all leading to slow economic growth of less than one 
percent by 2016 (Kanyenze et al 2017).  
 
Reeler and Chitsike (2015) note that by the end of 2014, there were clear indications 
that the economy was in a downward spiral and the government did not seem to have 
a clue or the political will-power to address the problem. A liquidity crunch gripped the 
economy soon after the elections (Reeler and Chitsike 2015) and it has continued to 
worsen. Describing the crisis that faced the country post 2013 elections, Moretti (2017) 
argues that the downward slide was: 
 
characterised by the crash of the Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange (ZSE), loss of investor confidence and drainage 
of banks’ funds, hundreds of companies were forced to 
close, several thousands of jobs were lost and the capacity 
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utilisation of the manufacturing sector declined from 44.9 
percent in 2012 to 39.6 percent in 2013 (Moretti 2017: 11).  
 
With the re-election of Robert Mugabe and his ZANU PF party, the country returned 
to a predatory state with economic decisions being subservient to power politics 
(Bratton 2014). Almost all the revenue collected by the government is gobbled by 
salaries for government employees (Reeler and Chitsike 2015). When the then 
minister of finance, Patrick Chinamasa, proposed reducing the government wage bill 
by downsizing the government workforce as well as freezing wages, these were 
reversed by the president Robert Mugabe (Reeler and Chitsike 2015). Provision of 
services in urban areas suffered due to a unilateral government directive to local 
authorities for debt forgiveness towards the 2013 elections (Reeler and Chitsike 2015).  
 
In the period between 2013 and 2015, the country accrued a deficit of US$25 billion, 
a domestic debt of US$6 billion and US$11 billion of liabilities towards International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) (Moretti 2017: 11). Trade deficit ballooned to US$323 
million as exports and FDIs remained low and diaspora remittances dwindled as 
Zimbabweans abroad chose to use informal means to send money back home (Moretti 
(2017). In September 2015 at a meeting of the IMF and World Bank in Lima, Peru, a 
government delegation headed by the finance minister, Patrick Chinamasa, committed 
to a strategy to clear the country’s external debt arrears to its multilateral and bilateral 
donors (Moretti 2017). However, the government failed to meet conditions of the Lima 
agreement and by June 2016, the government had not yet paid the US$1.8 billion it 
owes the IMF (Moretti 2017).  
 
In November 2017 the only president Zimbabwe had ever known since independence, 
Robert Mugabe, was removed from power through a ‘soft coup’. It involved the military 
restricting Mugabe to his residence and announcing on national television that the 
president was safe, but the military was targeting alleged criminals around him. 
Parliament then initiated an impeachment process with support from both the ruling 
party and the opposition. This process, combined with efforts from negotiators who 
included a Roman Catholic priest, joined by a South African delegation at some point, 
managed to convince the president that it was in his best interest to resign. A former 
vice president who had been fired by Mugabe a few weeks earlier, Emmerson 
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Mnangagwa, became the interim president until elections were held on 30 July 2018 
which he won. Mnangagwa immediately sought to distance himself from his 
predecessor and adopted the mantra ‘Zimbabwe is open for business’. However, signs 
of improvement in the economy are yet to be visible. Rather it appears the economy 
is getting worse with inflation rising and shortage of basic commodities such as fuel. 
All these events shape how financial and economic news journalists interpret and 
produce the news, practices that the study interrogates.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed literature relevant to the problem of this study. By tracing the 
history of the development of the business press the literature review made it clear 
that business news is as old as the capitalist system itself. It is also a key part of the 
history of the colonisation of Zimbabwe. It is therefore surprising that not much has 
been done to understand how the country’s economy and business sector has been 
interpreted by journalists. Furthermore, by highlighting the formation of some of the 
iconic business news outlets such as the Wall Street Journal and the Dow Jones and 
what they emphasised in producing the news, the literature review places business 
journalism in Zimbabwe in the context of globally recognised practices so that the 
similarities and differences can be compared. The literature review also focused on 
economic developments in the country from 1980 to present. This was done to 
recognise that the practices that shape the production of business news cannot be 
separated from the various economic policies adopted by the government and the 
subsequent economic performance. How journalists interpret these policies and how 
they understand their position and role in such interpretation is an integral part of what 
business journalism practice in the country is. Through an appreciation of economic 
developments, we may be able to gain an insight into how business journalism shapes 
and is shaped by the prevailing economic discourse. 
 
As part of the literature review the sociology of news production was highlighted as 
the theoretical underpinning of the study. From a political economy approach the 
chapter highlighted some of the key arguments such as the role that investors, owners, 
shareholders and the state may play in shaping the practice of business news 
production. It highlighted that these arguments have largely been advanced in the 
context of functioning economies such as the USA and the UK. However, they do not 
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shed much light on what happens in a country suffering from both an economic identity 
crisis and serious economic crises. In the social organisation of newswork approach, 
the chapter highlighted some of the key arguments relating to how sources interact 
with journalists as well as organisational practices and how they shape what appears 
in the news and how. These again may not be as straightforward in a country in which 
economic crises have seen a massive dwindling of the business sector and depressed 
economic activity. From a culturological approach, some of the cultural givens in the 
Zimbabwean society were highlighted. However, there remains a gap in terms of how 
these apply to the production of business news which is different from political news 
production which many scholars have concentrated on. The next chapter discusses 

























CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodology of the study. It explains what types of data I 
collected, how they were collected, and how I analysed them, including sampling and 
ethics. Furthermore, I outline some methodological challenges faced, and how these 
were solved. The importance of this chapter is that it sets the stage for the findings 
and data analysis chapters that follow. The central research questions that the study 
sought to address were:  
 
1. How have Zimbabwe’s “economic identity crisis” and “economic crises” been 
represented in selected mainstream Zimbabwean print media from 1980 to 
2017?  
2. Why do finance and business journalists in Zimbabwe report about the 
economy, business, and the world of finance, the way they do? 
3. How has Zimbabwe’s “economic identity crisis” and “economic crisis” shaped 
and constrained institutional and newsroom practices, professional 
imperatives, journalistic agency and their wider socio-economic and political 
context? 
 
This study aims to provide an in-depth examination of the practices that constitute the 
production of financial and economic news in Zimbabwe. Such an examination gathers 
critical insights into the beat of journalists who produce the news (see Barbie and 
Mouton 2001; Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Creswell 1998). 
 
The Interpretive Paradigm 
The study is situated in the interpretive paradigm because the study of how financial 
and economic news is produced in Zimbabwe should of necessity reflect the distinct 
nature of the business journalism ‘tribe’ in Zimbabwe rather than a natural order (see 
Bryman 2012). Taking the interpretive route is an acknowledgement that business 
journalists have subjectivities which are constantly influenced by the contexts and 
environments in which they operate (see Deetz 1982; du Plooy-Cilliers et al 2014). 
Interpretivism involves several intellectual strands, the dominant ones of which include 
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hermeneutics, phenomenology and symbolic interactionism (Bryman 2012; du Plooy-
Cilliers et al 2014; Deetz 1982). 
 
Hermeneutics, a method drawn from theology, is concerned with the interpretation of 
human action (Bryman 2012). Bryman (2012) sees a clear epistemological clash 
between hermeneutics and positivism, which I consider not suitable for this study. 
Whereas positivism concerns itself with “explanation of human behaviour”, 
hermeneutics is concerned with “the understanding of human behaviour” (Bryman 
2012: 28). Likewise, this study has no intention of explaining the production of 
business news in Zimbabwe but, rather, seeks to establish how business news is 
produced in the country. It is philosophically interested in “the emphatic understanding 
of human action rather than the forces that are deemed to act on it” (Bryman 2012: 
28). 
 
The study also draws on the phenomenological intellectual tradition, “a philosophy that 
is concerned with the question of how individuals make sense of the world around 
them and how in particular the philosopher should bracket out preconceptions in his 
or her grasp of the world” (Bryman 2012: 30). Shultz aptly captured the work and 
content of phenomenology thus: 
 
The world of nature as explored by the natural scientist 
does not ‘mean’ anything to molecules, atoms and 
electrons. But the observational field of the social scientist 
– social reality – has a specific meaning and relevance 
structure for the beings living, acting, and thinking within it. 
By a series of common-sense constructs, they have pre-
selected and pre-interpreted this world which they 
experience as the reality of their daily lives. It is these 
thought objects of theirs which determine their behaviour 
by motivating it. The thought objects constructed by the 
social scientist, in order to grasp their social reality, have 
to be founded upon the thought objects constructed by the 
common sense thinking of men living their daily life within 
the social world (Schutz 1962: 59). 
 
The actors involved in the production of business news, in this case the newsworkers, 
view what they do as meaningful and the way they go about doing it is on the basis of 
those meanings. What this study therefore aims to do is gain an insight into the 
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common-sensical thinking and actions of those involved in the production of business 
news in Zimbabwe and interpret these actions and their social world from their point 
of view. The interpretation is necessarily nested in the sense that in this study I provide 
an interpretation of business newsworkers’ interpretations. From an interpretivist point 
it is important to get an authentic grasp of what business newsworkers in Zimbabwe 
view as common sense and how this affects and shapes how they do their work (see 
du Plooy-Cilliers et al 2014). The context within which business newsworkers in 
Zimbabwe act is unique to any other, therefore it is important to have a grasp of the 
grounded and context-specific meanings they attribute to it. This is done with the 
understanding that “individual meanings are not primary but arise from deeper 
meaning structures (Deetz 1982: 133).  
 
To realise study objectives within the interpretive paradigm, I adopted a qualitative 
research approach. It is common cause that qualitative research makes it possible to 
study issues in depth and detail (Patton 2002). This is in contrast to a quantitative 
research approach that makes use of standardised measures with the intention to fit 
human experiences and perspectives into probabilistic and predetermined categories 
(Patton 2002). Qualitative research therefore came about as a result of seeking to 
understand the other (Denzin and Lincoln 2000). Data was collected from the 
journalists’ own words as well as the primary texts they have produced (that is, 
newspaper stories). In order to build “a complex; holistic picture, [the researcher], 
analyses words, reports detailed views of informants, and conducts the study in a 
natural setting” (Creswell 1998: 15). The reason to seek detailed views of key 
informants is that my position is “one of lack of familiarity with what is actually taking 
place in the sphere of life chosen for study” (Flick 2006: 12). My lack of familiarity made 
it crucial that I seek an insider’s perspective (Barbie and Mouton 2001). To gain a good 
understanding of the insider perspective, I combined interview data with archival data. 
As noted by Denzin and Lincoln (2000), multiple methods help in the quest to obtain 
an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in question. “The combination of 
multiple methodological practices, empirical materials, perspectives, and observation 
in a single study is best understood as a strategy that adds rigor, breadth, complexity, 




The Case Study Design 
To understand the practice of making business news in Zimbabwe the study makes 
use of the case study research design. The case study allows for an in-depth 
investigation of a single unit (Barbie and Mouton 2001). Furthermore, a case study 
makes possible thick descriptions as a result of the multiple perspectives considered. 
In this study I seek to understand how business journalists in Zimbabwe make 
meaning of the multilevel social systems that influence their everyday work practices. 
It calls for an approach that allows for a multiple perspective drawn upon journalists’ 
work and everyday beat. Hence the sociology of news production is the theoretical 
lens I use to understand the world of business journalists at work. The multiple angles 
employed, political economy, social organisation of newswork and the culturological 
approach, help to unpack the multiple influences upon business news production in 
Zimbabwe, allowing for thick descriptions. Thick descriptions in this case are enabled 
by employing a historical perspective from 1980 (when Zimbabwe got its 
independence) to 2017 when Mugabe fell from of power in a coup. The historical 
perspective is naturally amenable to archival investigation, leading to a multiple 
method approach and multiple sources of evidence in line with Geertz’s (1973) 
definition of thick descriptions. As noted by della Porta (2008), cases can be used to 
analyse the development of some characteristic in a single unit over a long period. In 
this case I investigate the development of financial and economic news production 
over a period of 38 years in a country that has gone through various notable periods 
of economic and political development. In addition, the media polarisation in 
Zimbabwe calls for an investigation that analyses both state-controlled and privately-
owned media houses. In this case the Business Herald and the Financial Gazette, 
respectively, provide the multiple systems (Barbie and Mouton 2001; della Porta 2008) 
which also enhance the elicitation of thick descriptions. 
 
Creswell (1998: 61) gives the definition of a case study as “an exploration of a 
“bounded system” or a case (or multiple cases) over time through detailed, in-depth 
data collection involving multiple sources of information rich in context.” In this case 
the ‘bounded system’ is the practice of producing business news. It is a system made 
up of what journalists do in and outside the news organisation, the relationships that 
are created both in and outside the organisation, their interaction with information on 
a day to day basis and the evidence of these various interactions and relationships in 
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the course of producing newspaper stories. The study explores this bounded system 
and the context in which it exists. As highlighted by Barbie and Mouton (2001) context 
is a central consideration in a case study investigation. Since my focus is on two media 
houses, the Business Herald and the Financial Gazette, the design is a collective case 
study (Stake 2000).  
 
Further, the case here is a particular social group (Barbie and Mouton 2001), that is, 
the business journalism collective in Zimbabwe. Of this cohort the Business Herald 
and the Financial Gazette, two media houses that have consistently been in existence 
from 1980 to the present are selected due to this longevity which allows for a more or 
less longitudinal examination. Indeed, they existed before 1980. The study is 
ideographic (Bryman 2012) where the aim is not to generate general statements 
regardless of time and place, but to simultaneously elicit and elucidate the unique 
features of business news production practices in Zimbabwe. A caveat is that the 
insights gathered apply to the selected two media houses and may not necessarily be 
generalisable to the other media houses that do not boast the same longevity. At any 
rate, the unit of analysis, the two media houses, do not operate in isolation, neither are 
they insulated from the environmental influences in which they are embedded (see 
Barbie and Mouton 2001). Thus, “the surrounding ‘ecology’ or ‘environment’ with its 
notions of multiple, interacting contextualised systems, help conceptualise the 
contexts, and contextualise the concepts, in which the unit of analysis is embedded” 
(Barbie and Mouton 2001: 282). The ecology may include the social, historical, political 
and economic setting of the Business Herald and the Financial Gazette, and the 
country, Zimbabwe, in which they operate.  
 
Sampling 
The multiple data collection methods adopted here required appropriately tailored and 
multilevel sampling methods as well. There was need to sample which media houses 
to make the subject of my primary data collection, the journalists to be interviewed, 
and the quality and amount of my archival sources. Having previously worked in the 
media industry before, my considerable knowledge of the media terrain helped. As 
Gans (1979) clearly understood in posing the difference between formal “journalistic 
decisions” and informal “journalistic considerations” (see discussion in Chapter 2), the 
informal, intuitionistic streak helped me mediate, “consider” and “decide” on the core 
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aspects of my non-probability sampling. That is, I drew on my prior knowledge of the 
terrain, and drew on insights I already had, while also trusting my intuition and instinct 
where inadequate data and knowledge were a problem. Indeed, it is always the case 
in Zimbabwe that street smarts get you out of many a tight corner. Doing things 
(always) by the straight and narrow will not get you anywhere. Rather, one requires to 
kukiya kiya (cf. Jones 2010), kuita zviripo (to do what is appropriate for the situation), 
and kutamba iri kurira (to dance to whatever tune is playing). I found myself doing 
more and more of those methodological sleights of hand that only Zimbabweans can 
understand. The Zimbabwean environment is not normal, and few pretend that it is, 
and even fewer act like it is. In Zimbabwe you stand a far better chance to survive if 
you expect the unexpected. Zimbabweans are always future-proofed. For instance, I 
did not expect any of the engagements and interviews to go ahead as expected, and 
indeed none did go ahead as expected. In some interviews I got far more data than I 
expected or wanted, in other times I got far less than I expected or desired. But 
because I had been in these streets before and been part of this “tribe” previously, I 
was proofed from surprise and failure. This helped me recover considerably when I 
lost most of my interview data. Had I not prepared for it, and had I not had the nasty 
Zimbabwean streak of making much from very little, this episode would have signalled 
a disaster for my study. The main take away is that most decision making made in 
formal settings is at best often inadequate in real life naturalistic settings and at worst 
useless, irrelevant and an obstacle.  
 
Hence, as said, I trusted my formal decision-making as much as I trusted my gut and, 
even more importantly, respected how things do not always go as planned in 
naturalistic settings and, indeed, in everyday life in Zimbabwe. At any rate, the decision 
to purposively sample two newspapers, namely the Business Herald and the Financial 
Gazette was one such decision-cum-consideration informed by both research design 
protocols as well as street smarts and trained intuition. This would appear to be what 
Bryman (2012) calls sampling of contexts. At the time the study started these two were 
the most prominent business newspapers in the country, and the oldest in the game. 
But I had not started my study with two. I started with three. The other business 
newspaper in the country, the Zimbabwe Independent was initially part of the study 
but was later discarded in preference of papers that were there in 1980. The quiet 
discarding of things that appear to work at first but do not work so well in reality is a 
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very Zimbabwean thing. Mugabe did this with his NDP, ESAP, and ZIMPREST, price 
controls, many ministerial appointments (many were a cabinet reshuffle in “Bob’s” 
time) and, above all, with socialism. RBZ Governor Gideon Gono did it with the 
interbank rate, Agro-cheques, BACOSSI, and, above all, with zeroes (which he 
dropped with quiet recklessness in the last days of the Zimbabwe dollar leading to 
2008). Mnangagwa has done it with the Indigenisation law, Command Agriculture 
(most of it anyway), the eating of meat for most Zimbabweans (to be replaced with 
murivo (greens) and mapoteto (potatoes)) and even with history (in 2018 Mnangagwa 
infamously declared that history was dead). Indeed, in Mnangagwa’s time, things are 
never what they seem since the country, although it has a cabinet, is ruled by advisors 
and Statutory Instruments (SIs). SIs are convenient, tend to snowball and can be 
defended as purposive. There was also a way, in my data collection, in which I adopted 
a form of methodological statutory instrument. The only problem with the SI view of 
the world is that, if one is lacking in “probity” (the word used to label Mnangagwa by 
Mugabe as the latter was being fired from the Vice Presidency), one can also discard 
things that work and persist with those that clearly are not working. For instance, the 
decision to drop the basket of currencies seems to have been rushed by Mnangagwa’s 
administration. At the same time, they are persisting with an interbank rate that many 
think should be scrapped. As such, in applying my statutory instrument methodology, 
I also had to be self-aware and display a lot of probity. 
 
Thus, I quietly discarded the Zimbabwe Independent. Later I was to do the same with 
the interview data of a veteran journalist – an interview that (despite my attempt to turn 
it to the question of business journalism in Zimbabwe) kept returning to the journalist’s 
own image and legacy. The other newspapers that have been established since then, 
such as The Business Times, and that are competing for the business news space, 
did not fit the bill. I merely applied my methodological statutory instrument as exclusion 
criteria.  The Business Herald and the Financial Gazette provided both heterogeneity 
and homogeneity (cf. Bryman 2012) something which is not a contradiction on the 
Zimbabwean streets. Heterogeneity because they cut across state controlled and 
privately-owned newspapers. Homogeneity because they are both involved in the 
production of business news in Zimbabwe. Barbie and Mouton (2001) state that 
purposive sampling, also called judgemental sampling, involves selecting a sample 
guided by one’s knowledge of the population or a consideration of the purpose of the 
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study. Purposive sampling is about selecting units of analysis that help in answering 
the research question (Bryman 2012). 
 
Ultimately, the Business Herald was selected because it is the biggest state owned 
business daily in the country (subsidised by tax payer’s money) and because it is the 
oldest newspaper in Zimbabwe, dating back to the establishment of the country as we 
know it today in the late 19th century. Owned by the Rhodesia Printing and Publishing 
Company (RPPC) before independence, the government at independence gained 
control of it after buying a controlling stake in the parent company and renaming it 
Zimbabwe Newspapers (Ronning and Khupe 2000). As a daily, it produces enormous 
amount of business news and requires a sizeable and visible contingent of business 
journalists and a newsroom to match. That is, my knowledge of the scale of the 
operation at the Business Herald was a factor in my sampling criteria. The main paper, 
The Herald, had traditionally had a strong business section, and this has continued up 
to today. In the 1980s and 1990s it had a business pull-out every Thursday. It is this 
Thursday pull-out that is called the Business Herald. The fact that the paper is 
controlled by the government makes it very interesting because many of the studies 
that have been done internationally have not had a similar sample because there are 
no government-controlled business newspapers in many of the Western countries 
where business news studies have largely been concentrated.  
 
Finally, as a state-owned newspaper, the Herald routinely reflects the government 
position (particularly the President’s) and seldom criticises its pay masters. For 
instance, if the President is saying land must be expropriated without compensation, 
The Herald says that land must be expropriated without compensation. If the President 
is caught in a contradiction, The Herald either softens the contradiction or merely 
refrains from publishing it. As Harrington (1989) suggests, presidential comments are 
very powerful in shaping the amount of coverage and slant given to certain news. The 
president may influence the amount of coverage given to these statistics by timing 
speeches to coincide with the release of a favorable statistic or by commenting on the 
statistic to reporters. (Harrington 1989: 21) Hence, for instance, “…presidential 
comments influence the length of report” (Harrington 1989: 34). Indeed, media 
scholars (see Ranger 2002; Chuma 2008) have argued that the Herald is biased in 
favour of ZANU PF and against the opposition MDC. The political opposition and civil 
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society routinely dismiss The Herald as a government mouthpiece and as ZANU-PF 
propaganda. Most significantly, studying the Business Herald reflects the mood, 
inconsistencies and the twist and turns of government economic policy. It is a sort of 
barometer. As such, the Business Herald perspective is crucial in that it doubles up as 
a reflection of government policy. In any case, most of what is published in the paper’s 
pages is typically filtered by shadowy gatekeepers (see Mabweazara 2011). Having 
worked in the Zimbabwean media industry, one observes many things and is aware 
of all the talk going on. This “knowledge” cannot fail to exercise an influence on how 
one goes about selecting who to interview and what to study. 
 
The Financial Gazette (or Fingaz), on the other hand, was selected because it has 
been a specialist business newspaper since 1969 (the only one to do so) and 
continues to be one of the best known business newspapers in the country with its 
distinct pink colour, modelled along the Financial Times of the UK. Fingaz is important 
to this study as a contrast to the Business Herald for the reason that it does not tow 
the government line slavishly. The fact that it is privately owned means that it is freed 
to say things that government may not want said. Of course, being privately owned 
means that, ideologically, its position is pro-free market. It can be trusted to be broadly 
anti-ZANU-PF, like most privately owned newspapers are in Zimbabwe. Indeed, the 
government routinely dismisses the privately owned press as “opposition” press 
(Chuma 2008). One could say that, in the choice of the Business Herald and Fingaz, 
I get a balanced sample: a “pro-government mouthpiece” and an “anti-government 
mouthpiece”. The reality on the ground, of course, is much more complex than that 
and neither the Business Herald nor the Financial Gazette can be reduced to simple 
binaries.  While Fingaz has been privately-owned the entire span of its existence, its 
ownership by a consortium led by former Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe governor, 
Gideon Gono, a ZANU PF member, led to it being perceived as having become 
compromised, less independent and less rigorous. However, the paper was recently 
bought (in 2017) by Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (ANZ), owners of the Daily 
News. The Daily News is well known for being a fierce critic of the government, a role 
it performed legendarily in the years between 1999 and its banning in September 
2003. Indeed, the Daily News was such a thorn in the government’s side that its 




A combination of snowball and purposive sampling was used to select journalists for 
interviews. I know some journalists who are not necessarily on the business desk, but 
these would be good as points of initial contact. Due to the high securitisation of the 
country (see Dombo 2018), it is not always easy to get someone to open right away 
up about their work, especially journalists who are perpetually considered undesirable 
elements by state security agents. As an outsider the best way then to get interviewees 
is to work by reference: it is not what you know but who you know and who knows you!  
In Zimbabwe they are called makonekti or makonekshens (connections). You will often 
hear someone say “ko ndikonekte ka” (please connect me). The power of “the 
reference” or the “konekshen” in the current Zimbabwean socio-political and economic 
situation is not just a matter of snowball sampling. It is, rather, a matter of the ultimate 
difference between success and failure and, even, of life and death. People survive 
on the strength of their konekshens. The wisdom is that the right konekshen can get 
one very far. One’s konekshen could be the difference between getting commodities 
from a supermarket or going home empty handed, getting cash from a bank teller or 
getting nothing, getting a job or being unemployed, getting US dollars or nothing at all, 
getting arrested or being released (dockets often mysteriously disappear in Zimbabwe, 
and influential people who are arrested are often quietly released in what is known 
sarcastically as the “catch and release” method). Essentially, Zimbabwean is one large 
informal economy, and so things do not follow formal channels that much, if at all. In 
such a highly informalised environment, the power of the reference takes on an entirely 
new aspect and meaning.  
 
The konekshens “system” is important in Zimbabwe purely as a means of survival, but 
also because – due to the extreme precarity of everyday life that includes state 
organised harm – people are distrustful of people that they do not know. As such 
people, do not like to talk to strangers unless they know their bona fides. Knowing who 
you are talking to, and having a good reference, can be a means to ensuring safety. 
In that sense one feels that it is difficult to criticise people either for seeking survival or 
for seeking to be careful. When I set out to do this study, I wanted to do some 
newsroom observation and then do my interviews as I gained the trust of journalists 
by being with them in the newsroom. I then wrote letters to the editors of the three 
newsrooms seeking permission to do the newsroom observation. I got a positive 
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response from only the Financial Gazette. However, in a decidedly very “Zimbabwean” 
turn of events, things did not go according to plan as I will explain later.  
 
To do interviews I was referred to one senior journalist in the newsroom who agreed 
to do the interview. It was then easier afterwards to have interviews with other 
journalists since it appeared I could be trusted. At the Business Herald, my former 
lecturer linked me (again the power of the reference) with someone who works at the 
business desk. By that time Zimpapers had re-organised business desks of its different 
titles. They brought together business journalists from the Business Herald and its 
sister paper The Sunday Mail. They then established a new business title that 
publishes on Thursday called the Business Weekly. The previous journalists from The 
Herald and the Sunday Mail were now writing for three papers, that is, The Herald, 
The Sunday Mail and the Business Weekly. This is the newsroom where I met my 
contact (my konekshen). The connection then introduced me to more journalists in the 
newsroom which helped me gain their trust. The problem with the konekshen system 
as it unfolds in Zimbabwe is that it can be very arbitrary and unreliable. Because it is 
informal, a meeting can happen or not happen on a whim and without an explanation 
forthcoming.  Most significantly, informal connections reflect the Zimbabwean 
propensity for chiokomuhomwe (hand-in-pocket) or mari yedrink (cool drink money), 
both of which are euphemism for bribery, kickbacks and quid pro quos and, in the 
worst cases, downright extortion, corruption and malfeasance. As Mare and Brand 
(2010) and Mabweazara and Mawindi (2010) have shown, chiokomuhomwe is a 
disease in the business journalism industry. In terms of organising for collection of 
data through interviews, the konekshen system can – as I will show below – be very 
unreliable. The point is that there are enormous costs, but also benefits, to the current 
informality dominating social and economic life in Zimbabwe. But ultimately this is a 
study for another day. 
 
I used purposive sampling to sample archival material in the form of newspaper 
stories. Because the study stretches from 1980, I initially set out to find journalists who 
were practising from that time, so I could interview them. I wanted to use snowball 
sampling having first purposively identified Geoff Nyarota, one of Zimbabwe’s best- 
known investigative journalist (see Chapter 2). While I managed to interview Geoff, I 
could not locate the other individuals he referred me to. I therefore decided to rely on 
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archival material to get a glimpse into news production practices in the 1980s and 
1990s. For this purpose, the Business Herald archives and the Financial Gazette 
archives, being the major archival repositories, were selected. To have a feasible and 
manageable sample I decided to include in the sample, one story per month from each 
newspaper for the two decades. It was therefore 480 stories for the two decades. I 
only sampled stories from The Herald on Thursdays because that was the day it had 
a business pull-out. The Financial Gazette also is published every Thursday. This 
helped ensure that a comparison could be made of how journalists approached similar 




Since the research seeks to understand practice, I set out to do some observation in 
the newsrooms. It would not be ethnography in the strictest sense because it requires 
an extended time in the field (Bryman 2012) and I did not have the resources to do so. 
It also could not be participant observation because newsrooms in Zimbabwe are not 
very welcoming to strangers due to the general suspicion brought about by the 
prevalence of government spying activities on media houses and on the population in 
general. Considering time and resource constraints I set out to do two weeks of 
observation in each of the three newsrooms I had envisaged to study at the beginning, 
The Herald, the Financial Gazette and the Zimbabwe Independent. After writing to all 
the three editors seeking for permission, I got a response from the editor of the 
Financial Gazette stating that I would be allowed to do observation on the requested 
dates. I flew to Zimbabwe and on the agreed date I had a meeting with the editor in 
which he expressed that he was pleased to have researchers in the newsroom as this 
would benefit newsrooms as well in terms of what journalists learn in college. I was 
allowed to sit in the newsroom where I was free to observe everything and ask 
questions to whoever was in the newsroom and the editor made it clear that I could 
also come to his office if I had any questions for him. While the day went well, things 
did not go according to plan the following day. 
 
As soon as I got to the newsroom, the editor requested a meeting with me. He told me 
that the General Manager had asked who I was and what I was doing in the newsroom. 
After being given this information the General Manager then stated that I could not 
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continue in the newsroom, I was to write to him directly copying the editor and stating 
again what I wanted to do and providing all the relevant letters from my university. I 
was to come the following day to have a meeting with the General Manager. I did as 
instructed and went back the following day. When I got there, I was told the editor was 
not in as well as the General Manager. I called the editor but received no response. 
All efforts to call later during that day and the days that followed did not yield any 
different results. I then realised I had become a victim of Zimbabwe’s newsroom 
sensitivities and, possibly, of the notorious unreliability of konekshen system. Being 
this or that person’s konekshen means that one cannot complain formally about a 
breach of an agreement. It also means that one may be welcome only when their 
konekshen, or the konekshen of their konekshen, is around. 
 
That day after I failed to meet with the General Manager I made a call to a former 
college mate who worked at The Herald and he told me the business editor was there 
and I could just try to go and see her without making an appointment. I did that and 
fortunately I found her in the office. This time I had dispensed with konekshen and had 
actually got an outcome. After a brief meeting, she indicated that she hoped I was not 
a member of the CIO (Central Intelligence Organisation) but had no problem with me 
doing the newsroom observation. It was on a Friday so I could start on Monday. When 
I got there on the Monday, I was told she had travelled to Davos with the President for 
the World Economic Forum (WEF). I could not do the observation in her absence. 
Again, this should not have been a problem had it not been for the pervasive informality 
of the konekshen system. In a normal, functioning organisation environment, one 
should not need the presence of an individual who has already given official 
permission. I then tried to arrange for a meeting with the editor of the Zimbabwe 
Independent but all efforts, even when I tried to make use of journalists who work there 
whom I know, came to nothing. I ended up flying back to South Africa having done just 
one day of observation at one newsroom. 
 
A few months later I tried again. By this time both editors I had met at the Financial 
Gazette and The Herald had left! I found it easier once more to arrange a meeting with 
the acting editor of the Financial Gazette. We agreed that due to what had happened 
previously the best I could hope for was to come and observe certain processes such 
as diary meetings but could not spend the whole day in the newsroom. I agreed and 
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was told to come the following day to observe the diary meeting which is done on a 
Thursday, the day the paper is published. When I got there, I was told the acting editor 
would not be attending the diary, but the General Manager was aware and since he 
would be the one presiding over the diary meeting, he would allow me in. Since the 
journalists now knew me from my previous brief time there, they allowed me to sit in 
the newsroom and wait to be called to the meeting. I waited for a long time without 
being called. The acting editor even came back from the event he had gone to and 
found me waiting and appeared surprised that I was not in the diary meeting. The diary 
ended without me being called in. It appeared I had been become victim for the second 
time. However, this time all was not lost. All the journalists agreed to have interviews 
with me that same day. I was given a room where I could hold interviews with the 
journalists. The following day after establishing contact with one of the journalists at 
The Herald, I was invited to come and hold interviews with some of the journalists. 
Again, I was given permission to conduct the interviews in the newsroom. At the 
Zimbabwe Independent my contact was told that because they were busy, I could try 
online interviews. I then decided to drop the idea of interviewing journalists from this 
newspaper. The decision was made easy by the fact that the Zimbabwe Independent 
had not existed in 1980 so it was better to only include those that were already 
publishing then, the Business Herald and the Financial Gazette. 
 
The Interviews 
I managed to conduct qualitative (semi structured) interviews with journalists from the 
Financial Gazette and The Herald. There were 8 journalists in the Financial Gazette 
newsroom on the day I was given permission and I managed to interview 6 of them. 
These ranged from those who had been in the newsroom since the early 2000s to 
those who had only been months into the job. They all agreed to be recorded but to 
maintain anonymity in my write-up. Interviews were held after they signed the informed 
consent form. Interview time ranged from 20 minutes to an hour depending on how 
long they had been business journalists. At The Herald I was not given a separate 
room as at the Financial Gazette. I had to go to each journalist’s desk to conduct the 
interview there. I managed to interview five on the day and one said we could do the 
interview the following day away from the office, which we did in his car. They all 
agreed to be recorded as well and maintain their anonymity. Interview times ranged 




At the initial stages of the research I intended to interview journalists who practiced in 
the 1980s and 1990s as well as those currently practicing. I knew those who worked 
in the 1980s and 1990s would not be easy to find but I thought I would give it a try. I 
decided to use snowball sampling starting with Geoff Nyarota, who apart from being 
known as an investigative journalist, also became editor of the Financial Gazette. After 
being referred by a colleague I managed to arrange an interview with him. We agreed 
to have the interview at a local hotel where he was very keen to reiterate that he had 
birthed the popular Daily News of the early 2000s. My task was made easier by the 
fact that he held in high regard the colleague (the connection) who referred me to him. 
After the interview with him I made a follow up on a few other suggested contacts, but 
I could not tie them down. I then made a decision to rely on archival material to 
understand the production practices of the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
Into the archives 
Only the Business Herald and the Financial Gazette were regarded as serious 
business newspapers from 1980 and continue to do so. As already highlighted in 
Chapter 1, The Herald was not a specialist business newspaper, but had a good and 
well-respected business pull-out on Thursdays. The Financial Gazette, a weekly was 
also published on Thursdays. The only place I could find copies of the two newspapers 
from that period was the National Archives of Zimbabwe. Even though I had been 
advised that there was a good library at The Herald, I chose to check with the National 
Archives first because it is a public place which would make it easier to access. 
 
When I got to the National Archives, I discovered that I had to pay $1 per day to get 
access. The dollar could be US$ or the bond note since at the time the Statutory 
Instrument 142 of 201910 had not yet been gazetted to ban the use of the US dollar 
(and other foreign currencies such as the Rand, Pula and British Pound) in Zimbabwe. 
After getting in I was told that the newspapers were packed in boxes containing copies 
for two months in the case of The Herald, and 6 moths for the Financial Gazette. I 
needed one copy per month for each paper. For The Herald I searched for all Thursday 
editions of the paper which were normally 4 for the month. Per box I was able to get 
                                                           
10 With effect from June 24, 2019, SI 142 of 2019, enacted by the Minister of Finance and Economic 
Development, Mthuli Ncube, introduced the Zimbabwe dollar as the sole legal tender in the country. 
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two copies and from each I then selected the most information-rich front- page story. 
I settled on using only front- page stories because usually the most important stories 
are found there, and it meant I did not have to read through the whole paper to get the 
story I wanted which would have been a daunting task. For the Financial Gazette, it 
was same process except that as a weekly I only got four copies for the month from 
which I selected the most useful copy from where I selected the most information-rich 
story according to my research objectives. Through this process I was able to gather 
24 stories from both papers per year, making them 240 in a decade. From 1980 to 
1999 (two decades), I collected 480 stories. From 2000 to 2018 I collected one story 
every two months since the period was going to be complimented by interviews. 
 
Data Analysis 
Researching business newsmaking practices requires that themes that discuss these 
practices be obtained from the collected data. Thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke 
2006) was used to analyse both the stories and interviews. Thematic analysis was 
used because of its theoretical freedom in that it can be used for both interpretive and 
essentialist paradigms (Braun and Clarke 2006). “Thematic analysis can be an 
essentialist or realist method, which reports experiences, meanings and the reality of 
participants, or it can be a constructionist method, which examines the ways in which 
events, realities, meanings, experiences and so on are the effects of a range of 
discourses operating within society” (Braun and Clarke 2006). In thematic analysis, 
both implicit and explicit meanings can be identified and described (Guest, MacQueen 
and Namey 2012). This study straddles both paradigms in that it seeks to understand 
the realities and meanings of business journalists while at the same time unpacking 
the discourses that shape these experiences of business journalists in Zimbabwe. This 
method is one of the most useful in capturing complexities of meaning in a textual data 
set (Guest et al 2012) To use thematic analysis is to go on a journey to identify, analyse 
and report patterns or themes that are located within the collected data (Braun and 
Clarke 2006). A theme encompasses the important bits of the data that help answer 
the research question. It captures some meaning within the data in relation to the 
study’s research question(s). In this case themes were selected on the basis of their 




While collecting stories I was placing them in folders per year, for example, all the 
stories collected for the year 1980 constituted a folder. These were then placed in a 
larger folder per decade, say 1980s; 1990s; 2000s and 2009+. I took the decision to 
include 2009 in the last decade because there was a significant change in both the 
politics and economics of the country. There were separate folders for each 
newspaper. Thematic analysis began with the reading of each story and noting down 
key issues in the story. This was done for all the stories in a decade. Having key issues 
per story made it easier to then look for patterns across the different stories in the 
decade. Recurring patterns were then noted and listed for potential themes. Themes 
were then noted according to the frequency of patterns as well as their importance to 
answering the research questions. This meant that sometimes a theme was preferred 
even though the pattern may not have been frequent across all the months in a 
decade. The themes were then listed with their corresponding stories. This was 
repeated for all the decades. 
 
Regarding the interviews, the first step was to transcribe them. After transcription each 
interview was read in search of patterns emerging and how they were relevant to 
answering Research Questions 2 and 3. Thus key responses were noted for how 
much they answered the questions, not so much their frequency across the data set. 
This meant that sometimes it could be responses from one interviewee that helped 
shed more light on why they report the way they do. However, in many cases there 
were patterns across the whole data set. This meant that in the write-up interviews 
were used to answer to why certain issues were reported the way they were and also 
themes that related to the work they do in general. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter provided the steps involved in preparing for and carrying out the field 
work to collect data as well as to analyse it. It highlighted the difficulties involved in 
obtaining observation data in Zimbabwean newsrooms due to the air of suspicion that 
pervades the industry as a result of surveillance activities by the state. The steps 
involved in sampling, collecting and analysing both archival and interview data were 
highlighted. The next chapter is the first of three chapters discussing the findings from 




CHAPTER 4: JOURNALISM AND THE ECONOMY IN THE 
FIRST DECADE OF INDEPENDENCE 
 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the first part of that analysis. It presents findings and analysis 
for the period from 1980 to 1989, the first decade of independence. The chapter 
discusses how the two newspapers, the Business Herald and the Financial Gazette, 
represented the economy paying attention to its duality or identity crisis and the crisis 
that confronted the government in the first decade of independence. It discusses how 
the two newspapers reported on the socialist principles and policies that government 
implemented in its quest to become a socialist country. It also discusses how the two 
newspapers reported the capitalist system and policies embraced by government even 
as it touted socialism as the way to go. As the economy moved from one crisis to 
another the newspapers reported on these and the chapter discusses in what ways. 
The chapter analyses the representation in light of wider contextual forces that worked 
to shape such kind of representation. 
 
The Business Herald on the economic identity crisis 
Eschewing Socialism 
In the midst of the general euphoria that engulfed the country due to the political 
transition from white minority rule to black majority rule, financial and economic news 
journalism found itself in a spot of bother. It was no secret that the incoming 
administration had fought the war of liberation on socialist premises, but had taken 
over an avowedly capitalist system, and that ideology was likely to determine how the 
economy would be run or, at least, would be reported. Financial and economic news 
producers found themselves in a position where they could just choose to run with the 
new administration’s ideology or defend the free market and state capitalism that had 
worked in the country since 1890. Interestingly, Ian Smith’s brand of capitalism was 
very much like socialism in that the state was heavily involved in the economy, whites 
were heavily subsidised by the state (a sort of “affirmative action”) in part through 
exclusive job reservation, and state intervention through parastatals and elsewhere 




At the beginning of independence in 1980 the Rhodesia Printing and Publishing 
Company (RPP) had white editors heading all its titles. When government bought 
majority shareholding it changed the company’s name to Zimpapers. This was 
followed in 1981 by the replacement of white editors with blacks (Saunders 1991). Two 
of the editors were card carrying members of the ruling ZANU party and one was a 
member of ZAPU. The first black editor for The Herald was Farai Munyuki, replacing 
R Drew. However, the Business Herald continued to have a white editor with David 
Linsell assuming editorship in 1981. This is important because from a quick scan of 
the bylines in the few months following independence, two names feature prominently, 
that is, David Linsell and Tim Chigodo. It appears therefore that while the government 
saw it fit to replace white editors with blacks for the main titles, the business desks 
were deemed to be not that important (or perhaps too important) to warrant a change.  
 
I wish to argue that the Business Herald practiced what I call patriotic journalism. I 
draw the notion of patriotic journalism loosely from Terence Ranger’s (2004) 
invocation of patriotic history. That is, patriotic journalism is the application of the 
framework of patriotic history in the realm of journalism. Patriotic history, according to 
Ranger (2004: 217), asks “which history for what Zimbabwe?” It promotes “a single, 
narrow historical narrative… (which is) endlessly repeated” (Ranger 2004: 217), and 
is “increasingly simple and monolithic history” (Ranger 2004: 218). Because of its 
narrow focus, patriotic history “has a certain force and simplicity” (Ranger 2004: 231). 
Basically, patriotic history is how those in power foreclose questions and force 
everyone else to toe the official line. It also has a dark side: it threatens sell-outs with 
banishment and anathematization.  
 
Patriotic journalism, for its part, creates particularistic justification which creates 
membership distinctions (whether one belongs to the “socialism” or “capitalism”) (or 
ZANU-PF or MDC) and holds out special obligations (that is, to support the new black 
government and shame its “detractors”) (or land reform and shame the Tony Blair and 
his local MDC agents). There is a special obligation to be partial to “socialism” (Gwara 
Regutsaruzhinji), ZANU-PF and, later, land reform, since these are unquestionably 
assumed to be for the “good” of Zimbabwe. A special obligation to be critical of 
capitalism (which is disliked because it is the favourite of the former colonisers) is held 
out. This model of journalism is evident right at the beginning of the “new” Zimbabwe, 
89 
 
but peaks dangerously from 2000 onwards when Zimbabwe was under the onslaught 
of the erstwhile former colonisers. After 2000 patriotic journalism blatantly deployed a 
type of “patriotic hygiene” in causing a hard and fast distinction between “patriots” and 
“sell-outs”. In this imaginary, patriots care for their country and are thus obedient to 
the authorised narrative and therefore do what they are told in service of “their” 
country. Anyone who questions the authorised narrative is a sell-out, an enemy of the 
state, and an enemy of progress. All sorts of national problems are blamed on the sell-
outs. Sell-outs deserve whatever comes to them, such as ostracisation, prosecution, 
jail, reputational damage or damaged livelihoods. 
 
Emerging from a period where there was heavy censorship of the news, the Business 
Herald in 1980 found itself relatively free from the threat of direct censorship but it 
nevertheless had to tread carefully to avoid getting on the wrong side of the new 
government too quickly. One could say that it was a case of treading circumspectly 
and testing the waters. After observing how their new  masters had been going around 
running the economy in the first few months, the Business Herald in September 1980 
carried a story that called for balance between emphasis on co-operatives as an 
economic driver, and individual enterprise. In a story titled “The co-operative 
alternative: A search for Zimbabwe’s rural strategy”,11 the paper made a case for co-
operatives as government was advocating but was quick to point out that this strategy 
had failed in other countries such as Kenya. The story pointed to China as an example 
of the folly of rejecting private enterprise. It stated: 
 
Experiences of many countries have shown the central 
role played by the incentive mechanism within an 
economy. China is a good example: after almost 30 years 
of neglecting and even suppressing individual motivation 
and incentives in the productive process, the Chinese 
government is now reported to be trying very hard to 
devise an effective system to allow individual initiatives 
(Business Herald 25 September 1980). 
 
This article played on irony. Considering the huge role that China played in the 
country’s war of independence (for supporting the Zimbabwe National Liberation Army 
(ZANLA) forces) as well as its place as one of the birthplaces of communism, this 
                                                           
11 Ikaro, K.G. The co-operative alternative, a search for Zimbabwe’s rural strategy, Business Herald  25 
September 1980: 3. 
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warning was quite hard-hitting in expressing the view that the Zimbabwean authorities 
could not be relying on a system that even its most ardent promoters and successful 
architects were walking away from or at least becoming unsure of. The story was, 
however, packaged in a way that would not attract unwanted attention from the newly-
minted government. But its central premise was that faith in socialism was a mistake.  
 
Since the period before independence had been marked by frequent censorship from 
the government (cf. Dombo 2014), it only seemed pragmatic that, with the coming of 
independence, newspaper editors would at first not only tread a little carefully and 
seek a modicum of balance in any stories that could be perceived as critical of the 
government, but more or less transitioned between being watchdogs and lapdogs. The 
Business Herald story of 25 September 1980 that pointed out the irony of choosing a 
socialist path where China was moving away from it, sought to balance things out by 
giving a somewhat positive and favourable account of how Kenya had adopted the co-
operative model and had been quite successful. Hence: 
 
Kenyan small-scale farmers had recognised the 
advantages of economies of scale which could be 
achieved through co-operation. These economies of scale 
could be enjoyed in many sorts of economic activity such 
as reduction of overhead costs in transportation, storage, 
marketing, accounting and management, purchasing 
inputs etc (Business Herald 25 September 1980). 
 
Focus on the theme of the importance of the rural economy was something the 
Business Herald seemed to try to maintain in the early years of independence. Such 
an orientation is not surprising. Most of Zimbabwe’s population stays in rural areas 
(67.79% in 2018), and most of the country’s agrarian economy is based there under 
the stewardship of small scale farmers (Moyo 1995). However, the colonial economic 
structure treated rural areas as backwaters and mere reservoirs for cheap labour for 
factories, mines and farms (van Onselen 1976). Settler colonialists had also alienated 
huge swathes of land from rural Zimbabweans and established their farms on it 
(Rukuni and Eicher 1994; Moyo 1995). Africans were thus pushed into barren reserves 
and so-called Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) through the passage of the Land Alienation 
Act in 1930, the Native Land Husbandry Act (1950), and the Land Tenure Act of 1969. 
The land reform process that came to a head in 2000 was in fact a historical land issue 
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that had been simmering since the 1890s – and it was fairly and squarely a rural issue. 
It is no surprise that the war of liberation was mostly waged from and in the rural areas. 
Indeed, ZANU PF’s most loyal voters who have helped it win election after election 
(allegations of rigging aside) hail from the rural areas. Finally, the poorest 
Zimbabweans stay in the rural areas, and infrastructure and services such as roads, 
health and education are generally neglected, making rural areas not just a key 
campaigning issue but also a key developmental issue as well. The Business Herald 
thus was not just being politically correct in emphasising the place of rural areas in the 
socialist matrix. Rural areas are a crucial element of Zimbabwean politics, economy, 
culture and society.   
 
Thus, in a 1981 story12 the paper wrote positively about the idea of Chinese communes 
that the country was contemplating adopting for rural development. In highlighting the 
findings of a team from the Zimbabwe Promotion Council (ZPC), the paper stated that: 
 
Chinese communes could be introduced in Zimbabwe and 
play an important role in the development of the rural 
areas…People in the communes worked very hard to 
produce food for themselves and for export…Commenting 
on the success of his mission, Mr Tracey said it was a very 
worthwhile endeavour and in the interests of Zimbabwe 
particularly in the circumstances of the country’s return to 
the international community (Business Herald 21 May 
1981). 
 
However, the rest of the story was dedicated to capitalist inclined activities of the 
Zimbabwe Promotion Council while it was in China. For example, the story notes that 
“Winding up the tour, the Zimbabwean group visited Guangzhou, and spent some time 
at the International Trade Fair. Members of the delegation held specific meetings with 
various trade representatives wishing to discuss bilateral trade with Zimbabwe”. What 
seems clear is that the Business Herald was itself caught up in the general 
schizophrenia that was gripping Zimbabwe when it came to the question of the 
country’s preferred economic identity. 
 
                                                           
12 Business Reporter, ‘China gives ideas on communes’, Business Herald 21 May 1981 
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The Business Herald engaged in cautious ‘watchdogism’ even as it tried to throw 
caveats in the government’s way about the potential and known dangers of going all 
out and full steam ahead on a socialist path. In pursuit of this it carefully selected its 
sources from the government, and gave ample space to their views. This, I feel, was 
partly to assure the government that the paper was on government’s side and 
recognised the authority of its functionaries. In a way, the paper had to make the new 
government feel that it was appropriately and visibly represented in the news as 
befitted the governing elite. As can be seen in the story on 21 May 1981, the paper 
used Mr C. G. Tracey, chairman of the Zimbabwe Promotion Council, exclusively as 
its source. At the same time, what editors could see as editorial pragmatism could also 
be seen by critics as mere sycophancy, something which journalists should not do. 
Certainly, sourcing a whole article from a single government source with little comment 
seems too fawning.  
 
Van Hout, Maat and De Preter (2011) have argued that sourcing determines who get 
to speak on what. Giving room to officials from the government or its agencies such 
as the Zimbabwe Promotion Council assured the government it was being given a fair 
hearing concerning its preferred socialist path. Interestingly, Mr Tracey himself had 
not travelled to China, but only his deputy, a Mr Philip Chipudhla, had. Avoiding getting 
the story from the head of delegation ensured that not many details about the 
communes were given. Furthermore, Mr Tracey gave more of an account of how the 
delegation worked to promote trade, a capitalist enterprise, rather than elaborate on a 
typical socialist way of living. Hence while the story appears to be about communes 
as a model for rural development in Zimbabwe, it dedicates much of the story to issues 
to do with trade. For a paper that had been forced to publish blank pages after 
censorship during Rhodesian times (Saunders 1991), such caution can be seen as 
justified pragmatism in the quest to create and maintain rapport with government but 
at the same time playing both an advisory and a watchdog role.    
 
The first decade of an independent Zimbabwe continued to be marked by reporting 
characterised by treading a fine line when it came to Zimbabwe’s ‘economic identity 
crisis’. In a story on 19 February 1986, the Business Herald pointed out that the 
country’s policies were strongly socialist but recognised the role of free market 




Although the Zimbabwean government’s policies are 
‘strongly socialist’ it still recognises the importance of free 
enterprise in the private sector, says a report by a mission 
of the British Overseas Trade Board which was recently in 
Zimbabwe (Business Herald 19 February 1986).  
 
What is even more telling is the way the paper pointed to the significance of the private 
sector by making it clear that investors were only interested in private enterprise rather 
than socialist economic activity. It revealed that: 
 
One of its other recommendations is that British aid money 
– within Zimbabwe’s development needs – should be 
allocated in a way that was of ‘direct benefit’ to British 
industry. The experience of the past two years suggests 
that this can best be achieved through a commodity aid 
programme directed at the private sector in Zimbabwe 
(Business Herald 19 February 1986). 
 
Zimbabwe at this time was getting some foreign aid and in explicitly announcing that 
Britain was only going to channel aid through the private sector, the Business Herald 
was creating room for a binary interpretation of the consequences of the country’s 
economic identity crisis. The socialist side of the economy was not able to attract the 
required investment funding and foreign direct investment (FDI), while private 
enterprise had ready funding for its expansion. 
 
While the Business Herald continued to routinely contrast the consequences of 
socialism versus those of capitalism (with a thinly veiled dig at socialism), it made it 
clear that it fully recognised the country as socialist and was accepting of (or resigned 
to) it. In the headline the words ‘Socialist Zimbabwe’ were not put in quotes while the 
rest of the statement which read ‘recognises vital role of free enterprise’, was put in 
quotes. At this time the paper was being controlled by the state even though it was 
officially a public media house owned by the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust (ZMMT) 
(Saunders 1991; Ronning and Khupe 2000; Mukasa 2003). The production of news 
involves not only journalists who source the stories but other players in the newsroom 
as well, such as sub-editors (Schultz, Suddaby and Cornelissen 2014). Headlines are 
written by sub-editors who internalise a way of writing headlines in a manner 
acceptable to the media house. Thus, in this case, writing the headline as they did, 
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demonstrated the influence of those behind the paper who considered themselves 
socialist. Some of these authorities such as the former minister of Information, Nathan 
Shamhuyarira, had declared that there is no such thing as freedom of the press 
(Saunders 1991). On the other hand, Gans (1979) argues that editors’ story judgement 
may be determined by the audience. It does make sense to know, and defer to, one’s 
audience. The Business Herald as a whole was distributed and read across the 
country, including some rural areas, where socialist policies of the government 
resonated with some of the people hence it was important to demonstrate in a way 
that the paper served as a platform for the expression of their aspirations. The pro-
business segment of the paper’s audiences were also going to relate to the story after 
reading the other part of the story title as well as the larger part of the story which 
recognised free enterprise as government policy. 
 
As the government emphasised global South-South co-operation, the Business Herald 
played its part in extolling such co-operation. Despite the country’s largest trading 
partners being in the West, there was a celebratory story in the paper when the country 
joined the Lome Convention, a grouping of countries from Africa, Asia and the Pacific. 
The headlined screamed “Into Lome at last: Full membership for Zimbabwe”. As a 
paper which at this time was indirectly controlled by the Ministry of Information 
(Saunders 1991), writing glowingly about South-South co-operation was something 
that could help keep ministry officials away from its newsroom. Such ideological 
gymnastics were probably something that the “pragmatic” paper had grown used to. 
When it was established in 1891 as The Rhodesian Herald, it shared the same mission 
as the British South African Company (BSAC), the company that led the colonisation 
of the country, of ‘Justice, Freedom and Commerce’ (Moyo 2003). This relationship 
demonstrated “how the print media was enmeshed in political and economic power 
structures” (Moyo 2003: 4). The same relationship was manifesting again even when 
the stated policy of government towards publicly owned media was ostensibly to 
maintain a hands-off approach.  
 
In the mid-1980s, under the editorship of Lynda Loxton, the Business Herald 
represented the country’s socialist project as one that only needed a dose of 
progressive vision to make it a success. At the same time, it retained the caveat that 
socialism on its own would not work. Hence it pointed out that nations were not islands 
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but, rather, lived in a “global village” on inevitable international trade. Socialist 
countries had no choice but to do business with typically hostile capitalist nations. In 
a story without any attribution to a source (thus making it a comment) the paper 
highlighted that Zimbabwe was trying to find ways of making trade with socialist 
countries work. In a story on 2 May 1985 titled “Improving trade with socialist 
countries”, the paper highlighted the desire of the country to trade more with socialist 
countries and how difficult it was finding that to be. It stated that:  
 
The Ministry of Trade and Commerce in conjunction with 
local and international trade bodies is planning to host a 
workshop on trade with socialist countries in Harare in 
January next year…It is known that socialist countries 
have found a number of problems entering the Zimbabwe 
market due to a number of reasons. Most businesses have 
had traditional suppliers in the West. And most socialist 
countries also face foreign currency shortages and 
therefore prefer barter deals to dealing in hard currency 
(Business Herald 2 May 1985). 
 
That the story does not have a single source, is classified as a comment, and appears 
on the front page of the business paper, may indicate the work of a hidden hand behind 
the story. It has been remarked that often state-controlled newsrooms get already-
written stories from the Ministry of Information (cf. Mabweazara 2011). That could be 
the case with editorial comment-like stories such as these. Starkman (2014) notes that 
there is a top-down approach in the production of business news, with investors and 
the market having a major influence. The Business Herald had to juggle the interests 
of investors in stories such as the above. While the ‘invisible’ hand of the government 
can be observed in this story, the ‘invisible’ hand of the market is also evident in how 
a story on socialism becomes a story of how difficult it is to ditch capitalism since the 
economy was intricately linked to Western markets and interests. 
  
Embracing Capitalism 
Throughout the 80s decade when the government sought to be on-message about its 
socialist path, the Business Herald still used the norms of balanced reporting to make 
the case that the virtues of capitalism were worthy of embrace too. This it would do 
without seeming to be supporting “the West” which had been ZANU-PF’s “enemy” 
during the liberation struggle. The love-hate relationship with former colonisers made 
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an open embrace of capitalism out of the question. As we will see, by 2000 the 
colonialism rhetoric had returned full circle, and Mugabe’s favourite slogan was that 
“Zimbabwe will never be a colony again” and hatred of the West and capitalism – 
particularly after the withdrawal from the Commonwealth and the Look East policy – 
became something of a virtue. In 1980, however, things were still in flux. Government 
rhetoric and the economic realities in the country were on different pages, shown by 
the fact that where government officials professed that they were socialists, many of 
them were involved in practices of private wealth accumulation (Davies 2004). This is 
lampooned as “socialist during the day, capitalist during the night” in GH Musengezi’s 
satirical play, The Honourable MP. Furthermore, Zinyama (1989: 235) notes that in 
1988 the then Minister of Finance, Economic Planning and Development 
acknowledged that the government sought “to consolidate a mixed economy with a 
strong socialist bent”.  
 
In a story on 20 May 1982, the Business Herald, quoting a policy analyst from the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), stated that 
“unemployment was worse than exploitation.” Taking this statement as a headline 
meant that the two systems could be placed side by side and when their negatives 
were objectively compared, those of capitalism would prove to be less devastating. 
While under capitalism there was bound to be some unemployment as the country 
was experiencing, the situation would be worse under socialism, a system which 
created room for exploitation of the people. The OECD policy analyst was quoted 
stating that “studies had shown that the success of a developing country was best 
served by an outward oriented economy aiming at export markets rather than an 
inward-looking strategy.” Thus, the Business Herald in representing Zimbabwe’s 
economic identity crisis – perhaps not too surprisingly – portrayed capitalism as a 
better system than socialism. We will call this the “capitalism-is-better-than-socialism” 
narrative. One of the members of OECD countries was Great Britain which was 
Zimbabwe’s biggest trading partner after South Africa. Comments from this 
organisation were bound to resonate well with the business community in the country. 
From this evidence, it would appear that newspapers reflect not so much a world out 
there as “the practices of those who have power to determine the experiences of 
others” (Molotch and Lester in Schudson 1989: 271). The OECD’s power lay in the 
economic influence it had on Zimbabwe as one of the country’s major markets for 
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goods and (therefore) a huge source of foreign currency which was in short supply in 
the economy.  
 
As part of the “capitalism-is-better-than-socialism” narrative, the Business Herald 
routinely praised state capitalism which had worked during the Rhodesia Front13 years 
(see Arrighi 1967; Anglin 1980). The coming together in a joint venture between the 
American company H. J. Heinz and the Government of Zimbabwe, for instance, was 
identified by the Business Herald as an example of a positive development in the 
economy. In a story on 23 January 1986, the paper reported that: 
 
The Olivine-Heinz-Zimbabwe Government partnership has 
come into its own with its long-awaited Heinz baked beans 
– made from locally grown Michigan pea-beans and 
tomatoes – due to go on sale for the first time next week. 
The beans are being marketed by Olivine Industries (Pvt) 
Ltd which is jointly owned the H. J. Heinz Company and 
the Government (Business Herald 23 January 1986). 
 
Incidentally, Heinz products, particularly Heinz baked beans, became a much loved 
brand for many Zimbabweans who could afford it. As noted by Starkman (2014), 
business journalism is investor oriented and market serving. There was a tone of 
celebration at the coming in of an investor of the calibre of H. J. Heinz, a well-known 
American company. The story also further confirms Davis’ (2007) assertion that 
journalism is a profession that caters for its consumers rather than its patrons. This is 
so because the Business Herald is primarily at the business sector. It should also be 
noted that the country was going through a difficult economic phase at this time and 
the coming in of a well-known blue-chip American investor was seen as a tonic to help 
restore some much-needed confidence in the economy. Furthermore, at this point the 
newspaper was controlled by the government through the Zimbabwe Mass Media 
Trust which was supposed to serve public interest, but the government had found a 
way of imposing itself on it. Consequently, an ‘elite discourse network’ (Davis 2000) 
can be observed in the convergence of interests of the newspaper, the government 
and private business. 
 
                                                           
13 The Rhodesia Front was the ruling party from 1965 when the country declared a Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence (UDI) from Britain. 
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Capitalism emphasises the free operation of the market (Froyen 2002). The Business 
Herald, in the face of Zimbabwe’s dual economy (Mazrui 1981), published stories that 
made it clear that free market policies were the superior logic as compared to 
controlled markets that socialism advocates for. In one such story the paper made it 
clear that the controls prevailing in the economy were hindering economic growth. On 
17 June 1982 the paper reported that “if short term constraints on the economy are 
removed, manufactured exports could rise from their 1981 value of $139.5 million to 
$334.8 million in the next year. This increase of $195.3 million could also create an 
extra 8 700 jobs in the manufacturing sector…” Presented this way, free market 
principles were appealing considering that the economy was suffering from a chronic 
shortage of foreign currency and there was need to get as many of previously 
disadvantaged black people as possible to work. Communication needs of 
corporations were overriding those of regulators as argued by Davis (2002). Similarly, 
in a study on perceptions towards capitalism, Peterson et al (1984) found that business 
and the media were the most influential of seven institutions competing for influence 
in capitalist America. In spite of working under the fear of being reprimanded by 
government officials, the Business Herald found a way of siding with business in 
calling for deregulation of markets. 
 
Policy consistency has always been an issue for Zimbabwe, and my view is that this 
policy inconsistency was born with the dual economy in 1980. Interestingly, policy flip-
flopping seemed to coincide with each crisis and, in turn, with the rise and fall off 
successive finance ministers and Reserve Bank governors. Finance ministers from 
Enos Nkala (1980-1983), Bernard Chidzero (1983-1995), Ariston Chambati (1995-
1995), Herbert Murerwa (1996-2000; August 2002 to February 2004), Simba Makoni 
(2000–2002), Chris Kuruneri (February 2004-April 26, 2004), Samuel Mumbengegwi 
(February 6, 2007-2008), Tendai Biti (February 2009- July 2013), and Patrick 
Chinamasa (September 11, 2013 to October 9, 2017) have all struggled to navigate 
between the demands of the “two” competing economies. Fiscal policy has, as a result 
seemed muddled, and balancing budgets, spending, and deficits, as well as attracting 
foreign direct investment (FDI), have seemed like a Sisyphean task for the ministers 
labouring in the shadow of Robert Mugabe’s gaze. The same effects of policy 
consistency have seemed to affect the work of Reserve Bank governors, but 
particularly beginning with Gideon Gono and the incumbent, John Mangudya. The 
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governorships of Dr. Kombo Moyana and Dr. Leonard Tsumba were relatively 
uncontroversial due to the fact that governors did not meddle in quasi-fiscal policy and 
activities. Schudson (2000) argues that from a political economy perspective, it is 
important to interrogate the role that the media play during periods of crisis and social 
change. Interrogating this may help us understand the extent to which economic 
fundamentals influence what the media publish. With the economy in crisis from 2000, 
the role of the governor and the finance minister became both contested and confused. 
At the heart of this confusion and hot mess, I wish to argue, is the policy inconsistency 
brought about by a “dual” economy. 
 
The dual economy of Zimbabwe has been consistently represented by the Business 
Herald at best as ‘confusing’ and in need of clarification from government officials. 
Where state controls on its reportage made it difficult to outrightly criticise socialism, 
the paper’s relative autonomy as a publicly-owned paper made it possible for it to 
demonstrate that it would rather have clearer policies concerning business to enable 
the economy to grow. It represented the duality of the economy as posing challenges 
for economic policy, for the efficient operation of business, and for the ability of the 
country to attract more investment from outside. In a story on 26 May 1983 titled “CZI 
congress: time for straight talking”, the paper presented a business wish list of issues 
that needed to be addressed by government to enable efficient operation of the 
market. The Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) needed to ask the Ministry 
of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs officials for “the government’s view of capitalism, 
corporations with outside interested parties, when drawing up legislation and 
parliamentary control over statutory powers” (Business Herald 26 May 1983). This 
stance by the Business Herald demonstrates the embeddedness of business news 
(Grunberg and Pallas 2012). This view sees the production of business news as 
encompassing norms and values residing in social systems broader than just 
journalistic ones. “These norms, values and logics”, say Grunberg and Pallas 2012: 
219, “are derived from the totality of activities and interactions between the media and 
other actors involved in news production such as shareholders of corporations and 
professional consultancies, as well as academia and industry associations”. In this 
case the Business Herald was articulating the values of an industry body, CZI, and the 
issues that it needed to bring to the attention of different ministries that had an 




One of the guaranteed things in Zimbabwe’s dual economy is government 
interference, firstly from the Office of the President, but also from the Party and 
Politburo. ZANU PF, because it sought to mimic China’s governing processes, sought 
to make the government take its orders from the Party. Shake-Shake house (the 
headquarters of ZANU PF) was, theoretically supreme in terms of guiding policy 
compared to cabinet. Even parliament (ZANU PF MPs who were in the majority) would 
get their briefing from Shake-Shake house and uphold party conference and congress 
resolutions. The same Party-government tension happens in South Africa, where ANC 
deploys government officials, including the president. All ANC deployees serve at the 
pleasure of the party. In Zimbabwe, however, ZANU PF was Mugabe and Mugabe 
was ZANU PF and thus the doctrine of the supremacy of the party did not work as 
efficiently as it did in China or even in South Africa. In fact, whatever supremacy the 
party had was usurped by the president, and policy became an extension of Mugabe’s 
will. The conflict lines were drawn between ZANU-PF’s or the government’s hand 
(which was really Mugabe’s hand) and the so-called invisible hand of the market. That 
is, there were two constantly contending but also constantly interacting invisible hands: 
Mugabe’s invisible hand and capitalism’s (via the free market) invisible hand. By 2000 
Mugabe’s invisible hand had become visible, and the invisible hand of the markets 
caused the markets to go into an inflationary and budget deficit tailspin that only ended 
with the abolition of the Zimbabwe dollar in 2009. 
 
Where interference was concerned, it was Mugabe’s invisible hand that was evident. 
Neither the ZMMT nor the other minority shareholders in the parent company, 
Zimpapers, were given room to influence editorial direction. Perhaps due to increasing 
government interference, the Business Herald became more cautious in its support of 
capitalism going into the latter years of the decade. Such caution is demonstrated in 
how it covered the seemingly complex question of wage and price freezes that had 
been imposed by the government in a bid to arrest galloping inflation which, in 1989 
had jumped to 14% from a low of 7% in 1980 and 7.3% in 1988. In 1990 inflation rose 
to 17% and jumped to 40% in 1991. Since 1991 inflation only came down to below 
20% in 1996 (16%). In fact by 2001, it had reached three figures for the first time, at 
112%. Six months after the imposition of the price and wage freeze, the Business 




The government is expected to make an announcement 
soon on the major topic of debate among employers and 
employees – the fate of the current wage and price freeze. 
But as always, the advice coming forth from both sides as 
to what the Government should do has differed widely. In 
the one corner, for example, there is the Confederation of 
Zimbabwe Industries, which wants the price freeze lifted 
completely in favour of a trigger mechanism for price 
increases to mainly rapidly increasing imported input 
costs; while the wage freeze is also hinted to be replaced 
by wage increases determined by employment boards and 
councils through collective bargaining… But in the other 
corner is the National Commercial Employers Association 
of Zimbabwe with president Emmanuel Jinda this week 
calling for an extension of the wage freeze – and, by 
implication the price freeze – until the medicine has done 
its work (Business Herald 21 January 1988). 
 
By merely describing differences among businesspeople, the paper seemed intent not 
to make the government for or against a particular position, considering that the policy 
was controversial from the start. However, it can be seen that the opinions of business 
were valorised in the paper’s reporting. Reported this way, the views of business were 
set to stimulate debate in society as to how the country should proceed with dealing 
with inflation and the policy of wage and price freeze. 
 
 
Fig 8: Zimbabwe’s inflation rates since independence. 
 
The paper’s support for allowing the invisible hand of the market is evident in the last 
paragraph of the story. It cites unnamed observers commenting that the view of the 
National Commercial Employers’ Association of Zimbabwe (NCEAZ) “highlights the 
difficulties and dangers of a wage and price freeze policy, no matter how essential it 
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was to introduce – as it was last year”. In other words, the paper’s conclusion is that 
any government interference in the operations of the market is retrogressive and 
dangerous. This seems, interestingly, to be a subtle anticipation of the 
neoliberalisation and deregulation of the 1990s decade. Business reporting in 
Zimbabwe at the time, it would appear, involved navigating gingerly between ZANU-
PF ideology and individual agency, on the one hand, and ZANU-PF ideology and 
market forces, on the other. Cottle (2000) argues that it is not sufficient to analyse the 
production of news from the political economy, sociological, and culturological 
perspectives only without considering journalistic agency as well. Since the Business 
Herald was controlled by the state at this time (see Saunders 1991; Mukasa 2003), its 
stories would be expected to be in support of ZANU-PF and government policies. 
While the fear of the government’s hand is evident in that there was no explicit criticism 
of government policy, the journalistic and editorial preference for the invisible hand of 
the free markets was evident. This navigation of pain reflects choices being made by 
journalists not only to express doubts about government’s preferred economic 
direction but also to subtly inform their audiences of the desirable scenario. 
Interestingly, writing what they thought the public wanted to hear would, for the 
journalists, fulfil a public service mandate. By telling themselves that they were writing 
in the public interest, journalists felt that they were fulfilling the mandate of the 
Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust which was entrusted with the ownership of the paper as 
custodians of public interest. However, was the public interest capitalist? The ZMMT 
cannot be regarded as capitalist. How did the journalists know what was in the public 
interest? Journalists were therefore making their own calls, as did the editors who had 




           
Fig 9: ZANU-PF’s continued homage to workers as “the backbone of the socialist 
revolution” and “the pillar of the nation” was in contrast to the silences of the Business 
Herald about this constituency. 
 
Something else stands out in this story of invisible and visible hands: the voices that 
are silent. Whereas government, on the one hand, and business, captains of industry 
and markets, on the other, were amply represented in the pages of the Business 
Herald, workers were a silent, unrecognised majority. The story, for instance, quotes 
only businesspeople and only mentions workers in passing without seeking their active 
voice. In fact, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) is lumped together 
with the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries in advocating for the removal of the 
wage and price freeze. However, unlike the CZI who are given an active voice, the 
ZCTU is not given one. This aporia when it comes to workers was in contrast to ZANU-
PF publications such as Zimbabwe News which continued to indulge in socialist 
rhetoric about workers as the vanguard of socialism (see Fig 9 above). The pattern of 
ignoring workers issues and silencing of workers’ voices could be said to demonstrate 
that the Business Herald was showing its true colours as being on the side of capital 
just as it had been in the early years of independence (when it was still dominated by 
mostly white journalists). At least, this was the expressed view of the trade unions 
such as ZCTU which felt marginalised despite being allied to ZANU-PF. This editorial 
leaning towards capitalism was, it seems, partly inherited. The pre-independence 
financial and economic news production scene and its news gathering and editorial 
practices was avowedly anti-communist and anti-socialist and, though often critical, 
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tended to be in support of capital. In October 1980 the Business Herald had a story in 
which workers were castigated for engaging in “unnecessary” strikes. It reported that 
“industrial relations had tended to be chaotic in recent months and unless something 
was done immediately to tell workers to follow the right procedures when voicing their 
grievances, there would be more ‘unnecessary’ strikes…” (Business Herald 30 
October 1980). No worker organisations were interviewed in this story just as in the 
21 January 1988 story. Thus, journalist agency is within the confines of experience 
(Bourdieu 1998). 
 
The Financial Gazette on the economic identity crisis 
On Socialism 
At the beginning of 1980 the Financial Gazette was owned by a white Zimbabwean 
(former Rhodesian) called Clive Murphy. Some of the prominent business reporters 
were Tom St Denis and Jack Verblow14.  As Chuma (2005: 48) notes, the privately-
owned press of which the Financial Gazette formed a part was in 1980 “predominantly 
owned, controlled by and addressing the concerns of a small, but economically 
powerful segment of the new society”. Interestingly, in spite of being “part of the 
colonial press that was aligned with the ideology and interests of the white ruling elite 
in Rhodesia” (Mukasa 2003: 173), the Financial Gazette – just like the Business Herald 
– also chose to tread a bit carefully in the early months of majority rule. Just like the 
Business Herald, the paper was concerned with allaying fears that the new 
dispensation would spell doom if and as socialism was wholesale adopted in place of 
capitalism. On 19 September 1980, the paper carried a story from a Swedish 
newspaper in which the then Prime Minister Robert Mugabe described the kind of 
economy the new government envisaged. The headline screamed “No evils of 
Russian Marxism here”. By writing a headline like that, the newspaper was not only 
fighting in the corner of its target market, the business community, but also playing an 
advocacy role of allaying fears and encouraging trust and confidence in the new 
system. Its take-home line was that there was no need to panic due to the change in 
government and the new government’s stated socialist principles. The story says that 
“Prime Minister Robert Mugabe recognises many people in Zimbabwe are frightened 
of the word Marxist”. The statement evoking fear captured the mood of the business 
sector at this time. In fact, some companies and individuals that had resisted 
                                                           
14 Evident from a perusal of newspaper copies 
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emigration during UDI, the war and sanctions were thinking of emigrating and in some 
cases did actually emigrate due to the uncertainty surrounding how the government’s 
stated economic policy would be implemented. The Prime Minister was asked along 
what principles he envisioned Zimbabwe. He responded:  
 
Our only model for Zimbabwe is Zimbabwe, True we have 
certain Marxist principles. People are frightened of the 
word - they see in it all the evil behind the system in Russia. 
But no, that’s not what we have in mind. We have in mind 
the common togetherness. The fact that people must work 
together and derive benefits, you see, which will be 
equitably distributed (Financial Gazette 19 September 
1980). 
 
The paper seemed to express overt relief that the form of socialism that the new 
government was adopting was not anti-capitalist (something which seems a 
contradiction!). Mugabe was turning out, at least in rhetoric, to be moderate socialist, 
whatever this meant. The Financial Gazette at this time had a very small circulation, 
about 4000 (compared to The Herald’s 92 00015), and mostly distributed by 
subscription to the white business community (Saunders 1991). The expression of 
relief was therefore both for the business community and for the paper’s own survival. 
This speaks to the fact that newspapers are not just in the business of reporting news 
objectively in order to inform. They also keep an eye on the prospects of their own 
continued survival and the continued feasibility of their business model.  Unlike the 
Business Herald, Fingaz (in Rhodesian times) did not beat about the bush when it 
came to socialism. It considered socialism unviable and an unmitigated disaster. In its 
view, a socialist trajectory could at best yield very unpredictable outcomes and at worst 
disastrous ones, which in its view included nationalisation of businesses. It is easy to 
see how a development such as nationalisation would spook a paper such as the 
Financial Gazette and not the Business Herald. Nationalisation would not spare the 
Financial Gazette, but would leave the Business Herald untouched (because it already 
belonged to the government). Hence a lot of store was put on the Financial Gazette’s 
apparent cautious tone at the outset. The spelling out of a different kind of socialism 
to Russia’s brought a huge sigh of relief to the newsrooms and corridors of the 
Financial Gazette. It was a welcome development for the paper and its market at the 
                                                           
15 Saunders (1991) 
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time. In a way, this is proof that newspapers are also driven by fears and hopes, just 
like people – and markets – are. In this case, the Financial Gazette’s fear seems to 
have a lot do with the jitters of the market and the stock exchange. Newspapers, says 
Parsons (1989: 2), play a key role in “how economic culture is communicated, and its 
myths and discourse sustained and propagated”. In this case the paper arrogated itself 
the task of debunking the “myth” of an evil economic system that, if implemented, 
would lead to potentially heavy losses for business. The paper was thus playing an 
advocacy role that suited the government. It would be trusted by its readers because 
they knew where it stood with regards to socialism. Thus, the Financial Gazette chose 
to give the government the benefit of doubt in the early months of independence. It 
recognised the duality of the economy that was coming into existence but chose to err 
on the side of caution by showing the duality in positive light. This was its way of giving 
ZANU-PF a chance. 
 
While it demonstrated no hostility towards the government’s socialist policies, the 
paper provided subtle hints that it would not cede its watchdog role. This it did by 
blending a cautious tone with a sprinkling of pointed warnings to the new regime about 
the challenges of adopting the socialist route. Unlike the Business Herald, the 
Financial Gazette did not have to fear being seen as supporting the former colonisers 
through its criticism of socialism and embrace of capitalism. As a privately owned 
weekly, it could report from angles it wanted without fear of government interference. 
In a story on 12 December 1980 the paper subtly warned the new government that the 
socialist bloc (Soviet Union, China, Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and so on) would not 
be of much help economically compared to the West. In a story titled ‘$222 million in 
aid pledged by 15 nations’, the paper subtly highlighted that all nations that were 
pledging to help were from the West except China. Even China was only offering a 
loan where Western countries were offering grants, with the exception of West 
Germany. The message was further emphasised by stating how Britain was the 
biggest aid contributor to the country. It stated that: 
 
To date Zimbabwe has received or has been promised 
Z$222.9 million (US$350m) in financial aid from 15 
countries and organisations. By far the biggest donor is 
Britain, which has pledged $112.0m in various aid forms 
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over the next three years (Financial Gazette 19 December 
1980). 
 
The unsolicited advice from the Financial Gazette was that the new regime stood to 
benefit more by sticking to the tried-and-tested West, in particular Great Britain, the 
former coloniser, which the paper said was an ‘eager’ partner in the development of 
the newly independent country. As noted, the Financial Gazette did not have any 
hang-ups about being seen to be pro-colonisers. This offered it better and broader 
scope, compared to the Business Herald, to speak favourably about capitalism and 
the West. Hence, for the Financial Gazette, the ‘reality’ of the country’s economic 
position and who truly were its “friends” (in this case, Britain) needed to be known by 
its audiences. By engaging in the very exercise of disseminating information that is 
needed or wanted by audiences, news organisations both circulate and shape 
“knowledge” (Cf. Tuchman 1978). Zimbabwe was in need of help to get its economy 
growing again after the damage and disruption of years of war and to the Financial 
Gazette it was the West that was proving to be a “friend” in need and in deed. The 
Financial Gazette backed itself to be the medium that would inform government, policy 
makers and audiences about the identity and consistency of those seen to be backing 
the country economically, in the process shaping knowledge about the better 
economic system between socialism and capitalism. This position, however, would 
have been hard to swallow for the government in 1980 or 1985, and it would have 
responded by labelling the Financial Gazette a Trojan horse for neo-colonialism as 
Parsons (1989) has argued that economic news is a core requirement for the 
functioning of a capitalist system. 
 
As the euphoria, though not the jitters, of independence receded, the Financial 
Gazette took an openly critical approach when it came to the details of implementation, 
feasibility and viability of a socialist approach to Zimbabwe’s economic development. 
One could say that the honeymoon was over. The claws were out. After only a year 
and half from the new majority government coming to power and articulating its pro-
socialism policy, the folly of this policy was already being “exposed”. For instance, 
other developing countries were reported to be abandoning it in droves in favour of 
market friendly policies. In a story in February 1981, the paper highlighted the naivety 
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and ridiculousness of taking a socialist approach and hoping to increase economic 
growth: 
 
The long-awaited government statement on economic 
objectives and priorities was released on Wednesday by 
the Minister of Economic Planning and Development, Dr 
Bernard Chidzero. As expected, the government 
reaffirmed its commitment to restructure the economic and 
social order to attain its goals of socialism and 
egalitarianism. However, with the exception of some new 
agencies proposed, there were few unfamiliar 
promulgations and few specific directives for which 
prospective local and international investors have been 
waiting, i.e. tax incentives for high-risk investments in rural 
areas or clear signals of certain hands-off policies 
(Financial Gazette 27 February 1981). 
 
The paper was slowly getting into its element and starting to shape its role and identity 
as a newspaper that was independent of the government – something which the 
Business Herald could never say for itself. It could be trusted to be impartial, unafraid, 
and unbiased, it said. The Financial Gazette was not afraid, even, to mock government 
policy in this story. For instance, it went on to declare that: 
 
‘Growth with Equity’ is intended to provide guidelines for 
investors and a ‘wishbook’ for donors. It is a statement of 
the government’s commitments, but not of proposed 
implementation. If its goals of 8% growth and full 
employment without inflation are met, Salisbury could well 
become the mecca of the economic magi. Certainly Dr 
Chidzero’s ‘whizzards’ would rank with Lord Keynes 
(Financial Gazette 27 February 1981). 
 
Bjerke and Kjos Fonn (2015) argue that business news can have an ideological bias 
and some of these ideological biases may concern the opposition between the state 
and the market. The ideological bias of the Financial Gazette was clear in this story in 
the way it highlighted that the government policy of Growth with Equity was a mere pie 
in the sky.  
 
In describing the Financial Gazette’s ideological leanings Saunders (1991: 347) states 
that it “emerged as an effective articulation of Zimbabwean capital-in-general”. With 
stories like these it was clear that in the dual economy the paper chose to go with 
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capital and saw the aims of government policy as incoherent, suicidal and irrational. 
Just as the state-controlled media such as the Business Herald became an ideological 
weapon for the ruling party hegemony (Moyse 2009), the Financial Gazette became 
an ideological weapon for capital. Both, however, claimed to be the most authentic 
voice of Zimbabwe’s economic interests. From a political economy perspective, it is 
possible to trace the relationship between ownership and power in the way both 
papers reported. Davis (2002) argues that ownership is visible in the editorial agendas 
of the media. As noted, the Financial Gazette at this time was owned by Clive Murphy, 
“a local white media entrepreneur and businessman”. (Saunders 1991: 351). There is 
little doubt that Murphy was in solidarity with other white people who dominated the 
business sector. 
 
The folly of government interference in business – according to the Financial Gazette 
– was “exposed” in a story on 4 December 1981. The paper made it clear that 
Zimbabwe’s peers in the developing world who used to favour socialism had already 
‘seen the light’ and were actively pursuing policies of government non-interference in 
business: 
 
A marked swing towards more freedom for private 
enterprise among many developing countries was evident 
at an important congress of International Chambers of 
Commerce of the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) held in Manila in the Philippines last 
week…There was criticism of increased government 
involvement in business in that it left statutory corporations 
in the hands of civil servants who did not have any 
responsibility towards shareholders (Financial Gazette 4 
December 1981). 
 
It is not surprising that the Financial Gazette wrote a story that pointed the government 
to what its peers in the developing world were doing, increasingly adopting market 
friendly economic policies. The privately-owned press in Zimbabwe is mostly liberal 
and pro-free market (Chibuwe and Nwafor 2012) Furthermore, economic reporting 
tends to take a particular worldview which is largely pro-capital (Lewis 2010). The 
worldview of the Financial Gazette, at least in this story, was the classical free market 
view of the world of massive deregulation and no government involvement in business. 
Government involvement in business through state-owned enterprises and a 
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centralised planned economy was portrayed as counterproductive since, for instance, 
where not only deployed cadres without expert knowledge of running enterprises but 
also civil servants placed on boards had no responsibility towards shareholders. The 
paper favoured the use of technocrats to head the administration of the economy, and 
not party cadres or Comrades. The promotion of free enterprise and employment of 
technocrats was therefore portrayed as a no-brainer.  
 
The sources the paper chose for this story betray its dislike for socialism. It had two 
sources, that is, Mr Abner Botsh, president of the Association of Chambers of 
Commerce of Zimbabwe (ACCOZ), and Mr John Robertson, the association’s 
chairperson for Economic Affairs Committee. These were selected from a team of 
eight individuals who attended the ASEAN congress. Such source selection points to 
what Usher (2015) calls a coalition of economists, politicians and media that tends to 
“defraud” audiences through their interpretation of financial and economic 
developments. The two economists, Mr Abner Botsh and Mr John Robertson, were 
used to emphasise the limitations of socialism and the superiority of capitalist systems 
(John Robertson is, to this day, still commenting on economic matters in both the 
Financial Gazette and the Business Herald). The two sources gave information about 
the benefits of capitalism exclusively from a business point of view. Thus Davis (2002) 
argues that financial elites influence policy makers through the economic “expertise” 
that they provide as knowledgeable sources for journalists.  
 
Considering that the Financial Gazette was mainly targeted at the business community 
in a Zimbabwe that was in the midst of a transition from pro-business policies of the 
Rhodesian regime to pro-socialist policies of the new regime, it is possible to describe 
the journalists at the paper as being “introjective” (Gieber in Clausen 2003: 50). 
Introjective journalists take on the values of their audience and internalise them such 
that they become part of them. By chiding the government and its policies and writing 
about pro-business developments elsewhere in the developing world, the journalists 
at the Financial Gazette espoused the feelings of businesspeople at the time who were 
the major subscribers. Davis (2002) explains that financial news outlets engage in 
cheerleading of business because businesses are the main consumers of financial 




The Financial Gazette also published stories that encouraged a collaborative 
soberness from both government and the business sector in relation to socialist and 
capitalist approaches to the economy. The country’s economic identity crisis was 
represented as requiring an economic compact and a spirit of co-operation from both 
business and government. While not afraid to offer hard-hitting critique, the paper also 
tried to report in a way that encouraged a common understanding between 
government and business. In doing this it also published stories that advocated for a 
mutually beneficial mix of socialism and capitalism. In October 1981 the paper quoted 
one of Zimbabwe’s well-known economists, Professor Tony Hawkins, in his inaugural 
lecture at the University of Zimbabwe stating that: 
 
In the past…state policy was to establish a climate within 
which business activity would grow and prosper. Little if 
any attention was paid to the basis on which the fruits of 
growth and prosperity were shared. In contemporary 
parlance, policy focused on growth without development. 
But the new government was committed to creating a 
different social order. It wanted to redistribute income, 
wealth and land, and ensure equality among all 
Zimbabweans…Equity achieved at the expense of 
efficiency and personal freedom would be just as 
disastrous as unbridled free enterprise. (Financial Gazette 
2 October 1981). 
 
By publishing such stories that called for a blended, multidimensional and mixed 
approach the paper was showing pragmatism. One reason for adopting a pragmatic 
reporting could have been the realisation that government was not totally committed 
to socialism as observed by Raftopoulos (2006: 205) when he stated that “the shallow 
internalisation of (Marxism-Leninism) in the ruling party in the independence period 
indicated more a tactical use of socialist ideology in the period of the Cold War than 
any far-reaching commitment to such an alternative project.” At the same time, 
government needed to be helped to save face, particularly with its urban workers and 
peasant constituencies on which it depended to win elections. For the government to 
abandon socialism unceremoniously would have been political suicide. It may have 
made sense economically, but it was not so politically. The voter needed to be fed the 
“right” slogans for as long as possible. This story was also important in how it 
discouraged businesses from disinvesting in the country and calling for localisation of 
operations of multinational corporations. The Financial Gazette, through such stories, 
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was playing the role of a (patriotic) mediator between government and business. If we 
take Peterson et al’s (1984) argument that the media as an institution sits as one of 
the foremost societal influencers, it is easy to see that the Financial Gazette was acting 
to get the two institutions, business and government, on the same page for the good 
of the economy. One could say, therefore, that the role of patriotic journalism was not 
only a monopoly of The Herald. 
 
On Capitalism 
Both the Financial Gazette and the Business Herald found themselves caught up in 
the conversations around the duality of the economy, but both tended to lean more 
towards valorising the virtues of capitalism (the Financial Gazette doing so much more 
wittingly and the Business Herald less so). However, there were clear but also subtle 
differences in how openly they celebrated free enterprise. The Business Herald took 
a more cautious approach while the Financial Gazette seemed to go all out in support 
of a free market economy. Parsons (1989) argues that since newspapers are 
embedded in the capitalist system, it is normal for them to become conduits for the 
transmission and legitimation of economic ideas and opinions. As the years passed 
and independence became a distant memory, the Financial Gazette adopted a more 
aggressive approach in its support of pro-business policies. The Business Herald, on 
the other hand, sat on the fence a long time, feeling the constraint of being government 
controlled. Only with the adoption of structural adjustment in the early 1990s did the 
paper feel free to talk openly about the “virtues” of capitalism. 
 
In a story on 18 February 1983 the Financial Gazette wrote approvingly of the 
government’s policy to abandon a currency non-devaluation policy which it had 
previously said was anti-business. The paper made it clear that command economics 
were disastrous for the economy. Thus “Zimbabwe’s method of devaluation was a 
‘realignment’ back to the competitive position of two years ago in relation to its trading 
partners and has ‘put us back on track’, said economist Mr Roger Riddell recently” 
(Financial Gazette 18 February 1983). There was a clear valorisation of policies that 
were there pre-independence as seen in the approving, almost nostalgic, reference to 
the ‘position of two years ago’. These policies, of course, were pro-free markets. As 
the government was going through difficult times economically at this time, the paper 
was placing the blame on government policy just as American media blamed the 
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Greek government for the country’s financial crisis in 2009 (Tracy 2012). However, it 
cannot be discounted that the paper was also playing its watchdog role over the 
government. The economy was not performing well, and government policy had to be 
scrutinised for suitability in promoting economic growth.  
 
But, when it was convenient, the Financial Gazette painted a picture of itself as pro-
ordinary people. In a period where the government had taken a socialist approach to 
the economy (Mazrui 1981), it was necessary that capitalism be seen as beneficial to 
ordinary people such as workers, rather than just capital. This is evident when the 
story highlights that: 
 
…devaluation would help the mining industry by increasing 
its cash flow. It would therefore ease the employment 
problem which would have been “acute” without 
devaluation…In relation to foodstuffs the effect of 
devaluation would not be so great as Zimbabwe produced 
most of its own food and even exported it (Financial 
Gazette 18 February 1983). 
 
Yet even this “pro-people” attitude was always done in a way that supported business 
position and free market policies. Writing about what business news does, Usher 
(2017) states that it “…provides information about reasons for the public and 
institutional investors to get excited about economic success…” In this case the 
Financial Gazette made it clear that both investors and the public had reasons to cheer 
the new devaluation policy because it would benefit all spheres of the economy. As 
Schudson (2000) argues, the media are good at making unbalanced power distribution 
and rewards common-sensical. In the Financial Gazette’s case there was need to 
make it appear as if there would be mutual benefit from devaluation even when it was 
business that stood to benefit more, particularly exporters who had not been getting 
the real value for their exports due to a rigid exchange rate policy. 
 
One of the key indicators of a growing capitalist economy is high levels of foreign direct 
investment. The Financial Gazette often published stories that upheld the value of 
creating an environment where foreign capital would be comfortable. In one such story 





Blunt speaking by an economist at an industrial seminar in 
Harare noted that the Foreign Investment Committee in 
Zimbabwe appeared to function “as a barrier to investors 
and not as a magnet” for foreign investment…He said that 
private sector opportunities were best identified by the 
private sector investor themselves, not by speech makers, 
bankers or civil servants…What can we hope to achieve 
by being so grudging in our acceptance of foreign 
investment? (Financial Gazette 25 November 1983). 
 
Taking Davis’ (2002) concept of elite discourse networks, it can be observed that 
journalists from the Financial Gazette were pitting two elite discourse networks against 
each other, namely, the voice of business and the voice of government bodies 
represented (in this case by Foreign Investment Committee). Thus, the Financial 
Gazette typified the fact that “business and financial coverage [becomes] confined to 
reporting the concerns of ‘financial discourse networks’…excluding both the general 
public and rival elites” (Davis 2002: 60). 
 
The Financial Gazette, as a matter of course, celebrated the resilience of capitalism 
in the face of ‘hostile’ policies such as those that the Zimbabwean government was 
implementing in the first decade of the country’s independence. In one story in 
November 1984, the paper celebrated how Delta (beverages), one of Zimbabwe’s top 
conglomerates, had managed to defy sluggish economic performance to post some 
impressive results. Commenting on the conglomerate’s better than expected results 
for the half year ending 30 September 1984, the paper stated that: 
 
In his last annual report for the year ended March 31, 1984, 
in which earnings per share were 30% down on the 
previous year, the chairman of the company, Mr John 
Carter, said there was little prospect of a resumption of real 
growth in consumer spending during the 1984/85 year. He 
forecast that earnings would be in line with those of the 
year under review. In fact he has now been able to present 
a half year balance sheet that shows significant growth and 
the earnings per share of 25.2 cents for the half year are 
85% up on the 13.6 cents for the half year ended 





News producers have in mind an imagined audience when they produce the news 
(Clausen 2003). At a time the country was undergoing serious economic challenges 
after immediate post-independence boom, the Financial Gazette had in mind business 
people who were suffering the economic headwinds and probably were reconsidering 
their position after resisting the early 1980 exodus. By reporting on the resilience of 
the capitalist system as evidenced by Delta’s impressive results, the paper was both 
reassuring business people that they could still thrive in the new Zimbabwe, and 
warning socialism advocates not only that there was no need to fix what was not 
broken but also that capitalism had the capacity to go on the ‘offensive’ when cornered.  
 
As the decade went into its latter years, there was no longer any perceptible fear from 
the Financial Gazette to go on the ‘offensive’ to expose the bad economic decisions 
the government was making. Stories that touched on economic policies were often 
those that highlighted the folly of running a controlled command economy. Such 
stories emphasised the unsustainability of command economics as opposed to liberal 
economic policies. In one such story, the reserve bank monetary policy was attacked 
for being anti-business. It reported that: 
 
The call by Dr Kombo Moyana, the governor of the 
Reserve Bank, urging Zimbabweans to make sacrifices in 
light of the current economic constraints facing the country 
‘is rather naïve and detached from the realities of life’, a 
local economist told the Gazette yesterday. The economist 
said that the country’s problems such as the deteriorating 
balance of payments position and the shortage of foreign 
currency, are vestiges of the government’s refusal to agree 
to monetary policy reforms suggested about two to three 
years ago by the World Bank (WB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) (Financial Gazette 27 March 1987). 
 
It is not hard to see why the Financial Gazette produced such stories with such a slant. 
Hartley (1982: 8) argues that “the way news is produced, what it concentrates on, how 
its stories are put together, and who takes an interest in it, all depend to some extent 
on the habits and conventions…which were developed in previous historical period.” 
The Financial Gazette had itself thrived while observing businesses doing relatively 
well during Ian Smith regime despite economic sanctions. The economy, some 
argued, had thrived largely because of the pro-business free market policies 
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implemented by the then government (Meisenhelder 1994). However, growth had also 
been sustained on the back of the post-war boom in mining, agriculture and 
manufacturing.  
 
The call by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe governor for business to make sacrifices 
was portrayed as unreasonable because the government itself had rejected reformist 
policies suggested by two of the most visible capitalist institutions, the World Bank and 
the IMF. The IMF and World Bank had left the country in 1984 after failing to agree 
with the government on how to reform the economy towards a sustainable free market 
trajectory (Meisenhelder 1994). Since then, the Financial Gazette had become more 
scathing in its criticism of government economic policy because the economy was 
clearly not performing well and there were signs of corruption by government and 
ruling party officials (Davies 2004). The height of such corruption in the first decade 
after independence was exposed in the Willowgate scandal where government 
ministers were caught up in a corruption racket where they bought cars from the 
country’s biggest car assembler at controlled prices and re-sold them to business 
people and wealthy individuals at many times the controlled prices. (Willowgate could 
be said to be the beginning of the arbitrage that became “democratised” with the 
“burning” of cash that began in the mid-2000s. See Chapter 5).  
 
While it was important for the Financial Gazette to report on the resilience of the 
capitalist system (as in the case of Delta above), the newspaper also highlighted how 
businesses were strained as a result of business-unfriendly government policies. 
When publicly listed companies do not perform well it can be due to internal influences 
or external, particularly the prevailing economic environment. One such company 
highlighted by the Financial Gazette was Cairns Holdings, one of the country’s then 
major agro-processing companies. The paper published a story in which the listed 
company announced its results highlighting poor performance due to the 
“unconducive” economic environment. The story on 13 April 1989 was titled “Economic 
change – why it’s needed”. The newspaper was clearly lobbying, almost as a pressure 
group, for a change in government economic policy which was premised on the ideals 




With speculation growing that the new investment and 
price regulations will be announced on Independence Day 
next Tuesday, a major local firm has provided sound 
reasons for why they are needed. Cairns Holdings has 
released what it calls ‘extremely disappointing’ results for 
the six months to end of February – and warned that things 
can only improve if certain changes take place (Financial 
Gazette 13 April 1989). 
 
Reporting that a major company expressed frustration with the current economic 
environment and direction of the country, coupled with the suggestive headline, 
demonstrates the paper’s position of defending free market principles in opposition to 
socialist principles that it directly blames for the difficult business environment. Hall 
(1973: 183) argues that “in setting out, each day, to signify the world in terms of its 
most problematic events…newspapers must always infer what is already known, as a 
present or absent structure.” The economy was one of Zimbabwe’s most problematic 
‘events’ at this time. The Financial Gazette, while diagnosing a problem that was 
already known at this time that the economy, really had the aim to lobby the 
government to change tack even without explicitly spelling it out. But its view, stated 
or not, was that socialism had only led to economic ruin. Sachikonye and Sachikonye 
(2011) give an assessment of economic performance by the end of the 1980s arguing 
that in contrast to the values of socialism, a politically connected black bourgeoisie 
had emerged and high-level corruption had taken root in the country. Furthermore, 
government debt had ballooned to 71% of GDP by 1989, with 36% of it being external. 
It had also become evident that the ruling party’s brand of socialism centred on state 
activity rather than the empowerment of the ‘masses’ (Meisenhelder 1994). It probably 
is no wonder then that a newspaper would take a stand to call for economic reforms. 
 
Representation of the economic crisis in the first decade 
The Zimbabwean economic was born in crisis, a crisis that began in Rhodesia. The 
new nation had been handed a hot potato. For instance, Mugabe’s government 
inherited a US$700m national debt. The cause of the crisis was many-fangled, but it 
included the loss of economic support from South Africa, the biting effects of the 
economic sanctions imposed after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) 
in 1965, the lingering effects of the 1973-1975 global recession, the budget deficit 
(20%) that was triggered by the bombing of the oil storage depot by ZANLA guerrillas 
in December 1978, a weakening Rhodesian pound, and defence spending that in 1979 
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was 47% of the national budget. While Rhodesia had managed to weather much of 
the effects of sanctions, the effects of the war, particularly in the late 1970s were more 
difficult to deal with, and the economy was poorly managed in the last decade of 
Rhodesia. It was therefore inevitable that with independence, the big question facing 
business news producers was how the economy would fare in the post-independence 
period. The fact that the new government came with communist tag attached to it 
served to amplify the need to track economic performance. Both newspapers 
published stories on the economic crisis that was already in existence at 
independence and what the new government would do and was doing to address the 
crisis. 
 
The Business Herald on the economic crisis 
As early as August 1980, the Business Herald was already flashing warning lights that 
the economy was heading for crisis even though it acknowledged the early post-
independence boom brought about by the removal of sanctions and aid from some 
donor countries. On 28 August 1980 the Business Herald reported that “A 21% percent 
increase in the money supply this year coupled with increased consumer demand is 
threatening to upset the so far moderate rate of inflation in Zimbabwe.” Where 
newspapers have been accused in recent times of failing to warn against impending 
disaster (Doyle 2006; Schifferes 2012; Starkman 2014), it can be observed in this case 
that the Business Herald was giving warning signs of inflationary pressures in the 
economy. Of course, a warning is not the same as a suggestion of solution. Someone 
still has to come up with a solution. The circumstances in which the Business Herald 
was reporting at this time were obviously different from those in which, say, Enron 
collapsed, Lehman Brothers went bankrupt and other banks needed bail-outs due to 
sub-prime lending activities in the US in the lead up to the 2008 global crash. However, 
the paper’s relative boldness can be seen in that at this time newspapers were still 
continuing to report within the framework of patriotic journalism (cf. Saunders 1991). 
 
In March 1981, the Business Herald reported the impressive growth that the country 
had registered in 1980. In the same breath, however, it was quick to warn that signs 
of economic strain were already evident. It reported that “Zimbabwe’s economy took 
off in 1980, according to official figures just published, and almost all sectors showed 
impressive growth. But signs of increasing strain also became evident” (Business 
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Herald 12 March 1981). Contrary to the view by Stein (1975) that while business media 
report accurately on macroeconomic developments, they often present one-sided 
comment and analysis, the Business Herald cautiously navigated its potential 
complicated ownership structure by providing a ‘balanced’ story (government was, at 
this time, making efforts to buy the holding company from the Rhodes linked Argus 
group). The title of the story “Impressive rise in Zimbabwe’s economy” gave a positive 
sense which would be acceptable to the government that was in the process of 
acquiring majority shareholding in the Business Herald’s parent company while in the 
story itself there were more statistics that pointed to an impending economic crisis 
than those that were positive. For example, after noting a few positives in the 
manufacturing sector, the newspaper pointed out some worrying trends. It stated that:  
 
But there are also some disturbing trends evident in the 
economy. The index volume of mining production was 
down in the beginning of the year and in fact over 
December the previous year dropped by 10 percent. Lower 
income urban families also had a sharp increase in the cost 
of living with the index rising by 16 percent from December 
1979 (Business Herald 12 March 1981). 
 
This representation of the ‘crisis’ reprises Allan’s (2004) argument that the news media 
operate within particular relations of power and control. Before independence the 
newspaper, as part of the Rhodesia Printing and Publishing Company (RPPC), was 
pro-capital. Now as a pro-socialist government was acquiring control of the paper, 
there was need for adjustment in editorial slant. As Doudaki (2015) argues, it is not 
only business interests that have some control over the news media, but political 
interests too.  
 
Tuchman (1978) notes that news is a product of newsworkers drawing upon 
institutional processes and conforming to institutional practices. Adhering to 
institutional processes meant that journalists at the Business Herald had to consider 
the demands of the paper’s owners while at the same time conforming to good 
journalistic practice of maintaining credibility. The Business Herald was, early in the 
decade, anxious to maintain and grow market share while also building and enhancing 
credibility” among audiences who relied on it for business news. This meant it could 
not just seek to please the government but had to play to the gallery as wel l. In any 
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case, the ‘brewing’ crisis was hidden in plain sight. Most financially literate readers 
had already noticed the way the economy was going by the time the story was 
published. As Drier (1982) says, the media is a highly contested territory. Competing 
interests were having some influence on how the Business Herald reported on the 
state of the economy with positive statics, for the benefit of its shareholders, mixed 
with those that pointed to a crisis, in the service and spirit of good journalism.   
 
The Business Herald’s cautious approach became more pronounced after the paper 
was taken over in 1981 by the Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust (ZMMT), a government 
created entity (Saunders 1991; Ronning and Kupe 2000). I wish to argue that this 
takeover increased pressures for “patriotic journalism” at the newspaper. On 26 
January 1984, the paper wrote a story titled “Getting to know the Reserve Bank…” 
The story itself did not offer much insight into the operations of the Reserve Bank but, 
rather, served more to highlight the crisis that the economy was in. Citing a 
representative of the Reserve Bank, the story stated that:  
 
The flow of money out of the country had to be severely 
curtailed to keep the balance of payments situation as 
much under control as possible in these difficult times. 
Zimbabwe could not further cut the remittances of 
dividends and pensions abroad without losing investor 
confidence, so it had no choice but to make further cuts in 
foreign exchange allocations and remittances of blocked 
funds, estates and the like (Business Herald 26 January 
1984). 
 
Thus, actual troubling details of a country in an acute financial and economic crisis 
were camouflaged by a story title that was almost deliberately misleading. This 
suggests that this was a newsroom that was well aware of the consequences of reports 
that portrayed the government in negative light. A New York Times story on 16 October 
1981 quoted the Director of Information in the government stating that positivity is 
news and negativity is not news. In the same New York Times story, it was reported 
that a white editor of the Manica Post, a newspaper which, like the Business Herald, 
was owned by Zimpapers, was fired after his paper reported the arrival of North Korean 
soldiers to train some local army units, a development it referred to as “sinister”. Such 
developments had worked to make newsworkers at the Business Herald cautious 




Sometimes the crisis was reported together with some good news so as to mask the 
full extent of the crisis, a practice that illustrates patriotic journalism. In Shona this is 
illustrated by the phrase kufukura hapwa, an injunction not to air dirty laundry. On 2 
February 1984, the Business Herald reported on the recovery that the mining sector 
was experiencing, but within that report it once again exposed the extent of the 
economic crisis the country was in. It reported that: 
 
Mr Leo Kimble, president of the Chamber of Mines said 
that members were now making a start towards a recovery 
in the industry after two years of disastrous results which 
in most cases necessitated financial support or guarantees 
from the government. ‘We are not out of the recession 
yet…’ (Business Herald 2 February 1984). 
 
The point seems to be that, as many ordinary Zimbabweans are wont to say, politicians 
can rig the news, but they cannot rig the economy. Due to state control through the 
Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust (ZMMT) the paper had to report the economy positively 
even though the crisis persisted. In spite of its socialist rhetoric, described as cosmetic 
(Marable 1983; Drakis-Smith 1987; Raftopoulos 2006), the government was in 
practice implementing more and more capitalist principles. What the government was 
using its “patriotic” media for, therefore, was to attempt to manage sentiment among 
businesspeople and other citizens who were getting disillusioned by the direction of 
the economy only a few years after the country’s independence. There seemed to be 
concerted efforts to convince the business sector not to ditch the country due to the 
economic crisis that resumed in 1982 after a brief, independence inspired, boom 
(Marable 1983). The Business Herald seemed to have been tasked with producing 
“patriotic” news that gave some hope. It seems to all intents and purposes that it duly 
complied, now that it was indirectly controlled by the government (Saunders 1991). He 
who pays the piper calls the tune, after all. However, newspaper’s desire to not just be 
patriotic meant that it need to be able to gauge the true mood of its readers and give 
them some news that they wanted and could respect. The means of doing this seems 
to have been to mix patriotic coverage with “unpatriotic” statistics and lines of analysis 
that, as it were, kept throwing the cat amongst the pigeons. To maintain credibility, the 
paper could not report fake news. Rather, it had to show that there was still room in its 
practice for the norms of basic journalism. Whatever was actually prevailing on the 
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ground had to be given an airing too. As Abraham Lincoln said of deception, “You can 
fool some of the people all of the time; but you can’t fool all of the people all of the 
time.”. It is therefore reasonable to take Schudson’s (2000) argument that there is a 
limit to how much owners micro-manage and control the narrative or what the news 
media always publish. The limits, rather, are imposed by journalists’ own professional 
intuition and a sense of responsibility towards audiences (that is, if we adopt a more 
optimistic view of the role of the news media). 
 
In the middle of the crisis in 1983 the paper was happy to report on findings of a 
University of Zimbabwe report that claimed business morale was gradually picking up. 
It reported: 
 
Business pessimism seems to have bottomed out but 
there is unlikely to be any major recovery in the 
manufacturing sector this year…Since the end of 1982, 
demand has slowly overtaken input considerations (raw 
materials, import quotas, skilled manpower), as the main 
constraint on industrial activity (Business Herald 7 July 
1983). 
 
In the construction of public knowledge, financial journalism – patriotic or not – is 
typical of the news media’s reliance on expert sources (Bjerke and Kjos Fonn 2015). 
Academic institutions such as the University of Zimbabwe in this story, are often 
sought for expert opinion by financial and economic journalists. The Business Herald 
could thus use a report from a credible institution to try to shape public knowledge in 
a manner that pleased government officials. However, the same credible source gave 
information that was designed to shape knowledge of those who read the business 
pages more, the business community. Again, the title of the story “Morale in business 
gradually picking up” had the potential to convince the public that the economic crisis 
was coming to an end. The rest of the report, however, gave a picture of an economy 
still in crisis. The fact that the report was prepared by the University of Zimbabwe, in 
a way also served to provide a defence for the paper in the event that government 
officials were infuriated by a ‘negative’ story. 
 
Much as it tried to remain a credible newspaper for business news, there are times 
when the Business Herald just gave optimistic reports – what I have called patriotic 
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journalism – of the economic environment even as the crisis was taking root in the 
economy. In October 1983 the paper reported that British investors were returning to 
the country, something that could persuade those who may have been thinking of 
leaving to stay. The calibre of investors a country receives can serve as a confidence 
boosting indicator for other investors. It was reported that:  
 
Leading London-based financial institutions and private 
investors are investing in Zimbabwe for the first time since 
independence. Britain’s largest investment fund, Globe 
and …[word unclear from copy] together with the M & G 
and John Clovette City investment funds are backing the 
$11.2 million acquisition by Aberfoyle Plantations, a 
company quoted on the London Stock Exchange with tea 
estates in Inyanga, of four Zimbabwean subsidiaries of 
international trading group Guthrie Corporation (Business 
Herald 27 October 1983). 
 
It is important to interrogate the role that news media play in the midst of social change 
(Schudson 2000). As the crisis was unfolding, the Business Herald played the patriotic 
role of calming markets by reporting on the return of British investment to Zimbabwe 
after some absence precipitated by the country’s gaining majority rule. Since the 
government had realised that socialism could not be implemented with haste 
(Meisenhelder 1994), there was need to reassure the business community in the 
country that Zimbabwe remained an attractive destination for capital. 
 
While this story highlights how the Business Herald was giving an optimistic view in 
the middle of a crisis, it is notable from the story that it mentions that British investors 
had largely shunned the country since independence. This is in contrast to the pre-
independence period where there was intensive foreign direct investment from 
companies coming largely from Britain, USA and South Africa (Zinyama 1989). It was 
estimated that at independence three quarters of companies in the manufacturing 
sector were foreign, with South African companies dominating (Zinyama 1989). It 
would therefore have been concerning to economists that foreign direct investment 
had dried up with independence – a surprise since sanctions had been removed. Did 
capital discriminate against a black government? Celebrating the return of British 
investors at this time, when the country was in the throes of an economic crisis, can 
be read as a reassurance effort to the business community that was already in the 
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country that it was not all doom and gloom. The economy that had grown in the first 
two years of independence (Meisenhelder 1994) was experiencing partly drought-
induced turbulence. 
 
Signs of an economic crisis were also intelligently covered by having stories that on 
the surface did not highlight a crisis. One of the key indicators of the economic crisis 
was skills shortage. What was more worrying was that the shortage did not come due 
to economic expansion but rather skilled personnel leaving for other countries. On 1 
March 1984, the Business Herald published a story that highlighted the skills shortage 
at the Posts and Telecommunications Corporation (PTC), the then only telephone 
service provider in the country. It reported that: 
 
The best equipment in the world is quite useless without 
the skilled staff to install and maintain it. An 
oversimplification but perhaps in a nutshell is the problem 
facing the Posts and Telecommunications Corporation and 
the main reason behind the deterioration in its urban and 
rural telephone service. Basically, the PTC is suffering 
from the loss of many skilled technicians coupled with 
having to keep ancient equipment going while modern 
plant is installed (Business Herald 1 March 1984).  
 
Journalists’ ability to describe and interpret economic news in a way that enables 
public understanding of the issues at hand has potential political ramifications (Doyle 
2006). This story could be understood in the context of the then shortage of telephone 
services which many ordinary people especially in urban areas were experiencing. 
The more alarming context, however, was the skills drainage that the country was 
suffering. For any business wanting to invest in the country one of the key 
considerations is availability of requisite skills. That highly skilled personnel such as 
telephone engineers were leaving was not a good indicator for an economy that was 
already grappling with a crisis. Thus, as much as the Business Herald had been 
‘captured’ by state interests, it tried to abide by its watchdog function over society. 
Unlike Starkman’s (2014) ‘watchdog that did not bark’, this watchdog was barking but 
in a tactical way, having been instructed ‘not to make too much noise’. 
 
Apart from highlighting the crisis, the Business Herald also tried to explain the causes 
of the crisis. In articulating the causes of the crisis, the paper had to be wary of 
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attracting the ire of government officials as well. Saunders (1991) highlights that there 
was more effort from the state to control political news. Perhaps that is the reason why 
sometimes the Business Herald could spell out some of the shortcomings of 
government policy even though it was treading a thin line. In one story the paper 
attributed the crisis in the agricultural sector to the controlled prices obtaining in the 
market. It reported: 
 
The prices for controlled commodities have to be 
‘significantly’ increased to counter the effects negatively 
facing Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector, the president of the 
Commercial Farmers’ Union, Mr John Laurie, said last 
week…Mr Laurie attributed the crisis to the drought and 
the world recession, and said confidence in the sector was 
‘possibly lower than at any time since independence’. 
Farmers were deeply in debt and this year it was possible 
that a carry over of the accumulated debt would be in the 
region of more than $200 million (Business Herald 24 May 
1984). 
 
Some of the functions of journalism as a watchdog of society include “educating and 
informing the public, offering diverse and alternative viewpoints, speaking truth to 
power, holding political and business elites to account for their decisions and actions, 
etc.” (Shaw 2016: 14). The Business Herald chose to speak truth to power and hold 
political elites to account for their policies that had led to an economic crisis. Although 
the source of the story, president of the Commercial Farmers’ Union, had his reasons 
for speaking of the crisis in the agricultural sector the way he did, that the Business 
Herald chose to publish the story even though it was negative to the government of 
the day, speaks of a newspaper that was prepared to play its watchdog role though 
that could attract censure from irritated government officials. Optimistically, 
newsworkers at the Business Herald were concerned about the health of the economy 
but the story also reveals a paper that was on the side of business as the business 
press has been accused of (see Doyle 2006; Thompson 2013; Usher 2015; Shaw 
2016).  
 
The Business Herald also explained the economic crisis in the context of global 
economic recession that was happening at the same time. On 13 January 1983 the 
paper published a story titled “Trade outlook – bigger, better”. In the story the paper 
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hinted that the country was failing to increase trade due to constraints imposed by the 
world recession. It reported that “Zimbabwe’s trading partners are set for a year of 
growing trade links with this country within the constraints imposed by the world 
recession”. In a way the Business Herald was sanitising the national crisis by pointing 
out that the world economy was in recession and Zimbabwe was feeling the effects. 
The sanitisation is further evidenced in a story on 19 February 1983 in which the paper 
wrote that “The key to recovery in Zimbabwe lies in a buoyant world economy which 
would enable this country to earn the necessary foreign exchange resources 
necessary to loosen the severe balance of payments constraint on the economy…” 
There was what appears to be a deliberate effort to exonerate the government from 
responsibility of presiding over the current economic crisis. The Business Herald was 
therefore put in a position where it had to constantly evaluate how it reported in order 
to stay on the right side of government (a ‘patriotic’ duty) while playing its role of 
informing the public of the causes of the economic crisis the country was in. 
 
Sometimes, in remarkable sign of patriotic journalism of kusafukura hapwa, there 
seemed to be concerted efforts from the Business Herald to hide bad news of the 
economy in positively titled stories. This again can be read as an attempt to conceal 
or deflect attention from government responsibility for the crisis. A story on 19 July 
1984 was titled “Businessmen are feeling more optimistic” but the bulk of the story 
gave a grim analysis of the crisis in which the country found itself. Quoting from a 
business opinion survey conducted by the Business Studies department of the 
University of Zimbabwe, the paper reported that:  
 
…forecasts were made at a time industrial output appears 
to be falling more sharply than in the two previous years 
and when industry can expect to experience the full brunt 
of the substantial import quota reductions imposed in the 
1983/1984 period…Provisional figures from the Central 
Statistical Office suggested that the volume of 
manufacturing production fell nearly 14 percent in the first 
quarter of 1984 and some forecasters had suggested that 
over the year as a whole industrial output would fall by at 
least five percent – or more than double the rate of fall-off 





Zimbabwe suffered the misfortune of two successive droughts in the 1982/83 and 
1984/85 seasons (Muzondidya 2009). These, combined with key mistakes made by 
the government to deal with an overheating economy in 1982, led to a crisis in the 
economy that threatened many businesses. At the time of this story the government 
was under pressure from the IMF and World Bank to abandon its socialist policies 
(Muzondidya 2009). How the Business Herald reported the crisis in this story can be 
read as an (patriotic) attempt to allay the fears of many in the country that were finding 
life harder under the ZANU PF government. At the same time because the government 
was negotiating with the Bretton Woods institutions it could not hide the reality of the 
crisis. In such cases the Business Herald found it much easier and much less painful 
to report the negative statistics.  
 
Analyses of the state and causes of the economic crisis continued to be buried under 
good news and neutral or positive titles, even when the information was readily 
available such as budget presentation. One could say that this was a form of false 
advertising. On 2 August 1984 the Business Herald had a story titled “Big business 
gives Budget a qualified yes”. The budget had been delivered in the context of 
measures adopted by government to stabilise the economy. These measures had the 
support of the IMF but later such support was suspended after the government insisted 
on some anti-free market policies deemed unacceptable by the IMF (Kanyenze 2003). 
The government was therefore under pressure to prove that its policies were actually 
working. Thus the Business Herald was used as an instrument to convey business 
satisfaction and talk progress. However, from a credibility-gap perspective there were 
fundamental issues in the economy that could not be glossed over.  For instance, in 
the story, a grim picture of the state of the economy was painted. It was reported that: 
 
In the face of the rising current account deficit, new tax 
surcharges, higher petrol prices, marginal wage increases, 
cuts in foreign currency allocations and higher prices 
because of lower subsidies to parastatals, the marginal 
decrease in sales tax would not significantly raise the 
levels of consumer spending and therefore production. 
The critical issue therefore is the urgent need to devise 
policies and programmes which would utilise the excess 
capacity in most sectors of the economy (Business Herald 




It seems to me, therefore, that there are clear and obvious limits to patriotic journalism. 
The most glaring limit, of course, is that politicians cannot rig the economy. PR has its 
limits.  Hartley (1982) argues that choices of what journalists report on and how they 
report on it are constrained by actors such as the state, the law, the audiences and 
the people whose activities they report. The Business Herald found itself in a space 
where they had to provide a picture of the state of the economy as truthfully as they 
could for the sake of business people who read the business pages of the paper, while 
at the same time avoiding painting the government in bad light, not only for fear of 
retribution but also a large percentage of the population still had a positive view of the 
Robert Mugabe led government. Thus news, as cultural commodity, describes “a 
particular way of life, which expresses certain meanings and values…in institutions 
and ordinary behaviour” (Williams in Turner 1992: 56). 
 
It was not just diagnostic stories that the Business Herald published, but prognostic 
ones as well. By doing this the paper became a platform for the dissemination of 
information that could help its business readers to plan and be prepared for possible 
future economic scenarios. This role was important especially in this decade of the 
80s without widespread use of the internet. As argued by Loeb (1966), there is a 
tendency for businessmen and investors to believe information they get from 
newspapers regarded as responsible, as correct and credible. In one such prognostic 
story, the paper reported on the potential economic performance from the mid to end 
of the 1980s. It took a story from the UK based African Economic Digest which 
predicted that: “Zimbabwe’s recent economic upturn is expected to continue for 
another year at between 2 to 4 percent compared to 0 percent last year and at less 
than 2.5 percent for the rest of the decade” (Business Herald 17 April 1986). Lack of 
forewarning of the public before financial crises is an accusation that has been pointed 
at the media (Starkman 2014). However, it is stories such as these that the press has 
used to defend itself, insisting that in fact warnings were given but people did not care 
to pay attention. 
 
The Business Herald then emphasised that the prediction was made not by a hostile 
agent, but a long-time friend of Zimbabwe called Roger Riddell. This source seemed 
calculated to give the prediction some weight. Reich (2011) argues that one has a 
better chance of appearing in the news as a source if deemed credible by journalists. 
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Roger Riddell was clearly regarded as credible (in a ‘patriotic’ sense) by journalists at 
the Business Herald. He had headed a commission appointed in 1980 to look into 
incomes, prices and conditions of service with the aim of correcting pre-independence 
imbalances (Kanyenze 2003). Mr Riddell was reported to have admitted that “accurate 
forecasting of the situation was difficult because of the volatile nature of regional 
events, the inability to predict weather patterns and the uncertainty about the US 
dollar, world trade volumes and key commodity prices” (Business Herald 17 April 
1986). Mr Riddell then gave some potential scenarios which the Business Herald 
considered important for its readers: 
 
As at the end of 1982, before the publication of the three-
year transitional development plan, there is at present 
heightened discussion around the overall economic 
strategy to be adopted over the next planning period…On 
the one hand would the Government move away from its 
pragmatic approach to the private sector and intensify its 
socialist thrust? On the other hand, would it pay greater 
attention to market-supportive critics who wanted more 
incentives for the private sector and a reduction in social 
services expenditure, subsidies and borrowing? (Business 
Herald 17 April 1986). 
 
The Business Herald’s difficult position of avoiding government censure was again 
evidenced by its emphasising that the report it was reproducing was from a ‘friend’. 
The friend appears to have had favour with both government and business, so the 
story provided a useful prognosis of the economy for the benefit of business and at 
the same time it was not too antagonistic to the government. By noting that future 
economic performance was not just up to the government the story served to 
somewhat absolve the government of full responsibility if things did not turn out good. 
Past experience in the 1983/1984 had demonstrated to the government that even its 
best intentions could have negative consequences. Its stabilisation policies had led to 
economic contraction instead (Kanyenze 2003; Sibanda and Makwata 2017).  
 
In the late 1980s as the crisis continued and the government re-engaged the IMF and 
World Bank, the Business Herald published stories that openly hinted at the need for 
the economy to be liberalised in order to stem the decline. For journalists that had 
never fully embraced the principles of socialism (but forced by circumstances to do 
130 
 
‘patriotic’ journalism), it must have been a  massive and collective sigh of relief to be 
able to report on the true conditions obtaining in the economy without the fear of 
censorship or retribution from government officials. In fact, it became a willing partner 
in the government’s quest to show that it was listening and moving towards more 
market friendly policies. Less liberal measures had received criticism from some 
quarters including academics and civic society groups in 1983 (Kanyenze 2003). 
Citing a report released by Standard Chartered Bank, the paper in 1987 reported that 
depending on favourable exogenous and internal factors, the economy was set to 
register some growth as the decade wore down. It reported that: 
 
Depending on favourable developments both at home and 
abroad Zimbabwe can expect modest economic recovery 
sometime during the middle of next year, reports Standard 
Chartered Bank’s latest Economic Bulletin. The bulletin 
echoes recent comments made by the Minister of Finance, 
Economic Planning and Development, Dr Bernard 
Chidzero, that the next two years will be ‘belt-tightening’ 
years before the country can get over its balance of 
payments squeeze and set course for growth once again 
(Business Herald 7 May 1987).  
 
As the decade came to an end the Business Herald, in as far as it churned patriotic 
journalism, continued to be a Trojan horse for the implementation of economic 
reforms. Even microeconomic issues were interpreted in the context of 
macroeconomic conditions and the need for change of course. On 13 April 1989 the 
paper reported on the frustration that one of Zimbabwe’s most prominent food 
processors, Cairns Holdings, was suffering due to hostile economic conditions 
including a price freeze. The title of the story read “Economic change – why it’s 
needed”. The story then started off stating that “With speculation growing that the new 
investment and price regulations will be announced on Independence Day, next 
Tuesday, a major local firm has provided sound reasons for why they are needed” 
(Business Herald 13 April 1989). 
 
By December 1989 there was more talk of liberalisation with the Business Herald 
quoting the Zimbabwe Economic Review provided by the Reserve Bank on 14 
December. The report gave grim statistics on the economy with only 11 000 jobs 
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created while the country had 300 000 school leavers in the year. Calls for more 
liberalisation were made with the report stating that: 
  
Employment creation is the reason for this year’s partial 
shift to free collective bargaining and for new pricing 
legislation. While more flexibility in firing surplus labour 
could also persuade employers to increase employment, a 
more accommodating official attitude to price rises is one 
essential pre-condition to an investment boom (Business 
Herald 14 December 1989).  
 
It is easy to see why the Business Herald had more latitude to report on what the 
government needed to do. The economy was in trouble. Kanyenze (2003) notes that 
there were severe restrictions on imports as foreign currency allocations were reduced 
to as much as 40 percent of their 1981 levels. At the same time the Zimbabwe dollar 
was depreciating against currencies of the country’s major trading partners.  
 
These developments were having a knock-on effect on investment and capacity 
utilisation. At the same time fiscal indiscipline continued with the budget deficit 
averaging 9.8 percent of GDP. Apart from the dire economic situation, the Business 
Herald, being state controlled, had other reasons to report liberalisation favourably. 
The increasing embourgeoisement and corruption (Sachikonye and Sachikonye 2011) 
of the ruling elites needed more room to expand. Socialism was also collapsing 
worldwide, and the country needed to follow suit. Compagnon (2011) even argues that 
contrary to popular opinion that structural adjustment programme that followed in the 
1990s was initiated by the IMF, it was a local initiative perhaps because of the desire 
for continued embourgeoisement. The Business Herald’s long held views of support 
for liberalised economy converged with the ruling elite’s desire for what Davis (2004) 
calls primitive accumulation of private wealth. Hence its reports in the latter years of 
the first decade of independence were pro-economic reforms. 
 
The Financial Gazette on the economic crisis 
Just as there was cautious hope for a better Zimbabwe under the new majority 
government, there was also hope in the Financial Gazette newsroom in the early 
months of independence. Such cautious hope came indirectly courtesy of some 
statements from the now ruling ZANU PF party concerning the economic trajectory it 
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would follow. Anglin (1980) notes that as it came to power ZANU PF expressed the 
intention to let the capitalist system continue even as it tried to implement its socialist 
policies. This feat, of course, was going to be next to impossible to achieve. Capitalism 
and socialism are a zero sum game. For instance, one cannot have both private 
property and collectivisation. One has to fall by the wayside. The Financial Gazette 
seemed set in its view that the economy was capitalist both in spirit and substance, 
and there was no need not only to change that overnight but to fix something that was 
not broken. But Zimbabwe had massive problems of poverty and illiteracy, primary 
health and housing, unemployment and nutrition, and above all landlessness, and so 
its leaders could not just sit by and hope that the market would cure everything. The 
incentive to meddle in the economy, particularly for a leader such as Mugabe and a 
party such as ZANU-PF that needed to grow its power base of voters and consolidate 
power, was a powerful motivation. Certainly, it would seem both ridiculous and 
irresponsible for Mugabe to just wait for private enterprise, trickledown economics 
(Reaganomics) and the market to solve Zimbabwe’s problems inherited from 
colonialism and the liberation struggle. The struggle had not been fought, as Mugabe 
never tired of reminding people at rallies, for nothing. Rather, it had been fought to 
transform Zimbabwe. The question was: how was Zimbabwe to be transformed?  
 
In light of the notorious indiscipline of the market (cf. the 2008 crash) and the profit-
making impulse which encourages more and more profit taking for the significant 
owners and shareholders, and very little for the poor, Mugabe was constrained to 
intervene more directly, and to institute some form of command economy. Hence the 
government introduced a minimum wage, strengthened workers’ rights such that the 
right to fire striking workers was weakened and whittled down (Meisenhelder 1994; 
Kanyenze 2003), interest rates were capped, government spend on education 
massively expanded (from Z$227.6 million to Z$628 million), spent big on healthcare 
(from Z$66.4 million to Z$188.6 million), supported and expanded the civil service and 
public-sector employment, and so on (cf. Davies 2000). What was clear was that the 
government was not holding back on intervening to expand government expenditure. 
The share of government expenditure grew from 32.5 percent of GDP in 1979 to 44.6% 




These massive interventions by the state yielded some positive returns, such as an 
increase in GDP per capita, increase in literacy and health, and a decrease in poverty 
and inequality. Furthermore, the hot potato of a misfiring economy that Mugabe had 
inherited needs to be acknowledged, including the fact that an economy built for a 
white minority was now to be opened up to the black majority. The potential for 
problems was huge, and success would have been miraculous. As the current 
example of South Africa shows, inheriting an economy meant for the few and opening 
it up to all is next to impossible. 25 years after “freedom”, South Africa is the most 
unequal nation on earth, and 55% of its citizens lives in poverty, and Black Africans 
on average earn only 20% of what whites earn. Basically, in South Africa, the top 1% 
of South African earners take home almost 20% of all income in the country, the top 
10% take home 65%, and the remaining 90% get only 35% of total income. Black 
Africans are overrepresented in the 90% who get only 35% total income, and Whites 
are overrepresented in the top 10% that take home 65% total income. In relation to 
Zimbabwe, this brings up the question: what choice did Mugabe have? Certainly, it 
seems that any attempts to open up participation of every Zimbabwean would have 
collapsed the economy, but, again, what choice did Mugabe have?  
 
 
Fig 10: The scale of South Africa’s inequality, 25 years after the “miracle” (Source: 
STATSSA 2019) 
 
There were therefore at independence questions around the extent to which 
government policy would emphasise equity rather than growth and stability (Anglin 
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1980). Against that background the Financial Gazette published a story that quoted a 
report from the Finance Ministry which stated that: 
 
Zimbabwe faces an uphill battle in 1980, mainly because 
of increasing oil prices, which have reduced the country’s 
terms of trade by 32 percent. For the first time in five years, 
however, the country will experience a positive growth 
rate, which should enable the government to meet some 
of the aspirations of the lower income groups (Financial 
Gazette 23 May 1980).  
 
Caution was also expressed when it came to the implementation of socialism. The 
Financial Gazette took caution not to overly criticise the policy in the first few months 
of independence. It took more of a ‘give it a chance’ attitude. Again, this was because 
the government seemed to be taking a policy direction that married liberalism with 
socialism (Mazrui 1981).  
 
The Financial Gazette of the early 1980s, being a firm part of the capitalist system and 
serving the interests of capital in its reportage, would have seen itself (at least in part) 
as having a ‘moral’ duty to highlight potential threats to the growth of capital. Hence 
as early as July 1980, it was already reporting on an economic crisis unfolding. In a 
story titled “Small business, big sell out” the paper reported that:  
 
The number of small businesses up for sale may have 
grown by as much as 50% in the last few months. These 
include restaurants, take-aways, hairdressing salons and 
butcheries. This means that it is not only skilled workers 
who are leaving Zimbabwe in alarming numbers but that 
the country’s small businessmen, on their own equally 
irreplaceable, are also indicating a distinct lack of 
confidence (Financial Gazette 11 July 1980). 
 
The early months of independence had been engulfed by a crisis of expectation as 
workers engaged in strikes for better pay and employment conditions (Kanyenze 
2003). The government responded by promulgating the Minimum Wage Act of 1980. 
When employers responded by retrenching workers the government promulgated the 
Employment Act of 1980 which made it difficult to retrench by requiring ministerial 
approval (Meisenhelder 1994; Kanyenze 2003). These promulgations proved to be 
challenging for many of the small businesses hence the Financial Gazette, being 
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steeped in the capitalist culture itself, was guided in its reporting by the need to 
highlight that a crisis was already in full swing in the economy. 
 
As alluded to in the story above the crisis was also unfolding with skilled workers 
leaving the country. Zimbabwe’s brain drain is legendary, and continues to this day. 
While the paper did not explicitly say it was white skilled workers who were leaving, 
the fact was implied in that at that time it was mostly white people who were skilled 
due to a deliberate education system employed during colonial rule. Furthermore, it is 
noted by Tevera and Crush (2003) that between 50 000 and 60 000 whites emigrated 
from Zimbabwe between 1980 and 1984. A large number of these were skilled workers 
and their departure was a cause for concern among capitalists and capitalist media 
such as the Financial Gazette. It should also be noted that some of these people that 
were leaving constituted the paper’s audience hence the issue was closer to home 
(bottom line) than just it being a capitalist organisation.  
 
Unlike the Business Herald that tried to avoid attracting the ire of government officials, 
the Financial Gazette magnified the unfolding crisis in the economy. The previously 
advantaged group of the country’s population, white, was feeling the crisis more and 
the Financial Gazette worked as a platform to express the fears of this group. Chuma 
(2005) argues that during the first decade of independence, mainstream private press 
such as the Financial Gazette was not only owned by white capital, but also served to 
articulate the white population’s fears and concerns. In one such story in 1982 the 
paper was concerned about the depressed performance of the Zimbabwe Stock 
Exchange (ZSE) and the loss to the country of skilled and experienced brokers. It 
reported: 
 
The palmy days of the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange are 
over. Since December at least four stock- and- share 
brokers have applied for deregistration and quitted their 
firms and one well known Salisbury firm of brokers has 
ceased trading…This shrinking of the once-flourishing 
share market in Zimbabwe has occurred within little more 
than a year (Financial Gazette 12 February 1982).  
  
To put the crisis in context the paper provided figures of how much the stock exchange 




During the optimistic second half of 1980 after 
independence, the Zimbabwe Stock exchange recorded a 
turnover of $91.6 million made up of more than $61 million 
for internal share dealings and about $30 million in external 
dealings. Last year the total figure for turn-over fell to $86.9 
million with a reverse trend in dealings. The bulk were in 
external shares, about $58 million, with only about $28 
million recorded for internal dealings. Today the market for 
internal dealings is at its lowest ebb so far recorded since 
the Stock Exchange Index started in 1967 (Financial 
Gazette 12 February 1982). 
 
The publishing of such grim statistics was not without significance. As has been 
argued, “facts are significant to the extent that they imply consequences to people’s 
lives” (Morson 1992: 24). The Financial Gazette’s representation of the unfolding 
economic crisis was meant to warn its main audience segment at this time of the 
‘wrong turn’ the country was making.  
 
With reports such as these it is not surprising that this period of the early years was 
marked by high levels of emigration as noted by Tevera and Crush (2003).  In their 
consideration of what facts to include in the news, journalists rely on their education 
and past experience (Morson 1992). Journalists from the Financial Gazette had 
experienced a country with a vibrant stock exchange even under sanctions, therefore 
it was significant that a newly independent country without the burden of sanctions 
was having such a bad performance of the stock market, one of the key indicators of 
the health of an economy. However, it would be unfair to not acknowledge the 
watchdog role of the media that the Financial Gazette was playing. It was warning the 
government of the crisis already prevailing in the economy that could not just be 
wished away or masked by good stories that the state-controlled media was 
publishing. 
 
Saunders (1991) articulates the dynamics at play in the first decade that enabled the 
Financial Gazette to represent Zimbabwe’s economic crisis the way it did. At 
independence the paper was largely a subscription-based, small circulation paper that 
served the white business sector. However, this changed when the owners in 1982 
decided to expand the newspaper’s reach and the range of stories it covered. It 
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deliberately started covering issues that affected several sectors of the Zimbabwean 
society, particularly as it related to the economy as well as politics. The coverage of a 
cross section of economic groups and their concerns gained it a larger audience to the 
extent that government officials from the Ministry of Information were concerned. 
However, it remained mostly business oriented as articulated by one of its former 
senior editors, Rachel Stewart: 
 
The paper seeks for many different sectors, including local 
small and medium size businesses, and privately owned 
businesses…and even multinational corporations in this 
country…but there is an underlying cohesion, the Gazette 
is the living printed existence of ‘white Zimbabwe’. We are 
the only newspaper that has the potential of reaching out 
to whites, and explaining to them the way things are here. 
In a way, we are an adjudicator of political economic issues 
for the white-led private sector, one which is also listened 
to by opinion-making blacks in government, business and 
elsewhere (cited in Saunders 1991: 357). 
 
Such emphasis on private capital is not new for the financial press. From mercantilist 
newspapers such as Lloyds’ List to free market newspapers such as The Wall Street 
Journal, the concern has always been with aiding a thriving private capital enterprise 
(see Parsons 1989; Starkman 2014). However, such an emphasis becomes more 
pronounced in a country such as Zimbabwe where private capital was concentrated in 
the hands of a minority white population. In that light, the consequences of the 
country’s economic crisis were interpreted in light of its impact on private capital. This 
is evidenced in stories such as one on 20 September 1985 titled “Mining fund kitty ‘not 
enough’ to keep mines going”. The story highlighted that “Zimbabwe’s entire mining 
industry is being seriously threatened by recent cuts in foreign currency allocations for 
the importation of essential materials, equipment and spares” (Financial Gazette 20 
September 1985). Thus, the foreign currency crisis in the economy was reported in 
light of its consequences for the mining industry. 
 
In explaining the crisis, the Financial Gazette attributed responsibility to the 
government almost always. In the above story the government was blamed for running 




A spokesman for one of the companies explained that this 
is a special fund which was set up in the late 70s wherein 
a special foreign currency reserve is kept ‘completely 
separate from the normal foreign currency allocation 
system’ for the mining industry…In March this year 
however, they [the government] said there was no more 
money left in the kitty, and all Mining Continuation Fund 
applications were turned off for several months (Financial 
Gazette 20 September 1985).  
 
It is reports such as these which exposed the government that led to some government 
officials becoming uncomfortable with the newspaper’s reportage. In 1989, a Ministry 
of Information report lamented how the paper was increasingly becoming influential at 
the government’s expense (Saunders 1991). The report noted that “government 
officials, politicians and many a patriotic Zimbabwean have expressed concern about 
the persistent negative attitude of The Financial Gazette against their government…” 
(cited in Saunders 1991: 354). 
 
Thus, as argued by Stein (1975) that the economic story requires a villain, the 
Financial Gazette found its villain in the government. The government was a ‘suitable’ 
villain because of the socialist policies it had adopted, which were anti-business, and 
its ‘mismanagement’ of the scarce resources, such as foreign currency in the story 
above, to the detriment of business and ultimately the economy as a whole. 
Governments that work not in the interest of capital often find themselves coming 
under ‘attack’ from the business press. In covering the 1997 Thai currency crisis, The 
Financial Times criticised Thai officials while “endorsing the Invisible Hand as a way 
to control emerging states” (Durham 2007: 64). When a new Thai government adopted 
reforms recommended by the IMF, the paper started reporting the government 
positively (Durham 2007). In like manner, the Financial Gazette became a platform for 
capital and the ‘Invisible Hand’ to express its frustration with government policies and 
actions.  
 
To its credit, the Financial Gazette did not only concern itself with covering implications 
of economic decisions on business only, but also the ordinary person such as workers. 
In a story in January 1985 the paper reported on how salaries were falling behind 
inflation. It stated that “Zimbabweans effectively had their salaries reduced in 1984, 
with increases being the lowest since 1980. This is the third successive year in which 
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increases have not kept pace with inflation, and in real dollar terms, people are worse 
off than they were in 1983” (Financial Gazette 18 January 1985). With such stories the 
paper managed to gain readership from wider section of society than it did before 
1982. The Ministry of Information complained that “long queues of supporters can be 
noticed early on Friday trying to secure their copies. The Financial Gazette has 
boasted of having more supporters that ‘vote’ for it than the Minister of Information had 
in his constituency…” (cited in Saunders 1991: 354). 
 
The Financial Gazette reported on issues that not only businesspeople were relating 
to but the general public as well hence the growth in readership. Ordinary people were 
feeling the biting effects of a combination of structural reforms and stabilisation 
programmes the government was implementing through the Transitional National 
Development Plan (TNDP) 1982 – 1985. Kanyenze (2003: 46-47) lists some of the 
policy adjustments that the government implemented: 
 
1. devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar by 20 per cent on 9 December 1982 and 
thereafter tying it to a trade weighted basket of undisclosed currencies 
2. introduction of new incentives for exports 
3. restrictions on new non-concessionary foreign borrowing from 23 March 1983 
4. balance of payments controls (27 March 1984) through (a) temporary 
suspension of remittances of dividends and profits; (b) temporary reduction of 
emigrants’ settling allowances; (c) acquisition of blocked external securities 
pool; and d) sharp cutbacks in foreign exchange allocations each year until the 
second half of 1985 
5. price and wage controls through cuts in subsidies and increases in 
administered prices (from May 1982); wage freeze (January 1982) and 
thereafter the adoption of a contractionary wage policy 
6. restriction on government credit expansion; restriction on new recruitment by 
the government (1983/84) 
7. contractionary monetary policies through increases in interest rates, restriction 




8. a major increase in central government revenues (they rose by about 10 per 
cent of GDP between 1979/80 and 1983/84) through both increases in taxes 
and a shift from quotas to tariffs 
9. increases in the controlled prices of key food items and utility and rail tariffs  
(Source: Kanyenze 2003: 46-47). 
 
A close analysis of these measures shows that they were bound to have an impact on 
both business and workers meaning the impact was more widespread. The Financial 
Gazette as a newspaper that did not have the baggage of reporting the government 
favourably could articulate these issues freely leading to its gaining wider readership. 
The crisis created conditions for the paper to expand its reach. Saunders (1991) notes 
that before 1982, Clive Murphy, the owner of Modus Publications which owned the 
Financial Gazette, left it to run down with no meaningful capital injection. This changed 
in 1982 when he, together with his business partners, Nigel and Rhett Butler, 
expanded infrastructure and increased staff compliment. It is no coincidence that the 
change in direction came at a time there was growing discontent with how people’s 
lives were being negatively impacted by the new majority government’s policies. 
 
From 1986 the government adopted First Five-Year National Development Plan. The 
Financial Gazette published stories that offered ‘sober’ analyses of the economy. Even 
when statistics looked good on the surface, the paper chose to make use of reports 
that uncovered why the economy was having such good numbers. An example is a 
story in March 1986 where the paper published a report from the RAL Merchant Bank 
that showed that the country had registered a balance of payments (BOP) surplus in 
1984, which was the first time in eight years. While on the surface this would be good 
news, the paper went on to explain the reasons behind the surplus. It stated that “The 
continued suspension of dividend interest and rent outflows during 1985, plus the sale 
of more of the external securities, suggests the probability of another overall surplus 
of the balance of payments for the year” (Financial Gazette 27 March 1986). Thus, 
Usher (2017) argues that financial and economic news provides information about 
booms and busts and offers reasons for such for the benefit of the public and 




The Financial Gazette made sure not to get its readers excited about the seemingly 
good economic statics, but rather chose to offer a sober analysis. In the same story, 
regarding an increase in export revenue, the paper noted that “steep rises in the 
current price values are however due more to the devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar, 
as Zimbabwe’s volume of trade showed no appreciable growth”. Kanyenze (2003) 
paints a picture of the positives and negatives brought about by measures in the 
National Development Plan: 
 
In terms of real GDP growth, the economy grew at close to 
the target growth rate of 5.1 per cent, averaging 4 per cent 
per annum for the period 1986–90. Employment grew at 
an annual average rate of 2.7 percent during the same 
period. This average annual rate of growth is inadequate 
to deal with new entrants into the labour market, as 
reflected in the growth rate of the labour force of around 3 
per cent per annum. The current account improved 
markedly during the period 1986–88, before deteriorating 
in 1989 and 1990. At the beginning of 1986, factor 
payments abroad were resumed. The pressure exerted on 
the current account was largely absorbed through cuts in 
foreign currency allocations. It is estimated that the real 
value of the 1986 allocation amounted to about 35 per cent 
of its 1981 value. Further cuts in the foreign exchange 
allocations were made in 1987 such that the real value of 
the 1987 allocation was about 30 per cent of its 1981 level 
(Kanyenze 2003: 50-51). 
 
The mixed results explain why the Financial Gazette chose to point out the reasons 
behind some of the good numbers the economy was producing. Thus, like the 
Business Herald, the paper chose to play its watchdog function over society. It did this 
without the metaphoric gun pointed at ‘its head’ by state officials as with the Business 
Herald. However, the media are never passive observers of the markets (Thompson 
2013). If the paper grew its circulation by publishing negative stories of the economy, 
it is possible that even when some positives were evident, these had to be mixed with 
some negatives. After all it was negativity that was selling. Therefore, as much as the 
paper provided a correct reading of the reasons behind the BOP surplus in the story 
above, the information also served to alert the paper’s fellow white capital colleagues 
to the fact that the economic crisis was far from over. The Financial Gazette was part 
of the capitalist system (Saunders 1991), therefore it had vested interests in the 
operation of markets which could have an impact on its own survival. If export figures 
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were high, it could mean an improvement in foreign exchange allocations but if the 
improvement was only in figures not in real terms then there was nothing to cheer 
about. 
 
In representing the country’s economic crisis, the Financial Gazette did not just make 
sober analyses, they were holistic too. Where business news has been accused of 
focusing on the good during periods of boom (Starkman 2014), the Financial Gazette 
did not get carried away by short-term recoveries in the economy. Instead, it offered a 
historical perspective as indicative of what could happen in future. In all this, it 
emphasised how the economy kept trudging along in crisis. In one story, the paper 
published an analysis from Tony Hawkins, a professor at the University of Zimbabwe, 
in which he reviewed the country’s economic performance from 1980 to 1987. The 
review chronicled government missteps in relation to the economy as well as 
unfortunate natural and global developments that contributed to the perpetual crisis 
the country found itself in. The review noted: 
 
Rapid growth in the first two years of independence arose 
from the favourable terms of trade effects of the lifting of 
the economic sanctions which increased exports 25% in 
one year, a superb rainy season in 1980/81, high levels of 
foreign borrowing, the strong bullion price and the doubling 
of investment level…But success was short lived. By mid-
1981 it was clear that the economy was overheating and 
that the manufacturing boom was unhealthily dependent 
both on substantially increased import allocations and 
buoyant domestic demand. The authorities moved to curb 
domestic spending with higher interest rates and taxes but 
these measures were soon overtaken by the downturn in 
the world economy and severe 1981/82 drought with the 
result that overheating turned – within a matter of months 
– into recession (Financial Gazette 8 January 1988).  
 
What is most notable about this story is that at this time a number of economic 
indicators were positive. For example, a story in August 1988 reveals how the country 
had registered some positives in the economy. It highlighted that:  
 
Manufacturing output increased by 3.2% in the first three 
months of 1988, compared to the same period in 1987. The 
drink and tobacco, and chemical and oils product groups 
recorded the highest increases in output of 26.9% and 
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5.9% respectively. Mineral production increased by 1.6% 
in the first four months of 1988. Coal and copper recorded 
the largest increases of 16.9% and 15.8% respectively 
(Financial Gazette 19 August 1988).  
 
By publishing a report that offered a holistic interpretation of developments in the 
economy from 1980 to 1988, the paper provided signals to its audiences to not overly 
become excited by short term positives as experience had taught. Furthermore, this 
is the period when discussions around economic reform were gathering momentum, 
so it was important to remind audiences that the reforms remained a viable way to 
long lasting prosperity instead of the seemingly short-term positives that the economy 
was producing. Thus, the Financial Gazette was guided in reporting the crisis by its 
being part of the capitalist system. It needed to be in capital’s corner while at the same 
time increasing its market share by publishing reports that resonated with a larger 
population than was possible prior to 1982. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter analysed how Zimbabwe’s economic identity and economic crises were 
represented by two newspapers, the Business Herald and the Financial Gazette in the 
first decade of the country’s independence. The economic identity crisis – a sort of 
schizophrenia –arose from government attempts to intervene in the economy by 
following socialist principles when, in fact, it was implementing measures that were 
leading the country on a liberal capitalist path. This resulted in state-controlled, the 
Business Herald, treading carefully when it came to reporting issues to do with 
socialism – what I have called the birth of patriotic journalism. It was noted in the 
chapter that the Business Herald, despite the ideological stand of its employer, never 
fully embraced socialism; its reports on socialism often mixed with some advocacy for 
free market policies. It therefore walked a fine line between keeping irritated 
government officials at bay while pointing out the benefits of capitalist principles. 
However, this fine balance was mostly kept in the first half of the decade. The second 
half of the decade was marked by the government internal discussions on the need 
for economic liberalisation and deregulation. For a while this marked the death of 
patriotic journalism, until its resurrection in 2000. The paper then openly sided with 
those that were for market reforms without the fear of facing backlash. By the end of 
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the decade the paper had taken an unmistakable pro-reform stance as reflected in its 
stories. 
 
The Financial Gazette, on the other hand, was only circumspect for a very brief time, 
in the first few months of independence when it practiced its own version of patriotic 
journalism by steering clear of openly criticising the new government’s chosen socialist 
path. However, this ‘hands off’ approach was quickly superseded as the capitalist 
system came under attack from the effects of the socialist principles the government 
was implementing. For the Financial Gazette, the way it covered the dual economy 
and the crisis were more about its own survival and future-proofing. As its traditional 
market was dwindling due to emigration out of frustration with government socialist 
policies, the paper cultivated a new market by publishing reports that resonated with 
more ordinary people such as workers who were feeling the pinch of difficult economic 
conditions. Being part of the capitalist system and reporting it favourably, the paper 
was about keeping business on its side while articulating issues that appealed to 
financially literate non-businesspeople to also bring them on board and increase 


















CHAPTER 5: BUSINESS JOURNALISM IN A TIME OF 
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT  
 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses how the Business Herald and the Financial Gazette reported 
the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in Zimbabwe’s second 
decade. The investigation begins in the lead up to the official adoption of the 
programme in 1991, during the course of the implementation of the programme, and 
the winding down phase. The discussion is premised on the argument that the 1990s 
saw a continuation of the economic crisis that was apparent from the time the country 
became independent in 1980, and which persisted throughout much of the 1980s 
despite some notable achievements of the Mugabe regime. The 1990s were marked 
by a crisis that the government had long known about and which they knew was going 
to cause problems, but had no consensus about the best way of heading of the crisis. 
This prior knowledge of what was coming made ESAP nationally painful to an unusual 
degree, and represents the beginning of the end of Mugabe. Everything else that 
followed in the new millennium was akin to a postponement of the inevitable (like 
attempting to chop off the heads of the Hydra) and a slow motion collapse. The real 
beginning of the long collapse begins in 1991. But how did the business pages report 
it? This is the focus of this chapter. 
 
The Business Herald: ESAP the crisis killer?  
As Zimbabwe entered the 90s decade with rising budget deficits, public spending and 
inflation, the question of “whither Zimbabwe’s economy?” grew insistent.  Pressure to 
dump half-hearted socialism in favour of neoliberal structural reforms was being felt 
by the government and its technocrats put together by Minister of Finance Bernard 
Chidzero (see Meisenhelder 1994), as markets, trade and finance seemed to tilt in 
favour of a return to a pre-1980 neoclassical economic path. Proof of this pressure 
could be seen in the way multilateral institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank 
began to make optimistic claims that “export-oriented, labour-intensive manufacturing 
industries, such as textiles, clothing, and footwear, would expand rapidly once 
Zimbabwe liberalized its economy under structural adjustment” (Carmody 1998: 319). 
Several other scholars have, however, argued that ESAP was actually brought in to 
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cover up a set of domestic and internal crises that had nothing to do with pressure 
from the Bretton Woods institutions. One argument is that the motive for the adoption 
of ESAP was simply because “the limits of the state as a site for personal wealth 
acquisition were being reached” (Davies 2004). Compagnon (2011) also argues that 
the adoption of ESAP was largely domestically-driven and home-grown. At any rate, 
the pressure to abandon socialism for good finally told when ESAP was formally 
announced by President Mugabe in a speech in 1989 which was carried in The Herald 
and other newspapers, and first detailed in Minister Chidzero’s 1990 budget proposal .  
 
The 1990s thus opened with the funerary rites of socialism and a Bretton Woods 
backed move for the country to become a fully-fledged capitalist state. ESAP, in 
outline, entailed reducing budget deficits and reductions in public spending to no more 
than 5% of GDP (Meisenhelder 1994). It would not have made good headlines for 
ZANU-PF ideologues (the “Comrades”) to be seen to be capitalists in the eyes of the 
workers and the peasants. The nation had to be taken into the government’s 
confidence, and assured and persuaded that ESAP was not only a good thing, but did 
not mean that ZANU-PF was selling its soul. Rather, it was merely strategic play typical 
of revolutionaries. From the onset state media assumed the role of ‘selling’ the 
economic structural adjustment programme to citizens. The Business Herald, as a 
state-controlled newspaper, played a significant role as a pro-ESAP Trojan horse and 
persuader-in-chief – a role that, as I will show, it played faithfully and with vigour.  
 
Since the economy had been in crisis mode for most of the 1980s, the Business Herald 
went about telling its audiences that the several crises that had characterised the 
previous decade were coming to an end through ESAP. That is, ESAP was touted as 
a panacea and, almost, as a silver bullet that would once and for all set Zimbabwe 
right. If it was a painful medicine, it was necessary for the patient to survive. In order 
to persuade readers into appreciating just how much ESAP was needed, the paper 
highlighted the extent to which the economy was suffering at a time when a solution –
liberalisation – was hidden in plain sight. In a story on 25 January 1990 titled 
“Manufacturing sector hit by sharp rise in input costs”, the paper drove home the 
narrative of just how much the end of the 1980s had been chronically and unhealthily 
crisis-ridden. It benchmarked the crisis by economic indicators such as the fact that 




The manufacturing sector’s input costs rose by a 
staggering 23.5 percent between April and November last 
year, reports the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries’ 
economic department. According to its second 
manufacturing sector input cost index released this week, 
input costs increased by an average of 10.58 percent 
between August and the end of November last year, 
bringing the cumulative increase for the eight months to 
the end of November to 23.5 percent (Business Herald 25 
January 1990). 
 
Here economic statistics were being used to throw down the gauntlet to readers. In 
Shona, the popular phrase would be “Kana nemiwo?” (Surely, what did you expect?) 
or “Honaiwo nemiwo” (See for yourself). Such figures were used as scientific 
persuasive devices that spoke for themselves. Who could argue with statistics? Thus, 
statistics functioned as “strategic rituals” (see Tuchman 1972) which buttress the 
newsman’s sense of their own objectivity. Of course, the same statistics, in different 
hands, could be used to persuade people in the opposite direction.   
 
At any rate, the Business Herald routinely used statistics such as these as if to say “if 
anyone needed convincing that the economy needed to change course, here was the 
incontrovertible evidence” The paper seemed to be doing this in service of generating 
positive sentiment in preparation of the impending economic reform programme.  One 
could say that the paper was psychologically conditioning its readers to accept 
economic liberalisation. Though, as I have shown, the Business Herald had previously 
demonstrated that it preferred to be on the side of capital rather than socialism, the 
introduction of Western sponsored neoliberal economic reforms fortuitously brought 
government officials, who would otherwise have griped about a state-owned paper 
that was overtly and openly supportive of capital, to the paper’s side. There could now 
not be any fear of accusations of counter-revolutionary tendencies thrown the way of 
editors. 
 
It became routine, from the early to mid-1990s, for the Business Herald to use statistics 
laden stories to serve up the narrative that nearly every sector of Zimbabwe’s economy 
– foodstuffs, packaging, clothing and footwear, wood and furniture, chemicals, 
transport, and so on – was facing increasing input costs under the 1980s economic 
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path. But such criticism could now be levelled under the guise of statistical and 
empirical objectivity, without any fear of party-driven censure. Indeed, rooting for 
ESAP became, in the 1990s decade, the new form of patriotic journalism. The chief 
irony is that both pro-socialist and pro-capitalist reporting could occupy the same role 
of being patriotic. Thankfully, the Business Herald found government officials and 
“technocrats” to be willing allies and tools in the task of propagating an openly pro-
capital agenda as the 1980s came to an end and the 1990s began. If limits of personal 
wealth acquisition had been reached as argued by Davies (2004), then the ruling elite 
would have looked at ESAP as an opportunity for continued personal wealth 
acquisition (or looting). With such personal interests of politicians coming into play, the 
Business Herald found it easier to report on all the ills the economy was suffering and 
consequently highlighting the need for economic reform. 
 
The excitement – almost to the point of gloating – with which the Business Herald 
reported in an openly pro-capitalist tone can be seen in a story on 19 July 1990 which 
crowed that the inconsistent growth patterns of old were coming to an end with the 
adoption of ESAP. 
  
The Central Statistics Office has released new data 
indicating that the economy has been growing faster than 
expected and might now have broken out of the stop-start 
patterns and stagnation of the mid-1980s. This indicates 
that some of the government’s policy reforms introduced 
ahead of the new structural adjustment programme have 
started working (Business Herald 19 July 1990).  
 
While the report may have been intended to highlight the benefits of reforming the 
economy, it also demonstrates the Janus-faced mask that a newspaper beholden to 
state control and a powerful capitalist leaning was forced to wear.  
 
It can be seen that the Business Herald did not use any of the existing positive 
economic data to urge caution in implementing ESAP. If the economy seemed to be 
doing relatively well, there would be no need for full blown economic restructuring. As 
such, one can see in the Business Herald’s reporting what can be called ESAP-bias. 




Zimbabwe in 1990 had a relatively well-developed and 
diversified economy, good social services and an effective 
civil service. It was not forced to adopt ESAP as a result of 
a fiscal and balance of payments crisis like most African 
countries, but had achieved positive, albeit modest, 
economic growth during most of the 1980s, and enjoyed 
significant improvements in social service provision. The 
last years of the decade had seen rising levels of 
investment and exports and declining debts. All this 
suggests that rapid liberalisation was a serious mistake, 
and that what should have happened was gradual reforms 
combined with strong state controls (Brett and Winter 
2003: 1).  
 
In analysing how the Business Herald reported the introduction of ESAP it is worth 
drawing attention to ESAP-bias, particularly the issues that it chose to de-select, de-
emphasise and even to ignore. The major issue that was de-selected and de-
emphasised was urging of caution in adopting wholesale structural economic reforms 
which had already wreaked havoc in the developing world, particularly in Latin America 
and Asia. Had the paper chosen to take on this role, it would have been playing the 
role of creating and fostering an informed Zimbabwean citizenry on the issue of 
structural adjustment. As a publicly owned newspaper whose main shareholder was 
the public, whose interests it was meant to serve, this would not have been amiss. In 
the same way that it had subtly defied government control to report positively on the 
capitalist economy, the paper could have – if it wanted – chosen to defy same 
government control to frame for itself a new role which questioned the new economic 
reforms However, this was a missed chance to frame a new role for a public 
newspaper. The Business Herald’s openly capital-leaning approach not only led to its 
‘blind’ extoling of the virtues of the coming economic reforms, thus neglecting its 
watchdog role in the process, but also to a “grooming” role whereby the paper seemed 
to be actively preparing its readers to get used to a future of structural adjustment and 
liberalisation. The Business Herald thus not only became a lapdog of neoliberal 
reforms, but also a virtual cheerleader, groomer, confidence-builder and trust-builder 
for capitalism and capitalist economics. In this regard, cheerleader journalism and 
grooming journalism was a core characteristic of how the Business Herald reported 




State control of the media (see Murdock and Golding 2000) can have far-reaching 
consequences for how the media interrogate and speak plainly on crucial issues of 
interest to the citizenry. Worse, it can induce a tendency for the media to speak with 
what can only be described as a forked tongue and rank opportunism. This forked-
tongue opportunism is demonstrated in how the Business Herald saw the need to urge 
some caution only because a government minister had expressed the need to take 
some caution in the implementation of ESAP, but did so in a way that still expressed 
an internalised ESAP-bias and ESAP-friendly journalism. This was a case of wanting 
to eat one’s cake and still have it. On 20 September 1990, the Business Herald 
reported that the Minister of Finance, Bernard Chidzero, had drawn attention to some 
of the dangers of too rapid an implementation of economic reforms. It reported that 
“the government has sent out a strong signal that, although necessarily cautious, the 
trade reform programme is irreversible, even though world economic developments 
are now not so favourable following the Gulf crisis” (Business Herald 20 September 
1990). Because a minister had seen fit to speak about the need for caution, so the 
paper saw it fit to speak about the need for caution. But the newspaper’s “change of 
heart” was as sorely lacking in sincerity as it was short-lived. On the whole, the 
Business Herald chose the path of cheerleading ESAP and grooming for ESAP until 
the reforms had reached the point of no return. Shaw (2016: 14) argues that the social 
watchdog roles of the media which include “educating and informing the public, 
offering diverse and alternative viewpoints, speaking truth to power, holding political 
and business elites to account for their decisions and actions, etc.” should be taken 
seriously if journalism is to maintain legitimacy and principled activity during crises.  
 
With the official adoption of ESAP in 1991 the Business Herald consolidated its unique 
strain of ESAP-friendly cheerleader journalism and grooming journalism by reporting 
on the “positives” the country was “already” enjoying and gaining through the 
economic reforms. If ESAP was a godsend, as the paper seemed to suggest, it needed 
to back up this narrative with empirical evidence. The paper was not wasting any time 
in reporting that some of the key reform areas were already bearing fruit. Some of the 
key measures included “trade and exchange rate liberalisation, domestic (including 
labour market) deregulation, and financial sector reform and institutional reforms 
pertaining to fiscal reform” (Kanyenze 2003: 56-57). On 11 April 1990, the paper had 
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a story titled “ZIC approves $1.6bn projects”. The story shed some light on the 
developments that were already happening due to trade liberalisation. It reported that: 
 
The Zimbabwe Investment Centre has approved about 
250 projects worth just over $1.6 billion, with a potential of 
creating 25 000 new jobs when fully implemented, the 
acting director of the ZIC, Mr Richard Wilde, said this week. 
Mr Wilde said in interview that the projects would generate 
additional export revenue of $740 million and save the 
country about $320 million in imports (Business Herald 11 
April 1990).  
 
The ZIC had been created with the aim of becoming a one stop centre for foreign 
companies and individuals who wanted to invest in the country. The envisaged role of 
the centre was to aid one of the key result areas of ESAP of increasing foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the country. In touting such progress, the Business Herald was 
cheerleading and grooming the discourse that opening up the economy would, rather 
than the empty rhetoric of socialism, turn up actual results and work for the good of 
just about everyone in the country including those who were failing to find jobs. In a 
complete reversal, capitalism was now the true gutsaruzhinji!. The ESAP-friendly, 
confidence-building discourse was an elite discourse that the political and business 
elites were propagating to convince the sceptics of the good that would come from 
ESAP. Interests of the powerful were playing out in the stories the Business Herald 
was publishing. As Starkman (2014) argues, business journalism, relies on powerful 
players for its output.  
 
It is one of the normative functions of business news to provide surveillance of macro-
economic developments for citizens (cf. Van Dalen; de Vreese; and Albaek 2015), but 
this can be done in a way that advances (and “grooms” for) a particular agenda. The 
Business Herald routinely wrote ESAP-friendly grooming stories that helped 
consolidate and cheerlead the discourse promoted by powerful interests. This can be 
seen in the story of 30 May 1991 where the paper reported that: 
 
The government has prepared an investment register with 
ongoing and planned projects worth over $20 billion. The 
474-page register lists projects in the agricultural, 
manufacturing, mining, electricity, natural resources, 
transport, telecommunications, trade, housing, health and 
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human resources development sectors (Business Herald 
30 May 1991). 
 
The Business Herald’s provision of information that was positive about investment in 
the country seemed to have been meant to build the public’s trust and confidence in 
what was to come (what I have called grooming journalism) and to give the same 
public reason to believe that deregulation of markets was a good thing. As Van Dalen 
et al (2015) have argued, the media have the capacity and the ability to influence the 
public’s perceptions of the economy, how the economy works, and how the economy 
works for the public. In working to influence the public’s perceptions in their coverage 
of the economy, business journalists actually play a political function (Undurraga 
2017). Grooming and cheerleading are, in this regard, the clearest political functions 
of the Business Herald. 
 
When the business journalists at the state-owned Business Herald played a political 
role, it led to some notable outcomes that are instructive of the contested nature of 
journalism. For instance, although the Business Herald pulled all the cheerleading and 
grooming stops to show that all was well with ESAP, the year 1991 was in fact not as 
rosy as portrayed. Instead the year was marked by a world recession that wreaked 
havoc in many countries that relied on the export of primary commodities (Brett and 
Winter 2003). The Business Herald did not completely ignore the economic upheaval 
induced by the world recession and deregulation of the local market, but failed to 
attribute it to a failed capitalism or to use these upheavals as a platform to call for 
caution in adopting wholesale structural reforms in Zimbabwe. The reporting tended 
to bury the negative report card of capitalism inside the positive one. So, just as it had 
managed to report on the virtues of socialism while still subliminally rooting for 
capitalism, the paper used positive economic developments to dilute or even drown 
out an underlying acknowledgement of the difficult realities being faced by the ordinary 
person.  
 
One of the enduring values in the news according to Gans (1979) is the notion of so-
called responsible capitalism. Gans argues that one of the indicators of responsible 
capitalism is that economic growth is always reported as a positive phenomenon. The 
ambivalent and ESAP-friendly reporting by the Business Herald of the negative or dark 
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side of capitalist progress seems to be a characteristic of cheerleader and “grooming” 
journalism. If the population is to be made to “believe” in the virtues of capitalism, then 
its failures must be under-reported or, at least, made exceptional. On 25 July 1991 the 
paper had a story titled “OGIL imports to ease shortages”, where it was reported that: 
 
The supply of some goods should improve dramatically 
following the easing of import restrictions on a range of 
finished products and raw materials by the government. 
This should force down prices and dampen inflation, 
stoked by too much money chasing few goods on the 
market, economists said (Business Herald 25 July 1991). 
 
The explanation of what inflation is in the story gives away the possible intention of the 
Business Herald in publishing this story. It was a story intended for the general public 
who were presumed to have little understanding of economic terms such as, for 
instance, inflation. These were the people who typically would be feeling the worst 
effects of rising prices and cuts in public spending. Placing goods on the Open General 
Import License (OGIL) was itself part of the deregulation of trade. The public was being 
persuaded of the positive effects of trade liberalisation that would lead to large-scale 
availability of goods and then to reduction of prices. This reduction of prices would 
translate, the Business Herald suggested, to a welcome relief for families that were 
being financially squeezed by rising inflation.  
 
While the OGIL story was an acknowledgement that the economy was in some sort of 
crisis, the Business Herald also used it to rescue a positive spin on trade liberalisation. 
Thus: 
 
The rate of inflation is officially estimated at 22 percent but 
private economists say it is running at up to 35 percent. 
Inflation has been fuelled by the de-control of prices as part 
of the structural adjustment programme being 
implemented to boost economic growth and also by the 
financing of the budget deficit from the monetary banking 
sector. The Reserve Bank has called for restraint on wage 
and price demands to try to contain inflation during the five-
year transition to a market economy (Business Herald 25 




It has been argued that newsworkers do not produce the news to please private 
economic or state interests but rather in line with their institutional and organisational 
practices (Tuchman 2002). In the case of the Business Herald all those interests 
seemed to converge, particularly in the case of the story above. Whereas the interests 
of the state and capital are evident as already noted, institutional practices are 
evidenced by the way the newspaper found a way to sugar coat facts that may have 
appeared too negative if produced in stand-alone stories. At the same time, it could 
be said that all this is evidence that journalists at the Business Herald had found a way 
of catering for the different interests in a way that did not overly compromise their 
professionalism. They were merely doing what they believed in, and doing it 
consistently. If so, this would speak to how journalists, including editors, exercise 
agency in producing the news. They are not “‘unwittingly, unconsciously’ serving as a 
support for the reproduction of a dominant ideological discursive field” (Hall 1982: 82).  
 
When, after the drought of 1992 the economy started on a recovery path, the Business 
Herald consolidated its cheerleading role when it, once again, started to publish stories 
that celebrated the success of ESAP. In early 1993 the paper was cautiously predicting 
an uptick in the economy. On 22 April it reported that economy was set to register a 
modest growth. The story stated that “the economy is set for modest growth of 
between 2.5 percent and 5 percent this year, boosted by a recovery in agriculture” 
(Business Herald 22 April 1993). However, it noted that headwinds persisted stating 
that “but the slow rebound in Western economies, weak demand on the domestic 
market, the high cost of local capital and rising production costs will stand in the way 
as the economy tries to surge ahead after last year’s depression” (Business Herald 22 
April 1993). Considering that the Business Herald has its roots in neo liberal capitalist 
values, its publication of stories that demonstrated the resilience of the Zimbabwean 
economy evidenced by the predicted growth rates in the face of all the factors working 
against such growth is indicative of what Gans (1979) referred to as reporting of 
“responsible capitalism”. Any positive growth at this time was being spun as further 
confirmation that the neoliberal policies of ESAP were not only working but must be 
deepened, scaled up and expanded. None of the signs were read as false positives 
or as false starts. Rather, they were treated as empirical proof of even greater good 




By 1994, as the economy showed signs of some marked growth, the ESAP 
cheerleading reached a crescendo. On 27 January 1994, for instance, it saw fit to 
celebrate the increase in foreign exchange reserves, reporting that “Zimbabwe’s 
foreign currency reserves have exceeded US$600 million ($5 billion), the highest level 
since independence”. Cheerleader stories such as this served to demonstrate that the 
economic crisis of previous years was coming to an end, not out of a fluke but thanks 
to the liberalisation of the economy. To highlight the benefits of increasing foreign 
currency reserves, the paper cited an economist, Mr Mervyn Ellis, stating that:  
 
With such a high level of foreign reserves the authorities 
had the courage to take risks by announcing the new trade 
liberalisation measures,’ he said, adding that the situation 
was also an important indicator of a country’s credit 
worthiness. This position would also enable the country to 
finance its imports out of the reserves without seeking 
foreign aid or other sources of finance (Business Herald 27 
January 1994).  
 
The interpretation of what it means to have such reserves of four months import cover 
points to an intention to appeal to ordinary people who ordinarily would not be excited 
by such news, an effort to persuade non-business people that ESAP was ridding the 
country of the crisis that had characterised it since independence. Hence, as Gans 
(1979: 81) argues, one of the characteristics of news is “the exercise of power over 
the interpretation of reality”.  
 
Reality dawns – or not 
What happens when all the grooming and cheerleading encounters stubborn 
economic facts and crisis? What happens when all the efforts to cheerlead ESAP to 
success merely show an emperor without clothes? The media, it seems, becomes a 
fig leaf. By 1992 it was becoming apparent that ESAP was not turning out to be exactly 
what was initially promised. The Business Herald published stories that did not criticise 
ESAP outright but pointed out the side effects of ESAP and warning audiences of 
tougher times ahead. The cause of these problems in the economy was not ESAP, 
the Business Herald suggested, but normal economic downturns or else results of 
poor implementation. ESAP itself was beyond reproach. Thus, elite economists and 
institutions were sought to give analyses of what was going on, what (or who) was to 
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blame, and the state of the economy and where it was heading to. One of the most 
quoted economists was Professor Tony Hawkins of the University of Zimbabwe. In 
one such story the paper wrote that: 
 
Said leading economic analyst and head of the Business 
Studies Department of the University of Zimbabwe, Prof 
Tony Hawkins: ‘The outlook for Zimbabwe during this year 
does not look good at all’. He cited the uncertain weather 
conditions this season, the current recession affecting 
most major industrialised nations and what he called ‘badly 
managed monetary policy’ by the authorities as the three 
main factors which would adversely affect prospects for 
this year (Business Herald 9 January 1992). 
 
The University of Zimbabwe was a well-respected institution at the time so professors 
from the institution had perceived legitimacy. Here the paper quotes the economist in 
a manner that echoes “responsible capitalism” in blaming the economic problems and 
failures not on capitalism per se but on temporary and predictable setbacks in the 
(global) economic cycle or, simply, human error (‘badly managed monetary policy’). 
Though reality was dawning that something was wrong with ESAP, it was not really 
ESAP that was being blamed, but external factors. These were things that were 
beyond ESAP’s control. 
 
Banks were also regarded as legitimate sources to comment on the state of the 
economy and its prospects. On 6 February 1992 the Business Herald quoted Standard 
Chartered Bank giving a grim outlook of the economy.   
 
Even without the drought, 1992 was always going to be a 
difficult year for the Zimbabwe economy. The straws of 
economic slowdown were in the wind by mid-1991, albeit 
heavily camouflaged by the tobacco boom, says a 
comprehensive report on business trends compiled by the 
Standard Chartered Bank of Zimbabwe (Business Herald 
6 February 1992). 
 
The Business Herald used these legitimated institutions to manoeuvre their tricky 
relationship with government officials. “Economists”, says (Fitzgerald and O’Rourke 
2016: 269), “benefit from the legitimacy of their profession that has been created in 
academia.” Through using ‘renowned’ economists and institutions, the Business 
157 
 
Herald was able to articulate what it thought were the causes of the economic 
difficulties the country was facing. After all, the capitalist system depends on the 
perceived legitimacy and trustworthiness of economists and institutions such as 
banks. Thus, the Business Herald’s reliance on them for the explanation of what was 
going on in the economy shows, firstly, how much the paper espoused the values of 
capitalism as it did in the 1980s and the years before independence. Secondly, it, in a 
way, shielded the paper and its journalists from criticism by government officials 
because these were sources that could not be disputed. Finally, the paper could use 
these undisputable sources to concoct and to continue its ESAP-friendly narrative. 
 
The Blame Game 
As the economy huffed and puffed and lurched from mini-crisis to mini-crisis, positive 
economic news literally dried up. With so much crisis engulfing the country, 
newspapers were running out of angles to spin the crisis in a manner that would either 
buy time before things recovered or exonerate structural adjustment. When 
cheerleading journalism runs out of cheerful angles, it descends into a blame game. 
The surprising thing was that, as things fell apart, the Business Herald deigned even 
to blame its owners, government, rather than ESAP. Having shown its hand too openly 
and staked its credibility on the success of ESAP, it seemed that it was too late to 
admit mistakes. On 16 July 1992 the paper was not afraid to blame government for 
contributing to the crisis by breaking its fiscal promises. However, consistent with the 
paper’s practice of patriotic journalism, it would not blame government openly. Rather, 
it blamed the government using a report from a bank, thus shielding itself from 
government displeasure at this display of ideological mutiny. The paper reported that: 
 
A merchant bank has said the economic reform 
programme has been ‘placed into a state of uncertainty’ 
because of the delay by the government to implement 
essential policy measures. The First Merchant Bank said 
in its latest quarterly guide to the economy released this 
week that the problems being faced by the economy would 
have been considerably less severe had the government 
been more imaginative, less costly and generally more 
supportive of the productive sector during the past decade 




Again, ESAP is not fingered as the problem. Indeed, ESAP is seen as the victim of 
typical government policy inconsistency. There is a continuous reconstruction of 
business news “in highly organised interactions between interested actors” (Grunberg 
and Pallas 2012: 229). The Business Herald’s interest in maintaining legitimacy as a 
purveyor of credible and reliable yet patriotic economic commentary converge with 
those of banks as key enablers of the capitalist system. This convergence gives the 
paper the adequate cover it needs to be able to point out that it was government 
actions that were threatening the success of the economic reform programme. In this 
way, newspapers such as the Business Herald function as instruments by which 
neoliberal capitalism shielded itself from scrutiny and censure and instead turned the 
heat on African governments. The Business Herald performs an important enabling 
function on behalf of capitalism of dispelling the notion of inappropriate reform 
programmes. As Gans (1979: 39) explains, “the values in the news are not necessarily 
those of journalists, nor are they always distinctive to the news…many are shared by 
or originate with the sources from whom the journalists obtain information”. 
Government ineptitude, rather than inherited problems in the Zimbabwean economic 
structure or ESAP itself, is identified as the sole, favourite or most important cause of 
the failures and crises.  
 
But, even as government ineptitude was identified as the biggest threat to economic 
reform, the Business Herald was careful to continue playing both its patriotic role on 
behalf of ZANU-PF and its cheerleading role on behalf of capitalism. It did this by using 
a range of sources that allowed it sufficient distance as well as credibility. Evidence of 
the consequences of government failures that had led to the crisis, for instance, was 
presented in the form of reports of companies shutting down. The opening up of the 
economy without concurrent appropriate policies had led to lack of competitiveness in 
local industries. On 19 November 1992 the Business Herald reported that a major 
factory in the area of Glendale was going to shut down. It reported that “Zimbabwe 
Spinners and Weavers Ltd is to close its Glendale factory which produces yarn for 
export as the company has become less competitive on the export market”. While the 
lack of competitiveness was largely attributed to South Africa’s decision to impose a 
35 percent tariff on all yarn imports, the local negative conditions found their way into 
the story when the company’s chairman stated that “but whichever way you look at it 




Apart from companies closing down, high interest rates became one of the key 
indicators of government failure to implement ESAP to the full. In a story on 31 
December, the Business Herald saw it necessary to explain the cause of the high 
interest rates that were wreaking havoc in the economy: 
 
The low economic activity which had been fuelled by 
drought and the global recession had impacted negatively 
on government revenue and this made it imperative that 
the government reduce its expenditure further so as to 
keep the budget deficit within fundable limits…Dr Chidzero 
[Finance Minister] said his ministry was discussing with 
other ministries to see how spending could be cut further. 
‘This is absolutely essential as the government is currently 
having to borrow more than was planned in the National 
Budget from the domestic market to finance its operations’. 
This had a negative impact on the economy as the 
government was now crowding out the private sector. This 
reduced economic activity and contributed to inflationary 
pressures as well as push up interest rates (Business 
Herald 31 December 1992). 
 
When The Rhodesia Herald (precursor to the Business Herald) was established, its 
editorial policy was to advance the mining and agricultural interests of the white 
community (Moyo 2003). It also shared the same vision with the company that 
established Rhodesia, the British South Africa Company (BSAC), of “Justice, Freedom 
and Commerce” (Moyo 2003: 3-4). One can say that, despite being majority owned by 
the public through the ZMMT, the Business Herald is – deep down – still a creature of 
capitalism. Shaw’s (2016: 14) assertions that “…as journalism based on the neoliberal 
capitalist model breathes and lives capitalism, it stands to reason that any form of 
crisis that hits global capitalism is bound to have an adverse effect on it”, are relevant 
to understanding such bold analysis from the Business Herald. At any rate, it has never 
been clear that Zimbabwe ever stopped being a capitalist country, even during the 
1980s decade. It is not clear that the Business Herald ever stopped being a pro-
capitalist rag. 
 
In developed economies the media has been criticised for failing to anticipate 
economic crises (see Doyle 2006; Schiffrin 2011). For instance, in the 2008 financial 
crisis the US press was found to have neglected to play an agenda setting role before 
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or during the crisis (Bjerke and Kjos Fonn 2015). In contrast, the Business Herald in 
the 1990s decade seemed to try to set an agenda that would see government policy 
(or lack of it) being blamed for the failure to realise the full benefits of ESAP and the 
subsequent continued crisis. To set the agenda the paper relied mostly on business 
organisations or economists for sources, and less from government. When ESAP 
came to its first five-year conclusion, the media were presented with an opportunity to 
offer analysis concerning how well the programme had fared. In many of its stories in 
1995 the Business Herald pointed out the lack of commitment from government to cut 
spending, reduce budget deficit, and lower interest rates. This, according to the paper, 
had contributed to the continuation of an economic crisis which ESAP was supposed 
to have been brought about to address. A story titled “High interest rates under fire 
again” (Business Herald 5 March 1995) reported that “high interests rates continue to 
stifle meaningful economic development and if they do not come down, all sectors, 
and particularly the productive sector, will suffer, the Zimbabwe Association of 
Business Organisations (Zobo) has said”.  
 
There is a thinly-veiled warning in this story, almost as if the paper were anticipating a 
botched job by the government that – should ESAP really go wrong – would free the 
paper to say to the public “We told you so, did we not?” Sources from the private sector 
are utilised in a narrative that juxtaposes the disinterested and efficient profit-making 
of the private sector with the bureaucracy, red tape, policy inconsistency and 
inefficiency of the government and the by now much expanded public sector. 
Whatever agenda setting was in place, it was in favour of the private sector. Thus, if 
the Business Herald was reporting in a patriotic mode, this was not in direct support 
of the government, but more in the mode of “we are trying to save your from 
yourselves”. The paper had become a watchdog of/over government on behalf of 
ESAP. It sincerely believed that it was being patriotic since a narrative had been 
created that the success of ESAP was in the public interest. So by supporting ESAP 
the Business Herald succeeded in (telling itself that it was) shooting two birds with one 
stone: serving capital and serving the public interest. Once again, patriotism was an 





In cases where government sources were used by the Business Herald, it was to pick 
and choose and cherry pick stories and soundbites that suggested that the 
government was for the most part responsible for the continued crisis and not 
business. Were it not for government bungling, that narrative went, the economic crisis 
and ESAP troubles could have been averted. A story on 9 November 1995 quotes a 
government minister criticising the continued unrestrained government spending. It 
reported that:  
 
A cabinet minister has criticised excessive government 
spending and the country’s dependence on external 
borrowing which have plunged the country into heavy 
foreign debt. The current economic woes have largely 
been attributed to high government expenditure which has 
had serious economic repercussions (Business Herald 9 
November 1995).  
 
That this was coming from the minister of mines, Eddison Zvobgo, served to 
emphasise the point that the paper (told itself) had been making all along in many of 
its stories. Those stories, as noted, repeat the line that there was need for government 
to rein in spending if the current economic crisis was to be eliminated. Interestingly, 
government sources such as Zvobgo were always an interesting choice for a source 
since Zvobgo was one of the few outspoken members in ZANU-PF, in parliament, and 
in cabinet. Unlike other ZANU PF deployees, Zvobgo could be counted on to speak 
his mind, to call things by their names, and to say unpopular things. Hence the choice 
to use Zvobgo as a source suggests a deliberate choice to canvass the views of the 
one government representative most likely to stray off message about what was going 
on with ESAP. Schifferes and Coulter (2013: 246) noted that in covering the financial 
crisis, business journalists in the UK relied on some tried and tested frames to explain 
the crisis, namely, “scandal (blaming the bankers), moral panic (blaming the public), 
and reform (blaming the policymakers). The Business Herald did not use any of these 
other frames except that of reform. In this case, government was blamed for the 
sluggish and tanking economy. The problem, said the paper, was not to be sought in 
ESAP as a concept but in the flawed implementation. Blaming the government is a 
stock-in-trade of capitalist media, particularly in cases where the government is not 
moving fast enough to implement private sector friendly reforms or is seen to be 
interfering with industry or over-regulating. From as early as Adam Smith and David 
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Ricardo, the government was always the easy scapegoat and pantomime villain of the 
business sector. Indeed, the whole idea of the free market and the invisible hand speak 
to the anxiety of pro-capitalism and pro-market economists about government 
regulation and interference. Less or even non-existent regulation was considered 
ideal. It seemed too, in Zimbabwe between 1990 and 1999 that the Business Herald 
was singing from a very old hymn book going all the way to the Wealth of Nations.   
 
Hence, the overall tone of the reporting was one of regret at government’s bungling. 
Stories pointed out that the government had an insatiable appetite for spending, one 
that was having negative effects on the success of the economic adjustment 
programme. After the first five years of ESAP ended in 1995, and government wanted 
to continue with the economic reform programme, the Business Herald played a 
watchdog role where it pointed out potential pitfalls. As the 1996/1997 national budget 
was being prepared, the paper offered the following analysis: 
 
Today the Minister of Finance, Dr Herbert Murerwa, will 
present the national budget amid complaints of high 
government expenditure, high taxation and deteriorating 
social services, among other things. With a blueprint for 
Esap 2 and Zimbabwe Vision 2020, the minister will as 
usual not be in an enviable position. But top of his list 
should be the high government expenditure which has led 
to overborrowing from the domestic market. In turn, the 
private sector, which is supposed to be the engine for 
economic growth, has been sidelined (Business Herald 25 
July 1996). 
 
Of course, the question is whether in focusing on failures of government to rein in 
spending, the Business Herald shifted spotlight away from business responsibility to 
innovate in a period of economic transition. Did it become a watchdog only over the 
public sector while playing lapdog to the interests of business? As has been noted 
before, financial journalism tends to be on the side of investors and business (Doyle 
2006; Tambini 2010; Starkman 2014). This is no great surprise. But, for the Business 
Herald, a majority government owned public newspaper, it was not a given that leaning 




Whatever the reasons – historical orientation, or the journalists’ training, or any other 
reason – the paper reported government responsibility over the crisis in a way that 
would not ordinarily be expected from a state-controlled paper in Zimbabwe. For 
example, on 26 September 1996 it quoted a new IMF country representative giving a 
warning on government spending habits: 
 
If any country in Africa has any chance of succeeding with 
economic reforms, it is Zimbabwe because it has the 
necessary infrastructure, the newly appointed International 
Monetary Fund resident representative, Mr Roberto 
Franco has said…Mr Franco said the Achilles’ heel in 
Zimbabwe was the high government expenditure which 
had to be curbed at all costs. It was not viable to continue 
having a public sector that operated on deficit. More so if 
that deficit was financed by domestic borrowing. Such 
countries often relied on either domestic or foreign 
borrowing. Others simply did not pay their debts leading to 
huge external debts while others simply printed money 
(Business Herald 26 September 1996).   
 
A glimpse into how government relied on domestic borrowing is given by Kanyenze 
(2003: 59) who says “Whereas short-term Treasury bills accounted for 3.9 per cent of 
the total debt in 1990, its share rose to 53.4 per cent in 1995, 88.1 per cent in 1999 
and 94.5 per cent by December 2000.” The Business Herald was therefore zeroing in 
on the issues that were contributing to the continued crisis as the ESAP was being 
implemented. Interestingly, it was these very same issues covered by the Business 
Herald that led to the IMF suspending assistance to Zimbabwe under the Enhanced 
Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) in September 1995 (Kanyenze 2003). However, 
as Brett (2006) suggests, it was not correct to lay all the blame at the feet of 
government. The demand for fiscal control led to cuts in social spending and loss of 
jobs in the civil service, problems which “could have been avoided with greater policy 
flexibility and donor support” (Brett 2006: 14). These are issues that the Business 
Herald rarely interrogated and instead chose to concentrate on exposing a litany of 
failures by government. It seems that, from the beginning, the odds were heavily 
staked against the government: it was damned if it did and damned if it did not. Times 
of crisis offer a huge test for business journalists interested in catering for interests of 
big business and investors as well those of the public (Shaw 2016). In the case of the 




The ‘unreasonableness’ of some of IMF’s requirements were rarely highlighted by the 
paper. In one story where such demands were evident, the government is subtly made 
the villain. On 16 January 1997 the Business Herald reported that the government had 
rejected some of the IMF’s recommendations which included cutting civil servants’ 
salaries.  
 
The International Monetary Fund has proposed that the 
government should increase civil servants’ pension 
contribution as well as cutting by half salaries of certain of 
its employees. But the government has written to the IMF 
saying its proposal to increase civil servants’ pension 
contributions from 7.5 percent to 15 percent of salary ‘flew 
in the face of reality’ taking into account last year’s strikes 
for among other things more pay by the government 
employees. It said the other proposal to put certain classes 
of civil servants on half salary was equally impractical 
(Business Herald 16 January 1997). 
 
The story went on to justify the IMF’s demands. 
 
The need to control the mushrooming wage bill and 
restructuring the civil service were areas of great concern 
hence the proposal to cut the salaries of certain classes of 
civil servants. At least 13 percent of GDP is spent on the 
civil service wage bill. Salary increases and bonuses have 
pushed further government expenditure on salaries 
(Business Herald 16 January 1997).  
   
Producers of culture such as journalists should be located within the broader 
intellectual climate in which they operate (Stonbely 2015). This view may help us 
understand why the Business Herald tended to be less critical of institutions such as 
the IMF and business. Considering that many countries were taking the liberalisation 
route after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the paper was flowing along with the 
discourse of the time – protectionism = anti progress, liberalisation = progressive. 
Many countries in the world were going the capitalist route and Zimbabwe was no 
exception. However, as we have already shown, the Business Herald’s pro-capital 
stance went back nearly a hundred years. The conclusion is that one cannot, after all, 




The intellectual leaning of the Business Herald towards ESAP, in this case, led to its 
reluctance and failure to report on the negative effects of the programme itself. 
Carmody (1998) has noted that there were flaws with the way the programme was 
structured. For instance, a 1995 World Bank report indicated that, despite deep cuts 
in social and infrastructure spending, African governments would still experience 
higher budget deficits under the structural adjustment programmes. In this regard, 
Carmody (1998) explains what happens with some key aspects of ESAP: 
 
Financial liberalisation and tight credit policies mean 
higher interest rates on domestic markets; currency 
devaluation increases foreign debt payments; and firm 
closures reduce the tax-take…In Zimbabwe state 
expenditure, excluding interest payments fell from 38 to 28 
percent of GDP from fiscal year 1991 to 1995, but interest 
payments rose from 7.8 to 11.1 percent of GDP from 1990-
1991 to 1993-1994 (Carmody 1998: 327).  
 
The Business Herald, however, chose to focus preferentially on how government was 
maintaining a high budget deficit which was financed through domestic borrowing 
leading to high interest rates on the market. At no point did it seriously question some 
of the practices that big businesses were engaged in that were against the intentions 
of ESAP. For example, banks in African countries were oligopolistic and routinely took 
advantage of governments borrowing from the domestic market to increase interest 
rates to artificially high levels (Carmody 1998). In Zimbabwe the government borrowed 
domestically from the financial sector such as banks and insurance companies 
through instruments such as treasury bills and prescribed assets. 
 
Notably, even when the Business Herald reported positively, the culpability of 
government in the economic crisis would somehow find its way into the story. For 
instance, when the economy was showing signs of recovery in 1996 and 1997 (Brett 
and Winter 2003), the Business Herald reported on some of the effects of the 
economic recovery, while still managing to take a subtle dig at the government. In a 
story on 8 May 1997 the paper reported on ongoing liquidations, stating:  
 
The turnaround in the fortunes of the economy has 
changed the fortunes of liquidating companies, some of 
which might now be wound up themselves owing to a 
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slump in business…Most of the companies were liquidated 
mainly because of the adverse effects of high interest 
rates. The companies had borrowed large amounts of 
money to finance various expansion projects but failed to 
keep up with the repayments because of the escalating 
interest rates (Business Herald 8 May 1997). 
 
Without explicitly mentioning the government, the paper leans on the prevailing 
knowledge at the time that high interest rates were caused by government. This fitted 
in well with the criticism that government was failing to provide policy consistency and 
to let the “invisible hand” to operate. If ESAP was to succeed, the reasoning went, then 
government had to completely let go and stop interfering in the economy, the currency 
and the exchange rate. Rather, the “market” was supposed to be left alone to find its 
own “level”. The Business Herald, it could be said, was ideologically in favour of laissez 
faire economics – a policy that the Mugabe government was never likely to see through 
to its logical conclusion. But such stories were still written because reporters at the 
Business Herald knew that their written work was going to pass through “an 
organizational chain consisting of hierarchically arranged editors and their assistants” 
(cf. Tuchman 1972: 662) who were sympathetic to the “invisible hand” and laissez faire 
doctrine rather than Mugabe’s preferred “command economics”. Reporters could also 
simply hide under the cloak of objectivity. 
 
Of interest is the fact that criticism of the government’s real or perceived failures in 
ESAP was not only framed as a continuation of the pattern of “patriotic reporting” by 
the Business Herald begun in the first 80’s decade, but was done under a cloak of 
objectivity. As Tuchman (1972: 664) argues, it is assumed that, “if every reporter 
gathers and structures ‘facts’ in a detached, un- biased, impersonal manner”, then 
they can avoid the charge of bias while claiming to be objective. This was the context 
in which government ineptitude was routinely exposed by the Business Herald as 
contributing to the ongoing economic crisis. Government was called out, for instance, 
for failing to do what could be regarded as simple things that were meant to ensure 
that ESAP succeeds. In one story the government was criticised for failing to craft 
necessary legislation to operationalise the Export Processing Zones (EPZ), even 




The government ‘forgot’ to amend the Customs and Excise 
Act to allow for duty free importation of capital goods, a 
lapse which is compromising the implementation of 
projects in the Export Processing Zones. In a frank 
admission, Dr Stanley Mahlahla of the Ministry of Finance 
said that the government had forgotten to address the 
‘Customs side’ when EPZs were introduced in the country 
through an Act of Parliament (Business Herald 17 July 
1997). 
 
The insinuation of incompetence is clear in the claim that the government “forgot”. How 
can the government forget to do its duty – in this case the simplest of duties?   Dr 
Stanley Mahlahla’s admission is described as “frank”, a description that treats his 
admission – without evidence – as authentic and genuine and therefore as something 
readers must believe or take for granted. Describing the official’s contribution as a 
frank admission is meant to remove doubts about his credibility. Readers are not left 
any room to doubt the official’s version or even his frankness. If Mahlahla says the 
government forgot, then of course the government forgot. Here, again, is proof of the 
use of sources to buttress both a sense of objectivity and credibility.   
 
Modern journalism acknowledges that society is intrinsically made up of different 
groups with different opinions on a subject or event being reported (Shaw 2016). 
Hence it is necessary that for journalism to be regarded as credible, it has to be 
“objective” and “accurate”. The cloak of objectivity, then, was in the case of the 
Business Herald entangled with the quest for journalistic credibility which saw the 
paper report somewhat in a “balanced” way on the attitude of both business and 
government towards ESAP. On 28 July 1994 the paper published a story analysing 
expectation, as presentation of the national budget neared, which reported that: 
 
A lot of changes have taken place, but as Dr Chidzero 
knows fully well, the business lot is hard to please. He has 
given and given, and they have continued to ask for more 
and sometimes justifiably so for Esap to bear fruit…One 
economist said, I for one do not want to be in Dr Chidzero’s 
shoes today. He has to please two sides, the business man 
and the man on the street. So far what we have witnessed 
in Esap is a lot of suffering by the common man. The jobs 
he was promised are not there and things seem to be 
getting harder for him. On the other hand, business people 
are calling for more reforms to attract foreign investment 
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and make them competitive on the international market 
(Business Herald 28 July 1994). 
 
ESAP, it went without saying, was being viewed and experienced differently by the 
various groups in society. In this analysis, the Business Herald attempts to provide a 
glimpse into how ESAP was affecting both the businessman and the ‘common’ man 
alike. In 1838, Benjamin Day is reported as having declared that:  
 
Now every individual, from the rich aristocrat who lolls in 
his carriage to the humble labourer who wields a broom in 
the streets, reads the Sun; nor can even a boy be found in 
New York City or the neighbouring country who will not 
know, in the course of the day, what is promulgated in the 
Sun in the morning (Muhlmann 2008: 7).  
 
If it could be shown that everyone cares about business news, then the business paper 
could claim to be speaking on behalf of everyone. Further, such bold declarations were 
based on the belief that the newspaper provides nothing but the truth. The Business 
Herald, for its part, never lost the opportunity to pitch such “unifying stories” that 
showed that “we are in this together” highlighting that everyone was being affected 
one way or the other. In this way, the Business Herald, portrayed ESAP as a 
programme in need of the broad-based support from all groups in society. One could 
say that the paper was playing a hegemonic role as defined by Antonio Gramsci where 
the interests of the “haves” are conflated with those of the “have-nots” and represented 
as “common interests”. 
 
Muhlmann (2008) argues that modern journalism and its concepts such as objectivity 
and accuracy were meant to unify the readers. In reality, however, the Business 
Herald’s sympathies lay with business. The concern with “the common man” 
ideologically belonged to socialism (gutsaruzhinji). Further, the postmodern view, at 
any rate, treats facts as relative. The Business Herald tended to straddle the two views. 
If it sought to unify, it also mixed facts with opinion, something normative journalism 
shuns but is tolerated in a postmodernist approach. The benefits of this double 
straddling for the Business Herald could be two pronged. On one hand it could unify 
the different groups in the economy to continue supporting ESAP, on the other if it 
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succeeded in appealing to the different groups, then it could diversify and grow its 
readership.  
 
Political Decisions, Exacerbating the Crisis 
In the late 1990s when the government was seen as making political decisions more 
and more without due consideration of the economic effects, the sense that the 
Business Herald itself was facing an ideological crisis was exacerbated. If, as we 
argued, the paper was pro-ESAP, it depended on using its “soft power” to persuade 
government to go all-in for ESAP. It played this role, as shown, through suffusing its 
stories with warnings. However, such a softly-softly approach can only work as long 
the government has some interest in reforms. If the government abandons reforms 
and relapses into old habits (which die hard), then the paper would be thrown into a 
crisis where its warnings are no longer heeded and, indeed, its increasingly strident 
tone could be viewed as “unpatriotic” and thus invite the government’s  ire on the 
editors. Thus, the more the government indicated left and turned right, the more the 
paper found it hard to walk the ideological tight rope. It becomes a lame duck. The 
sense of ideological crisis, which tended to reflect the larger economic crisis, was seen 
in the way the paper, while continuing to cover the crisis on the side of the economy, 
had to make concessions to the politics of the time. Such developments made the 
paper sound strained and exasperated. Thus, the government decision to reward 
veterans of the 1970s war with hefty gratuities and a monthly pension was criticised 
by the paper in a manner reflective of the strain of walking an ideological tightrope. In 
one story the paper published the concerns of IMF over the awarding of the war 
veterans’ payments: 
 
The International Monetary Fund says it will support 
Zimbabwe’s second structural adjustment programme 
provided the government comes up with solutions to the 
additional expenditures tied to the war veterans 
payments…The World Bank and the IMF have been very 
anxious after the government recently announced that it 
would award war veterans $50 000 each in pension 
payments before the end of the year to be followed by 
$2000 per month beginning January next year (Emphasis 




The paper is more and more ideologically exposed in its attempt to be “patriotic” while, 
at the same time, criticising the government for making the IMF very anxious. 
Powerless to stop the government doing what it wants, the Business Herald’s 
journalism becomes limited to issuing lame appeals to the government’s previously 
loudly stated desire for monetary hand-outs from the IMF: hence “The International 
Monetary Fund says it will support Zimbabwe’s second structural adjustment 
programme provided the government comes up with solutions to the additional 
expenditures tied to the war veterans payments”. As far as warnings go, this is 
ineffectual. Hidden in the IMF’s stance is a clear threat of financial sanctions and 
penalties – or at least blackmail – but the Business Herald is constrained from calling 
a spade a spade.  
 
Left exposed by a government returning to budget deficits and unbudgeted over-
spending, the Business Herald could be said to have started engaging in the last throw 
of the dice, hoping Mugabe would not call the paper’s (and the IMF’s) bluff. This the 
paper did by over-reliance on IMF and World Bank sources whose threats of financial 
penalties and conditionalities it seems to have hoped would shake the government 
into a return to austerity and structural adjustment. However, the shadow of politics 
was once again looming large on the Zimbabwean economy and it was clear which 
way Mugabe would go if it came to a stark choice between staying in power through 
structural adjustment and staying in power through shoring up his ZANU-PF support 
base. After all, there was no guarantee that structural adjustment would work. At the 
same time, sticking too close to the IMF script tied the government’s hands politically, 
a situation which Mugabe resented. For him sovereignty meant doing what had to be 
done when it had to be done, such as printing money to keep war veterans quiescent. 
Describing what happens with news, Gans (1979: 5) argues that journalists select a 
few actors from the many millions they could choose from, leading to “a recurring 
pattern of news about a fairly small number of actors and activities”. The IMF country 
representative was quoted extensively in this story with no one from government 
responding. Thus, the concerns of the IMF and World Bank were bound to dominate 
the discussion about the war veterans pay-outs. By pointing out that the IMF was 
willing to fund ZIMPREST once this issue was resolved, the Business Herald made 
sure it is the government which would be painted as a villain if the economic crisis was 
to persist due to lack of funding from the international funders who were concerned 
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about the impact on the budget of the war veterans pay-outs. The question was to wait 
and see if Mugabe cared. Invariably, he did not care. The unbudgeted Z$50,000 war 
veterans payments went ahead. 
 
In a sign that, once the last dice was thrown, the paper had no choice but – at least 
overtly – to toe the political line favouring its employer, the Business Herald reverted 
to open patriotic journalism once more.   In the aftermath of what has come to be 
known as black Friday of 14 November 1997, the Business Herald went into the same 
defensive mode as the government’s. This is shown by the fact that the paper 
persisted in claiming that the crisis was being artificially manipulated. This marked, in 
fact, the sort of reporting that would dominate for the next two decades marked by 
defensive reporting against real or perceived regime change agents. In a sign of the 
power of the one who pays the piper (the government) to call the tune, the paper 
suddenly tried to shift responsibility away from the government. In a story on 20 
November, less than a week after black Friday, the paper attributed the heavy collapse 
of the exchange rate to speculation in the market. It reported that: 
 
The Zimbabwe dollar plunged to an all time low last Friday 
after coming under heavy pressure from speculative import 
demand to trade at $25 to the United States dollar and $43 
to the British pound. The Reserve Bank quickly came to 
the rescue with a package of measures that helped raise 
the Zimbabwe dollar to $13 to the US dollar and $22 to the 
pound sterling on Tuesday. However, analysts said a 
combination of the high speculation, false press reports 
from South Africa that the visiting International Monetary 
Fund had left Zimbabwe in a haste and a single large 
import payment of $15 million for electrical consumables 
by a large wholesaler in anticipation of the war veterans’ 
pay-outs before the end of the year had caused the 
currency crisis (Business Herald 20 November 1997). 
 
The analysis by the Business Herald, while technically correct, is notable for the way 
it insulates the government from responsibility for the exchange rate crash. The 
Business Herald, it could be said, is showing another facet to patriotic journalism 
where it could come out in support of its owner-employer without due concern for 
objectivity and credibility. The clear suggestion, as we will see in Chapter 6, is that 
newsroom politics had shifted decisively from benign editorial control to open political 
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hostility to any of the fence-sitting of the early ESAP decade. Either one is with us, or 
is against us: the newsrooms at Zimpapers had no choice but to be with their owner-
employers. 
 
The decision to pay the war veterans, and to ignore the economic consequences, was 
a political decision that made “objective” economic reporting more and more 
untenable. Bond (2007) captures how certain government policies led to the crash and 
deepened the crisis: 
 
One sign of impending economic collapse was the crash 
of the massively overvalued Zimbabwe Stock Exchange 
beginning in September 1997. This was soon followed by 
three controversial political calculations by Mugabe—first, 
to raise rhetorical (and later actual) conflicts surrounding 
land maldistribution; second, to grant large pension-fund 
payouts to veterans of the 1963–79 Liberation War; and 
third, to involve Zimbabwean troops in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo war. As punishment, investors simply 
ran from Zimbabwe. On the late morning of 14 November 
1997, the Zimbabwe dollar lost 74% of its value over a four-
hour period (Bond 2007: 170).   
  
The Business Herald’s attribution of the 14 November forex crash to market 
speculation can seem baffling if one considers that for the most part it had taken the 
side of business and had been consistently critical of government’s real or perceived 
failures to support ESAP fully. However, in retrospect, this sea-change in editorial 
policy is not as inexplicable as it may seem at face value. Rather, it is explained by the 
vicissitudes (and the pitfalls) of patriotic reporting. The paper had, while arising from 
the capitalist newsrooms of the Rhodesian Herald, always toed the government line. 
Its criticisms were always measured, never all-out. It claimed objectivity to a point. 
Once the government went into a corner, it needed all its “weapons” (which included 
newspapers) to contribute directly to the “cause”. The steps taken by Robert Mugabe 
and his government, as noted by Bond (2007) above, left little to the imagination. The 
increasing challenge to ZANU PF hegemony led to the increasing sloganeering about 
sovereignty and anti-colonial rhetoric in support of land and the massive pay-outs to 
war veterans. As the politics grew more and more confrontational, journalist also 
followed suit. News production and news values from the state-controlled Zimpapers 
stable became strained as questions and suspicions arose concerning editorial 
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independence and monitoring of newsrooms. In these circumstances the paper could 
not continue with its fence-sitting and ‘blame the government’ reportage. News work, 
even for business reporters, had suddenly become a mine field. Just as the political 
situation became more volatile, so did the Business Herald become less critical of 
government. If this was patriotic journalism, it was less objective and less concerned 
with the objective interests of the nation per se but, rather, with the national interest 
as defined narrowly by ZANU-PF. Such a patriotism was, of course, highly contested 
and could only be imposed and maintained at great cost from above.  
 
Full blown Crisis 
As the crisis resulting from the events described by Bond (2007) intensified into 1998, 
the Business Herald resorted to just reporting the goings-on without much commentary 
and analysis. One could call this minute-taking journalism (in the sense of the 
“minutes” of a meeting where one jots down exactly what was said without 
embellishing, analysing or commenting). Whereas the journalism of the early to mid-
1990s was replete with commentary and analysis, minute-taking journalism took the 
safer route of treating events descriptively and according to a pre-determined 
template. Indeed, minute-taking journalism expressed the fear that too much analysis 
could leave reporters open to censorship or even open political attacks. Whereas the 
Business Herald had previously sought economists and other technocratic sources 
who offered “objective” and “credible” criticism of government policies, the paper 
began to offer descriptive reports that scratched the surface concerning the cause of 
the crisis and kept to a pro-government template. In this new dispensation of business 
journalism, the commonest sources were government sources or, better still, unnamed 
sources who happened to agree with government whole-heartedly.  
 
A common problem that faced journalists at the Business Herald was, of course, that 
while one could manipulate a story to make it fit a narrative, it was harder to rig the 
economy itself. This meant that even in the tame reports that came out of the one-
sided reporting of the paper in the last years of the decade, there was still enough that 
amounted to inevitable criticism of government policies. For instance, in 8 January 
1998, the paper had a story about how construction projects had been suspended due 




The construction of at least 10 farm dams in various parts 
of the country and a sugar mill in Bindura have been 
shelved owing to a variety of problems facing the economy 
as well as uncertainty over the land issue. The latest 
developments have hit hard the already battered 
construction industry which was expecting these major 
projects to help lift it out of the doldrums (Business Herald 
8 January 1998). 
 
The point is that one could, if one wanted, still read between the lines.  However, where 
alternative news sources such as the Financial Gazette existed, readers would rather 
buy the Fingaz rather than spend energy reading between the lines in the Business 
Herald. This brought the added risk of losing market share for the latter.  A further, and 
perhaps more important point pertaining to the fact that the government could not 
ultimately rig the economy to suit the narrative, is that one senses a continual tension 
in the descriptive, minute-taking journalism where the real economy kept intruding on 
the pre-determined pro-government narratives. 
 
At any rate, the description-heavy reporting gradually took hold and became a 
Business Herald standard. Whereas previously the paper would clearly spell out 
government policies that were behind the crisis in the economy, it was now reporting 
them just as negative economic developments – a use of language which sought to 
minimise attribution of blame where the blame could have been attributed to 
government. Because of the tension between pre-determined narratives and the 
goings-on in the real economy, stories carried an entanglement of rigid description 
and shards of analysis, a blend that created a new type of reporting that became 
typical of the Business Herald which seemed to say one thing while saying another, 
or to say something without quite saying it, almost like a PR-executive doing damage 
control on behalf of a client where facts are mixed with advocacy and falsehoods. In 
Shona this is known as pamutondo-pamusasa (all-over-the-place). Hence in the same 
story the Business Herald went on to report that: 
 
Mr Richard Maasdorp, of the Construction Industry 
Council, said projects worth between $500 million and $1 
billion had been put on hold and prospects were not good. 
He said that the collapse of the Zimbabwe dollar, the 
suspension of Foreign Currency Denominated Accounts, 
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land acquisition and increased taxes were badly affecting 
the industry (Business Herald 8 January 1998). 
 
Brett and Winter (2003) assert that ebbing support in the 1996 elections led to an 
increasing insecurity in the ZANU PF government that made it take steps to reward its 
allies (and also muzzle its opponents). Just as in the early 1980s when the Business 
Herald had to be careful in its criticism of the government, the late 1990s were 
presenting the same challenge. Regimes with much to gain by remaining in power and 
with a substantial risk of revolt may, of course, allow some partial media freedom 
(Lorentzen in Huang 2009). At that point the political situation was tense with the 
generality of citizens dissatisfied with the state of the economy. However, since blame 
was not universally or openly attributed to the government or to Mugabe, the 
government could allow some partial freedom especially in the business press which 
was largely read by elite audiences. At the same time, the government could not allow 
the public press to be too critical as that could increase the negative perception that 
was already pervading society. Unlike the previous years of independence where the 
ZANU PF government’s grip on power was relatively safe, the worsening conditions 
of living were threatening that relative safety.  
 
To show how far things were falling apart, black Friday was followed by food riots in 
January 1998. Typically, the paper reported the aftermath of the riots in the context of 
consequences to business without delving too much into the reasons for the riots. At 
this point, the self-censorship of the late 1970s and early 1980s had returned. While 
the business paper may not have been in the spotlight to the same extent as the main 
paper, it erred on the side of caution, and for good reason too. The long-serving editor 
of The Herald, Tommy Sithole, for instance, was relieved of his duties after he criticised 
police handling of the riots. Sithole had described police as “trigger happy”, and 
“overzealous” (Chikuhwa 2004: 61). At any rate, the dismissal of Sithole marked a 
turning point. The government, being the owner of The Herald, was flexing its muscles 
directly in a manner reminiscent of the early 80s purge (see Saunders 1991). Direct 
government interference in editorial appointments and editorial policy was to become 
standard. Against such a background the Business Herald, lapsed increasingly into 
lapdog journalism. On the 19th February reported the aftermath of the riots without 




Insurance companies are set pay at least $70 million to 
clients whose property was damaged during last month’s 
food riots…the hardest hit of the 15 companies in the 
industry will pay about $8.5 million. Of the claims received 
so far, 30 percent represented stoning of vehicles while the 
remainder was for breaking in and looting (Business 
Herald 19 February 1998). 
 
While the report retains traces of the Business Herald’s traditional leaning towards 
business, the lack of analysis of what led to the riots tells of the strain of a paper that 
was coming under increasing state control. Such strain, of course, was not felt directly 
or in the same way by the Fingaz. Schifferes and Coulter (2012) note that during the 
2008 global financial crisis some were concerned that the media worsened the crisis 
by its coverage which caused panic among the public and investors. By intensifying 
its direct control over newsrooms of the publicly owned media including the Business 
Herald, government may have been showing its concern to limit the crisis and the 
damage from the crisis. However, the next decades would show that a further 
explanation was Mugabe’s ready and active use of all tools at his disposal to retain 
power at all costs. Such tools included state-owned newspapers. If the Business 
Herald saw through the government’s increasing controlling behaviour, it did not do 
much about it. Rather, it went along submissively, even improving on the types of news 
frames of pamutondo-pamusasa reporting. The paper’s overall attitude could be seen 
as fawning and embarrassing, or as realpolitik.  Yet, seen from another angle, the go-
with-the-flow attitude of the Business Herald at this time could be summed up in the 
“patriotic” Zimbabwean saying Ane benzi ndeane rake kudzana unopururudza (one 
could praise and delight in a fool’s performance, as long as the fools is one’s own fool). 
What choice did they have? 
 
The Financial Gazette representation of the ESAP years 
From cautious embrace and measured warning to oppositional journalism 
As the year 1990 began, and as Zimbabwe was preparing to embark on a programme 
to restructure its economy, the Financial Gazette as the one purely financial paper in 
the country not only had a lot to say about the programme, but faced different 
challenges to those faced by its state-owned counterpart. The paper, on the one hand, 
continued highlighting that the economy was in a crisis and something needed to be 
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done, while navigating the new space offered by the prospect of structural reforms. As 
a capitalist enterprise, the Financial Gazette stood to gain if the government went all 
out and enacted the obligatory liberalisation reforms. However, the paper from the 
beginning was never optimistic that the ZANU-PF government was the right candidate 
to steer these reforms. Its scepticism, if measured at first, soon became universally 
tetchy and unfriendly to the government. The paper sought to show that the crisis 
arose from the way the economy was structured under the ZANU PF government, and 
that this government could not be the solution to the problems it had caused. Rather, 
it could only make them worse. The narrative was that one could not teach an old dog 
new tricks. According to the Fingaz, the government already had ‘too much hand’ in 
the economy. This was not only a bad thing, but could not be remedied by ZANU-PF. 
One could say that this sort of reporting from the Financial Gazette marked the 
beginning of the oppositional reporting that was to reach legendary proportions with 
the Daily News in the early 2000s. The Financial Gazette saw little to enthuse in the 
government’s stewardship of ESAP and predicted unmitigated disaster from the 
beginning. 
 
Shades of oppositional journalism by the Financial Gazette were in evidence from the 
very beginning of the 1990s decade. This was evidenced, for instance, by stories such 
as one on 22 June 1990 titled “Zisco take-over shock”. It reported that: 
 
The business community this week described as 
‘shocking’ the government’s intention to buy out minority 
shareholders in the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company 
(ZISCO) saying the move puts a huge question mark on 
government’s sincerity in respect of allowing greater 
private sector involvement in the economy (Financial 
Gazette 22 June 1990). 
 
For the Financial Gazette this story spoke about the indecisiveness and unreliability 
of government in relation to liberalising the economy. This was “shocking” coming in 
the wake of the discourse on liberalisation having started in the late 1980s. All the 
sources were from business, and the story gives a picture of a government that is 
reckless and lacking in seriousness about restructuring the economy. To the Financial 
Gazette government’s action reeked of bad faith considering that it has been noted 
that it was not forced to adopt reforms (see Compagnon 2011). Suffice to say that 
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headlines with words such as “shocking” would not have seen the light of day at the 
Business Herald. Unlike the Business Herald, the Financial Gazette did not see itself 
as practicing pamutondo-pamusasa reporting. Indeed, it took pride in saying that it told 
it like it is, without fear or favour. Its reporting, if it counted as patriotic, reflected the 
saying that Chokwadi hachiputsi ukama (truth-telling is good for relations). That is, the 
paper leveraged its independent ownership to claim that it operated an unvarnished 
watchdog journalism that was unrivalled in Zimbabwe. Certainly, the Financial Gazette 
seemed to have seen and framed itself in opposition to the Zimpapers state-owned 
stable.  
 
In pursuit of the chokwadi hachiputsi ukama model of business journalism, the 
Financial Gazette carried stories that seemed framed in opposition to the headlines of 
the Business Herald. For instance, it carried a story in January 1990 where the World 
Bank was refuting allegations that Bretton Woods institutions had forced ESAP on 
Zimbabwe. This was the opposite of the stories in the Business Herald that hinted at 
the role of the IMF’s sticks-and-carrots in Zimbabwe’s adoption of ESAP. The paper 
reported the comments that it said had been made by the World Bank Vice President 
for Africa, Mr Edward Jaycox: 
 
Mr Jaycox denied that the bank was putting pressure on 
Zimbabwe to move towards the reform path. He conceded 
however that the bank had intimated to government that ‘if 
you move towards these directions, substantial support will 
be forthcoming’ (Financial Gazette 26 January 1990). 
 
Unlike the Business Herald, the Financial Gazette emphasised local agency in the 
adoption of ESAP. Ironically, it is this emphasis that made the paper sceptical that the 
programme would succeed.  
 
While the Financial Gazette initially published stories that approved of the 
government’s reform programme, saying that it was only fair that the government be 
given the benefit of the doubt, its preponderant selection of non-governmental sources 
showed that it wanted to sound a note of both scepticism and caution on the reform 
programme as a whole. On 23 February the paper had a story on how trade 




Debate on the proposed trade liberalisation policies 
continues to grip the nation’s business community. But as 
a local executive pointed out this week, are local 
enterprises really ready for the advent of such a 
development considering that they would cease to be 
insulated from cut-throat international community 
(Financial Gazette 23 February 1990). 
 
The selection of sources reflects where a paper thinks “true” objectivity lies. This is 
because “news, like knowledge, imposes a frame for defining and constructing social 
reality” (Tuchman 1978: 180). The more objectivity a paper sees itself as achieving, 
the more credible it seems. An objective and credible paper is able to perform a 
watchdog role much more than one that throws its lot with the government, the 
Financial Gazette seemed to be saying.  In deciding to sound a note of caution from 
the very beginning, the paper could claim to have been playing not only its watchdog 
role over society, but the necessary task of telling truth to power and even holding 
those in power accountable. As the government was touting ESAP as the panacea to 
the country’s economic woes, the Financial Gazette seemed interested only in 
dispelling the perception that ESAP was a magic wand. Not only were results not going 
to be seen overnight but if the government failed to commit fully to the programme, it 
could score many own goals and cause an economic crisis. Whereas the Business 
Herald leaves open the possibility that ESAP could have failed for other reasons other 
than government failures, The Financial Gazette primes its readers to lay all the blame 
at the government’s door. This priming is done through such reportage that creates 
suspicion about the true motives of the government in adopting ESAP. 
 
The Financial Gazette continued to report what it saw as the true extent of the crisis 
that was affecting the economy. A favourite approach was to show that the 
Zimbabwean economy was traditionally hamstrung by bottlenecks and inefficiency in 
production which were often leading to problems such as shortages of raw materials 
as well as goods on the market, overcapacity and a high import bill. The pantomime 
villain in The Financial Gazette’s columns was the controlled economy. In its view, 
nothing good could ever come out of a command economy. Ironically, the Rhodesian 
economy under the Rhodesian Front was based on state planning and intervention. 
Indeed, in some ways it was more socialist than Mugabe’s.  In a story from April 1990, 
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the Chairman of the Commercial Grain Producers’ Association (CGPA), Mr Jon Parkin, 
was quoted lamenting the problem of overstocking of maize: 
 
He welcomed the partial liberalisation of marketing of 
yellow maize and hoped that the process would be 
developed further, in cooperation with the government. He 
however, expressed concern at the size of the present 
maize stockpile and urged that all opportunities to earn 
foreign exchange by exporting maize should be explored 
as a matter of urgency (Financial Gazette 27 April 1990). 
 
The nearly constant use of “however” in reports of this kind in the Financial Gazette 
indicates a narrative that sees the liberalisation drive as piecemeal and as not going 
far enough. Hence the paper drew on sources that seemed to have ready-made 
howevers to counteract whatever optimism could have been generated by the 
adoption of ESAP. The Financial Gazette seemed to believe that the Mugabe 
government wanted to eat its cake and still have it (gumbo-mumba, gumbo-panze). It 
saw in this attitude the seeds of future disaster. 
 
The Financial Gazette’s role in urging the government to go all-in (or all-out) in 
implementing structural reforms, rather than making piecemeal change is clear in a 
range of stories that are critical of the government’s gumbo-mumba, gumbo-panze 
approach. A story on 11 May 1990 highlights shortages due to control of prices in the 
economy. The packaging industry was being affected by shortage of raw materials 
due to a severe shortage of foreign currency to pay for imports: 
 
The packaging crisis is fast reaching a point of no return, 
and thousands of jobs and millions of dollars in exports are 
threatened. Experts yesterday warned that the food 
processing and packaging industry’s viability has been 
seriously eroded by the shortage of packaging. Food 
processors, such as Lever Brothers owned Lemco, are 
already finding it difficult to process and pack the many 
agricultural products grown by hundreds of commercial 
and communal farmers. Vegetables and fruit grown under 
contract with these companies are being thrown away and 
it is estimated that up to 60 000 farmers and their 
dependants will lose their main source of income unless 




Stories like these served to create a sense of panic and apocalypse if reforms were 
not done now and done in full. Such reporting performed a dual function of pushing 
the government towards market reforms while laying the blame for any failures 
squarely on the government’s door-step. One sees a lot of this “pressure-group 
journalism” from the Financial Gazette’s reporting. The paper seemed to be lobbying 
the government on behalf of business, while also reminding government of promises 
it had made.  As argued by Fishman (1980), news media work to construct a certain 
reality not only in the society, but in people’s heads as well. The Financial Gazette 
sought to ‘create’ a new reality whereby deregulation replaced regulation. For the 
paper deregulation was an imperative, not a mere alternative. It could save jobs and 
businesses. The Financial Gazette thus sought to expose as fatal the hesitations and 
shortcomings of government when it came to solving the crisis in the economy through 
ESAP. Throughout its implementation and life-cycle, the paper reported on the areas 
that government was demonstrating lack of will-power to do what was necessary for 
ESAP to succeed. These areas included lack of fiscal discipline, government domestic 
borrowing leading to high interest rates and inflation, and privatisation of parastatals.  
 
Fiscal Indiscipline 
One of the key demands of ESAP was that the government needed to reduce its high 
budget deficit (Meisenhelder 1994; Kanyenze 2004; Sachikonye and Sachikonye 
2011; Compagnon 2011). The deficit was supposed to be reduced from over 10 
percent to five percent by 1995 (Kanyenze 2004). Naturally this indicator was key in 
the implementation of ESAP and the media were watching it closely. In 1991 as the 
budget for the 1991/1992 fiscal year was to be presented in July, the Financial Gazette 
had a story that highlighted that there was no way ESAP could be successfully 
implemented without the government announcing measures to reduce the budget 
deficit. The paper reported that: 
 
Economists, bankers and businessmen have warned that 
the 1991/92 budget, to be presented on July 25, will be a 
non-event unless it has specific measures to speed up the 
implementation of the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme. A snap survey this week revealed that many 
people expect the Senior Minister of Finance, Economic 
Planning and Development, Dr Bernard Chidzero, to 
propose concrete measures to reduce the budget deficit, 
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which currently stands at about 10 percent of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) (Financial Gazette 18 July 1991). 
 
The Financial Gazette was involved in setting an agenda whereby the issue of 
reducing the budget deficit was ranked as the most important priority for the 
government to address. Economists, bankers and businessmen were lined-up to 
express their frustration with the budget deficit. In the eyes of these individuals, 
reducing the budget deficit was key to the success of ESAP.  
 
The media are both actors and arenas (Gafstrom and Windell 2011). As actors they 
construct ideas about events and as arenas they provide a platform for stakeholders 
to present their views (Gafstrom and Windell 2011). Sometimes they are seen as 
constructing ideas in people’s minds by setting the agenda – telling people what to 
think about (McCombs and Shaw 1972). As noted, the Financial Gazette was by this 
time no longer a paper for a few elites. It was still a financial paper but had spread its 
reach to many high density suburbs of Harare and other cities (Saunders 1991). 
Because people in these low-income areas were going to be affected the most through 
losing jobs, setting an agenda where the responsibility for ESAP to succeed lay with 
the government, not business, was a masterstroke of agenda setting. Indeed, the split 
between government and its erstwhile labour union partners (the Zimbabwe Congress 
of Trade Unions (ZCTU) in particular) came about as a result of the wedge created 
between low income urban workers and the ZANU-PF government. To this day urban 
workers mostly support the opposition MDC. One could say that the breach started 
with this narrative seen in the pages of the Financial Gazette as early as the 1990s. 
 
The narrative that the government only had itself to blame also took the form of the 
government’s own evidence. In a story on 25 June 1992, the Financial Gazette even 
quoted a government report for the 1991/92 budget performance which conceded that 
“although the cumulative revenue rose by 11 percent, expenditure had exceeded the 
target resulting in an overall deficit of $1.2 billion”. By using the government’s own data 
and evidence against itself, the Financial Gazette further set itself up as objective and 
credible. Government’s failure to rein in expenditure such as the continued high budget 
allocations for the army at a time the country and region was becoming more peaceful 
was cited as evidence of chronic incompetence. On 6 August 1992 the Financial 
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Gazette reported that “against an atmosphere of relative peace and stability at home, 
the Zimbabwean government is reported to have acquired military equipment worth 
about $1.6 billion.” To demonstrate the absurdity of the military spending when the 
government was supposed to be implementing austerity measures to reduce the 
budget deficit, the paper noted that “Statistics released in the World Bank’s 1992 World 
Development Report show that Zimbabwe is third largest military spender in Africa 
after South Africa and Libya” (Financial Gazette 6 August 1992). In this way, the 
Financial Gazette used the question of high expenditure and the budget deficit to 
provoke opposition to the government not just from the business elites but also the 
ordinary workers. It is my contention that papers like the Financial Gazette sowed the 
seeds of anti-government and anti-ZANU PF urban stronghold oppositional politics by 
not only showing government failures but using government failures to demonstrate 
that ZANU-PF had “to go”. Clearly, if ZANU PF had to go, an alternative had to be 
found. By 1999 such an alternative had been found in the form on an alliance of urban 
workers and students (with the tacit support of the business class and, indeed some 
commercial white farmers and also foreign governments intent on “regime change”) 
which formed the backbone of the MDC. Thus the reporting of papers such as the 
Financial Gazette did not just criticise passively, but also created political ground for 
political alternatives. This argument is borne out by the fact that Mugabe’s government 
increasingly became paranoid about the independent media, which it accused of 
fomenting “regime change” agenda and of being “tools” of the “West”. 
 
The Financial Gazette reported extensively on the lack of fiscal discipline by the 
government that led to the IMF and World Bank suspending payment after the first 
phase of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme, while also publishing 
stories that emphasised that government was to blame for crisis of funding ESAP. In 
a story following the IMF suspending funding in 1996, the paper reported that: 
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has cancelled a $1 
billion disbursement for Zimbabwe’s economic reform 
programme due to missed targets and has ruled out any 
new funding negotiations until after the next budget in 
July…Jurgen Reitmaier who heads the southern Africa 
department of the IMF from Washington DC, said 
yesterday in Harare that Zimbabwe no longer qualified for 
further financial support because it remained ‘off-target’ in 
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reducing its budget deficit…” (Financial Gazette 16 May 
1996). 
 
To the Financial Gazette, the government was incapable of exercising fiscal prudence 
and austerity measures to reduce the budget deficit. Instead, the government was 
consistently labelled as having a tendency for heavy borrowing to satisfy its insatiable 
appetite for spending money it did not have and living beyond its means. The 
borrowing was seen to lead to high interest rates from the banks which was stifling 
productive sector lending leading to stifled economic growth. This narrative by the 
Financial Gazette was consistent with its original position that the government had not 
been pressured into adopting ESAP. Rather, the government had adopted ESAP to 
satisfy its appetite for debt. 
 
Indeed, to show that it was not merely performing a hatchet job on the government, 
the Financial Gazette drew on evidence-based reporting that suited the narrative of an 
irresponsible government careering towards inevitable catastrophe. Hence it wheeled 
out reports and analyses, some from state aligned institutions, to “demonstrate” the 
crisis of government borrowing. For example, on 25 September 1997, it used a 
statement from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe: 
 
Zimbabwe’s central bank warned the cash-strapped 
government yesterday against borrowing from the local 
market to finance its bloated fiscal deficit expected to 
balloon to over $15 billion in the 18 months to December 
1998 due to unbudgeted payouts to ex-freedom fighters. 
As well as the high payouts to the war veterans, the 
government has to set aside millions of dollars to meet 
emergencies in case the country is hit by a crippling 
drought this farming season (Financial Gazette 25 
September 1997). 
 
Davis (2007) notes that power in the financial press is increasingly vesting in the 
supranational institutions such as the IMF. In this case the concerns of the IMF and 
the World Bank were being taken into consideration and legitimised through a local 
institution such as the Reserve Bank. The Reserve Bank report was used to express 
the fears of businesspeople, the Bretton Woods institutions and other elite groups who 
were worried about the announcement of the huge pay-outs to war veterans. The IMF 
was reported as even requesting a clear indication from the government about how it 
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was going to fund this unbudgeted expense. By using the Reserve Bank as the source 
of the story, the Financial Gazette legitimised the concerns of all those that that were 
opposed to the pay-outs which Mugabe was seen as having recklessly promised 
without getting input from other stakeholders. On the one hand, the Financial Gazette 
could be seen as a lapdog of the multilateral lending institutions such as the IMF and 
the World Bank. As a lapdog of these powerful global institutions, it was empowered 
to be a watchdog over the ZANU-PF government. On the other hand, we will do well 
to remember Schudson’s (2000) point not to exaggerate the power that powerful 
groups have over the media. Hence, from this point of view, one sees not so much the 
Financial Gazette playing poodle to the Bretton Woods institutions, but rather as 
negotiating its own interests in a sea of other complex interests. Some of these 
interests coincided, but were not necessarily reducible to one another, just like the 
interests of the urban workers, students, white farmers and foreign embassies 
coincided in the formation of the MDC. The support of the farmers and the foreign 
embassies for the MDC does not invalidate the real concerns of the workers and the 
students. These concerns would still have been there, and still have been legitimate, 
with or without the ulterior motives of the other actors. However, as we will see, the 
ZANU PF government conflated these interests and created a binary where the 
opposition and the private media were puppets of the West. In this narrative only 
ZANU-PF and the state-owned media could be patriotic. At the same time, the 
Financial Gazette’s capitalist leanings made it work hand-in-glove with the global 
lending institutions, thus to some extent justifying the contention that independent 
media in Zimbabwe were working alongside external bodies to foment “regime 
change”. Such a content is plausible, though it is hard to prove. I am more inclined to 
accept the explanation of a coincidence of interests rather than the conspiracy theory. 
 
Journalists are an interpretive community who use data and statistics in the service of 
a particular narrative. In the pages of the Financial Gazette, data showing heavy 
domestic borrowing was fingered as the cause of the high interest rates that were 
reportedly hindering expansion plans of local industries and being a major impediment 
to the growth of manufacturing. On 29 April 1993 the paper reported on how 
government continued to borrow from the domestic market, depriving industry of much 




Government yesterday floated two stocks to raise at least 
$50 million required to replenish its dwindling coffers 
following a sharp fall in revenue receipts over the past 10 
months. The latest floatations – which close on May 3 1993 
– bring to seven the number of stock issues floated so far 
during the 1993 calendar year…Government whose deficit 
has greatly exceeded its target against a dwindling 
revenue base is now borrowing from local money market 
after every two weeks. This, analysts have said, is forcing 
rates to soar and also crowding out private sector activity. 
The impact of excessive government borrowing on the 
local money market, on the size of the budget deficit, the 
cost of financing interest rate repayments, market rates 
and inflation, will be colossal, analysts contend (Financial 
Gazette 29 April 1993). 
 
Thus, the Financial Gazette did not just report on the excessive borrowing, but 
provided information on what it regarded as the consequences for such borrowing. It 
is this latter form of explanation that I wish to suggest had political ramifications way 
beyond the limited scope of financial news reporting. As Saunders (1991) shows, 
general audiences had become some of the key consumers of business news from 
the Financial Gazette. Doyle (2006) argues that it is important to establish how 
financial news coverage aids public understanding and appreciation of the significance 
of particular events. 
 
Sachikonye and Sachikonye (2011) note that part of public enterprise reform under 
ESAP included privatisation and reduction of state subsidies and transfers from 
ZW$629 million to ZW$40 million by 1995. The lack of fiscal discipline extended to 
government lack of willingness to institute parastatal reform. The Financial Gazette 
reported it as one of the causes of fiscal indiscipline as the government continued to 
provide financial support to loss making parastatals. As already noted, privatisation of 
state owned enterprises was one of the key requirements of ESAP. The Financial 
Gazette studiously reported on government failure to meet these requirements. In a 
World Bank assessment of how ESAP had been implemented, the Financial Gazette 
– like a dog with a bone – continued to raise the issue of parastatal reform as the bank 





There were serious weaknesses in parastatal reform, the 
bank notes, with price reform being given precedence over 
resolving structural problems of the parastatals. ‘An 
accelerated appraisal process with a more dynamic lead 
from the centre, an explicit definition of the enterprise’s role 
and a greater commitment to involving the private sector in 
a more active implementation role were not accorded 
sufficient priority’, it (World Bank) said (Financial Gazette 
22 June 1995). 
 
The lack of public enterprise reform was persistently reported to be one of the reasons 
why ESAP failed (Compagnon 2011; Sachikonye and Sachikonye 2011). Hence 
“Persistent lacklustre performance and losses by parastatals weighed heavily on 
public finances, necessitating increased government debt through domestic borrowing 
and reduced availability of finance for private sector investment” (Sachikonye and 
Sachikonye 2011: 95). The Financial Gazette’s pro-market agenda setting thus 
coincided with the IMF’s on this matter. By reporting on key performance areas such 
as parastatal reform, the Financial Gazette was helping the public to assess the 
performance of their political leaders.  By 2000 the public verdict was largely negative, 
thanks in no small part to the reporting of papers such as the Financial Gazette.   
 
The political role of business journalism at the Financial Gazette became very clear in 
the reporting of the two major decisions that many scholars have pointed out as playing 
a major role in shaping the direction of the economy and economic discourse in the 
late 1990s. These issues – which became a sort of cause celebre – are the gratuities 
and pensions paid out to ex-fighters in the 1970s liberation war and the sending of 
troops to the DRC to help quell a rebel onslaught (see Kanyenze 2004; Mashingaidze 
2006; Compagnion 2011; Sachikonye and Sachikonye 2011). The Financial Gazette 
was fervently opposed to both, and made this very clear in its editorials, features and 
general reporting. In the aftermath of the announcement by Robert Mugabe of his 
government’s intention to reward war veterans with gratuities and pensions, the 
Financial Gazette had a story on 25 September 1997 where the Reserve Bank 
governor, Leonard Tsumba, was reported as warning the government against 
borrowing to finance costs of the pay-outs. It reported that: 
 
Zimbabwe’s central bank warned the cash-strapped 
government yesterday against borrowing from the local 
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market to finance its bloated fiscal deficit expected to 
balloon to over $15 billion in the 18 months to December 
1998 due to unbudgeted payouts to ex-freedom 
fighters…governor Leonard Tsumba yesterday bluntly told 
the government that any recourse to domestic borrowing 
would be inflationary and would put brakes on the fragile 
recovery of the largely agro-based economy (Financial 
Gazette 25 September 1997). 
 
The paper uses the Reserve Bank’s warning to government to buttress its opposition 
to the pay outs which it had already argued were not economically sound. The same 
pay-outs were reported as being a hindrance to the continued funding of economic 
reforms by the IMF.  
 
The story of how the war veterans pay-outs spooked the markets and caused black 
Friday, as well as cause global financial institutions to reconsider their relationship with 
the Zimbabwe government, has been told many times and does not need repeating. 
What is not often told is, on the one hand, how ZANU-PF saw the crisis as 
manufactured by its enemies in the West bent on “regime change” and, on the other, 
how the story was grist on the mill of independent newspapers that sought empirical 
proof that the government was suicidal and was hell-bent on sending the country into 
an economic apocalypse. On June 13, 2000 then US Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs, Chester Crocker, stated during Senate hearings on the “Zimbabwe 
Democracy and Economic Recovery Act” that:  
 
To separate the Zimbabwean people from ZANU PF, we 
are going to have to make their economy scream, and I 
hope, you senators, have the stomach for what you have 
to do. So if we were to decide to try and work for change 
in power in Zimbabwe, I would hope that we would have 
the wisdom to be discreet, to be low-key, and to avoid 
giving those in power there the excuse that foreigners are 
out to get them.  
 
This statement has been widely repeated by ZANU PF as proof that Zimbabwe’s 
economic woes were specifically manufactured by the “West” as part of a long-game 
regime change agenda. It is more than plausible that Zimbabwe’s economic problems 
are externally caused as part of a regime change agenda, as happened in places like 
Chile, Venezuela, Haiti and Iran, and so on, where the US actively destabilises 
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countries to buttress its foreign policy interests. However, ZANU PF is not a party of 
angels. Since 1980 it has looted the state and caused untold suffering to 
Zimbabweans. The Financial Gazette reported this latter part consistently, showing 
how the trinity of Mugabe, ZANU-PF and the government themselves made 
Zimbabweans economically “scream”. 
 
As part of showing how Mugabe, ZANU-PF and the government made Zimbabwe’s 
economy “scream”, the Financial Gazette outlined the policy disasters of the Mugabe 
regime, beginning with the unbudgeted Z$50,000 pay outs. Hence:  
 
Major Western donors financing Zimbabwe’s market 
reforms are said to have agreed in principle to consider 
releasing suspended key balance of payments support 
after receiving assurances from the government that this 
year’s fiscal budget would not be affected by the 
unbudgeted payment of billions of dollars to the war 
veterans. At the same time government has calmed the 
nerves of nervous local MPs who also wanted to know how 
the funds would be raised by saying it had the means to 
secure the money without affecting its self-imposed target 
of limiting the budget deficit to 8.9 percent of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in the 18 months to December 
1998 (Financial Gazette 2 October 1997). 
 
Revealing that the legislature was against the unbudgeted for pay-outs further 
exposed that the decision was political and yet without widespread political support. 
Interestingly, the legislature had a ZANU PF majority. The Financial Gazette played 
an important role in exposing fissures and cracks in the ruling classes in terms of policy 
direction. This was not just a question of an external regime change agenda. Mugabe 
had become deeply unpopular inside and outside his own party. As evidenced in the 
2000 parliamentary election, ZANU PF had seriously haemorrhaged support. The 
stage was set for major policy decisions that were going to affect the economy to 
benefit a narrow ruling power base. 
 
The Financial Gazette reported that the seriousness of the war veterans’ pay-outs 
issue was evident in the fact that an IMF representative “hurried” to Zimbabwe to hold 
discussions with the government. Prior to the representative, Michael Novak’s visit, 




His arrival in Harare came shortly after the World Bank 
temporarily froze disbursement of over $700 million in aid 
until the government had revised the budget to take into 
account gratuity and pension payouts to the veterans, 
estimated at $3.6 billion this year and another $140 million 
each month from January next year (Financial Gazette 2 
October 1997). 
 
In this report the Financial Gazette continues its framing which shows the multilateral 
financial institutions in good light, with the ZANU PF government shown consistently 
negatively. The paper, unlike the Business Herald, was not ideologically or politically 
constrained from taking this position. Furthermore, the Financial Gazette had all along 
been priming its readers to blame the government should ESAP fail and the economy 
go into a tailspin. Looking back, this strategy seems to have, by and large, worked. 
Today the generality of Zimbabweans – aside from die-hard ZANU-PF supporters – 
blame the government more than any other player for the country’s current economic 
woes. 
 
The Financial Gazette also went further in its apportionment of blame. For instance, 
Robert Mugabe – keen to hang on to power at all costs – was fingered very early on 
as the key architect of the deal to reward the war veterans with unbudgeted for pay-
outs. The paper reported that:  
 
Under the deal between Mugabe and the war veterans, the 
government would make a one-off payment of $50 000 to 
each of the estimated 70 000 ex-fighters this year and 
$2000 in monthly pension payments from January next 
year (Financial Gazette 2 October 1997).   
 
The deal which started Zimbabwe’s descent to an unprecedented economic hell, in 
the Financial Gazette’s view, was the result of one man, the president, taking a 
unilateral decision without consulting with other arms of government. In reporting the 
economic crisis the country was facing because of this bad decision, the paper linked 
the decision to the power-hungry, dictatorial tendencies of Robert Mugabe. This sort 
of reporting from the Financial Gazette underlined a turn in business journalism where 
reporting did not just focus on financials and technical economic data but now included 
full blown political commentary. Indeed, since then, business and financial news 
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reporting in the privately owned media is often replete with political commentary and 
interpretation. 
 
The Financial Gazette, unencumbered by the constraints placed on the Business 
Herald, brought the political ramifications of the Z$50,000 pay-outs to its readership, 
many of whom wage earners. The unpopularity of this one-man decision was driven 
home in a story on 18 December 1997: 
 
In the past two weeks the government has been forced to 
withdraw highly unpopular tax increases and to drop the 
introduction of a five percent war veterans’ levy after 
parliamentarians overwhelmingly rejected a Bill to effect 
the increases. The legislators were supported by members 
of the ruling ZANU PF party and the general public which 
staged massive anti-tax protests countrywide last week 
(Financial Gazette 18 December 1997). 
 
The Financial Gazette was thus giving vent to a nascent political movement that was 
not merely critical of ZANU PF but sought political alternatives. It is this growing 
oppositional movement that drove ZANU PF into a defensive corner from where, to 
this day, it cries “regime change!” What was clear from the Financial Gazette’s 
reporting, however, was that there was a coalition of politicians and the public against 
the proposed plan to fund the unbudgeted for war veterans’ pay-outs. Such reporting 
also provoked the ruling party’s hysteria against the privately owned media, which it 
was quick to label and dismiss as “oppositional” media. 
 
The second disaster was, as noted, the deployment of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces 
to the DRC. Alongside the war veterans Z$50,000 pay outs, it is regarded as one of 
the key causes of Zimbabwe’s fast-track economic decline. The Financial Gazette was 
on hand to map the scope, nature and extent of the disaster. In a story on 17 
December 1998 titled “World Bank puts US$300 million Zimbabwe aid on ice”, the 
paper highlighted the disastrous consequences of the deployment of soldiers to the 
DRC. The deployment became one of the reasons why the IMF and the World 





As well as meeting economic targets which include 
keeping a tight rein on state spending, the IMF, in 
withholding its aid, said it wanted the government to 
explain its seizure three weeks ago of 841 white owned 
farms and the cost of Zimbabwe’s military involvement in 
the Congo civil war (Financial Gazette 17 December 
1998). 
 
The DRC military intervention was represented as an unmitigated disaster for the 
country’s fiscal health. Such framing, which is today repeated by many citizens 
particularly in urban areas, drew to a certain extent on the Financial Gazette’s 
successful agenda setting frame. The paper reported, for instance, the high cost of the 
military intervention in monetary, equipment and personnel terms. That the money 
being used to support the deployment was unbudgeted for was a problem that the 
economy had to bear.  
 
The Financial Gazette also framed the problem as one of lack of transparency. ZANU 
PF’s political culture, said the paper, was sinister and anti-transparency. For instance, 
it was reported that the government was not being transparent with the costs involved. 
A story on 13 May 1999 captures this aspect: 
 
Zimbabwe has so far spent at least $500 million of 
unbudgeted public funds on the war in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Finance Minister 
Herbert Murerwa is expected to make a public statement 
on the costs of the military intervention within the next few 
days, top government officials said yesterday…The 
estimated $500 million already spent on the war is roughly 
twice the annual budget of the Foreign Ministry (Financial 
Gazette 13 May 1999). 
 
The net outcome was to increase the sense of distrust in the government and, at worst, 
to show a government that was toying with citizens lives for its own selfish gain. 
Because most citizens were struggling economically, the framing of the issue as one 
of an uncaring government by and large succeeded, as shown by the successful 
formation of the MDC in 1999.  
 
The Financial Gazette also played an investigative role, which added a new layer of 
complexity to financial journalism in Zimbabwe. Due to the corruption that had 
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permeated the public sector since the Willowgate scandal, independent newspapers 
had inadvertently added the role of exposing malfeasance in the public sector to their 
usual functions. Thus, the Financial Gazette investigated and exposed the scope of 
the DRC expenses, showing how the nation was going to shoulder the burden of these 
costs. In exposing these expenses, the paper was holding government to account for 
abuse of power and for its previous misinformation.  
 
The revelation by the government officials, who asked not 
to be identified, contradicted Zimbabwe’s previous public 
announcement that most of its operations in the vast 
Central African country were largely funded by the DRC 
and Angolan governments (Financial Gazette 13 May 
1999). 
 
Just as in the case of war veterans pay-outs, the Financial Gazette highlighted that 
political decisions were behind the economic crisis. Robert Mugabe was again 
reported as having made a unilateral decision to deploy soldiers without the consent 
of parliament as required by the constitution. Readers were primed into seeing Robert 
Mugabe as the architect of their problems. Hence: 
 
President Robert Mugabe last year committed more than 
6000 troops, millions of dollars worth of warplanes and 
heavy armour to the DRC without consulting Parliament or 
officially informing Zimbabweans, the majority of whom 
were found by an independent survey to be opposed to the 
deployment (Financial Gazette 13 May 1999). 
 
By putting a face to the economic crisis, Financial Gazette succeeded in putting the 
cross hairs of scrutiny on Mugabe and thus beginning the “Mugabe must go” mantra 
that was to dominate oppositional politics and slogans for the next two decades. 
Interestingly, this framing can also be blamed for stunting political discourse in 
Zimbabwe whereby people were led to think that once Mugabe was gone, Zimbabwe’s 
problems would be solved. The fixation with Mugabe has proved unhealthy for 
Zimbabwe’s political discourse because his removal in 2017 did not usher in a Golden 
Age. Indeed, many are beginning to think that Mugabe’s rule was preferable to 




The Financial Gazette did not just report the political dimension of the cost, but also 
the human dimension and human losses accruing. This gave a human interest to the 
story, and captured the popular imagination. Whereas the government wanted the 
DRC escapade to happen without much fanfare, the analyses by papers such as 
Fingaz helped to bring the story into the homes of many Zimbabweans:  
 
According to the government, about 35 Zimbabwean 
soldiers have died in combat in the jungles of the DRC, 
some 3 500km away from home. Rebels fighting the 
government of DRC President Laurent Kabila put the 
number of Zimbabwe’s dead at 200 (Financial Gazette 13 
May 1999). 
 
The groundswell of opposition that included the food riots, mass stayaways, formation 
of the MDC, electoral losses for ZANU PF in the 2000 elections, and the losses in the 
constitutional referendum all trace their roots to the conditions reported by papers such 
as the Financial Gazette between 1995 and 1999. This groundswell of opposition also 
led Mugabe to plunge headlong into further policy miasma when, to retain support, he 
embarked reluctantly on the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP).  
 
Scholars such as Bond (2007) and Bond and Manyanya (2002) have argued that the 
two developments of 1997 and 1998, together with the land reform programme starting 
in 2000 (the subject of the next Chapter), contributed a lot to Zimbabwe’s terminal 
economic decline which peaked in 2008 but – after a hiatus between 2009 and 2013 
– continues unrelentingly to this day. Bond (2007) notes that: 
 
One sign of impending economic collapse was the crash 
of the massively overvalued Zimbabwe Stock Exchange 
beginning in September 1997. This was soon followed by 
three controversial political calculations by Mugabe—first, 
to raise rhetorical (and later actual) conflicts surrounding 
land maldistribution; second, to grant large pension fund 
payouts to veterans of the 1963–79 Liberation War; and 
third, to involve Zimbabwean troops in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo war. As punishment, investors simply 
ran from Zimbabwe. On the late morning of 14 November 
1997, the Zimbabwe dollar lost 74% of its value over a four-




There has been much scrutiny of the work of financial and economic journalists in the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. These two events however demonstrate how 
difficult it is to generalise journalistic experience. Policymaking practices in Zimbabwe 
are different from those of most of the world that was severely affected by the 2008 
crisis. In this case we cannot ask whether the media such as the Financial Gazette, 
the only specialist financial paper then, could have adequately warned the public about 
the impending disaster, and whether such warnings would have amounted to anything. 
The two “policies” came from ‘nowhere’ and were a surprise to many including those 
in government. Rather we can ask whether the paper interpreted the consequences 
well enough for the grasp of the public (see Doyle 2006).  
 
The Financial Gazette made it clear that the unilateral, unbudgeted and abrupt nature 
of the announcement of pay-outs to war veterans, and the country’s unilateral and 
unbudgeted intervention in the DRC, would have dire consequences on the economy. 
This prediction has been borne out. What the Financial Gazette could never have 
predicted, to my mind, is that the crisis would go on for more than 20 years (2000-
2020, and still counting). The problems have proven to be much deeper than Mugabe, 
too. This the Financial Gazette did not quite foresee. By pointing audiences to Robert 
Mugabe as the root cause of the crisis that emanated from the war veterans pay-outs 
and deployment of the army to the DRC, the paper was playing not only an economic, 
but a political role as well. There was a growing discontent with the way Robert 
Mugabe and his government were running the country, especially in urban areas, the 
same market for the newspaper. The Financial Gazette gave full vent to this 
discontent. To my mind the paper played a major role in the opposition politics that 
began with the food riots in 1998 and the stayaways in 1999 followed by the formation 
of the MDC in 1999 and the “Vote No” campaign in the referendum of 2000. By the 
1990s the Financial Gazette had transformed itself from being a purely financial 
newspaper to include national and international political and social issues (Saunders 
1991). It thus reached an audience that was diverse and national in character. Unlike 
the Business Herald, it could say things that the state-owned paper could not. Its 
greatest casualty was the sacred cow, Robert Mugabe himself, whom it placed at the 
centre of its critique. It has been argued that the media are political institutions (see 
Iyengar and Reeves 1997; Hall 1997; Cook 2006; Entman 2007). Cook (2006: 159) 
argues that “the media are a product of politics and feed back in to influence politics 
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as well”. The Financial Gazette’s reportage went beyond the remit of “pure” economic 
journalism into the realm of politics and political mobilisation.  It has never been able 
to capture such salience and importance since, partly due to the proliferation of 
independent papers, ownership wrangles, the changes in the Zimbabwean economic 




The representation of the economy by the two papers in the 1990s, dominated by the 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) was largely sympathetic to the 
liberal ideas of institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. It was easy in the early 
1990s even for state-controlled the Business Herald to take a liberal angle because 
that was also the direction the ZANU PF government was taking. However, in its liberal 
enthusiasm, the paper paid little attention to in-depth analysis of the potential 
unintended consequences of economic reforms. In contrast the Financial Gazette 
provided warnings of the potential consequences of implementing ESAP. This was in 
spite of it being mostly in support of the liberalisation of markets. The Business Herald 
encountered challenges in reporting the crisis brewing in the late 1990s as the 
government appeared to tighten its control of information due to increasing criticism of 
its policies. It was the Financial Gazette that then reported the economic and political 
turmoil that ensued in the late 1990s, particularly after the payment of unbudgeted for 
gratuities to war veterans and the unilateral and unbudgeted for deployment of soldiers 
to the DRC. It was the Financial Gazette that provided meaningful analysis of the crisis 
that would turn into a catastrophe in the new millennium.  
 
The next and final analysis and discussion chapter explores how the two newspapers 
represented the economic crisis in Zimbabwe from the year 2000 to 2018. The period 
can broadly be divided into the land reform and hyperinflation period from 2000 to 
2008; the inclusive government period from 2009 to 2013 elections; and the post 2013 








CHAPTER 6: THE NEW MILLENNIUM AND THE CHAOS 
 
Introduction 
The decade from 2000 to 2010 is dominated by twin crises: the Fast Track Land 
Reform Programme (FTLRP) and the collapse of the Zimbabwe dollar. From 2010 to 
the coup that removed Mugabe from power in 2017, and beyond, the economy merely 
lurched from policy misstep to policy misstep, until the present where the economy is 
dominated by vested interests and cartels16 and is run via fiat and unilateral Statutory 
Instruments and financed by Treasury Bills and helicopter money and quantitative 
easing. This chapter discusses how the two newspapers represented the twin crisis 
that ensued due to the chaotic and often violent land redistribution programme. By 
1998 farm invasions by landless blacks (Raftopoulos 2006) caused the government to 
initially take a hard-line stance on the land question in Zimbabwe (Mkodzongi and 
Lawrence 2019), before making a volte face. While the economy was already in crisis 
(as discussed in Chapter 5) due to two political decisions made, that is, unbudgeted 
pay-outs to war veterans in 1997 and the unilateral deployment of soldiers to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the land reform programme arguably 
accelerated Zimbabwe’s descent into unprecedented economic chaos. In this chapter 
analysis of the archival data is reinforced by analyses of interviews from journalists 
from the two newspapers who have been reporting on this crisis. 
 
The Business Herald: Journalism in a Time of Fast Track Land Reform 
 
As already highlighted in the previous chapter, sporadic farm reclamations or 
occupations (critics called them “farm invasions” or “land grabs”) were already 
happening by the end of the 1990s. However, land reclaimers were all swiftly and 
summarily removed by the police, a fact that suggests that the government at that 
stage believed that these were really farm invasions rather than legitimate 
reclamations by land hungry citizens. That is, at this stage government policy was 
firmly against this “type” of land reform. Also, all the occupations/invasions were by 
villagers and rural dwellers, indicating the sites of the land hunger. The most famous 
                                                           




incidents involved villagers from Svosve (cf. Murisa 2011). What these sporadic farm 
occupations show was that, firstly, land hunger was and remains a reality in 
Zimbabwe. After all, most of the land in 2000 was still in the hands of a white farming 
minority (Moyo 2011). Secondly, these events showed that the government had not 
fulfilled its promises made during the liberation war and after (Moyo 2011). The 
government had forgotten not only the peasants in the ESAP decade, but also the war 
veterans and ex-combatants, and it was soon to get a rude awakening (Murisa 2011). 
Thirdly, the government now faced both economic trouble (from a tanking, comatose 
economy) and political trouble (from land hungry landless peasants, an angry urban 
working class led by a rebel ZCTU, and the formation of a strong opposition in the 
form of the MDC). There was little wiggle room. Something unprecedented had to be 
done, and quickly. The question was: what? What was to be done? ESAP had failed, 
investment had fled, and the Zimbabwe dollar was facing devaluation.  
 
The radical shift came after a government sponsored constitution was rejected in a 
referendum in 2000 (cf. Shay 2012). The loss stung Mugabe into action. For the first 
time he realised the magnitude of the challenges facing his own personal hold on 
power. With strong urban and worker support, as well as the sympathies of civil society 
and Western embassies, the MDC was a different political proposition to Edgar 
Tekere’s Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), Margaret Dongo’s Zimbabwe Union of 
Democrats (ZUD), Ndabaningi’s Sithole’s ZANU Ndonga, or the absorbed ZAPU 
(Olaleye et al 2005). For Mugabe, the formidable opposition had to be rolled back, and 
fast. Thus, the government, from evicting the land reclaimers and treating them as 
farm invaders and land grabbers, suddenly turned around and started treating the 
former “invaders” as comrades, heroes and revolutionary vanguards (Murisa 2011). It 
was noticeable that, as the country prepared for parliamentary elections in the same 
year, the government increasingly gave a blind eye (or even tacit encouragement) to 
the farm occupations (cf. Willems 2004). These radical political moves coincided with 
government’s quiet increasing of its control of the publicly owned media including The 
Herald (Ranger 2004), such that from 2000 onwards it was no great surprise that The 
Herald published stories that showed implicit support for the land reform programme 




The Business Herald, strikingly, treated the unfolding drama with silence. Such 
political and politicised silence has been remarked on by the likes of Foucault (1978), 
who says: 
 
Silence itself – the things one declines to say, or is 
forbidden to name, the discretion that is required between 
different speakers – is less the absolute limit of discourse, 
the other side from which it is separated by a strict 
boundary, than an element that functions alongside the 
things said, with them and in relation to them within overall 
strategies (Foucault 1978: 27). 
 
The silence indicated the emergence of a new norm in post-2000 journalism in 
Zimbabwe where economic questions were rolled into politics in a new openly 
politicised combo where journalists could no longer sit on the fence but had to be 
openly pro or anti-government. An ideological stance was maintained, whether or not 
it often contravened journalistic norms, since the newsroom was now being 
weaponised against detractors and “enemies” of the state. Essentially, the business 
sections of The Herald played the role of extended footnotes to the main political 
headlines of main (political) section of the paper. The land reform programme was 
largely a political one hence it was covered by the main section of The Herald.  The 
Business Herald’s silence was not a protest, but, as Foucault would say “an element 
that functions alongside the things said”.  At the same time, functioning “alongside the 
things said” could be taken to mean that, if we consider the paper’s record of aligning 
with capital (which had been openly displayed in the ESAP decade), it was being 
strategically silent and therefore retaining some “faith” in that traditional alignment. 
Silence, uneasy throughout and intermittently broken, helped the paper to maintain a 
modicum of distance from the slogans of the main political section.   
 
Credibility, already highlighted in Chapter 1 and 2 as a key issue in the production of 
financial and economic news (Reich 2011), had never been more at stake in 
Zimbabwean journalism than in the land reform decade. This is highlighted by several 
journalists whom I interviewed. Patterns of control never seen or thought possible 
before were beginning to be felt, bringing with them unique pressures. One journalist 
described the sort of context they had to negotiate and environment which they had to 




It was policy versus consequences. Yes, the policy was 
meant to empower people by giving them land, but it 
destroyed the economy. Up to now we have 80 – 90 
percent unemployment (Personal Interview 24 September 
2018). 
 
Here the land reform is what is being referred to as “policy”, which the journalist says 
was pursued without consideration of the “consequences”. Hence policy versus 
consequences. But what did policy versus consequences mean in real terms for the 
operating environment of journalists? Clearly, it meant journalists at the Business 
Herald learning a new type of journalism where policy was reported as if it had no 
consequences, or, increasingly, as if consequences were separate from policy.  It was 
this understanding that led to the Business Herald steering away from much coverage 
of the land reform programme, particularly in the early 2000s when the government 
stopped the eviction of “land invaders” and, instead, started encouraging and 
promoting it. By separating policy versus consequences, the paper could continue to 
focus on other pressing economic issues as if there was no land reform happening or 
as if the land reform had no consequences on the economy.  
 
For instance, the Business Herald continued to cover the relationship between 
Zimbabwe and the IMF. The coverage, characteristically, pretended not to know about 
the land reform currently taking place. It did not mention it, and did not factor it into the 
interpretation of what was going on with the economy and the IMF. Hence a story in 
February 2000 stated that:  
 
Paulo Neuhaus, the assistant Africa director of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) now visiting Zimbabwe, 
this week rejected pleas by the government to be given 
until after the general elections due in April before it can 
start implementing tough economic reforms in exchange 
for vital economic aid…Diplomatic sources said 
Zimbabwe, mired in its worst economic crisis in years, told 
Neuhaus it would be political suicide to devalue the dollar 
or drastically cut costs to bring down the budget deficit now 





This sort of coverage was not even a manifestation of “slanting” or “burying” an 
unfavourable story. It was a type of journalistic gymnastics, and exercise in journalism 
hygienic where politics was filtered out of financial reporting. Such contortions were as 
striking as they were spectacular. Issue obtrusiveness (cf. Ju 2014) played little part 
in influencing reporting. To achieve a total blanketing of such an obtruding fact as the 
ongoing land reform was nearly impossible, but journalists at the Business Herald 
nevertheless (somehow) managed it. 
 
Loud Silences 
Not only did the Business Herald choose to not report anything of significance on the 
land reform programme, it also chose to maintain silence when it came to explaining 
the causes of the economic crisis that unfolded in the 2000s. While it reported on some 
of the economic developments that demonstrated the deepening crisis, it steered clear 
of holding the government accountable for the crisis. For example, in a story in March 
2000 the paper reported on the fuel crisis and its consequences on the economy. 
Again, it chose not to report the cause of the fuel crisis: 
 
The three month fuel crisis gripping the country is 
restricting the delivery of raw materials for the 
manufacturing and retailing sectors, which are losing a 
combined average of $3 million a week, according to a 
recent national survey…. The survey jointly commissioned 
by the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce, the 
University of Zimbabwe and Friedrich Naumann 
Foundation showed that capacity utilisation of companies 
had dropped to 65 percent (Business Herald 2 March 
2000).  
 
This is an extension of the policy versus consequences mode of reporting, but with a 
new layer added to it. Sources are cited in a way which suggested that it is not the 
journalists at the Business Herald who are ignoring consequences or enforcing 
silences on the economic fact of the land reform. Rather, surveys by other independent 
authorities such as the Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce, the University of 
Zimbabwe and Friedrich Naumann Foundation were roped in to buttress the policy 
versus consequences narrative.  It was as if the paper was saying, “Look, it’s not only 
us focusing on policy versus consequences. Everyone is doing it”. This practice shows 
a concern with objectivity and professionalism. Journalists at the Business Herald still 
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cared deeply – and still care deeply – to be seen as objective as any other and be 
seen as steadfastly adhering to the professional code. The best way of doing this was 
taking up, heart and soul, the policy versus consequences narrative and making a 
crusade out of it. 
 
In yet another story in 2006 the paper reported on the poor performance of the 
Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE) and the consequences of such poor performance 
on the economy. Just as in the policy versus consequences stories, the paper offered 
surface analysis without questioning the origins of the crisis. This story noted that the 
fall of the stock market was due to investors taking their money to Treasury Bills (TBs) 
that were offering better returns. It further reported on the sudden flight to TBs: 
 
The reinstatement of the 91-day Treasury bills on Monday 
sparked excitement on the money market, which, in recent 
months, had developed into a lifeless investment option… 
‘This scramble for the short paper is because investors are 
reluctant to lock their money for longer periods due to the 
continued economic uncertainty on the back of the 
continued deterioration in the economic fundamentals 
especially inflation… It should be noted, however, that the 
issue of short-dated paper is not sustainable as it 
negatively affects the fiscus, thereby worsening the 
economic situation. A long term solution for the authorities 
is to address the bad economic fundamentals as this 
restores investor confidence – something that is badly 
needed by the authorities to better manage money market 
liquidity’ (Business Herald 23 February 2006). 
 
On the surface this looks like a good attempt at providing analysis for readers as 
economic journalists often do when the intended audience is not only those who 
understand economics but also includes lay readers. On the surface it is good 
journalism that seeks to objectively help audiences better understand economic jargon 
(see Doyle 2006). However, the silences are even more significant in reports such as 
these because it touches on what the government needed to do to change the 
direction of economic performance. A long term solution, says the report, was not to 
deal with the chaotic land reform but, rather, to address the bad economic 
fundamentals and restore investor confidence. The land reform programme is not 
mentioned as part of the bad economic fundamentals or the cause of lack of investor 
confidence. Rather, the issue was mainly dealt with as one of authorities to better 
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managing “money market liquidity”. While there is a slight inference to government 
responsibility, the story largely avoids questioning government actions that had taken 
the country to this point of hyperinflation.  
 
The silences at the Business Herald speak to the fact that the paper was being 
absorbed into the project to maintain the existing system of power relationships which 
benefitted ZANU PF elites. Such ruling party journalism functioned on behalf of the 
strata holding the powerful levers of state power and which intended to retain them in 
the long term. Breed (1955) would describe this form of coverage as “policy news” 
which he says “may be slanted or buried so that some important information is denied 
the citizenry” (Breed 1955: 334). What was going on at the Business Herald is a type 
of journalistic dysfunction, which would become even more pronounced as the decade 
wore on, the economy broke down, and censorship became more open. One journalist 
confirmed that, in the newsroom, they resorted to just reporting what was happening 
without offering analysis as to why these developments were happening: 
 
The truth is it (hyperinflation) was like a disaster as a result 
of an act of God, a disaster when it strikes you just want to 
find out how we can get out of this disaster – at times you 
cannot even blame anyone – or the person to blame is 
there but you cannot do anything…(Personal Interview 25 
September 2018). 
 
Basically, reporters could see what was going on and even experience it, but when it 
came to reporting it, they would not let such issues obtrude. There was open and 
structured resistance to issue obtrusiveness. Issue obtrusiveness is defined as “the 
amount of personal experience people have with issues” (Ju 2014: 444; see also 
Winter and Eyal 1981). Basically, an obtrusive issue “obtrudes into people’s everyday 
lives, thereby making people rely less on news media” (Ju 2014: 444; see also Kiousis 
and McCombs, 2004). Issue obtrusiveness thus moderates the agenda-setting effect.  
 
Journalists at the Business Herald, in expounding policy versus consequences 
journalism, collapsed issue obtrusiveness into itself, whereby – when they could no 
longer report as if there was no land reform – they began to see not only a policy 
without consequences but consequences without a policy. The refrain from blaming 
government was a result of what Mabweazara (2011: 102) called “proprietary 
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demands codified through formal and informal editorial policies”. Breed (1955: 326) 
argues that, theoretically, the only controls journalists should face in the newsroom 
“would be the nature of the event and the reporter’s effective ability to describe it”, but:  
 
In practice, we find the publisher does set news policy, and 
this policy is usually followed by members of his staff. 
Conformity is not automatic, however, for three reasons: 
(1) the existence of ethical journalistic norms; (2) the fact 
that staff subordinates (reporters, etc.) tend to have more 
“liberal” attitudes (and therefore perceptions) than the 
publisher and could invoke the norms to justify anti-policy 
writing; and (3) the ethical taboo preventing the publisher 
from commanding subordinates to follow policy (Breed 
1955: 326).  
 
Mano (2005) pointed out that journalists in Zimbabwe developed sophisticated ways 
of getting around the pressures they face from proprietors, both public and private. 
Giving analyses on economic developments while remaining silent on government 
culpability is one of those ways. It was sophisticated in the sense that journalists got 
to carry out their mandate of reporting on economic developments with the relevant 
“analysis” while avoiding attracting the censure of government officials who controlled 
the publicly owned media. 
 
Basically, the paper found someone to blame, as long as it was not the government 
directly. Some government agencies were blamed for contributing to the economic 
crisis, but, of course, never government or ruling party officials. In one story the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe was called out for policy inconsistency:   
 
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe has raised its bank 
rate…to 64.5 percent in a surprising change in 
policy…Analysts interpreted the increase in the bank rate 
as another example of policy inconsistencies on the part of 
the RBZ and a contradiction to stabilisation measures 
announced in August this year by the Minister of Finance 
and Economic Development, Dr Simba Makoni (Business 
Herald 12 October 2000).  
 
The Business Herald in this case chose to apportion blame for financial chaos to the 
RBZ while presenting the government as making efforts to stabilise the economy. The 
‘malevolent’ RBZ was contrasted with the ‘benevolent’ Minister of Finance, Simba 
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Makoni. Finding someone or something else to blame also functioned to deflect 
attention from the failures of government. 
 
The most important device for deflecting attention, however, was sanctions. Between 
2001 and 2009 Britain, the EU and the US placed a variety of economic sanctions on 
Zimbabwe. In March 2001 the US imposed sanctions via the Zimbabwe Democracy 
and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA). Britain imposed sanctions under the 
Zimbabwe (Financial Sanctions) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/847).17 The EU, for its 
part, imposed travel sanctions and froze assets of a number of prominent Mugabe 
associates under the Common Position 2002/145 /CFSP and the Council Regulation 
(EC) No 314/2004.18 These sanctions have been renewed and expanded since, with 
some relaxations and new additions since Mugabe fell from power. In fact, one could 
say that sanctions began in 1999 when, in September of that year the IMF suspended 
financial support to Zimbabwe for economic adjustment and reform under a ‘‘Stand By 
Arrangement’’ which had been approved barely a month back in August 1999 
(Bracking and Sachikonye 2009). This, to all intents and purposes, marked the death 
of ESAP. A month later, in October 1999, the International Development Association 
(IDA) followed the IMF in suspending all structural adjustment loans, credits, and 
guarantees to Zimbabwe (Bracking and Sachikonye 2009). The suspensions 
continued into the new millennium, when, in May 2000, the IDA stopped all new 
lending to Zimbabwe and, in September, stopping the disbursement of funds under 
previously approved loans, credits, and guarantees.  
 
Exclusively blaming sanctions was and continues to be one of the key defence points 
for the ruling ZANU PF government. It is correct that sanctions have cost the 
Zimbabwean economy, although this is difficult to quantify since the Zimbabwean 
economy has also been cost by corruption and looting by the ZANU PF elites and their 
associates as well as capital flight, cartels and externalisation. For instance, in 
February 2016 Mugabe stated that US$15 billion in diamond receipts had 
                                                           
17 “The Zimbabwe (Financial Sanctions) Regulations 2009”, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2009/847/contents/made  
 




disappeared19. It is a fact that ZANU PF runs the country at best like a party fiefdom 
and, at worst, like a party Auto Teller Machine. Although the EU, US and UK deny that 
sanctions have hurt the Zimbabwean economy, only individuals, this claim is 
disingenuous and false. Sanctions have contributed in stifling Zimbabwe’s economy. 
It is not correct, however, that sanctions are the only reason that Zimbabwe’s economy 
has collapsed. Rather, they are only one of the main reasons. The narrative that 
exclusively blames sanctions for Zimbabwe’s economic woes is as false as the one 
that exclusively blames ZANU PF or absolves sanctions for the same. The facts, 
however, suggest that government and the ruling party bears equal, if not more, 
culpability for the happenings of the last three decades both for missed and 
squandered opportunities as well as corruption and cartel behaviour.  
 
The Business Herald followed the ZANU-PF party line in exclusively blaming sanctions 
for government’s economic failings. On 9 October 2008 the paper reported on the 
latest inflation figures which turned out to be the last officially released figures during 
the hyperinflation era.  
 
Zimbabwe’s annual inflation rate rose to 231 million 
percent in July, driven faster by food prices, according to 
official Government statistics…The latest inflation figures 
show that Zimbabwe is suffering the highest inflation rate 
in the world…The government blames this on illegal 
sanctions imposed by Britain and its allies…The economy 
has contracted almost 50 percent over the past 10 years 
on pathetic performance by all sectors. This was coupled 
by corruption in both the public and private sectors 
(Business Herald 9 October 2008). 
 
The ‘sophistication’ that Mano (2005) observed is evident in this story. The economy 
had reached a point that no amount of spin could mask. The Business Herald 
managed to report on how deep the economic crisis had become while at the same 
time pointing out that, according to the government, it was because of illegal sanctions 
imposed on the country by Britain and its allies. Having partially covered its tracks by 
taking the government’s line of defence, the paper went on to indirectly concede that 
corruption played a part in the deteriorating economy. But, to cover itself from criticism 





some more the paper threw a disclaimer that the corruption was in both public and 
private sectors. Crucially though, the paper remained silent on the economic policies 
that government was implementing that kept driving the country deeper into crisis. 
Some of these policies included fixing prices below viability levels, accruing huge 
budget deficits, an unsustainably huge public sector, fixed exchange rates, fiscal 
indiscipline, and many others (Kanyenze et al 2017).  
 
Even more significantly, this mode of writing flips the policy versus consequences 
narrative around, and begins to see the policy of sanctions as having consequences 
on the economy! The journalists who could not see the consequences of the FTLRP 
now clearly saw them in the EU, UK and US sanctions. This was a new level of issue 
obtrusiveness. In an interview, one journalist pointed out that although they were living 
and experiencing the economic hardships like every other ordinary Zimbabwean, they 
had to be careful when it came to analysing the cause of the problems: 
 
We were writing about it but the way we were writing was 
just to announce what was happening or just tell what is 
happening, inflation is at whatever figure – until we 
stopped writing about inflation because – I remember 
former US ambassador, Christopher Dell, who once said 
the problem with Zimbabwe now is inflation is no longer 
being driven by any economic fundamentals, but inflation 
is now being driven by inflation – inflation is the cause of 
inflation – so he was saying when you get to a point where 
inflation is feeding on inflation then the numbers will be 
doubling, quadrupling – and he claimed to be an economist 
(Personal Interview 24 September 2018). 
 
The role of journalism is “to inform, to ask questions, to provide answers, and to 
sharpen social awareness or even crusade on social issues.” (Hayes 2014: 3) In 
business journalism, in particular, reporters are supposed to ask questions, pursue 
threads, seek for complex causes, dig out facts and report as accurately as possible. 
This is because “business and economic journalism reveals important things that 
affect everybody. And they need to analyse it intelligently and contextualise it usefully” 
(Hayes 2014: 2). All reporters: 
 
are taught that their stories must answer the standard 
descriptive questions: Who? What? Where? When? How? 
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They are also taught to ask the overarching sixty-four-
thousand-dollar question: Why? Yet too many members of 
the journalistic profession around the world fail to ask that 
big question and thereby fail in their first duty as journalists. 
(Hayes 2014: 2) 
 
What is clear is that journalists at the Business Herald were asking “Why?” but only 
when it was safe to do so. They were asking questions that would not rock the boat, 
and pursuing safe threads and seeking surface or one-sided causes behind things. 
Facts were dug out selectively and reporting was accurate only when possible. 
 
Several explanations have been given for the way journalists’ reportage, or lack of it, 
of the impending financial crisis of 2008. Many of the scholars highlighted that 
journalists failed in their watchdog role of warning the public of impending disaster 
(see Tambini 2010; Fahy et al 2010; Usher 2011; Starkman 2014). There have also 
been studies on how journalists reported during the crisis. Some of these studies noted 
that financial journalists relied on a few elite resources hence offering a narrow 
analysis of the nature of the crisis that tended to favour investors (see Berry 2012). As 
already highlighted most of these studies were conducted in advanced economies of 
the USA and Europe. In the case of Zimbabwe, the 2008 crisis takes a different context 
and meaning to that experienced in much of the world. The country’s 2008 crisis was 
that of hyperinflation that reached levels that made it extreme sports to try and 
measure. In the interview, the journalist explained the nature of the difficulties of writing 
about the cause of hyperinflation: 
 
Journalists were united that we were in trouble, but the 
problem was who is to blame. Our colleagues in the private 
media would blame the government but we would blame 
the sanctions – so those ones (private media journalists) 
would blame poor governance, human rights issues etc 
while on our side we were saying sanctions, issues that we 
could not trade with the outside world, we were not 
competitive because of the operating environment 
(Personal Interview 25 September 2018). 
 
Every newspaper, says (Breed 1955: 327), has “a policy”, whether this is admitted or 
not. The principal areas of policy are “politics, business, and labour; much of it stems 
from considerations of class. Policy is manifested in ‘slanting’” (Breed 1955: 327). The 
Business Herald’s “policy” in simple terms was to defend the FTLRP and deflect 
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negative attention from government. This led to “alternative” analyses of hyperinflation 
that not only often ignored basic economic realities of ordinary Zimbabweans but 
parroted the prescriptions and explanations of the Reserve Bank Governor Gideon 
Gono.  
 
The Business Herald journalists, just like those in the UK as established by Berry 
(2012), relied on a few elite sources to report on what was happening. However, unlike 
in the UK where City of London sources dominated news coverage, at the Business 
Herald government rhetoric dominated news coverage. The cause of the crisis in 
Zimbabwe and the solutions were explained away by government and journalists from 
the Business Herald were uncritical stenographers and minute-takers of that 
information. Though they knew the source of the crisis, and said as much in private, 
confidential conversations, in their official lives they lived in another universe of 
alternative facts. They lived in a journalistic schizophrenia. The state’s control over its 
reportage ensured that the journalists did not deviate from the established analysis. 
This is in sync with an observation by Potroski, Wong and Zhang (2014) that many 
developing economies do not have the necessary institutional structures that promote 
transparent information environments that are key for high quality financial journalism. 
They further observe that these environments are created by political forces for selfish 
ends. At the Business Herald actual censorship and the threat of censorship created 
an environment where journalists could not offer complete analyses of the economic 
developments for fear of retribution or the stories being spiked, what Hayes (2014) 
calls “protocol journalism”. In their schizophrenic universe, journalists found a way of 
ensuring that they could offer some relevant analysis without directly implicating 
government. Policy without consequences contravened and trumped journalistic 
norms. 
 
Valorising lay audiences 
As the economy faced fires in every direction, there was a visible emphasis in the 
reporting of the Business Herald on explaining economic terms to audiences who – it 
was assumed – did not have a knowledge of economics. That emphasis was 
previously not widely evident in the paper’s stories. This most likely was because the 
economy was becoming more of a concern for many people in the country. “Economic 
news”, says Lischka (2016: 13) “not only reports on the economy but may also 
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influence its development”. It “affects the real‐world economic situations” and does so 
“through shaping economic sentiment and behaviour of private and corporate agents” 
(Lischka 2016: 13). Many Zimbabweans, who were soon to be involved directly in the 
financial sector through the arbitrage of “burning money”, were suddenly getting 
acquainted with terms such as inflation, fiscal and monetary policy. Various economic 
terms that lay people would not properly understand were then patiently explained in 
a selection of the Business Herald’s stories.  
 
For instance, on 10 July the paper explained the consequences of a hike in interest 
rates. As illustrated in Chapter 5, one of the impediments to the country attracting new 
investment was the high interest rate regime. In this story the paper explained that: 
 
Economic pundits welcomed the increases in the lending 
rates arguing that this would reduce credit creation by 
banks and thus inflation. ‘Zimbabwe is suffering a very high 
inflation rate emanating from high money supply in the 
economy, high interest rates would directly crowd out 
prospects of demand pull inflation arising from increasing 
borrowing by individuals and private sector,’ said an 
economist with a leading financial institution. He 
emphasised that it is not always the case that higher 
interest rates are detrimental to the level of economic 
activity, but they could also help to squash the dreadful 
inflation (Business Herald 10 July 2003). 
 
In this role the Business Herald sought to foster business, financial and economic 
literacy, which suggested that it sensed an increased readership due to the economic 
headwinds. This recognition of readers is central in economic journalism. Newspaper 
readers, says Breed (1955: 334, “possess potential power over press performance. 
Seen as a client of the press, the reader should be entitled to not only an interesting 
newspaper, but one which furnishes significant news objectively presented”. The role 
of provisioning economic literacy to readers suggests not only reader power but an 
interest in agenda setting. Economic news, and news in general, plays a powerful role 
in shaping public opinion (see Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Harrington 1989), although 
the way and manner it does this varies from time to time and context to context. News, 
in the words of Iyengar and Kinder (1987: 117), “clearly and decisively influences the 
priorities that people attach to various national problems”. Here, it seems, the Business 




As part of building a nascent business literacy in its readers, journalists relied on 
analysts, a reliance that has been noted to be important in the production of financial 
and economic news (see Davis 2002; Doyle 2006; Reich 2011; Berry 2012; Grunberg 
and Pallas 2012). Journalists also relied on explanations given by agencies releasing 
key economic information data such as the Central Statistics Office (CSO). For 
example, in a story where the poverty datum line was explained, the Business Herald 
cited the CSO. 
 
The Poverty Datum Line (PDL) has surged 24 percent to 
$84 000 ($84 million) last month from $68 000 ($68 million) 
in June for a family of five, according to figures released by 
the Central Statistics Office (CSO) yesterday. The PDL 
represents the cost of a given standard of living that must 
be attained if a person is deemed not to be poor. Going by 
the CSO definition of the PDL, the majority of the workers 
in Zimbabwe will be found in the poor category even after 
the July collective bargaining processes (Business Herald 
10 August 2006). 
 
How the media describe the state of the economy also has consequences for 
democracy and citizenship (Mårtenson and Lindhof 1998). Citizenship in the economic 
arena can best be fulfilled if individuals have an understanding of the economic and 
financial developments happening in the country. The way journalists report on these 
economic developments plays a big role in how the public gains knowledge regarding 
the economy. It is therefore noteworthy that there were instances when the Business 
Herald explained some of these economic developments to help the public have a 
better understanding of the economy. It is also important to place such reportage in 
the context of the political economy of working for the state-controlled media in 
Zimbabwe.  
 
A  publisher such as Zimpapers, in Breed’s (1955: 327) words,  “has much say (often 
in veto form) in both long-term and immediate policy decisions (which party to support, 
whether to feature or bury a story of imminent labour trouble, how much free space to 
give “news” of advertisers' doings, etc.). Finally, policy is covert, due to the existence 
of ethical norms of journalism; policy often contravenes these norms.” Some 
journalists that I interviewed for this study noted that they are aware of what they need 
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to do as journalists but they find themselves being silent on certain matters because 
they know stories that paint the government in bad light will not see the light of day. 
One journalist stated that they have no option but to write what they are told: 
 
ZANU PF will tell you that we are going to have two million 
jobs, that was the campaign message in 2013, we can’t 
really question them on what they are saying. What they 
are telling you is what you write. Of course we can have 
our discussion outside, it’s fine, but when it comes to 
writing, you write what they say (Personal Interview 24 
September 2018). 
 
Editorial actions by editors may serve as controlling guides where journalists learn 
what or what not to write through observing the stories that are “blue-pencilled”, 
canned or altered. Oblique reprimands also occur and tend to sensitise journalists to 
tread a fine line (cf. Breed 1955). It is this understanding that their journalism is 
compromised that sees Zimpapers try whenever they can to enlighten the public on 
the true picture of what is happening, to the extent that the government is not 
implicated in wrongdoing.  
 
“Explaining” economic developments and focusing on economic literacy is one way of 
compensating for the ‘inadequate’ journalism they are required to practise. These are 
“safe” means of continuing in one’s line of work while navigating the humps and curves 
in the road. A journalist confirmed this rationale: 
 
When writing certain issues that are not directly related to 
the wider economy and government failure we have the 
freedom to write but to a certain extent…Say it’s reporting 
season and you are writing that Delta has made a profit of 
$2 million or a loss and there is no attacking the 
government, then it’s ok I can write and explain some of 
the terms in the report because I am required to do that as 
a journalist (Personal Interview 21 September 2018). 
 
Explaining certain economic terms is also a way of enabling audiences to make their 
own conclusions on what is happening in the economy without the journalists explicitly 
spelling it out for them. One journalist explained that “it is our duty to explain some of 
these terms to readers, as long as we don’t spell it out that the government is playing 
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a role, say in the rising inflation. They can figure that out when I explain what inflation 
is” (Personal Interview 21 September 2018).  
 
Hyperinflation and the blame game 
As the economic crisis deepened with inflation shooting through the roof, the Business 
Herald increasingly brazenly took a ZANU PF agenda and made it its own. The paper 
would blame the same institutions the government blamed, particularly the private 
sector and sanctions. For instance, businesses were reported as profiteering and 
sabotaging the economy so that the ZANU PF government could be viewed by the 
public in bad light. Hence in a story on 5 October 2006 the paper reported that bakers 
were unscrupulous in using a false percentage rise in electricity tariffs as justification 
for bread price increases: 
 
The Zimbabwe Electricity Regulatory Commission (ZERC) 
has castigated the National Bakers Association (NBA) for 
misleading government and consumers by overstating the 
contribution of electricity costs to their business cost 
structures. In their bid to lobby the government for a 150 
percent increase in the price of bread, NBA had indicated 
that, among other input costs, electricity tariffs had risen by 
389 percent in the period between June 2006 and August 
2006, when, in fact, the Zimbabwe Electricity Development 
Company had effected quarterly increases of 95 percent 
between March and June…ZERC noted with concern the 
tendency by some manufacturers and service providers to 
justify product and service price increases on the basis that 
electricity tariffs had gone up by wide margins (the 
Business Herald 5 October 2006). 
 
Both the Zimbabwe Electricity Regulatory Commission and the Zimbabwe Electricity 
Development Company are controlled by government. The effects of hyperinflation 
were being attributed to unethical business practices that saw bakers colluding to 
increase prices of bread citing a rise in electricity costs. While it was logical that the 
price of goods and services would rise in a hyperinflation environment, the 
government, through entities that it controlled, chose to shift blame away from itself to 
business. The story highlights that there were negotiations between government and 
bakers for a bread price increase, but the government pre-empted those negotiations 
by ‘exposing’ the bakers as deceitful. Thus, the Business Herald was used to publish 
stories that contrasted the ‘bad’ intentions of business with government’s ‘considerate’ 
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position. This was a continuation of protocol journalism which emphasised the policy 
versus consequences pitch.  
 
In another story on 4 January 2007, Old Mutual was blamed for unreasonably 
increasing rental prices for its commercial properties. This is interesting because, in 
2019 and 2020, Old Mutual has also come under the same sort of criticism, more than 
ten years later, when Finance Minister Mthuli Ncube suspended the fungibility of Old 
Mutual’s stocks to try and halt the losses of the Zimbabwe dollar.  While acknowledging 
that hyperinflation was causing the constant rise in rental prices, in 2007 the Business 
Herald singled out Old Mutual for charging too high rental prices, far above those being 
charged by other market players: 
 
A survey by The Herald Business this week revealed that 
tenants have been vacating Old Mutual properties such as 
Highglen shopping centre. Eastgate and Westgate, among 
others, were by far much higher than levels charged by 
other managing agents such as CB Richard Ellis, Knight 
Frank and Fairvest Real Estate. It costs between $2 million 
and $3.5 million monthly to rent a 200 square metre office 
space at any of Old Mutual’s plush office complexes 
whereas other managing agents’ charges range between 
$900 000 and $1 million for similar space (Business Herald 
4 January 2007). 
 
Old Mutual is one of the biggest property owners in Zimbabwe with the parent 
company, Old Mutual Plc listed both in London and Johannesburg. By ‘exposing’ the 
‘exorbitant’ prices that the insurance and property giant was charging, the Business 
Herald was advancing the ZANU PF government’s argument that business was 
complicit in the hardships that people were suffering in the country. The newspaper 
was used to draw the public’s attention away from the government mismanagement 
of the economy to focus on greedy businesses such as Old Mutual. Old Mutual was 
significant in that the government was blaming the British government for imposing 
sanctions on the country and British headquartered companies were following their 
country’s flag to make life unbearable for Zimbabweans. 
 
In relation to the Greek bailout discourse, Doudaki (2015: 1) argues that “the media 
hold a key position in mediating the discursive struggles in which social and political 
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actors fight over the definitions of the Greek financial crisis”. In Doudaki’s (2015) 
analysis, mainstream media were accused of giving space to political and economic 
elites to provide their interpretation of the crisis. In the case of Zimbabwe, the Business 
Herald was used to provide space for the ZANU PF government to provide its 
interpretation of economic conditions prevailing in the country. In that interpretation, 
the government was doing nothing wrong. The problem, rather, was external forces in 
collusion with local businesspeople. When the parallel market, not only for currency 
exchange, but most goods and services took root in 2008, the Business Herald 
continued on the ‘blame business’ mantra. In a story on 10 June 2008 the paper did 
not question government rationale in seeking to ‘punish’ business by implementing the 
Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act. It reported that: 
 
President Robert Mugabe said on Tuesday the 
government will implement the Indigenisation and 
Economic Empowerment Act soon after the June 27 
Presidential run-off. He said the programme, aimed at 
enabling local people to acquire majority shares in foreign-
owned companies, would first target firms that were 
working with the enemies of Zimbabwe to destabilise the 
country… ‘We will target companies that are channelling 
products on the informal market and those that are 
increasing prices without justification’ (Business Herald 10 
June 2008). 
 
Acknowledging the lack of critical analysis, one journalist from the Business Herald 
stated that “that critical way of analysing things was always limited.” They wanted to 
warn the public of the consequences but found their hands tied. The journalist further 
stated that “from the state media point of view that policy (indigenisation) was 
empowering people so that’s how we framed it”.    
 
The use of the Business Herald as a tool to disseminate information that deflected 
attention from government’s real and perceived economic mismanagement becomes 
apparent when we consider commentary that has been given by several scholars 
concerning the hyperinflation period, especially late 2006 to 2009 when the economy 
dollarised. For example, Kairiza (2009) notes that the Reserve Bank’s quasi fiscal 
activities after Gideon Gono became the central bank governor contributed much to 
the sharp spike in inflation which was already high by the time he assumed office in 
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2004. Ironically when Gono became the central bank governor he declared inflation 
the country’s number one enemy (Coomer and Gstraunthaler 2011). However, “quasi-
fiscal activities went beyond the operational realm of a normal central bank and had 
the effect of undoing the ephemeral achievements in the inflation battle and firmly set 
course for the drive towards hyperinflation (Kairiza 2009: 10). These quasi fiscal 
policies were used mostly for political expediency instead of any intentioned fight 
against inflation (Kairiza 2009). If we take Cagan’s (1956) definition of inflation as 
when month-on-month inflation exceeds 50 percent, Zimbabwe officially entered 
hyperinflation in March 2007 when its month-on-month inflation reached 50.54 percent 
and annual inflation reached 2 200 percent (Kairiza 2009). As the economy was 
spiralling deeper into hyperinflation the Business Herald could not report the quasi 
fiscal activities negatively so business became the villain – a strategy that coincided 
perfectly with how the ZANU PF government articulated it.  
 
Reporting the Government of National Unity (GNU) ‘politics’: Old Wine in New 
Bottles, Re-excavations and New Directions. 
The GNU in 2009 following the disputed elections of 2008 came about as a result of 
an acknowledgement that the economy was in such a bad shape that the controversial 
winner of a presidential run-off, Robert Mugabe, and his ZANU PF party, were not 
going to be able to bring it back to life on their own. That economic emphasis was also 
evident in the Business Herald. At the same time, the settlement came after a period 
of political violence unprecedented since the Gukurahundi years, as well as renewal 
of EU and UK sanctions. The pressure on Mugabe and ZANU PF was palpable and 
telling. South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki came to mediate in the crisis. The settlement 
brought about a calculated news values and news production direction from the 
Business Herald. Starting off with uncertainty as the parties in the new government 
haggled over ministerial posts, the GNU presented unique problems to reporters at 
the Zimpapers who had taken openly anti-MDC and pro-ZANU PF positions. The 
paper acknowledged that there was need for all the actors to work together to lift the 
economy from the doldrums and settle the politics in such a way that it did not set a 
heavy price on the economy.  
 
For a while, the GNU presented a journalistic thawing, a détente, of sorts. In a story 
on 7 May 2009 the paper reported on a speech made by the Prime Minister Morgan 
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Tsvangirai which was about the need for the government and business to work 
together for the good of the economy. 
 
The Government and the private sector should bury their 
differences and work towards the maximum harnessing of 
available human skills that are fundamental to the 
country’s economic turnaround, Prime Minister Morgan 
Tsvangirai has said…Mr Tsvangirai told captains of 
industry the government was willing to engage everyone 
to ensure the turnaround project worked (Business Herald 
7 May 2009). 
 
It is telling that the Prime Minister, who previously was vilified especially by the main 
(politics) section of the paper, was given space in the Business Herald talking about 
the need for trust rebuilding between government and business. Morgan Tsvangirai 
and his party MDC-T were perceived as pro-capital and pro-sanctions, and their joining 
government was seen as the beginning of the country’s return to pro-capital policies. 
While many changes may have happened in the Business Herald newsroom from the 
1980s and 1990s when it was largely pro-capital in its reportage, those pro-capital 
leanings were once again being partially re-excavated with the dawn of the GNU 
period. Being pro-capital, however, was clearly distinguished from being pro-
sanctions. Pressure was still being applied on Tsvangirai and MDC to, in their turn, 
pressure the EU, UK and US to remove sanctions.  
 
In these early stages of the GNU economists and organisations that had lost legitimacy 
when the government was blaming business for economic sabotage found their voice 
again in the Business Herald. Whereas in the 1980s and 1990s industry organisations 
such as the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) and economists such as 
Professor Anthony (Tony) Hawkins were valued analysts in the Business Herald and 
were quoted frequently, their value was once again ‘rediscovered’ and re-excavated. 
Hence a story in September 2009 quoted Tony Hawkins extensively:  
 
The 2009 Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries annual 
congress kicked off yesterday with speakers calling on 
industry and government to change the way they have 
been operating and embark on the right growth path. 
University of Zimbabwe School of Management lecturer, 
Professor Anthony Hawkins said there is need to develop 
218 
 
national macro-economic strategies to enable business to 
‘discover’ where their competitive advantages lie – new 
growth engines for the economy (Business Herald 3 
September 2009). 
 
In terms of re-excavation, the paper seemed to find newfound relief from the 
impossible gymnastics of the first eight years of the new millennium. This meant a 
throwback to the pro-business angle of the 1990s ESAP decade. Newspapers, it 
seems, have long ideological memories. The silences of the early 2000s, the strident 
sloganeering of the mid 2000s and the noncommittal support for the Look East policy 
were now replaced by a newfound voice in favour of a capitalist path.  
 
As part of the early GNU-détente “re-branding”, the Business Herald experimented 
with polite and “unifying” reporting that avoided the openly political undertones that 
had characterised its news from the year 2000. Its concern became exclusively 
business-related in the months after the consummation of the GNU. Government 
efforts and policy pronouncements were not attributed to any political party. An 
example is a story on 10 December 2009 that reported on policies adopted by 
government and how they were aiding capacity utilisation in the manufacturing sector. 
 
In the current season, the manufacturing sector, which 
recorded a cumulative decline of 91.1 percent between 2000 
and 2008 was estimated to have registered a positive growth 
of 8 percent in 2009. The successful turnaround was a result 
of the implementation of market friendly and stabilisation 
policies provided for under STERP. These policies include 
the adoption of stable multiple currencies, liberalisation of the 
current account and the removal of price controls and 
distortions, as well as surrender requirements on exporters’ 
foreign exchange earnings (Business Herald 10 December 
2009). 
 
Explaining this change in editorial policy one of the journalists at the Business Herald 
pointed out that the consummation of the GNU lessened political pressure on them, 
especially in the early stages. He noted that “between 2009 and 2012 the situation 
kind of improved. When the GNU came we could write in a more balanced way. It was 
better than before” (Personal Interview 21 September 2018). However, in an indication 
that this change might have been a case of new wine in old bottles, the journalist told 
me that the old polarisations of the last decade returned with a vengeance towards the 
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2013 elections. He stated that “towards the 2013 elections still we went back to the 
old system”.  
 
The reversion to type in editorial policy was noticeable in the stories published by the 
paper as it aligned more with a ZANU PF agenda. In fact, the deterioration is evident 
from 2011 when ZANU PF’s hawkish language on the Indigenisation and Economic 
Empowerment Act found its way in the paper’s pronouncements on economic policy. 
In September 2011 the paper reported that: 
 
More than 50 foreign-owned mining firms risk losing their 
licenses after failing to submit acceptable indigenisation 
and empowerment plans as directed by government…In 
terms of the Indigenisation and Empowerment Act enacted 
in 2008 foreign-owned firms are compelled to cede for 
value at least 51 percent equity to locals. Leading the band 
of delinquent foreign-owned mining firms is the country’s 
largest platinum miner, Zimplats which might be the first to 
lose its licence (Business Herald 8 September 2011). 
 
The language used to describe non-compliant firms such as “band of delinquent firms” 
was in keeping with the hostile language that the Minister of Youth Development, 
Indigenisation and Empowerment, Saviour Kasukuwere, was using at the time as he 
threatened to shut down non-compliant firms. Cabinet ministers from the MDC-T, not 
surprisingly, were against the way the indigenisation programme was being 
undertaken (Ndakaripa 2017). Such opposing voices were excluded in the stories the 
Business Herald published on the indigenisation programme.  
 
The silencing of MDC-T voices became part of an evident controlling pattern in other 
issues arising in government apart from indigenisation. For instance, as the GNU 
progressed there were many differences among cabinet ministers with ZANU PF on 
one side and the former opposition on the other. One of these issues was the 
implementation of mandatory blending of petrol which was championed by ZANU PF 
as a way for the country to save scarce foreign currency but the former opposition 
disputed merits of the programme since the ethanol was going to come from only one 




Energy and Power Development Minister Elton Mangoma 
has come under fire for his ‘negative perception’ of the 
Green Fuel ethanol project following his remarks that the 
government had no immediate plans to enact a law 
compelling fuel companies to blend petrol with 
ethanol…Stakeholders in the fuel industry said they could 
not understand the minister’s position considering that 
blending fuel with ethanol was in line with international 
trends (Business Herald 12 April 2012).  
 
The ‘deterioration’, or reversion to type, in reporting standards of the Business Herald 
reflect the growing influence of the MDC’s old nemesis, the Minister of Information and 
Broadcasting Services, Jonathan Moyo, who was back at the helm for a second stint 
after a spell in the political wilderness. Moyo had presided over the intensification of 
control of publicly owned media when he became minister in 2000 (Moyo 2005). He 
had, among other controversial acts, overseen the shutting down of privately-owned 
newspapers such as the then highly popular Daily News in 2003 (see Moyo 2005; 
Mazango 2005). Interestingly Moyo had, like the Business Herald, started off in a spirit 
of “unity” and magnanimity before the return to default settings. Article 19 of the GPA 
acknowledged the importance of media reforms to allow for freedom of expression 
and multiplicity and diversity of media (VMCZ 2013). The minister had made efforts in 
this respect by commissioning an inquiry into the state of the media in the country, the 
Information and Media Panel of Inquiry (IMPI). He had also allowed the licensing of 
several privately-owned newspapers including the previously banned Daily News and 
Newsday, both of which are still operating today.  
 
The early détente and Moyo’s initial thawing of relations seems to have given space 
to the Business Herald to return to some “neutral” reporting in the early stages of the 
GNU. As confirmed by some journalists whom I interviewed, there was room to write 
“balanced” and “objective” economic news in a period of optimism and economic 
stabilisation underpinned by the Short-Term Economic Recovery Programme 
(STERP) (Kanyenze et al 2017). This is reflected by the fact that coverage was more 
about how the economy was functioning again and less about “traitors” and “puppets 
of the West”. As noted by one journalist, “Tendai Biti (of the MDC) was the Minister of 
Finance but we reported the developments as due to government efforts”. As long as 
the Minister of Information and Broadcasting Services, Jonathan Moyo, was portraying 
a new role of working with the media to create a conducive environment for them, 
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journalists did not feel constrained to go into attack mode. Due to the fact that business 
news is not as popular as politics, the Business Herald was given a long leash that 
allowed it to report more objectively. However, this by no means should be taken as a 
period of non-interference at all. The paper still had to be sensitive to limits constrained 
by the fact that the GNU was a temporary measure. The future after the GNU 
presented problems for journalists who could not tell how ZANU PF and MDC would 
fare in the 2013 presidential elections. What worried journalists who had been relieved 
by the détente was that ZANU PF was preparing for wresting back power. The 
temporary relief was not going to last. 
 
The return to default settings can be attributed to ZANU PF efforts to assert itself as 
the reality of a pending election set in. Governments of national unity have been noted 
to provide an environment for former ruling parties to regroup and re-strategise, 
leading to them winning the subsequent elections. In Zimbabwe that period of re-
strategising coincided with the Business Herald’s return to openly biased reporting that 
had characterised it from 2000 to 2008. While journalism in Zimbabwe is modelled 
along Western concepts, a reflection of its evolution as part of the capitalist conquest 
of the country, traces of Chinese approaches to party-style, Politburo and Central 
Committee control of the media can be seen from the way journalists at the Business 
Herald behaved during GNU and, to some extent, continue to do so. After a period of 
close direct control, the Chinese media enjoyed some freedom in the late 1970s after 
the death of Mao Zedong (De Burgh 2000). The purpose of journalism during this 
period was seen as advancing the interests of China and not to undermine the Party 
(De Burgh 2000). However, Deng Xiaoping was not too enthused about the freedom 
of the media, leading to a relationship between the Party and the media characterised 
by an “uneasy modus vivendi until the mid-1980s” (De Burgh 2000: 550).  Likewise, 
the relationship between the media and the dominant ZANU PF arm of government 
was characterised by an uneasy modus vivendi that came to an end when the party 
decided to set its re-strategising plan in motion in preparation of the coming 2013 
presidential elections which would end the GNU and return the country to the edge of 
the economic abyss once again. 
 
While there was a return to default settings of reporting ZANU PF-led economic 
policies positively, the Business Herald found a way to foreshadow for the public the 
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hard times ahead. The economy was in bad shape and experiencing turbulence 
towards the end of the GNU. Around 2012 the paper was warning of the consequences 
of the high percentage of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) in the banking sector. In a 
story on 19 July titled “Banking woes worry RBZ” the paper warned that there could 
be a crisis in the banking sector. 
 
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe has said it is concerned 
at the emergence of a number of banking sector problems 
similar to the ones that caused the 2004-2005 financial 
crisis…remarks come amid further revelations that there 
has been a worrisome increase in non-performing loans, 
which have risen from just over 2 percent to more than 6 
percent (Business Herald 19 July 2012). 
 
The Business Herald thus could perform a dual role of preparing for the return of 
ZANU PF to power while reporting old style economic news. This function indicated 
that the paper had learnt many important lessons in the last decade, particularly 
about navigating and negotiating the mix of politics and economics. There was also 
a sense in which the reporting was mourning the end of the GNU and the return to 
polarisation. 
 
The economic warnings by the Business Herald towards the close of the GNU were 
not only restricted to the financial sector but also covered other sectors of the economy 
including industry which was a major focal point after years of decline before GNU. 
Hence:  
 
The Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries has warned 
that more companies are likely to collapse this year as the 
operating environment is expected to remain tough. Last 
year saw the number of companies going bust increasing 
as industry continued to suffer many ills…the sector needs 
at least US$2 billion to fully recapitalise, supported by a 
vibrant agriculture sector which provides about 60 percent 
of the raw materials (Business Herald 3 January 2013). 
 
The context in which the business press has been accused of failure to warn the public 
of impending disaster in the 2008 financial crisis (see Usher 2015; Shaw 2016) or the 
collapse of Enron before that (see Doyle 2006), is only slightly different from the 
context in which the Business Herald was warning of potential disaster coming. The 
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country was coming from a few years of high economic growth post GNU 
consummation. Similarly, the 2008 financial crisis came after a period of boom in which 
even people who did not qualify got credit they did not deserve leading to the housing 
bubble and credit crunch.  
 
On the surface it thus seems as if the Business Herald played its watchdog role better 
than the Western press. However, the former’s failure comes when the causes of the 
two then impending crises are analysed. The Zimbabwean crisis has a lot to do with 
the anti-investment law that the ZANU PF side of government decided, against advice, 
to implement during the GNU thus scaring away potential investors in the process. A 
Reuters report in 2010 says: 
 
Billionaire Richard Branson urged people on Monday to 
invest in Zimbabwe, saying the world was wrong to wait 
instead of helping the politically volatile, impoverished 
southern African nation revive itself…Zimbabwe has 
struggled to attract aid and investment because of 
President Robert Mugabe’s policies, which include a plan 
for local blacks to acquire 51 percent shares in foreign-
owned firms, including mines and banks. Talks to improve 
Zimbabwe’s ties with the European Union have stalled 
over slow political reforms in Harare while U.S. President 
Barack Obama said last month he was ‘heartbroken’ by 
Zimbabwe’s decline (Reuters 21 September 2010). 
 
It is plausible that there was goodwill to invest in Zimbabwe when the coalition 
government came into existence. For instance, it was during the GNU that one of 
Zimbabwe’s former big conglomerates, Lonrho, restarted efforts to invest in the 
country with the formation of a Zimbabwe-focused investment arm called Lonzim. 
However, many of the potential investors stayed away when President Robert Mugabe 
activated the Indigenisation and Empowerment Act. The Act had already been signed 
into law on 9 March 2008 and, like the FTLRP in 2000, was standing by to be used if 
and when Mugabe felt his power base being eroded.  
 
The Return to ZANU PF Rule 
The GNU came to an end when ZANU PF won the disputed 2013 elections by 
2,110,434 to MDC-T’s 1,172,349. The return to ZANU PF rule happened when the 
economy was already under stress. Some of the questions that needed to be 
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addressed included the multi-currency regime which was increasingly coming under 
scrutiny due to a liquidity crunch, indigenisation, and land (Chitiyo and Kibble 2014). 
The Business Herald which had increasingly taken a pro-ZANU PF stance in the latter 
stages of the GNU continued to avoid criticising government but chose to lay some 
blame for difficulties on the economy on business. The stage was set in the early 
months of ZANU PF retaining its single party reign. On 13 February 2014 the paper 
published a story urging government to improve its taxation systems to curb tax 
evasion in the private sector.  
 
Zimbabwe should put in place tax measures to reduce 
revenue loss from minerals through illicit financial 
outflows…A study undertaken by a research firm Global 
Financial Integrity revealed that Zimbabwe could have lost 
US$12 billion in the past 30 years through illegal financial 
outflows that include secret financial deals, tax avoidance 
and illegal commercial activities…This therefore calls for 
the need to promote fiscal transparency, unitary taxation, 
capital repatriation schemes and close monitoring of multi-
national corporates that operate in the country who might 
take advantage of loopholes in the tax system to either 
evade or avoid paying taxes (Business Herald 13 February 
2014). 
 
However, the paper also offered critique of certain government policies in a way that 
would not attract too much attention to itself from government officials. There was 
some passing semblance to the paper that had, in taking the side of capital, critiqued 
government command policies in the 1980s.  
 
There is an indication that the stories from this post-2013 period were written by senior 
journalists who had joined the newsroom in the early 2000s. These journalists had 
learnt from those who had been in the newsroom before ways to play the role of 
holding government to account in a way that did not attract overt backlash (kuruma 
uchifuridzira). In one such story the paper reported that: 
 
Government should heed policy reform recommendations 
by the International Monetary Fund to ensure economic 
stability, growth and increased revenue to support its huge 
expenditure bill. A research report by Zimnat Asset 
Management noted the country needed to work on 
balancing the fiscal budget…The government…can take 
225 
 
two routes in addressing its primary budget, either through 
cutting its recurrent expenditure amount or through 
expanding its revenue base…However cutting 
government’s wage bill at this juncture would be 
challenging. In the run-up to the 2013 harmonised 
elections ZANU PF promised to create over two million 
jobs after being elected into office…This therefore means 
government has only one option to improve its primary 
fiscal position that is through growing its revenue 
base…The biggest hurdle the government was facing in 
this regard was the Indigenisation and Empowerment Act, 
which, according to Zimnat, was deterring foreign direct 
investment (Business Herald 30 October 2014). 
 
Using the Zimnat Asset Management report the paper was able to illustrate the 
shortcomings of government in addressing the country’s economic challenges. It 
managed to point out that political decisions pertaining to job creation and the 
indigenisation programme were key hindrances to the country’s efforts to address its 
economic problems.  
 
Indeed, following the end of the GNU, the Business Herald did seem to have recovered 
some bite. For instance, the paper was able to occasionally paint a bleak economic 
picture, thus basically telling it like it was. This was expressed by journalists that I 
interviewed, and also in stories such as the one that said: 
 
Finance and Economic Development Minister Patrick 
Chinamasa is expected to present the 2016 budget this 
afternoon amid expectations that he will pronounce policy 
measures to stimulate the economy…The budget comes 
at a time when the economy continues to face serious 
macro-economic challenges related to liquidity constraints, 
power shortages, high cost of funding, low industrial 
capacity and poor infrastructure…One way of ensuring 
predictability and consistency is to reduce the extent of ad 
hoc discretionary policy decisions…(Business Herald 26 
November 2015). 
 
Notably, though, the painting of the bleak picture is done without much penetrating 
analysis. It is still protocol journalism. One key question we need to ask from a political 
economy perspective is the role that the media play during social change (Schudson 
2000). This is a key question when we consider the place that the Business Herald 
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took as the country moved from a period of relative political and economic stability 
during the GNU to a potentially uncertain ZANU PF rule post GNU.  
 
What the instances above demonstrate is that the political climate led to it returning to 
a cautious approach reporting the economy and government policy in contributing to 
that economic environment. As in the years between 2000 and 2008 business became 
a target for criticism to draw attention away from government responsibility. However, 
somewhat mirroring the Chinese experience, (see De Burgh 2000), journalists tactfully 
critiqued government policies. I draw the Chinese experience here because of the 
fairly similar elite political culture and environment to Zimbabwe’s. Though the ZANU 
PF government insists that it is democratic because it is always elected by the people, 
its control of key institutions such as the media gives it significant authoritarian 
characteristics. In the Chinese case the media are allowed to be critical and engage 
in investigative journalism, but in a manner that by and large serves the Chinese 
Communist Party (De Burgh 2000). The same can be said of the Business Herald. 
Though it published stories that analysed government policy and pointed out some 
shortcomings in policies such as the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act, 
these reports still served to magnify ZANU PF and deflect attention from its failures 
and corrupt management of the economy. 
 
An emerging trend in the post-GNU economic reporting by the Business Herald was 
factionalisation of news. The factional battles in the party started off with the purging 
of the then Vice President Joice Mujuru in 2014 (Mungwari 2014). Those in the party 
who ganged together to push Mujuru out found themselves at loggerheads soon after 
and the party was divided between what became known as the G40 and Lacoste 
factions. The G40 faction was on the side of President Robert Mugabe’s wife, Grace, 
while the Lacoste faction was on the side of Emmerson Mnangagwa, the then vice 
President (cf. Hove 2019). Each faction sought to control the publicly owned media. 
Though affected to a lesser extent compared to the political section of The Herald, the 
Business Herald still fell under the sway of factionalised journalism. For instance, the 
reporting of ZimAsset20, or the indigenisation programme was faction-based. The 
                                                           
20 “Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation” This was an economic blueprint crafted 
to be implemented in the 2013 – 2018 period. It “was crafted to achieve sustainable development and social 
equity     anchored     on     indigenization,     empowerment     and employment  creation which  will  be  largely  
propelled  by  the judicious  exploitation of  the  country’s  abundant human  and natural resources” 
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indigenisation programme was championed by one of the key personalities in the G40 
faction, Saviour Kasukuwere, as the Minister of Youth Development, Indigenisation 
and Economic Empowerment. Stories that appeared to be warning the government 
about the challenges presented by this programme served the ends of the Lacoste 
faction which was then viewed as pro-business. These factional battles extended to 
other programmes such Command Agriculture.21  
 
Thus, while in the 1980s and 1990s the Business Herald found a way of critiquing 
government policies to serve the interests of capitalism, in the post GNU period such 
critique increasingly functioned to serve factional interests. One journalist noted that 
stories that criticised government policy were few because they are supposed to look 
at the bigger picture: 
 
The indigenisation programme, it came in, you expect your 
private media journalists, some of you call them corporate 
media journalists. They are obviously critical all the time 
but what some of us do is go beyond criticising and say it 
has come in, what has it done? Yes, you see some large 
multinational companies moving out of the country, then 
the economy is affected at some point. But when you start 
seeing companies or companies that were formed 
immediately after the programme was introduced, when 
they start taking shape, you then start saying ah ok… 
(Personal Interview 22 September 2018). 
 
If this is how the journalists were supposed to report, then instances of critiquing 
policies were few as confirmed by another journalist saying, “government policy is 
always right unless someone comes and says write differently”. These exceptional 
instances were when factional teams brought stories to the newsroom as noted by 
Mabweazara (2011). Such factionalism in the media came to a head when George 
                                                           
(http://www.zim.gov.zw/sites/all/libraries/pdf.js/web/viewer.html?file=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.zim.gov.zw%2Fsites
%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fpublications%2FZIM-ASSET%25281%2529.pdf) . Interestingly, ZimAsset was dumped 
once Mugabe was removed from power. This suggests that the policy might have been factional.. 
 
21 Command Agriculture involved the supply by government to farmers of agricultural inputs which the farmers 
were supposed to pay for by delivering grain to the Grain Marketing Board (GMB), a state-owned company. The 
programme was instituted as a way to guarantee food security in the country since its staple food is maize. Later 
the programme was expanded to other crops such as wheat. However, the programme has been criticised for 
being opaque and an unnecessary drain on the fiscus. The government claimed the programme was funded by 
the private sector but a recent audit report by the Auditor General showed that some US$3 billion was allocated 




Charamba, then permanent secretary in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 
Services was famously and publicly humiliated by Grace Mugabe at a rally for using 
the state-controlled media to fight factional battles on the side of Lacoste22. 
 
While policy “is set by the executives, it is clear that they cannot personally gather and 
write the news by themselves. They must delegate these tasks to staffers, and at this 
point the attitudes or interests of staffers may-and often do-conflict with those of the 
executive” (Breed 1955: 327). Journalistic agency was and is still an important factor 
in the factionalised environment at Zimpapers. In an interview, one journalist with state 
media said that, “I always tell people that being a state media journalist…we have a 
duty to responsibly inform those in authority to say this is what is happening. At least 
when they make policies and decisions, they make informed decisions” (Personal 
Interview 21 September 2018). These assertions seem to confirm Davis’ (2007) view 
that professional cultures and codes of ethics help journalists resist the temptation to 
give in to powerful interests. In Zimbabwe all journalists who have passed through the 
various training institutions are taught ethics but are then socialised into particular 
newsroom practices (Mano 2005; Mabweazara 2011). From what the journalist said, 
it can be seen that the desire to abide by professional standards and ethics is there in 
some journalists who work for the Business Herald in spite of the interference from 
government officials. It is therefore this desire to stick to professionalism that saw the 
Business Herald publishing stories that may have appeared as critical to government 
policy. However, it is more compelling to see the hand of factionalism within ZANU PF. 
 
Hayes (2014: 3) says that business reporters have “a big responsibility to ensure that 
they observe the general rules governing the practice of journalism. Being a 
competent, honest, and impartial journalist is essential when reporting on business, 
the economy, and government. If journalists get their facts wrong or let opinion take 
over from independent reporting, they may cause people to lose their jobs, prevent 
inward investment, or encourage corruption and incompetence in government or 
corporate affairs.” The more the Zimbabwean economy sunk deeper into crisis the 
more the Business Herald published stories in the mould of protocol journalism that 




were a mere parrot of officials and offered no analysis. The following stories 
demonstrate this: 
 
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe governor, Dr John 
Mangudya has said that international banking regulations 
dictate that limited amounts of cash are imported at any 
given time and just like individual depositors had a 
maximum daily withdrawal, banks were also subjected to 
the same by correspondent banks…Dr Mangudya, 
however, bemoaned the rate at which the financial 
services sector is losing funds through externalisation. 
‘There is too much externalisation in this economy. So 
even if we import, the money is not coming back into the 
system. These unscrupulous businesspeople are taking 
money. We are feeding the looters (Business Herald 12 
May 2016). 
 
The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe will not force the public to 
use bond notes but is rather trying to monetise the five 
percent export incentive without doing away with the multi-
currency regime, Central Bank Governor, Dr John 
Mangudya said…Dr Mangudya also said there were no 
banks keeping money offshore to sabotage the economy 
adding that a tight monitoring system is in place to monitor 
the flow of forex from the economy (Business Herald 18 
August 2016). 
 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Governor, Dr John Mangudya 
has said bond notes will not go beyond the $200 million 
cap given that each bank will reconcile exports receipts 
coming through their customers’ accounts with the amount 
due as given in the policy. There have been fears among 
Zimbabweans that the government would at some point 
increase the notes allocation to banks and flood the 
system, thereby causing hyperinflation (Business Herald 3 
November 2016). 
 
Retailers who are using a multi-tier pricing system for 
different payment systems are violating the Bank Use 
Promotion Act and risk the full wrath of the law, a senior 
Reserve Bank official has said. RBZ deputy governor, Dr 
Kupukile Mlambo told breakfast meeting held in Harare 
yesterday to discuss the implications and effect of the bond 
notes on the economy that multi-tier pricing was unlawful. 
He said the practice, which has become rampant following 
an increase in the amount of bond notes in circulation amid 
growing shortage of US dollar notes, had spawned three 
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pricing models for US dollar notes, bond notes and use of 
electronic platforms (Business Herald 23 March 2017). 
 
Government has started investigations to identify 
individuals and companies involved in externalising foreign 
currency from Zimbabwe and in turn fuelling the current 
cash crisis, Finance and Economic Development Minister, 
Patrick Chinamasa said yesterday. Zimbabwe is suffering 
an acute cash shortage attributed to several factors, chiefly 
externalisation and low exports (Business Herald 29 June 
2017). 
 
A competent business reporter digs out and reports “on issues that can immediately 
or ultimately affect the average person’s predicaments and choices. The business 
journalist is the professional who alerts and informs ordinary people about such 
personally interesting issues as job losses and opportunities, rising medical costs and 
declining housing prices, food shortages, and the factors affecting investment income 
and paychecks” (Hayes 2014: 2). The stories above are all related to the introduction 
of a local currency called bond notes which the government argued at its introduction 
was only going to be paid to exporters as an incentive. It was also expected to alleviate 
the cash shortages in the economy.  The introduction of the bond notes received 
widespread resistance from many sections of the society including business. The fear 
was that bond notes would enable the government to print money, taking the country 
back to hyperinflation. In spite of the widespread resistance, the Business Herald did 
not question the rationale behind the bond notes. It only reported on what officials 
were saying without seeking alternative sources. Though many journalists rely on 
economic analysts to provide insights on economic and financial developments (see 
Davis 2002), the Business Herald did not even seek these analysts in their stories 
regarding the introduction of bond notes. In previous stories the paper had made use 
of economic analysts. 
 
New Directions: The Business Weekly Launched 
On 10 July 2017 Zimpapers, parent company of the Business Herald, launched a new 
weekly business paper titled Business Weekly. The establishment of the paper saw a 
reorganisation of The Herald newsroom. To cut costs Zimpapers decided against 
hiring new journalists to work for the Business Weekly. Instead it took journalists who 
worked for the Business Herald and combined them with those who were working in 
its sister title The Sunday Mail Business. These journalists now write for three titles, 
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The Herald Business (daily), The Sunday Mail Business (weekly), and the Business 
Weekly. The Business Weekly is published every Thursday. This study was based on 
The Herald’s Thursday edition (Business Herald) which had grown to be a pull-out 
because of extensive business coverage. This extensive coverage shifted to the 
Business Weekly. To avoid any ambiguity, the following analysis is based on 
interviews with journalists only. It is therefore an analysis of how journalists interpret 
the work that they do and what influences them to work this way. 
 
A few months after the launch of the Business Weekly another significant development 
occurred. On 17 November 2017 a military coup toppled the long-ruling Robert 
Mugabe from power. While in his address on national television, Major General 
Sibusiso Moyo said it was not a coup, the exercise had all the hallmarks of a coup (cf. 
Asuelime 2018). It was nevertheless a strange coup in that the army did not 
immediately take power, but triggered a parliamentary process to impeach Robert 
Mugabe, a motion that was supported by all parties in parliament. Crowds also poured 
into streets calling on Mugabe to go, thus legitimising the façade of a popular uprising. 
Emmerson Mnangagwa, the former vice President who had been forced to flee the 
country, was made interim president as the country prepared for elections. In the 30 
July 2018 elections Emmerson Mnangagwa was elected president of the country in an 
intensely disputed presidential election won with just over 50% of the vote that went 
all the way to the Constitutional Court.  ZANU PF maintained a clear majority in 
parliament. 
 
At any rate, journalists interpreted the establishment of the Business Weekly as a 
positive development that restored the professional element to their work as 
journalists. This is because the paper was established to refocus exclusively on 
business without the political undertones, as explained by the journalists: 
 
The media has been polarised, it’s either opposition or 
ruling party – on the ruling party we have the Zimpapers 
stable, on opposition we have private newspaper 
companies. So, the way they write things, we noticed 
something to blame – policies and this and that. Then we 
also go to the other side, The Herald and the Sunday Mail, 
it’s either they would go to the extreme end because of 
external forces bent on making sure that people suffer – 
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those are the kind of stories they write. So company 
management then said why don’t we come up with a 
project that does not talk about all those issues, but 
concentrate on business, what issues are affecting 
business and what should be done (Personal Interview 21 
September 2018). 
 
The shift in focus confirms Davis’ (2007) assertion that journalism is an evolving 
profession that has moved from serving the interests of its patrons to those of 
consumers as news producers seek to attract more advertising revenues. 
Furthermore, Schudson (2000) argues that there is a limit to how much a capitalist 
system can continue to manipulate discourse through biased news. The deteriorating 
economic conditions in the country have resulted in dwindling advertising budgets 
leading to media houses scrambling for what little is available. The situation saw many 
newspapers that were licensed during the inclusive government failing to sustain 
operations or even start. Of course, the phenomenon has not been limited to 
Zimbabwe only, but is global as news consumption patterns shift. The consideration 
to depart from the usual pro-ruling party reportage demonstrates the need for news 
producers to consider their audiences. Business news is mostly consumed by an 
urban population which in Zimbabwe has tended to align with opposition politics. With 
little financial support from the government, the management at Zimpapers appears 
to have concluded there was need to adopt commercially viable strategies. Davies 
(2007: 37) argues that “a commercially produced news product will lose sales and, 
consequently, advertising if it is not regarded as legitimate and consumer-led in the 
eyes of the public”. There has however been disconnect between what the intention 
for launching a purely business paper was and the reality journalists are experiencing.  
 
When Emmerson Mnangagwa became the president of Zimbabwe, he promised a new 
dispensation in which previously limited freedoms would be enjoyed, including that of 
the media, as well as focus on the mantra that “Zimbabwe is Open for Business”. This 
mantra, if there was any truth in it, was going to work well for business journalists at 
the Business Weekly which had been established to provide purely business news. 
However, journalists interviewed revealed that self-censorship remained and even 




There are certain areas where you say we can’t do this – 
even under the new dispensation there are still stories you 
can’t write. You hear people talk of a different 
dispensation, but I personally think we still have a long way 
to go (Personal Interview 21 September 2018). 
 
Essentially, the more things changed the more they remained the same. Whereas 
business journalists “must be impeccably accurate and impartial. And you must 
understand your role in society – you are reporting on stories that affect many people 
in the community one way or another” (Hayes 2014: 2), the emphasis at the Business 
Herald leans much more on political expediency. 
 
There is thus a strong sense that journalists from the state-controlled media are not 
given room to interrogate economic issues in a manner that is helpful to the public or 
true to their calling as journalists. One of the journalists revealed that they feel they 
are hamstrung to properly interrogate some of the ‘mega deals’ that the government 
has been announcing: 
 
I will give you an example, we talk of attracting investment 
commitments of US$20 billion. Obviously, one would want 
to interrogate who is gonna bring that US$20 billion. 
Probably it is someone who just spoke to Minister so and 
so to say guys I am happy with the new dispensation and 
I would like to come and invest US$2 billion. That is a lot 
of money and when you write you just say we have 
somebody from China who wants to do a,b,c,d. We don’t 
want to waste our time, we have lost several years, and we 
can’t to lose more. So as state media journalists we have 
a duty. They should just let us or at least give us leeway to 
try and interrogate some of these so-called mega deals. 
They should send us to go and investigate who are these 
guys and what they want to do. We need that kind of 
journalism where we are given leeway to do investigations 
and advise those in authority, the politicians, to say no, 
scrutinise these guys before you give them permits. At the 
end of the day look at what happened in Chiyadzwa. 
People will tell you that that we have invested US$100 
million, when you go on the ground there is nothing but 
sophisticated artisanal mining and yet somebody claims to 
have invested US$100 million. I tell you this is happening 
in various sectors but our hands are tied to investigate 




The financial press has an impact on economic ideas (Straub 2018). The quest by 
journalists to be given the leeway to interrogate so-called mega deals confirms this 
assertion. The announcement of the mega deals in the state-controlled press often 
does not include any analysis of who the investors are and whether they have capacity 
to implement the projects announced. Journalists at the Business Herald do want to 
be involved in the interrogation of the validity of these deals, not only for the benefit of 
consumers, but for the government itself. Such interrogation would help the 
government make appropriate economic policies, not based on dubious promises of 
investment. However, none of this ever happens, at least not in the way expected of 
journalists. The views and feelings of the journalists show that they would prefer to go 
beyond the factionalised report, the party-line reporting, the protocol journalism and 
the narrow patriotism to a more expansive economic journalism that actually marches 
in step with the real economy. 
 
To my surprise, however, I also learnt that the need for more leeway to interrogate 
policies is not universally shared in the Business Herald newsroom. Some journalists 
are happy working the way they currently are. That is, they view the work they do as 
justified and as that which is expected from those who work for publicly owned media. 
This view echoes Breed (1955: 330) who says that “The publisher ordinarily owns the 
paper and from a purely business standpoint has the right to expect obedience of his 
employees. He has the power to fire or demote for transgressions.” One journalist, for 
instance, argued that it is not their duty to expose weaknesses of government policies. 
The journalist argued that their contribution to authorities’ decision-making is pointing 
out the good things unlike their counterparts in the privately-owned media. 
 
Working as a journalist anywhere in the world you are quite 
constrained to criticise something probably on the basis of 
who has introduced it…as a state media journalist you are 
not quite required to criticise a policy that government has 
introduced. What you need is to exploit the opportunities 
that exist in the policy, how the people can benefit from that 
– and when you write about the successes and failures of 
that policy, you then highlight the gaps that the government 
can move in to address. But to then openly write a story 
and say this policy is bad – it’s not quite apt (Personal 




Breed (1955) says that there is no one factor which creates conformity-mindedness, 
“unless we resort to a summary term such as ‘institutionalized statuses’ or ‘structural 
roles.’” Rather, particular factors must be sought in particular cases. For instance, 
journalists must be seen “in terms of his status and aspirations, the structure of the 
newsroom organization and of the larger society. He also must be viewed with 
reference to the operations he performs through his workday, and their consequences 
for him” (Breed 1955: 329).  
 
While in conventional journalism professionalism context, the failure to effectively 
interrogate government activities and policies points to relegation of the media’s 
watchdog role, one journalist was adamant that they play that role through reporting 
the government positively: 
 
Yea sure we have been playing our watchdog role in terms 
of policies. From our perspective, the readers want to know 
how they are going to be impacted by a policy so in our 
case instead of giving them the negatives we give them the 
positive impact to say can you move in with government 
(Personal Interview 21 September 2018). 
 
Journalists thus do adapt to newspapers that they work for. If they had not adapted, 
they would have left and joined another media house. Otherwise, “the adaptations 
seem to run in this way: i) keep on the job but blunt the sharp corners of policy where 
possible (“If I wasn't here the next guy would let all that crap go through. . .”); ii) attempt 
to repress the conflict amorally and anti-intellectually (“What the hell, it's only a job; 
take your pay and forget it . . .”); iii) attempt to compensate, by “taking it out” in other 
contexts” (Breed 1955: 334). 
 
Interestingly the same journalist stated that they have a duty to expose corporate 
malfeasance. The journalist argued that as journalists from state-controlled media they 
are not worried about businesses that are shutting down, they just do their business 
of exposing corporate malpractices. Hence:  
 
Yes I have written several stories that exposed wrongdoing 
in companies (examples given) … We are not quite limited 
in terms of our reportage by reports or indications that 
companies are closing. While some are closing others are 
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opening. Anyway, when you look at the staple for business 
journalists are companies listed on the stock exchange 
mainly and some small and medium sized enterprises. So, 
when you look at companies listed on the stock exchange, 
I can count the number of companies that have closed, 
they don’t go beyond the number of fingers on my one 
hand (Personal Interview 22 September 2018).  
 
There is an emphasis in these journalists’ assertions that they are fully aware of what 
they are doing, and do have agency. They understand the professional code, ethics, 
the need for accuracy objectivity, and the relative worth of the Business Herald in the 
world of business and financial newspapers. But, as Breed (1955) argues “when there 
is news to get”, journalists just do what has to be done. That is, “News comes first, 
and there is always news to get. They are not rewarded for analysing the social 
structure, but for getting news. It would seem that this instrumental orientation 
diminishes their moral potential.” (Breed 1955: 333). 
 
If news and journalism play a powerful role in shaping public opinion, then we must 
examine the question of “how faithfully their coverage reflects reality” (Harrington 
1989: 37). But “This is a difficult question because it ultimately rests on value 
judgments concerning the role of the networks, the definition of ‘faithful’ coverage, and 
even what is meant by reality.” To these factors one can add the issues of journalists’ 
agency, ideology and the pressure exerted by political economy. In the case of the two 
newspapers under review, the role and function of the respective news stables, 
journalists agency, ideology, political economy, the definition of ‘faithful’ coverage, and 
what is meant by reality proved to be very complex and shifting. Journalism once again 
proves to be a moving target. That said, it is possible, as this study did, “to collect 
empirical evidence on the decisions made by the networks' journalists concerning the 
amount of coverage given to different issues” (Harrington 1989: 37). In their 
explanation of watchdog journalism, Franklin et al (2005) note that:  
 
First, the media are essentially autonomous; second 
journalism acts in the public interest looking after the 
welfare of the general public rather than that of society’s 
dominant groups; and third, that the power of the news 
media is such that they are able to influence dominant 





From this definition one can begin to see how even in Zimbabwe’s so-called new 
dispensation journalists at state-controlled the Business Herald come short. The 
reasons as demonstrated from the quotes above vary from journalist to journalist. 
While there are those journalists who want to play the watchdog role in its true spirit 
for professional reasons, there are others who are contend with the status quo. In fact, 
they see nothing wrong in aligning with government policies and activities without 
question. This group though appears hypocritical in that when it comes to business, 
they insist it is their duty to expose corporate malfeasance. There are different 
standards applied to government and business. This could be due to an internalisation 
of the way state-controlled media have operated for a long time, to a point where that 
has become their ‘truth’. It could also be due to political support for the ruling party, 
leading to political beliefs clouding professional judgement. As argued by Ranger 
(2005) post 2000 in Zimbabwe arose patriotic journalism from the state-controlled 
media. It appears from the interviews that some journalists have internalised this 
patriotic journalism hence the conviction to report on the positives of government while 
ignoring the negatives. 
 
New Dispensation, Economic crisis and Journalism at the Business Herald 
The optimism that was there when Robert Mugabe was removed from power has 
turned into what can arguably be termed a nightmare as the economy keeps getting 
worse.  A World Bank23 report noted that in 2019 real GDP was projected to contract 
by 7.5%. There is a severe shortage of foreign currency, fuel, electricity, and a severe 
drought and cyclone Eline further added to economic turmoil. There has been very 
little investment in the country and industrial output has dwindled and businesses 
continue to close down and capacity utilisation has gone down. This state of affairs 
has influenced the way journalists do their work at the Business Herald. Some 
journalists noted that the launch of the Business Weekly was supposed to bring on 
board more advertisers, but the progress has been slow. One of the journalists stated 
that:   
 
The kind of stories we try to generate are not 
announcements as such but are issues of – now this is 




happening, what are the consequences…Since we are not 
extremists on either side, we have less sympathisers 
unlike our colleagues either in the private media or The 
Herald and the Sunday Mail…But we are gaining ground 
in a difficult economy. Slowly we are getting support from 
other people who are impressed by what we are writing. 
So the kind of support we get is through adverts. You know 
you might sell 3000 copies but those are read by serious 
businesspeople (Personal Interview 21 September 2018). 
 
The media’s pursuit of advertising revenue can make them “structurally dependent on 
business” and thus restrict news content (Craig 2004: 233) (see also Bagdikian 1987; 
Curran 1977; McChesney 1999). Craig (2004) suggests that businesses employ their 
advertising to socially control and censor viewpoints they do not like. Businesses can 
withdraw a substantial amount of advertising, causing newspapers to lose money. This 
leads to internal pressure within the paper to change content and staff. In the case of 
the Business Herald the employers, using taxpayer dollars to keep the newspaper 
viable, basically refused to let advertising pressures affect the newspaper’s ideological 
slant to any large extent. While they do need advertising dollars, it seems that the 
government will never allow such an important ideological mouthpiece to go out of 
business.  
 
Another journalist, however, begs to differ. He indicated that as the economy is 
performing poorly, pressures have told, and some companies have become very 
powerful and try to influence the stories the paper publishes. Indeed, at times, they 
even succeed. Hence:  
 
There are certain companies you don’t want to write too 
negatively about because they support you with adverts. 
As you know he who pays the piper calls the tune. The 
guys come up with ideas to say they have given you an 
advert today or you know they support us every time, so 
when you have a negative story they can give you the 
responses and you write the story but they phone your 
immediate boss or even the CEO to say there is this guy 
from your department who is doing this story. We feel the 
story is not quite good for us and it will cause panic in the 
market or it might cause disharmony between us and some 
of our suppliers etc. You may not be called by the CEO or 
this boss, they will just instruct each other to say let’s just 
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let go of that story (Personal Interview 21 September 
2018). 
 
Craig (2004: 233) notes that one of the enduring problems in the political economy of 
media “has been to verify that media’s pursuit of advertising profit affects news.” 
However, as already noted, the media’s pursuit of advertising revenue makes them 
structurally dependent on business (Bagdikian 1987; Curran 1977; McChesney 1999). 
This structural dependence can restrict news content in a variety of ways. Journalists 
themselves have internalised the role of advertisers in the survival of their newsroom 
and ultimately their livelihoods as well. One journalist highlighted that “there is this 
unwritten rule in the newsroom – follow the money”. This means journalists are 
generally aware of the big advertisers. The dwindling economy has made these more 
conspicuous. Journalists therefore are more careful when it comes to the stories they 
write about these big advertisers. 
 
Advertising was identified by Herman and Chomsky (1988) as of one of the filters of 
news in their propaganda model. Schudson (1989) also argues that advertising plays 
a role in how the same issue may be covered differently by newspapers. These 
arguments are confirmed by how journalists at the Business Herald consider big 
advertisers when selecting issues to cover and how. That there are some advertisers 
who have access to editors and CEOs of media organisations such as the Business 
Herald confirms Golding and Murdock’s (2000) assertion that advertising has become 
a latter-day licensing authority. In the case of the Business Herald, it is clear that in 
spite of the support it gets from government, advertisers still play a big role. This is 
also because as much as the state controls Zimpapers, it is a publicly listed company 
which is expected to make profit for its shareholders who include big investors such 
as Old Mutual. Furthermore, Parsons (1989: 2) argues that “given that newspapers 
are so embedded in capitalism and the structures of power, it is inevitable that they 
also constitute a significant medium through which economic ideas and opinions are 
legitimated”. The mutual relationship between advertisers and newsrooms such as the 
Business Herald ensures that unwanted ideas are thrown out, in the process diluting 
the ability of the press to hold business to account. It becomes even more dire for 
journalists in Zimbabwe because the deteriorating economic situation makes it harder 
for media organisations to attract advertising as the remaining organisations try to 
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keep their costs to a minimum. In addition, the few remaining big corporates are also 
valuable sources for business stories. This raises the problem of access journalism 
which Schiffrin (2015) argues happens when journalists censor information for fear of 
jeopardising chances of getting more information from these sources. 
 
Apart from advertisers, public relations (PR) officials were also cited as working hard 
to influence the stories that journalists write. However, it was pointed out that PR plays 
a lesser role than advertisers. In fact, one journalist insisted that PR officials do not 
influence his stories in any way. 
 
I am there to tell the real story. The PR person of a 
particular company, be it listed or not, wants to tell a 
positive story but I am not to do that. I am there to tell the 
people as it is and say what is happening is this. Even 
though I also want positive stories it doesn’t mean I should 
ignore the negatives. I am there to tell facts as they are 
(Personal Interview 21 September 2018).  
   
Whereas the newspaper “is not conceived as a purely business enterprise” (Breed 
1955: 330), due to the protection of media freedom and press freedom laws, money 
talks very loudly and whoever pays the piper calls the tune. In an economic 
environment like that in Zimbabwe, the lure, in particular of the greenback, can 
seriously constrain journalistic choices and content. 
 
Hence, as some told me, their editors sometimes find it convenient for journalists to 
attend functions where they are invited by corporates. These invitations mark the 
beginning of problematic relationships with the corporate world: 
 
When I attend I don’t feel like I owe anybody anything. To 
be honest some of them invite us to out of town functions 
where they give us per-diems…We forward these emails 
to our superiors and all the payments they give us are 
above board. Ordinarily I would get money from here if I 
need to go somewhere, but it’s not every trip they approve- 
things are hard- so if the company says it will provide my 
editor will say ok. But when I get there I am not part of their 
PR department. But to be honest with you it becomes very 
difficult, not for me in particular, but for every journalist to 
write negatively after being invited and being hosted and 
being paid, even if it’s above board. A journalist then 
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censors, we all do that (Personal Interview 21 September 
2018). 
 
Contacts, as says Hayes (2014), are the life blood of a journalist. All journalists “build 
up a regular list of contacts comprised of government officials, other journalists, 
entrepreneurs, business club members, bank personnel, business owners, politicians, 
and representatives of such organizations as NGOs, trade associations, international 
bodies, unions, and chambers of commerce” (Hayes 2014: 30). They also invest time 
in “getting to know what’s going on even when it’s not worth reporting; get an overall 
picture, be well informed, and also be respected by your contacts”. Every journalist 
keeps a list of helpful people and their contact details and even tries to find out people’s 
private home and mobile telephone numbers, to “call them out of hours or out of the 
office, where it may be difficult for the person to speak freely” (Hayes 2014: 30), and 
so on. However, these contacts can also open up a journalist to subornation, 
corruption and brown envelope journalism (see Mare and Brand 2010; Mabweazara 
2010). 
 
In the difficult environment thus described, journalists are always adapting. Some 
journalists told me that they have developed ways of dealing with sponsored tours. 
One journalist stated that the best is not to take the officials’ word for it. Hence:  
 
My philosophy is that I prefer to get a story, not from a CEO 
or PR, but from the ordinary worker. That person will give 
you a better picture of what’s happening. Those workers, 
they know, if you really want to get the real story you go to 
those shop-floor workers, they will tell you everything. Of 
course, you then do your investigations, but they actually 
give you a better picture of what is happening. So that’s 
the approach to take even when you go for a tour (Personal 
Interview 21 September 2018). 
 
The suggestion here is that journalists work in difficult environments but retain agency. 
“While policy is set by the executives,” says Breed (1955: 327), “it is clear that they 
cannot personally gather and write the news by themselves. They must delegate these 
tasks to staffers, and at this point the attitudes or interests of staffers may-and often 
do-conflict with those of the executive.” Editors in newsrooms “may be ignorant of 
particular facts” thus journalists who do the leg work actually get to gather news in 
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which they can use their superior knowledge of the situation on the ground to subvert 
editorial interference and utilise “the option of selection at many points”. For instance, 
the journalist out on the beat “can decide whom to interview and whom to ignore, what 
questions to ask, which quotations to note, and on writing the story which items to 
feature (with an eye toward the headline), which to bury, and in general what tone to 
give the several possible elements of the story” (Breed 1955: 333).  
 
Public relations “instrumentalises” various developments in society (Edwards 2018). 
In Zimbabwe it has instrumentalised the economic crisis to seek to broaden influence 
over journalists. As confirmed by journalists from the Business Herald sometimes it is 
difficult not to censor oneself when an organisation has been an excellent ‘host’ by 
providing not only logistics for one to attend its functions, but per-diems as well. 
Although journalists argued that they often resist overtures by PR officials they admit 
that indirectly they are influenced. There is an understanding by journalists that PR 
officials sometimes come with a hidden agenda as argued by Sallot and Johnson 
(2006). It is the mutually beneficial relationship that sees PR officials funding 
journalists to cover their functions and journalists get stories without expenses on their 
organisation, that keeps journalists keep doing it even though they understand the 
consequences. The economic crisis that has not spared newsrooms has seen media 
organisations such as the Business Herald relying on the same organisations they are 
supposed to hold to account if they are to stay true to their watchdog function. 
However, as the journalists highlighted it is not always that they compromise their 
independence. The PR-Journalist relationship becomes a bit more complicated when 
the quest for individual benefit is factored in. Some journalists at the Business Herald 
admitted that the harsh economic conditions make it difficult for them to resist when 
they are offered ‘incentives’ to drop or adjust certain stories. As one journalist put it: 
 
Nobody calls you asking to do some PR, maybe if you have 
a good relationship, but they tell you their real story and 
you can see it’s a PR effort, and they ask you to tell the 
world their version. And we are human beings, sometimes 
you falter. As a human being you may fall for it, you accept 
a gift and to some extent it then influences you. It happens 
especially in a difficult economy like ours (Personal 




However, others admitted that the practice of taking ‘incentives’ to write positively 
about organisations has increased with the continued decline of the economy, but they 
resist it. One stated that “to a certain extent, journalists are kind of managed, not 
necessarily by brown envelopes but PR exercise. Unfortunately, sometimes we also 
fail to interrogate…”. One flatly refused that they take bribes saying, “no it doesn’t 
happen here, not at all”. 
 
The Financial Gazette in the New Millennium 
The Financial Gazette’s Political Angle in Reporting the Economy 
As the political situation became increasingly volatile at the onset of the new 
millennium, the Financial Gazette shifted the way it reported economic and financial 
news. Where the 1990s were dominated by news of the government’s implementation 
(or lack of it) of the IMF prescribed ESAP, the new millennium arrived when the country 
was already facing censure for violating terms of the programme. As already noted, in 
1999 the IMF suspended financial support to Zimbabwe for economic adjustment and 
reform under a ‘‘Stand By Arrangement’’, marking the death of ESAP. The 
International Development Association (IDA) also followed suit, suspending all 
structural adjustment loans, credits, and guarantees to Zimbabwe. In 2000 the IDA 
stopped all new lending and disbursement of funds under previously approved loans, 
credits, and guarantees. As politics tended to dominate the economy in the country, 
so the Financial Gazette – much like the Business Herald – followed events by taking 
a political angle to reporting the economy. But, unlike the Business Herald, the 
Financial Gazette did not report a policy versus consequences narrative. Rather, as 
the Robert Mugabe led government increasingly took an openly autocratic character, 
the Financial Gazette exposed these tendencies and the consequences on the 
economy.  
 
The political turn of the Financial Gazette resulted in most of its front-page stories 
being preponderantly political though still framed largely as business news. 
Furthermore, such reportage tended to be disproportionately negative. Indeed, the 
Financial Gazette seemed to find particular relish in portraying government’s economic 
blowouts negatively. This took the form of constant exposes of failures, policy 
missteps, corruption and hypocrisy. Hence, for instance, on 30 March 2000 the paper 
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“exposed” hypocrisy of government in spending large amounts of foreign currency in 
supporting the DRC war efforts while begging for aid from the international community: 
 
The joint assembly of the African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) states and the European Union (EU) has called on 
Europe to consider suspending non-humanitarian aid to 
Zimbabwe until the country respects the rule of law, 
democracy and the rights of minorities within its borders, it 
was learnt this week… The joint assembly cited the 
government’s continued involvement in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) and ongoing farm invasions by 
war veterans as reasons for the resolution (Financial 
Gazette 30 March 2000).  
 
The Financial Gazette emphasised news of this kind that portrayed government in 
increasingly negative light. Although it does not seem as if Mugabe – at least since 
2000 – cared too much what picture was in the mind of people that he dismissed as 
“opposition” (all he cared to do was to consolidate his ZANU-PF support base), if 
journalists “overemphasize bad economic news, this coverage could potentially cause 
individuals to acquire a distorted view of the condition of the economy. These 
misperceptions could directly alter their economic behaviour. At the very least, it could 
be used in judging the performance of political leaders” (Harrington 1989: 36). In 
response, political leaders might adopt inappropriate policies since the government 
must respond to the picture that is in the public mind. Covering negative economic 
changes more intensively than positive changes is called negative asymmetry (cf. Ju 
2014: 442). The Financial Gazette’s attitude can be described as a form of economic 
pessimism. While the Business Herald’s attitude cannot of course be described as 
economic optimism, it can be described as economic patriotism in the narrow definition 
of patriotism promoted by ZANU-PF as anything pro-government. 
 
The editorial position taken by the Financial Gazette in highlighting government failure, 
showing it in negative light and editorialising how the international community was 
concerned about what was happening in Zimbabwe is not surprising. Raftopoulos 
(2006) argues that:  
 
In the journalistic world, the Zimbabwean crisis since 2000 
has been constructed through the dichotomy of either a 
radical nationalist redistributive project carried out as 
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historical redress in the face of neo-liberal orthodoxy, or a 
breakdown of the norms of liberal governance through the 
machinations of an authoritarian political figure 
(Raftopoulos 2006: 203).  
 
The Financial Gazette took the latter position. As noted in preceding chapters, the 
newspaper was established as an element of the (white Rhodesian) capitalist system 
in 1969 and continued to be so after independence in 1980. Zimbabwe’s involvement 
in the DRC war was one of the major contributing factors to the crash of the Zimbabwe 
dollar in the late 1990s as already discussed in the previous chapter. Land occupations 
which started in the late 1990s also intensified after the government lost the 
constitutional referendum. All these were working against the capitalist system of 
which the Financial Gazette was a tacit mouthpiece. Taking a political and negative 
angle in its reportage was inevitable because it was political decisions that were 
deemed to be causing the current crisis which was harming capitalist interests. By 
mentioning the ACP, the Financial Gazette sought to emphasise that it was not just 
Western countries that were isolating Zimbabwe and calling for the suspension of aid. 
The ACP was made up of largely developing countries sharing a history of having 
been previously colonised. Zimbabwe was a member. For these countries to turn 
against one of their own, in the Financial Gazette’s view, demonstrated the magnitude 
of the Zimbabwean government’s delinquency. Furthermore, such coverage coming a 
few months before parliamentary elections due in June same year, served to remind 
readers (those who could be persuaded and were undecided) of the need to vote 
‘wisely’ in a manner that would not allow the current events to keep happening. 
 
Highlighting Zimbabwe’s international isolation not only became routine for the 
Financial Gazette but was part of the broader agenda to expose the economically 
ruinous path that the ZANU PF government was taking. The ills of the ZANU PF 
government were considered so self-evident that the journalistic principle of 
“presenting both sides of the story” was seldom adhered to. Negative coverage was 
par for the course. In February 2001 the paper reported how Europe was isolating the 
country: 
 
Several European Union (EU) governments as well as key 
international aid donors and development partners this 
week began moves to completely isolate the Zimbabwe 
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government because of its disregard of court rulings and 
refusal to uphold the rule of law. Comments earlier this 
week by President Robert Mugabe and his two deputies, 
Simon Muzenda and Joseph Msika that they would never 
allow the opposition Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC) to rule the country, even if it won elections, and the 
bombing of a local newspaper had all combined to push 
the foreign governments to cease all development 
cooperation with Harare, diplomatic sources told the 
Financial Gazette (Financial Gazette 1 February 2001). 
 
Whereas in the 1980s and 1990s the Financial Gazette front page was dominated by 
what one could call purely business news, the turn of the millennium saw the 
production of stories on the front page that could easily be transplanted onto any of 
the general/political newspapers. Literally every story now contained as much political 
information as it had economics. As argued by Parsons (1989: 2) newspapers have 
always “been about selling markets: providing information for the businessman”. When 
the markets become hostile it is also the business of the newspapers to scold 
governments and warn the businessman. The Financial Gazette got into the space of 
warning business how bad the Zimbabwean market had become as political leaders 
created an environment too politically volatile for capital to thrive, and took its role of 
scolding government quite seriously.  
 
Zimbabwe’s economy, like those of all other developing countries, has strings attached 
to it. For instance, it relied on donor support. Sanctions were bound to cripple the local 
economy. The Financial Gazette, throughout the 2000s decade, found sanctions to be 
particularly newsworthy. On 1 March the paper reported that the USA was discussing 
imposing sanctions on the country. 
 
United States lawmakers are due next week to introduce 
in the Senate a revised version of the Zimbabwe 
Democracy Bill which, if passed, will ban US aid to the 
Zimbabwean government until it embraces democracy and 
the rule of law…They [official sources] said the Bill is 
receiving overwhelming support from members of 
Congress who have been triggered to act by the 
government’s persistent refusal to obey court orders, its 
purge of the judiciary, clampdown on the media and 
renewed and widespread violence against perceived 




The negative impact of sanctions on any economy can never be overemphasised, 
highlighted by the fact that the Zimbabwean government has been exclusively blaming 
the country’s economic meltdown on sanctions imposed by the USA and EU. The 
Financial Gazette seemed to share the UK, US and EU’s position that sanctions were 
“targeted” and that they had a positive role to play in forcing the Mugabe government 
to implement reforms and cease human rights abuses. The question about the 
deservedness or ruinous nature of sanctions has continued to divide Zimbabweans, 
mostly along party lines. Those in the opposition support the sanctions and pray for 
them to remain in place. ZANU PF on the other hand blames the MDC for calling for 
the sanctions, calls them “evil” and campaigns for their removal. As I have already 
noted, however, there is no truth to the view that sanctions are exclusively to blame 
for Zimbabwe’s economic collapse. Bond (2007) explains how the Zimbabwean 
government blames everyone else but itself:    
 
The Zimbabwe government typically blames the crisis 
upon Western states and institutions angry about land 
reform, or mythical ‘‘sanctions’’ (there are only minor smart 
sanctions against a few dozen individuals in operation), or 
‘‘the country’s detractors’’ for causing shortages every time 
the country comes out of elections, or even the US and UK 
governments for allegedly controlling weather patterns to 
cause droughts (Bond 2007: 151). 
 
Such “explanations” were mostly published by the state-controlled media (Mano 2005; 
Ranger 2005). At the same time, the sanctions have played a hard-to-quantify role in 
the economic collapse. Dislike of Mugabe should not blind us to the fact that he 
became persona non grata because the economic powerhouses of the West sought 
to punish him and make an example of Zimbabwe for daring to take back the land from 
whites. That is, the argument that Zimbabwe’s economy was made to scream (as per 
Chester Crocker) is valid. But it was not only the West that made Zimbabwe’s economy 
scream. ZANU PF also made Zimbabwe’s economy scream, perhaps more so than 
the West. Essentially, both sides (the pro-sanction and anti-sanction camps) have a 
point, but the respective point of views are so entrenched that it is hopeless to seek to 
persuade either side of the plausibility of other’s side position. This is largely because 
the positions are political and politically motivated. To give a quarter is seen as 




This environment in which concession on political questions was out of the question 
also “infected” the business reporting of the Financial Gazette. Its anti-government 
posture was traditionally provoked, as we have shown, by the paper’s capitalist 
leanings but, more importantly by the completely new environment of political 
polarisation that began in 2000s with the rejected referendum and the FTLRP. What 
this polarisation meant was that independent media became subject of constant 
harassment and censorship, a situation which made rapprochement not only 
completely out of the question but also politically suicidal. The threat on independent 
media from the government deepened and entrenched the anti-government spirit and 
made it difficult to sympathise with Mugabe or try to see the world from his point of 
view. Essentially, the independent media became campaign vehicles for the “Mugabe 
Must Go” agenda. This political role coloured much of their reporting and even gave it 
a bitter tone. On the other hand, the Mugabe government tarred all independent media 
with the same brush, labelling them “opposition media”. This led to a media divide that 
was only to be briefly healed after 2009 by the same man who had done so much to 
cause it: Jonathan Moyo.  
 
In this environment, any story that put the Mugabe government in a spot of bother and 
served to portray it in negative light was welcome and was certain to make headlines 
in the Financial Gazette. By contrast, in the Business Herald such stories were not 
even published. When they were published, it was only to “hit back”. The Financial 
Gazette – in its acerbic anti-government tone and content – was merely reflecting and 
expressing the zeitgeist, for Zimbabwe was – and remains – a deeply divided country. 
Not much quarter is ever given, and business news if ever mere business news. On 
12 April 2001 the paper published a story on the United Kingdom suspending aid to 
Zimbabwe. The same reasons of a breakdown in the rule of law were given for that 
suspension. In the story it was reported that:  
 
The British government has withdrawn aid worth over $200 
million to the Privatisation Agency of Zimbabwe (PAZ) and 
another programme aimed at strengthening trade policy 
capacity within the government in yet another slap in the 
face of Harare by a key development partner. British 
Secretary of State for International Trade, Claire Short told 
the House of Commons last week that London had written 
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to the Zimbabwe authorities informing of the cuts in aid to 
the PAZ and the Trade Policy Capacity Building 
programme because of Harare’s failure to implement 
policies that could reverse the country’s economic crisis 
(Financial Gazette 12 April 2001).  
 
In three consecutive months the paper reported Zimbabwe’s isolation from the 
international community. The UK, EU and USA were Zimbabwe’s major trading 
partners apart from South Africa. They were also the major development aid partners 
to the country as well. Reporting on these developments place the Financial Gazette 
as a friend of business that needed to be aware of the deteriorating economic and 
political environment.  
 
Chuma (2005) notes that at the turn of the millennium there was increased demand 
for news that provided a critical and analytical angle to events in the country. This 
market had become disillusioned by the increasing control of publicly owned media by 
the government. This was the market the Financial Gazette had in its sights when it 
took an increasingly political tone in its reportage of economic developments. 
Furthermore, the unprecedented performance of the opposition MDC in the 2000 
constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections the same year increased 
oppositional sentiment particularly in the country’s urban centres. These also 
constituted the paper’s growing readership as noted by Saunders (1991). Hence 
Chuma (2005: 46) argues that “the press both shaped and was shaped by the shifting 
contestation(s) within and between different centres of power during the second and 
third part of the third decade of independence”. We can say the same has continued 
to be true up to today. 
 
In the words of John Palmer (in Parsons 1989: 4), newspapers occupy a “crucial 
intersection between the world of finance and the world of government”. The political 
actions of Robert Mugabe’s government (in particular the land reform, but also 
gimmicks like the Indigenisation Act) were having a huge influence on the world of 
business, a fact which seems to have rubbed the Financial Gazette the wrong way. 
The Financial Gazette, in this regard, stood in that intersection of business, 
government and the (so-called) international community. While political power 
contestations within the country were mainly between the ruling ZANU PF and 
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opposition MDC parties, the Western world wielded much economic power in the 
country due to the aid it provided as well as investments by its citizens and 
multinational companies. It is therefore not surprising that the Financial Gazette paid 
attention to the country’s widening ostracisation from the West with such stories 
appearing on the front page. The following stories demonstrate just how much the 
Financial Gazette covered Western nations’ disengagement from working with 
Zimbabwe. 
 
Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe and his inner circle 
of top officials and army generals is sending money abroad 
and going on shopping trips to Europe, a senior American 
Congressman said yesterday. Ed Royce, chairman of the 
Africa Committee of the US House of Representatives, 
said his country would pile pressure on Mugabe to ensure 
presidential elections on March 9 and 10 are free and fair. 
Washington has threatened targeted sanctions on Mugabe 
and his key officials if the ballot is unfair. With the 
European Union it has decried as anti-opposition, the 
legislation that Mugabe is pushing through Parliament 
about public order, election rules, the media and the rights 
of trade unions (Financial Gazette 17 January 2002). 
 
Top bankers, army generals, heads of parastatals, senior 
civil servants and leading business and church leaders 
have been slotted into an expanded black list of 
Zimbabweans who are now under targeted sanctions by 
the United States government, it was established this 
week. The list is in addition to the one which names 
President Robert Mugabe and his inner circle who have 
already been banned from travelling to the US because of 
their alleged support for lawlessness and refusal to hold a 
free and fair presidential ballot (Financial Gazette 28 
March 2002). 
 
Zimbabwe could be expelled from the 54 nation 
Commonwealth and a trade embargo slapped on the 
country on top of smart sanctions imposed on President 
Robert Mugabe and his chief backers, it was established 
this week…the United States for the first time publicly 
announced it was working with three Southern African 
countries to isolate Mugabe for what Washington terms his 
fraudulent re-election in March. The 15-nation European 
Union, the US, Canada, Switzerland and New Zealand 
have already imposed targeted sanctions against Mugabe 
and 72 of his officials over the poll which they have blasted 




The United States of America is considering slapping 
President Robert Mugabe and his Cabinet with economic 
sanctions that diplomatic sources yesterday said could 
further undermine the Zimbabwean economy. Sources 
said Washington, which like the European Union (EU) and 
several other countries have imposed a travel ban against 
Mugabe and his top hierarchy, was considering tightening 
smart sanctions. They said proposed measures included 
the freezing of Cabinet ministers’ bank accounts and the 
seizure of their assets in the United States. The EU, 
Australia and New Zealand have already introduced 
similar financial sanctions against government and ruling 
ZANU PF party officials (Financial Gazette 30 January 
2003).  
 
The Financial Gazette, it could be said, tended to overemphasise negative news about 
the Zimbabwean economy, including stressing government corruption, culpability, 
mismanagement and cluelessness, while underemphasising Western meddling in the 
economy or the failure of neoliberal policies preferred by the IMF and the World Bank. 
It is not clear, as Harrington (1989: 36) would say, “why bad economic news should 
be more important than good economic news”, but some plausible reasons can be 
proffered, as we will see below. The Business Herald, on the other hand, tended to 
overemphasize positive economic news about Zimbabwe which put ZANU PF in good 
light, as well as to blame anyone but the government for the economic collapse. In 
particular, the Business Herald overemphasised the role of Western meddling and 
sanctions and any other circumstances that were considered to be beyond the 
government’s control. In this vein it could be said that sanctions actually helped the 
government, functioning as a fig leaf.  
 
The problem, in particular, for the Business Herald, was that the editorial slant could 
not rig the economy; citizens could still see the disjunction between the reporting and 
their own lives, particularly when the government paper overemphasised positives. 
Trustworthiness in the Business Herald decreased in proportion to the actual 
deterioration in the economy as reflected in the drop in people’s living standards. 
Furthermore, the urban class, which overwhelmingly supported the opposition MDC, 
tended to be roundly sceptical of state mouthpieces such as the Business Herald and 
more amenable to the critical stance of independent papers such as the Fingaz. Urban 
readers were, by extension, less critical of the Financial Gazette’s tendency to 
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underemphasise the role of Western meddling, failure of IMF and World Bank policies, 
and sanctions. Readers were thus as politicized as the media, and in the case of the 
Financial Gazette it seems that journalists served up their readers more and more of 
what they thought readers wanted. In the case of the Business Herald, where the long 
term sustainability and viability of the paper did not really depend on advertiser 
largesse, the newspaper’s slant could conveniently ignore readers’ scepticism. The 
Financial Gazette, being less dependent on tax payers’ “free funding”, and more 
dependent on advertisers, could not hope to ignore readers and still be viable; and so 
it served its readers what it thought they wanted. Luckily its set of perspectives aligned 
with the mood of national dissatisfaction with the way the government was handling 
(and perceived to be handling) the economy.  
 
Bad economic news, it seems, may be more newsworthy than good economic news 
for the reason that “individuals suffer more from bad economic events than they benefit 
from good economic events.” In Zimbabwe this rang true. With a declining, and then 
spectacularly collapsing, economy people distrusted any positive prognosis as 
propaganda that was out of step with reality. They preferred the bad news that tended 
to march in step with what they could see around them. This is described as issue 
obtrusiveness, defined as “the amount of personal experience people have with 
issues” (Ju 2014: 444; see also Winter, 1981). Basically, an obtrusive issue “obtrudes 
into people’s everyday lives, thereby making people rely less on news media” (Ju 
2014: 444; see also McCombs, 2004). Issue obtrusiveness thus moderates the 
agenda-setting effect. The more Zimbabweans experienced economic collapse, the 
less confident they were in the patriotic journalism of the Business Herald and the 
more they “believed” the Financial Gazette. Interestingly, journalists at the Business 
Herald, despite also living in hard times and noticing their environment, did not rely on 
this issue obtrusiveness and personal experience to criticise the government. Rather, 
they either pretended things were not as bad as portrayed or, where the economic 
collapse just could not be hidden, blamed external forces (mainly sanctions) and the 
opposition MDC. 
 
If economic news “influences both the volatility of returns and trading volume” in 
financial markets (cf Önder and Şimga-Muğan 2006), it is not clear that markets in 
Zimbabwe really depended on journalists’ perspectives. Rather, it was clear even to a 
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blind man (in a manner of speaking) that the economy was in shambles. The Financial 
Gazette was merely preaching to the choir, or basically confirming what was already 
known. No investor needs telling that Zimbabwe’s economy is – like any other 
emerging market – volatile and uncertain (cf. Mutenheri and Green 2003). Any 
investment made in Zimbabwe is due to the higher returns relative to the higher risks.24 
In Zimbabwe, where listed firms rely heavily on external finance, especially short-term 
bank financing, financial sector growth and company financial behaviour was not tied 
down to the vagaries of the performance and behaviour of the local economy. Asset 
tangibility, tax rates, growth opportunities, earnings volatility and bank liquidity were 
significant determinants of capital structure compared to business and financial 
journalists reporting. Rather, a publication such as the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange 
Handbook would be more authoritative to the intelligence and data gathering of the 
stock market than the newspapers. Indeed, the newspapers would quote from such 
authoritative sources rather than generate their own data. Still, the readers’ reasons 
for preferring the set of explanations given by the Financial Gazette for the bad 
economic news (government corruption, culpability, mismanagement and 
cluelessness) rather than those by the Business Herald (the role of Western meddling 
and sanctions and any other circumstances that were beyond the government’s 
control) are complex. A major reason seems to be that the readership was politicized 
along the dividing line of ZANU-PF and MDC. If you supported ZANU PF, you tended 
to believe the Business Herald and disbelieved the Financial Gazette. If you supported 
the MDC, you disbelieved the Business Herald and believed the Financial Gazette. 
However, this is putting it simplistically, since some readers would buy both papers. 
 
Government Responsible for Economic Decline 
The political angle the Financial Gazette took led to it exposing the government as the 
architect of the economic crisis the country was experiencing. Where the government 
was pointing at external forces being responsible, the Financial Gazette kept pointing 
at the government’s doorstep. Some of the reports were subtle while others were 
explicit in their holding the government to account for its actions. On 27 July 2000 the 
paper published a story titled “Makoni under pressure to break silence on currency” in 
                                                           
24 The major benefit of investing in emerging markets, as Önder and Şimga-Muğan (2006: 51) point out, “is 
portfolio diversification (where) higher uncertainty in these markets relative to developed markets increases both 
risk and return”. 
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which the government was held responsible for the depressed business environment 
due to foreign exchange controls.  
 
Pressure mounted this week on new Finance Minister 
Simba Makoni to make an official statement on the future 
of Zimbabwe’s artificially stable currency and end the 
haemorrhaging of the economy in the face of a biting 
foreign currency crisis…Sources in the manufacturing 
sector this week said the continued silence by Makoni was 
driving most local industrialists to the wall and warned that 
an accelerated deindustrialisation of the Zimbabwean 
economy would occur unless the minister urgently 
addresses problems caused by the fixed exchange rate 
(Financial Gazette 27 July 2000). 
 
The story offered a critique of the government’s foreign currency policy. Ndlovu (2015) 
argues that privately-owned media in Zimbabwe challenge the status quo and offer 
alternative narratives to the public. While the government was blaming its detractors 
for the economic crisis, the Financial Gazette was giving an alternative explanation: 
that, in fact, the problem was government’s own policies that were anti-business.  
 
By placing blame on government, the Financial Gazette thus played the role of 
oppositional journalism (Ranger 2005; Chuma 2005; Waldahl 2005). In playing this 
role the paper offered alternative accounts to those given by government regarding its 
actions in relation to the deteriorating macro-economic conditions in the country. For 
example, in a story on 11 October 2001 titled “Plot to expel farmers foiled” the paper 
compared Robert Mugabe’s actions to those of former Ugandan leader Idi Amin: 
 
Influential leaders of Zimbabwe’s ruling ZANU PF party 
and intelligence officers hatched an “Idi Amin type” plan to 
expel almost all white farmers from Zimbabwe by 
December if international efforts to resolve the land crisis 
failed but the plan has apparently been abandoned, it 
emerged this week…The Zimbabwean plan which seems 
to have been aborted following the signing of the Abuja 
Agreement last month would have begun with riots on 
farms in the Chinhoyi and Mhangura areas of 
Mashonaland West, intelligence sources told the Financial 




The story framed the actions of the Zimbabwean government against white 
commercial farmers as barbaric and racist. There was no mention of the legitimacy of 
landlessness and land hunger in the country. By consistently “exposing” such harm 
and malice from a government against its own citizens, the Financial Gazette 
portrayed the ruling government as an evil system that was driving the country to 
certain economic disaster. This reportage from the Financial Gazette was rather bold 
when considered in the context of the constant attacks against the independent media 
from government in the run up to the March 2002 presidential elections, attacks which 
Ronning (2003) describes as “vicious” and designed to prevent the media from playing 
its role of scrutinising politicians and their policies. Portrayal of the government as a 
personification of evil helped to generate a narrative whereby the Mugabe government 
was justified to be removed by the ballot or external regime change. Funding to civil 
society and non-governmental organisations, and to the opposition MDC was thus 
interpreted by ZANU PF as efforts at regime change, but by the opposition and the 
independent media as legitimate human rights and pro-democracy activism. The 
result, however, was further entrenchment of divisions, leading to cycles of political 
violence, rigged elections, more sanctions, further economic deterioration, more 
political violence, more rigged elections, further sanctions, world record hyperinflation, 
and on and on, endlessly, until the GNU. Consistently negative, anti-government 
coverage such as that in the Financial Gazette played its part in these cycles. 
 
Newspapers “have been consistently found to focus on negative economic changes 
more than positive changes” (Ju 2014: 441). Ju (2014: 442) claims that the 
“pessimistic expectation can influence the actual economic situation”, through the 
“association between the economic expectation and the actual economic situation”. A 
“negative trend in economic news coverage can have a negatively skewed impact on 
the public’s economic expectations” (Ju 2014: 442). In Zimbabwe, this could be true if 
one looks at how the public’s distrust of government, politicians, government’s 
economic policy and the Zimbabwe dollar tended to be reinforced consistently from 
the year 2000 onwards. The Zimbabwe dollar collapsed completely because economic 
fundamentals went bad, but also because the public lost confidence in it. While the 
Financial Gazette cannot be attributed with causing the public to lose confidence in 
the economy and the Zim-dollar, it certainly seems to have played a role in reinforcing 
it. This role, however, is unquantifiable. Negative economic reporting seems to have 
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coincided almost perfectly with negative public economic sentiment, reinforcing it. It is 
not clear, however, which came first – negative public sentiment or negative reporting. 
Again, it is impossible to say with any certainty which came first. What is certain, 
however, is that in Zimbabwe the two ‘walk’ hand in hand. Indeed, most government 
schemes seem to have failed partly due to failing to get people’s buy in, trust and 
confidence. A case in point is the return of the Zimbabwe dollar in 2019 which, by early 
2020, had virtually become useless again in a mirror reflection of what happened in 
2008.  
 
The land reform programme had both a political and economic significance. The ZANU 
PF government used it as a political campaign tool in the name of empowering the 
many Zimbabweans who did not have access to land. Those opposed to it were mostly 
against the way it was done, that is, farmers being violently forced off their farms and 
sometimes being killed. By publishing stories such as the one above, the Financial 
Gazette exposed the dark side of the process, contrasting it to what was being 
reported by the government as a revolutionary empowerment programme or Third 
Chimurenga. But where it came into its own was where the Financial Gazette 
systematically exposed the damage the programme was having on the economy. For 
example, in a story on 31 October 2002 the paper warned that the crisis in the 
economy was set to increase as tobacco output fell due to the land reform exercise.  
 
Zimbabwe’s tobacco receipts will fall by at least 20 percent 
next year and deepen the country’s biting foreign currency 
crisis, a development analysts warned this week could 
worsen President Robert Mugabe’s headaches. The 
analysts project that Zimbabwe’s 2002/2003 tobacco crop 
will decline by between 30 and 60 percent in the 2002/2003 
agricultural season because of the expulsion of more than 
1 400 white commercial farmers whose properties have 
been seized by the government (Financial Gazette 31 
October 2002).  
 
As commercial farmers were expelled from farms, grain deliveries to the state-run 
Grain Marketing Board (GMB) dwindled leading to shortages but mainly to collapsing 
food security in the country. The Financial Gazette framed the consequent 
dependence on food imports as a result of the “chaotic” land reform programme. 
Through reporting the food shortages and the increasing imports, the paper exposed 
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the negative consequences of the chaotic land reform programme contrary to 
government assertions that it was empowering people.  
 
In a story titled “Billions needed for food imports” the Financial Gazette revealed the 
magnitude of the imports the country had to pay for due to insufficient grain. 
 
The state-run Grain Marketing Board (GMB), which 
currently holds maize stocks many critics claim are enough 
only to feed the country for about two months, needs about 
US$27 million (Z$165 billion) to import 222 554 tonnes of 
grain to replenish the country’s depleted grain silos…the 
141 521 tonnes of maize imported in September had long 
been consumed, making the importation of 222 554 tonnes 
a priority for the parastatal, which is reeling from a massive 
$302 billion loss incurred in the year to March 2004…The 
GMB presently sells maize to millers at $9 600 a tonne 
while buying the grain from farmers at $130 000 per tonne 
(Financial Gazette 18 December 2004).  
 
At the time government was heavily subsiding the price of maize in what it said was a 
support price to cushion newly resettled farmers against market prices for maize. By 
pointing out that even with such an economically ridiculous practice of buying grain at 
$130 000 and selling it at $9 600, the country was still importing maize, the Financial 
Gazette highlighted the destruction of the once vibrant agriculture sector due to land 
reform. 
 
Audience consideration is important when the news is produced (Clausen 2003). For 
the Financial Gazette the audience needed to get the other side of what government 
was hailing as a genius empowerment programme of land redistribution. The other 
side would show that people being resettled did not have the necessary resources to 
successfully utilise the land. The role that the Financial Gazette played confirms 
Cook’s (2006) argument that the media are a political institution. It has also been noted 
that in the absence of vibrant opposition to the ruling ZANU PF party, the media, 
particularly the Daily News, played the role of opposition in Zimbabwe (see Moyo 
2005).  After the Daily News was forced to shut down earlier in 2004, other newspapers 
such as the Financial Gazette stepped into the role of opposition even though by this 
time the opposition MDC was vibrant but facing restrictions due to laws such as the 
Public Order and Security Act (POSA). The audiences needed to know what exactly 
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was happening on the ground outside of the pro-government news from the state-
controlled media.  
 
Gono who Pays the Piper 
In 2002 the parent company of the Financial Gazette, Modus Publications, was bought 
from then owner Elias Rusike by a consortium led by Gideon Gono (Mukasa 2003). A 
story by Dumisani Muleya in the Mail and Guardian of 12 August 2005 alleged that 
Gono was in partnership with Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO). 
Gono was then the Managing Director of the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ). 
He was then appointed the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe governor on 1 December 2003 
(Gono 2008). These developments had a potential impact on how the Financial 
Gazette reported economic matters. Soon after his appointment, Gideon Gono 
introduced the Productive Sector Finance Facility (PSF) (Gono 2008). The policy 
provided for productive sectors of the economy to borrow at rates lower than the 
prevailing market rates. The Financial Gazette reported on the fallout between 
government and the IMF over this facility. On 16 April 2004 in a story titled 
“Government, IMF haggle over cheap industry loans”, the paper expressed praise for 
the policy introduced by Gono. 
 
The government, desperate for external funds to stabilise 
its finances, is ironically playing hard ball with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) over the productive 
sector facility (PSF) which the international monetarists 
fear could fuel festering inflationary pressures…The 
government’s decision to stick to its guns could further 
stiffen the hand of the IMF, which has been accused of 
misplaced missionary zeal for fiscal rectitude to the 
detriment of most emerging markets… ‘They had a lot to 
say about it and raised the issue that if the funds are not 
superintended properly, they could be inflationary and 
compromise our fight against inflation. But we had to be 
firm on the usefulness of the fund and indicated that we 
were relying on our sources for the funds. It is prudent to 
support our own producers in order to kick-start our 
exports’, Kuruneri [Finance Minister] said (Financial 
Gazette 16 April 2004). 
 
The story did not mention Gono but went on to state that the IMF was impressed by 
the policies the government was implementing, particularly monetary policy. Gideon 




The IMF delegation which was in the country from March 
17 to March 31 on routine Article IV consultations, noted 
what it termed ‘strong policy efforts’, particularly the 
tightening of monetary policy, but indicated that it was 
imperative to guard against a loosening of the new 
measures (Financial Gazette 16 April 2004). 
 
Even the one analyst who was sought for the story gave a positive view of the PSF: 
 
A Harare based economic commentator who did not want 
to be named said the concessionary funds would not fuel 
inflation but help contain it through bolstering the supply 
side. ‘The facility actually had to be expanded not shrunk. 
It is not inflationary because it is being monitored to see 
that the funds are being applied to productive purposes. It 
is necessary that we address the supply side of the 
equation in the fight against inflation’, he said (Financial 
Gazette 16 April 2004). 
 
Curiously Gideon Gono offered a similar justification in his book Zimbabwe’s Casino 
Economy. He argued that: “funding for PSF was from statutory reserves and the level 
of these reserves provided the threshold of the facility. The record shows that in 2004 
the PSF programme managed to improve productivity in most sectors of the economy” 
(Gono 2008: 148). 
 
When the IMF threatened to expel Zimbabwe from the fund, the Financial Gazette 
reported it but made a point to reveal that the government and the RBZ had tightened 
the fiscal and monetary policy. In a story on 17 February 2005 titled “To expel or not 
to expel”, the paper emphasised the measures taken by the country to mitigate 
expulsion. 
 
At the core of the fallout was Harare’s arrears with the IMF, 
poor fiscal and monetary policies, as well as serious 
governance issues surrounding the controversial land 
reform launched in 2000. Zimbabwe, which owes the fund 
over US$300 million, has in the past year committed itself 
to regular quarterly repayments which were recently 
increased from US$1.5 million to US$5 million. The 
government and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe have also 
implemented tight fiscal and monetary policy controls, 
which have seen a marked improvement in aggregate 
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productivity and a decline in inflation (Financial Gazette 17 
February 2005). 
 
As the date for the IMF board meeting which would determine Zimbabwe’s fate in the 
fund drew close, Zimbabwe made a substantial payment to retire part of its arrears. 
The amount of US$120 million was a surprise considering the state of the economy at 
that time. It was a figure that would ordinarily raise some questions. The Financial 
Gazette reported it in a story on 1 September 2005. 
 
Zimbabwe this week made a US$120 million payment to 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) whose executive 
board meets this week to consider the Southern African 
country’s expulsion from the 184-member multilateral 
financial institution…Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) 
governor, Gideon Gono, confirmed the development…The 
central bank governor was quick to add that the funds 
came from Zimbabwe’s own resources, and had to starve 
other sections of the economy to raise the money 
(Financial Gazette 1 September 2005). 
 
While the Financial Gazette did not question the RBZ’s explanation of where the 
money came from, the IMF did raise questions. The paper reported the IMF’s 
reservations in a story titled “Where did you get it?” 
 
The visiting International Monetary Fund (IMF) team has 
renewed its demands for Zimbabwe to reveal the source 
of its loan repayments, clashed with officials over new 
exchange controls and demanded an end to farm 
invasions…The sources said on Monday this week the IMF 
team asked for evidence to prove that the US$120 million 
the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) paid last September 
was in the bank’s books and insisted on seeing signed 
facility contracts and the electronic transfer payments 
print-outs. The IMF mission requested confirmatory 
correspondence from banks whose clients the central bank 
says had offered free funds to Zimbabwe. The RBZ told 
the team that exporters had in return had the equivalent of 
their foreign currency contributions invested in treasury 
bills and allowed to keep higher Foreign Currency Account 
limits past the statutory time frame (Financial Gazette 2 
February 2006). 
 
An exiled businessman, Mutumwa Mawere, had been contesting the source of the 
money arguing that the RBZ had taken his money generated from his expropriated 
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asbestos mines. The Financial Gazette reported on the RBZ’s defence against that 
claim: 
 
The IMF also demanded a copy of Zimbabwe’s Exchange 
Control Act, details of the RBZ’s offshore bankers and 
clarification on assertions by fugitive businessman 
Mutumwa Mawere that the RBZ seized his money to pay 
off the IMF. It is however reliably understood that the RBZ 
‘satisfactorily proved that there was no single dollar that 
came from the sale of asbestos from SMM Holdings as 
claimed by Mawere’ (Financial Gazette 2 February 2006).   
 
There was a shift, albeit subtle, in how the Financial Gazette reported on the activities 
of the RBZ and the policies it crafted to curb the ballooning economic crisis. The paper 
had gained readership through some hard-hitting critique of government policies when 
it was still owned by Clive Murphy and his partners Nigel and Rhett Butler (Saunders 
1991). Similar editorial stance continued when the paper was bought by Elias Rusike, 
a former Zimpapers CEO, and his partners. It did not change much when it was bought 
by Gideon Gono and his alleged CIO partners. The change, however, came when one 
analyses the way it covered the Reserve Bank and Gideon Gono after he became 
governor in December 2003.  
 
Gono himself admits he faced a lot of criticism from many quarters including the media 
when he crafted some of his policies at the RBZ (see Gono 2008). Looking at the 
stories above, which all focus on Gono’s relationship with the IMF, one can see that 
the Financial Gazette chose not to question these policies. It reported on what was 
happening but avoided asking questions that a watchdog would ask. It is peculiar that 
when even the IMF was not satisfied by Gono’s explanation of where he suddenly got 
US$120 million to pay part of the arrears owed to the bank, the Financial Gazette 
accepted the explanation without questions or even seeking economic analysts to 
comment on it. The Financial Gazette’s lack of probing such activities as the SPF and 
the IMF payments raises questions about owner influence in media organisations and 
at the Financial Gazette in particular. It has been argued (see Allan 2004) that the 
media operate within particular relations of power and control. In this regard the media 
are “controlled by very wealthy people or by managers who are subject to sharp 
constraints by owners and other market-profit-oriented forces” (Herman and Chomsky 
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2008: 13). Thus, as much as issues of professionalism and journalist agency cannot 
be ignored, evidence from the Financial Gazette’s reportage on the activities of the 
RBZ after Gono’s takeover of the newspaper highlights that ownersh ip plays a big role 
in how issues are reported and consequently how the public may understand such 
issues. There are obviously varying degrees to which owner influence may bear on a 
media organisation’s reportage, but such influence is undeniable, particularly in highly 
polarised territories such as Zimbabwe. 
 
The evidence from the stories however differs from accounts given by journalists at 
the Financial Gazette on Gono’s influence on how they write news. Journalists argued 
that they were never, implicitly or explicitly, pressured to write positively about Gideon 
Gono and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. One of the senior journalists stated that 
“no single day was I ever pressured to write positively about Gono. I wrote two or three 
stories that got Gono asking whether ‘we are still together’ but none was ever 
censored. I don’t know maybe at editorial level” (Personal Interview 15 April 2018). 
However, the journalist also accepted that “naturally you wouldn’t go all out on 
someone you work with”. This confirms Herman and Chomsky’s (2008) argument that 
it is in explicitly authoritarian environments that visible power is used to control what 
journalists write, but in relatively democratic countries, the exercise of control is 
subtler. Gideon Gono stresses in his book that he is not a politician in spite of rumours 
that he was preparing for political office while at the RBZ. The media in Zimbabwe is 
polarised, for better or worse, between that which supports the ruling ZANU PF party, 
which is mostly the publicly-owned media, and that which supports the opposition 
MDC, which is mostly the privately-owned media. For Gono who took over the 
Financial Gazette as a commercial venture it did not make sense to turn the paper into 
a ZANU PF praise singer. The paper needed to maintain a reputation of being 
balanced if it was to maintain many of its readers who were businesspeople and largely 
the middle class who could afford it. However, the fact that journalists were aware that 
he was the owner placed an unspoken pressure on them to cease explicitly criticising 
him and his policies at the RBZ. It did not matter that editors tell journalists to be 





The GNU discord – ‘Evil’ ZANU PF versus ‘Good’ MDC 
When the Global Political Agreement that formed the basis for the Government of 
National Unity was signed, there was hope on the political front since it was expected 
to yield economic restoration and growth. However, the GNU was not smooth sailing 
and the Financial Gazette reported on the bickering in government and consequences 
on the economy. While the paper continued with its political lenses to report the 
economy, there was more emphasis on how the economy was faring under the GNU. 
The main political parties in the GNU disagreed on how the economy was to move 
forward and the Financial Gazette tended to report actions taken by the MDC-T wing 
of government positively. On 26 March 2009 the paper published a story titled “PM’s 
office cracks whip on invasions” in which farm invasions by ZANU PF supporters were 
portrayed as anti-progress. 
  
The Prime Minister’s office has stepped in to stop the 
ongoing farm invasions, tasking the Joint Monitoring and 
Implementation Committee (JOMIC) to investigate the 
disruptions affecting more than 100 properties 
countrywide…It is being alleged that hardliners in ZANU 
PF flatly opposed to the success of the inclusive 
government are burning the midnight oil to scuttle the one 
month old marriage of convenience seen as the first step 
towards rebuilding the country’s battered economy. There 
are concerns that the continuing land invasions could 
derail efforts to re-engage the European Union bloc, some 
of whose members have already initiated fact-finding 
missions to Zimbabwe in the wake of the formation of the 
new government (Financial Gazette 26 March 2009). 
 
The volatility of the period after the consummation of the inclusive has been noted by 
scholars (see Besada and LaChapelle 2011). In particular the insincerity of ZANU PF 
was cited as hampering efforts to resuscitate the economy. The Financial Gazette, a 
noted government critique, reported on some of those destabilising efforts by ZANU 
PF as in the story above. Thus, the paper, in spite of supporting the Reserve Bank 
and Gideon Gono, still pointed out when ZANU PF was engaging in activities that were 
against economic progress. There was a contrasting of what the MDC-T wing of 
government was doing for the economy and what the ZANU PF wing was doing 
against the economy. Simplistic binaries replaced complex analysis.  News media, 
however, are supposed to give “exposure and credence to different political 




The contrasting of “good versus evil” is also evidenced in a story on 6 May 2010 titled 
“I’ll name, shame ministers – Biti”. The ‘good’ Minister of Finance Tendai Biti was 
contrasted with the ‘bad’ ZANU PF ministers who continued to seek to spend more 
money than the economy was generating: 
 
In a development that exposes the rampant abuse of 
control systems in the inclusive government and how the 
polarity in the coalition is being taken advantage of for 
selfish gain by high ranking office bearers, several 
ministers have been accused of bleeding State coffers by 
flouting foreign travel restrictions…The foreign junkets 
could have been more excessive had it not been for the 
travel ban slapped by the European Union and the United 
States between 2001 and 2005 on ZANU PF ministers 
(Financial Gazette 6 May 2010). 
 
ZANU PF as the proponents of the country’s indigenisation programme were also 
portrayed as mean and vindictive when a statutory instrument was promulgated 
outlining the implementation of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act. 
In a story on 9 January 2011 it was reported that a Parliamentary Legal Committee 
had found the penalties imposed through the statutory instrument outrageous: 
 
The Parliamentary Legal Committee (PLC) has said 
provisions of the country’s empowerment regulations are 
unconstitutional as they impose  penalties on businesses 
that fail to submit indigenisation plans within an agreed 
time…The empowerment regulations state that 
businesses that fail to submit indigenisation plans or 
provisional plans within 30 days of receiving a notice face 
imprisonment of up to five years…They also say investors 
who make investments resulting in them having a 
controlling shareholding without approval in a sector in 
which locals must have majority control also risk 
imprisonment (Financial Gazette 9 January 2011). 
 
Not only did the newspaper frame ZANU PF as a destructive political and economic 
agent but also expressed its disquiet at the way the indigenisation programme was 
being implemented, comparing it to the chaotic land reform programme more than a 





Saviour Kasukuwere’s Youth Development, Indigenisation 
and Economic Empowerment Ministry will soon embark on 
company seizures similar to the chaotic farm occupations 
seen in 2000 as part of ZANU PF’s power retention 
strategy ahead of next year’s make-or-break elections, 
which the Southern African Development Community says 
should be held by June. The Financial Gazette can 
exclusively reveal that after narrowly escaping from the 
jaws of defeat in 2000 by hurriedly expropriating land from 
the perceived white funders of the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC), ZANU PF has again set its 
sights on taking over foreign owned firms and giving 
majority ownership in those seized companies to 
indigenous blacks as a political mobilisation tool (Financial 
Gazette 13 December 2012). 
 
No doubt reports such as these a few months before an election would be perceived 
as an attack on ZANU PF and its controversial policy of indigenisation. The Financial 
Gazette chose to be on the side of capital as it came under threat from ZANU PF. By 
reporting the indigenisation drive as a campaign gimmick, the newspaper was 
delegitimising the programme and in the process ZANU PF itself. Through such 
reportage ZANU PF could be seen as the ‘evil’ that continued to threaten Zimbabwe’s 
economy for political expediency.  
 
The Financial Gazette was drawing its readers’ attention to what Paul Collier (in Moore 
2011) argues is the character of dictators with a democratic veneer. Some of the 
tactics they use include scapegoating minorities or foreigners (Moore 2011). By 
labelling the proposed dispossession of foreigners of their majority ownership of firms, 
the Financial Gazette relegated Robert Mugabe and his ZANU PF party to the 
category of dictators with a democratic veneer. The democratic veneer evidenced by 
the holding of elections, albeit disputed. Jensen (1987) argues that the media are not 
neutral observers of events providing a platform for the public to make informed 
judgements of the state and private enterprise. Rather the media are part of the 
corporate economy. This argument rings true when we consider the way that the 
Financial Gazette took a position as a fiery critic of activities that the ZANU PF arm of 
government was undertaking. Audiences could read stories such as these as 




The Financial Gazette was able to write like this because the media environment had 
improved with the coming of the inclusive government. However, the biggest 
advantage it had was that Gideon Gono was a businessman. As explained earlier, 
journalists only practised self-censorship when it came to issues to do with the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ). One of the journalists stated that “Gono was both 
a politician and businessman, he never interfered in our work”. Furthermore, Gono 
was one of the foremost ZANU PF officials against the indigenisation of banks even 
though he stated that he supported the indigenisation programme (Gono 2008). The 
Minister of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment, Saviour 
Kasukuwere, wanted to embark on a destructive programme without considering the 
consequences, whereas Gono, as a businessman himself, preferred a programme 
that would not destroy business. The same views found expression in the stories the 
Financial Gazette published, such as the above. 
 
2013 Elections: The Aftermath 
The 2013 elections delivered a somewhat unexpected result. Morgan Tsvangirai and 
his MDC-T party lost by a wide margin leaving ZANU PF with a majority in parliament. 
The results were contested but as in almost all electoral cases in Zimbabwe, nothing 
came out of it for the opposition. For many urban people who had voted for the 
opposition, the future of the country economically seemed bleak. The Financial 
Gazette represented the post 2013 elections period as hopeless. On 16 August 2013, 
barely two weeks after the elections, the Financial Gazette reported an increase in 
number of people emigrating to South Africa. The story was titled “Zimbabweans pour 
into South Africa”, a title which spoke of a flood. In the story it reported that: 
 
Zimbabweans have been pouring into neighbouring South 
Africa in large numbers since the conclusion of the July 31 
harmonised polls, a survey by the Financial Gazette has 
shown. This trend started immediately after the 
harmonised elections that were won by ZANU PF amid 
claims by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) 
formations that the polls were rigged. A faction of the MDC 
led by the outgoing Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai has 
since challenged the outcome in the courts. Officials at the 
Beitbridge Border Post confirmed this week that indeed the 
momentum at the entry and exit point linking Zimbabwe 
and South Africa had picked up following the conclusion of 




The post-election period was also highlighted as a ‘crisis’ by the Financial Gazette. 
The paper highlighted the crisis that was already gripping the country in the immediate 
aftermath of the ZANU PF’s election victory when it reported on the worsening liquidity 
crunch in the economy.  
 
A story on 12 September 2013 titled “Cash squeeze to worsen” reported on the 
worsening of a cash crunch that started during the inclusive government period. 
 
The importation of maize to avert starvation in the face of 
looming hunger will have huge financial implications on the 
country which, among other things, may drain the fiscus 
and result in increased cost of borrowing on an already 
liquidity challenged domestic market, analysts have said. 
‘Any significant maize imports will exacerbate the situation 
and consequently credit conditions in the market will 
remain tight and corporates will find borrowing not only 
difficult, but a bit more costly’, economist Brains 
Muchemwa told the Financial Gazette this week (Financial 
Gazette 12 September 2013). 
 
The Financial Gazette represented ZANU PF as clueless on leading the country to 
economic prosperity after its disputed electoral victory. In a story on 14 November 
2013 the paper reported the ZANU PF government’s first 100 days in office as 
disastrous on the economic front. The story was aptly titled “Disastrous first 100 days 
for government”. It reported that: 
 
Despite the glowing promises made by ZANU PF during its 
election campaign, the first 100 days since President 
Robert Mugabe’s administration came into office have 
failed to produce something that could inspire confidence 
in the future of the country’s economy. While Tuesday 
marked 100 days since the party was voted into power, 
rhetoric and no action is still the trading currency in 
government, while the general populace continues to swim 
in a sea of poverty…Reports indicate that only 10 out of 
the 74 companies listed on the local bourse are in the black 
while several other companies are on the brink (Financial 
Gazette 14 November 2013). 
 
The ZANU PF government was held to account by the paper for greed and economic 
mismanagement. The government had a record of fiscal indiscipline that remained a 
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constant point of disagreement with the IMF during the ESAP years and the Financial 
Gazette reported the resurfacing of this tendency in the post 2013 election period.  
 
A story titled “Government in shocking expenditure” reported on how the government 
was disregarding good fiscal practice. 
 
The cash-strapped government incurred a shocking 
US$500 million in unauthorised expenditure by its various 
ministries and departments in a clear indication that the 
2013 National Budget sustained a higher deficit than 
initially projected…But what is more damning is the 
admission by government that the resultant indebtedness 
is choking the operations of suppliers and service 
providers thereby contributing to the economic crisis 
(Financial Gazette 23 January 2014). 
 
Stein (1975) argues that when journalists report on macro-economic conditions, they 
exploit anxiety, reporting of some impending catastrophe. The language used by the 
media is also meant to dramatise events such that “prices do not rise, they soar” (Stein 
1975: 39). The Financial Gazette exhibited these traits when it reported on the impact 
of government’s economic mismanagement on workers, both in the public and private 
sectors.  
 
On 23 April 2015 the Financial Gazette carried a story titled “Govt plunges civil 
servants into debt”. Use of the word plunge was deliberate to emphasise how fast civil 
servants’ debt position was deteriorating due to government’s economic 
mismanagement. In the story it reported that: 
 
The cash-strapped government has failed to remit millions 
of dollars deducted from civil servants’ salaries for 
payment of their debts to various institutions for the past 
three months, exposing the workers to legal action, the 
Financial Gazette can reveal. The money could run into 
US$50 million according to sources who spoke 
confidentially to this newspaper last week. It could 
increase this month if government fails to remit deductions 
for April (Financial Gazette 23 April 2015). 
 
Another story was titled “Civil servants on edge as government runs out of cash”. If 
one were to just read the title, they could conclude that the government had already 
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failed to pay salaries of its workers. Such an interpretation, while not too far from the 
truth but not quite exact.  
In the story it was reported that: 
 
The cash-strapped government is facing increasing fiscal 
pressures on the back of a rapid decline in tax revenues 
amid tell-tale signs that it could struggle in the coming 
months to pay salaries for nearly 350 000 civil servants on 
its payroll, the Financial Gazette can report. Conservative 
estimates suggest that the cash crisis rattling markets has 
worsened the country’s economic health with consumer 
spending dipping by as much as 40 percent in the past 
month (Financial Gazette 16 June 2016). 
 
For the Financial Gazette, the ZANU PF government became the villain as argued by 
Stein (1975: 40) that “the economic story requires a villain and a straight-line plot”. 
However, in its representation of the economic crisis as exposing workers to abuse, 
the Financial Gazette did not only portray government as the villain, but also greedy 
private sector employers.  
 
In a story titled “Workers toil for nothing” the paper reported on a report published by 
the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions exposing a practice by employers of not 
paying employees due to difficult economic conditions. 
 
The majority of employees outside the public sector are 
toiling for months on end without pay while their bosses 
are living large as the gap between the haves and have 
nots continues to widen in crisis hit Zimbabwe, the 
Financial Gazette can exclusively report. In a 36-page 
report titled ‘Working Without Pay, Wage Theft in 
Zimbabwe”, the research division of the main labour body, 
the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) – 
exposed a wage crisis that has reached catastrophic levels 
outside the Public Service Commission, which employs 
government workers…The research unit, Labour and 
Economic Development Research Unit of Zimbabwe 
(LEDRUZ) said at least 120 000 workers across the 
economy worked without pay between 2015 and last year 
(Financial Gazette 30 March 2017). 
 
Many financial and economic news media tend to align with investors and other 
activities in the interest of the capitalist economy (see Fahy et al 2009; Rafter 2014; 
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Berry 2016). The Financial Gazette is no exception. However, there are few cases as 
in the story above when they break with the norm and publish stories that express 
concern for workers.  
 
One of the journalists at the Financial Gazette shed some light on why stories like 
these may be found in the paper: 
 
I am from a peasant background and I find myself in an 
elite organisation writing for elite audiences but still I am 
for the transformation of lives…The capitalist economy is 
not what I was raised on, I subscribe to sharing (Financial 
Gazette Journalist). 
 
However, it must be noted that such departures are far in between. Furthermore, it 
was convenient for the Financial Gazette to report on the plight of workers as a way 
of highlighting how badly Robert Mugabe’s government was mismanaging the 
economy. Audiences could make a comparison between the inclusive government 
period and the period after ZANU PF won the 2013 elections. As much as employers’ 
greed was exposed, the deeper issue was the economic challenges the country was 
facing. 
 
The Coup Aftermath 
The period after the ‘soft’ coup of 14 November 2017 was marked by high expectations 
of change since many blamed Robert Mugabe for ruining the economy. The 
expectation was evidenced by the many people who took to the streets celebrating the 
fall of Robert Mugabe. Emmerson Mnangagwa, the man who took after Robert 
Mugabe was regarded in some sections of society as pro-business as evidenced by 
some respected businesspeople who argued that Mnangagwa had to be given a 
chance including Strive Masiyiwa, the richest man in Zimbabwe. The Financial Gazette 
reported on developments in the aftermath of the coup and according to the paper’s 
journalists, nothing much changed. Some expressed the sentiment that there was self-
censorship especially when it came to the military. 
 
We practice self-censorship because of the political 
environment. When army chiefs are implicated 
automatically self-censorship kicks in. I wrote a story that 
questioned how [information redacted to protect journalist] 
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got title deeds for land when everyone else was getting 99-
year leases. Army chiefs were implicated. I got calls from 
[a group of people that] are trying to reengage with 
government and don’t want negative stories (Personal 
Interview 15 April 2018). 
 
However, another journalist acknowledged the self-censorship but stated they still do 
their job well. The journalist stated that “when government officials make noise through 
phone calls you know you are holding them to account” (Personal Interview 15 April 
2018).  
 
The journalist further explained that they do not feel inhibited to report on the true state 
of the economy in the post-coup Zimbabwe. This is demonstrated in the stories that 
appear in the newspaper. For example, on 20 December 2017, a little over a month 
after the coup, the paper published a story on how Zimbabweans had lost confidence 
in the economy: 
 
Funds held by Zimbabweans in offshore banks rose to 
US$1 billion having declined to US$300 million four years 
ago, following escalating political risk and uncertainty at 
home, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) deputy governor, 
Kupukile Mlambo, has disclosed…Mlambo who reinforced 
the RBZ’s warning that the authorities must tackle the slide 
in confidence, said the funds held offshore by 
Zimbabweans reflected lack of confidence in the local 
economy (Financial Gazette 20 December 2017). 
 
To understand the tightrope that journalists walk in the post-coup Zimbabwe one 
needs to understand the nature of the government that emerged. While the president 
is a long-time former cabinet minister and vice president, the current vice president is 
the former Zimbabwe Defence Forces commander General Constantino Chiwenga. A 
number of former military men were given various positions in government including 
the man who announced the coup on television, Brigadier General Sibusiso Moyo, 
who is now the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The army had an incestuous relationship 
with the ZANU PF government of Robert Mugabe (Shumba 2018). This became more 
intimate after the coup. The army and the generals run several businesses in the 
country including lucrative diamond mines. Reporting business news consequently 
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becomes a bit complicated because one does not want to be seen to be attacking the 
generals. This is why self-censorship becomes ‘natural’. 
 
The economic crisis, professionalism and journalistic agency at the Financial 
Gazette 
The economic crisis that continues in the country and the political climate combine to 
place certain pressures on the work of financial and economic journalists as already 
highlighted. It is crucial to understand the extent of journalistic agency in this 
environment. One could assume that because there is no direct government control 
at the Financial Gazette, unlike at The Herald, journalists at the Financial Gazette find 
more expression of agency. However, it has been noted that in Zimbabwe journalists 
at privately-owned media have to contend with proprietor pressures (Mano 2005; 
Mabweazara 2011). Journalists at the Financial Gazette acknowledge that they have 
had to be careful when it comes to interests of the paper’s owners, such as in the 
Gideon Gono case. The paper was bought by the Associated Newspapers of 
Zimbabwe (ANZ) in early 2017. The ANZ are the publishers of the Daily News, a paper 
which used to be extremely critical of the government. Nevertheless, journalists 
contend that they have room to exercise agency in their work. One journalist stated 
that “Gono was hands-off and even now I still write my stories and have never had to 
change stories” (Personal Interview 15 April 2018). The journalist further highlighted 
that even editors can only interfere with their work to a limited extent. He argued that 
“we make the biggest decisions in terms of what gets published. I decide what people 
read in the process of selecting what I should write as a story. The editor cannot know 
should I choose not to write a certain story” (Personal Interview 15 April 2018). 
 
While individual agency cannot be doubted from what the journalists stated, one 
cannot ignore the reality that this agency is practised within particular professional and 
institutional constraints. Cottle (2007) argues that we need to move from an 
overemphasis on organisational routines determining news production and 
acknowledge journalistic agency. In considering journalistic agency we cease to view 
journalists’ work in the context of routines but begin to view it as practice. Viewing the 
work of journalists at the Financial Gazette this way enables us to appreciate that 
journalists are mostly in control of what they decide as newsworthy. However, the 
same does not preclude them from adhering to organisational routines and the subtle 
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pressures from proprietors as noted by Mano (2005). The argument of course can 
unintentionally find itself in the structure versus agency debate. However, the most 
important thing to note is that in spite of the reality of organisational routines and other 
factors of influence such as the economic crisis and political situation, journalists at 
the Financial Gazette still have the choice to pursue certain stories or not. 25For 
example, one journalist spoke of a story that he picked from The Herald which no one 
seemed to have had an interest in following up. When he followed up on the story, he 
uncovered a massive scandal involving both private sector and public sector players. 
All the organisations involved were valuable advertisers and also political connections 
meaning there was a possibility his editor could reject the story. The journalist went on 
to write the story and his editor was bold enough to publish the story. In the end 
individuals from both the private and public sectors were prosecuted. 
 
Conclusion 
The new millennium was characterised by Zimbabwe’s plunge into economic chaos 
which the two newspapers represented in diverse ways. Unlike the 1980s and 1990s 
where both newspapers represented the economic crisis from a pro-capital 
perspective, the 2000s proved to be different due to an increase in both economic and 
political meltdown. The Business Herald endured a prolonged period of tight control 
from government resulting in it publishing stories that lacked much analysis. On the 
other hand, the Financial Gazette adopted a more political tone in its reports on the 
economy. The change in ownership, particularly that which involved Gideon Gono 
taking over saw the paper reporting the Reserve Bank and Gono’s policies positively. 
The chapter also analysed how journalists responded to the various developments 
that took place from 2000 to 2018. In a word, this chapter, and the two before it, have 
evaluated the forms and types of coverage given to economic discourse in Zimbabwe 
by two different news organisations over a forty-year period (more or less). The point 
was to analyse the nature and characteristics of Zimbabwean economic, business and 
financial (EBF) news in three decades of varying crises, and to consider issues of 
selection of news, framing, reporter gaze, agenda-setting, representation, slant, 
salience, and nature and quality of reporting of the crises over this period.  
 
                                                           
25 I avoid direct quotations here because the journalist can then be easily identified. 
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The chapters delved into the issues of the relationship between politics, the economy 
and journalism, the news media’s portrayal of the economic ideas of political parties 
such as ZANU PF (and to some extent the MDC), the portrayal of larger than life 
figures such as Robert Mugabe, and the coverage of Zimbabwean politics as filtered 
through the business and economic lens. The three analysis chapters breaks new 
ground in its investigation of the theory and practice of business, financial and 
economic journalism in Zimbabwe. In sum, this study is the first of its kind in this 
regard. Its empirical findings and the analysis, discussion and interpretation of data 
will appeal to those interested in the sociology, and the political communication 
content, of economic, business and financial (EBF) journalism in a “Third World” 
country. It is relevant to an understanding of how one can understand a country’s 
history via newspaper mediated representations of its economic life. The study as a 
whole sheds light on the political and ideological content of EBF news, and the role of 
the EBF news media in a time of sustained crisis, while also showing the opportunities 
and challenges to EBF thrown up by the rise of the internet and the deluge of 
information that is available to readers and audiences.  
 
Zimbabwe is unique for many reasons. No other country in peacetime has quite seen 
the levels of hyperinflation that Zimbabwe did. People who were not living in Zimbabwe 
between 2000 and 2008, for instance, will have difficulty in understanding what was 
going on or how people survived on valueless trillions and quadrillions of dollars in a 
time of food shortages and constant price increases and severely eroded buying 
power. Furthermore, the situation in Zimbabwe in the three decades under study is 
unique due to the protracted nature of the crises, but also due to the fact that, by 2008, 
the general populace had become thoroughly immersed in macroeconomic and 
microeconomic issues, and in the operations of currency markets. Just about every 
Zimbabwean, for instance, knows about “burning money”.  
 
The highly informalised economy makes every Zimbabwean into a hustler who knows 
how to arbitrage and how to buy cheap and sell dear. The prevalence of the kukiya-
kiya economy (cf. Jones 2010), feja-feja economics, and the casino economics (cf. 
Gono 2008) has made Zimbabwe into a unique case study. Shaw (2016) distinguishes 
between financial journalism, which he says is focused on investors, and business 
journalism, which he says is aimed at the general public. In Zimbabwe these lines are 
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immensely blurred. The Business Herald and the Financial Gazette did not observe 
clear cut distinctions (indeed, they seemed reluctant to observe any hard-and-fast 
distinctions) in their reporting of macroeconomic issues of inflation, trade, wages, 
poverty, fiscal and quasi-fiscal matters, and so on, or the supply-side and demand-
side operations and activities of companies, businesses, entities and industries, and 
financial and currency markets, investment, and reporting on consumer data, among 



























CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
The study addressed how Zimbabwe’s economic identity crisis and the economic 
crises were represented in mainstream newspapers in the country. Acknowledging 
that the country’s economic duality and crisis have been studied from mostly an 
economic and development perspective, this study reads them from the lenses of 
mainstream financial and business media and intended to fill a gap in mediation of the 
“Zimbabwe Crisis” (Raftopoulos 2006), by focusing on the production of financial and 
economic news. The study thus did not seek to quantify the importance of economic, 
business and financial news in Zimbabwe but, rather, to gather a qualitative, in-depth 
and interpretive understanding of how they have operated between 1980 and 2018. 
This, I feel, it has done. This study systematically evaluated the forms and types of 
coverage given to economic discourse in Zimbabwe by two different news 
organisations over a forty-year period (more or less). The point was to analyse the 
nature and characteristics of Zimbabwean economic, business and financial (EBF) 
news in three decades of varying crises, and to consider issues of selection of news, 
framing, reporter gaze, agenda-setting, representation, slant, salience, and nature and 
quality of reporting of the crises over this period.  
 
The study delved into the issues of the relationship between politics, the economy and 
journalism, the news media’s portrayal of the economic ideas of political parties such 
as ZANU PF (and to some extent the MDC), the portrayal of larger than life figures 
such as Robert Mugabe, and the coverage of Zimbabwean politics as filtered through 
the business and economic lens. This study breaks new ground in its investigation of 
the theory and practice of business, financial and economic journalism in Zimbabwe. 
This study is the first of its kind in this regard. Its empirical findings and the analysis, 
discussion and interpretation of data will appeal to those interested in the sociology, 
and the political communication content, of EBF journalism in a “Third World” country. 
It is relevant to an understanding of how one can understand a country’s history via 
newspaper mediated representations of its economic life. The study sheds light on the 
political and ideological content of EBF news, and the role of the EBF news media in 
a time of sustained crisis, while also showing the opportunities and challenges to EBF 
thrown up by the rise of the internet and the deluge of information that is available to 




This chapter provides some critical reflection on the findings of this study as they 
address and respond to the objectives set out in the beginning. The chapter highlights 
how the findings answered questions proposed at the beginning. The study, at the 
outset, proposed and then went about addressing the following research questions: 
 
1. How have Zimbabwe’s “economic identity crisis” and “economic crises” been 
represented in selected mainstream Zimbabwean print media from 1980 to 
2017?  
2. Why do finance and business journalists in Zimbabwe report about the 
economy, business, and the world of finance, the way they do? 
3. How has Zimbabwe’s “economic identity crisis” and “economic crisis” shaped 
and constrained institutional and newsroom practices, professional 
imperatives, journalistic agency and their wider socio-economic and political 
context? 
 
These are questions that could be answered by studying newspaper coverage of 
business, financial and economic matters from the time Zimbabwe gained 
independence from Britain in 1980 to 2018. Two newspapers were selected for they 
are the only ones that existed in 1980 and continue to do so, the Business Herald and 
the Financial Gazette. Ideally the study would have benefited from having interviews 
from journalists who practised during the entire period but having failed to adequately 
sample journalists who practised in the 1980s and 1990s, interviews were conducted 
with business journalists practising from the 2000s. Some newsroom observation was 
further needed to gain an insight into the daily routines of producing financial and 
economic news in Zimbabwe. This again was hampered by rigid and paranoid 
gatekeeper policies that is suspicious of the intentions of anyone who wants to spend 
any extended period of time in newsrooms. In the end the research questions were 
answered through archival data and interviews held with currently practising 
journalists, some of whom have been in business newsrooms from early 2000s. 
 
Business news is often considered as for elites who are not a large group in Zimbabwe, 
and this appears to have been the case even in the study of Zimbabwean media where 
much attention has been given to its political aspects. Studies on business news such 
278 
 
as Mare (2009) and Mare and Brand (2010) have been far in between. This is an 
anomaly considering that newspapers have been about markets from their inception. 
As Parsons (1989) argues: 
Newspapers have, almost from their inception, been about 
selling markets: providing information for the 
businessman, and opportunities for the business 
community to advertise its products, services and prices. 
Newspapers in many senses, therefore, could be said to 
lie at the very core of the capitalist process and the ‘free 
market’ idea and consequently have a key role to play in 
the way in which what Peter Berger describes as 
‘economic culture’ is communicated and its myths and 
discourse sustained and propagated. Newspapers thereby 
assist in the integration and mediation of economic values, 
ideas and language (Parsons 1989: 2). 
 
This study brought to the fore this key capitalist institution, newspaper journalism, to 
help us read Zimbabwe’s economic duality and the crises that ensued directly or 
indirectly from the adopted economic system. Carroll and McCombs (2003) have 
argued that, while the news media may not be successful in telling the public what to 
think about, they often succeed in telling the public what to think about. This is the 
definition of agenda setting. Economic news is important because it, to some degree, 
translates “into entrepreneurial decisions, particularly investments” (Noelle‐Neumann 
1987, 292). “The outcome of a media system, i.e., its news, influences a society, its 
citizens, and its corporate and government actors. Along with direct experience of the 
economy, news serves as an important source of economic information, alerting 
citizens to economic problems.” (Lischka 2016: 17). 
 
Whereas western news media were criticised in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis 
for not giving the public adequate and timely warning, in Zimbabwe the news media 
contributed to the sense of crisis by either over-covering it and over-scrutinising it, or 
over-politicising and over-polarising it. This type of coverage, content and framing 
caused the sense of crisis to seem chronic and permanent, or else dulled people’s 
senses to it. Merrill (2019: vi) emphasises that EBF journalism “has a long track record 
of over-optimism”. This is borne out in terms of the Business Herald, but not so much 
in the case of the Financial Gazette. Covering negative economic changes more 
intensively than positive changes is called negative asymmetry (cf. Ju 2014: 442). The 
Financial Gazette’s attitude can be described as a form of economic pessimism.  That 
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is, the Financial Gazette, it could be said, tended to overemphasise negative news 
about the Zimbabwean economy, including stressing government corruption, 
culpability, mismanagement and cluelessness, while underemphasising Western 
meddling in the economy or the failure of neoliberal policies preferred by the IMF and 
the World Bank. It is not clear, as Harrington (1989: 36) would say, “why bad economic 
news should be more important than good economic news”, but some plausible 
reasons were offered in the study. While the Business Herald’s attitude cannot be 
described as economic optimism, it can be described as economic patriotism in the 
narrow definition of patriotism promoted by ZANU-PF as anything pro-government.  
 
If journalists “overemphasize bad economic news, this coverage could potentially 
cause individuals to acquire a distorted view of the condition of the economy. These 
misperceptions could directly alter their economic behavior. At the very least, it could 
be used in judging the performance of political leaders” (Harrington 1989: 36). In 
response, political leaders might adopt inappropriate policies since the government 
must respond to the picture that is in the public mind. However, it does not seem as if 
Mugabe – at least since 2000 – cared too much what picture was in the mind of people 
that he dismissed as “opposition”. All he cared to do was to consolidate his ZANU-PF 
support base. Merrill (2019: vii) found that “British news media tends to reinforce 
neoliberal assumptions in its reporting and gives only limited exposure and credence 
to interpretations of the economic environment from the left.” He calls this “deficit of 
perspectives”. This deficit is a core of Zimbabwean economic, financial and business 
journalism, largely because reporting is openly politicised. The principle of “present ing 
both sides of the story”, for instance, was routinely not adhered to by both newspapers, 
particularly since 2000. What was newsworthy differed due to political orientation. A 
summarised selection of salient findings is presented below: 
 
Of capitalist loyalties and ‘patriotic’ journalism 
At independence, the stated economic system to be adopted by the new government 
of Zimbabwe was socialism (Gwara regutsaruzhinji). However, there was a recognition 
that the economy could not be radically transformed from capitalism to socialism 
without unwanted consequences. In his own words the then prime minister Robert 




We realise that we have inherited an infrastructure which 
is principally capitalist, and that whatever socialist policies 
we would want to implement, these policies had to take 
into account the economic background of the country, and 
that it wouldn’t serve any purpose if we overthrew the 
system and tried to build on a completely new social basis. 
We have not hidden our beliefs. We have said we derive 
our socialist principles basically from Marxist-Leninist 
thinking, and we feel that there is a link between Marxist-
Leninist thinking and some of our traditional collective 
ideas, and we are linking these together. But we also 
accept the Christian principles that have come into it, the 
love that we should have for each other, good 
neighbourliness, charity and that kind of thing, and on the 
basis of that we evolving a philosophy which we believe 
will be acceptable to our people. There is of course 
individualism in our traditional society, but I think we would 
want to emphasise more the collective aspect, leaving 
room for individualism of course. This is how we look at 
it.26 
 
For newspapers that had been accustomed to reporting capitalist enterprise, of which 
they were part, these were uncharted waters. For the Business Herald, further 
complications arose from it being part owned by the public through the Zimbabwe 
Mass Media Trust (ZMMT) – and consequently controlled by the state. In the first 
decade of independence the Business Herald remained faithful to its capitalist 
traditions and often portrayed capitalism as a better economic system than socialism. 
This in spite of the Ian Smith regime having engaged in a form of state capitalism 
necessitated by a sanctions regime imposed upon the country in 1965 after the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). In Chapter 4, I described the narrative 
adopted by the Business Herald in the first decade of independence as ‘capitalism-is-
better-than-socialism’. This narrative was revealed over and over again as the paper 
constantly sought opinions of industry players and business bodies’ representatives 
to buttress the view that command economics, a socialist approach, would drive the 
country to economic ruin. The Business Herald was firmly embedded (Grunberg and 
Pallas 2012) in capitalist reason in keeping with its pre-independence reportage. 
However, care was taken to avoid antagonising the government, so criticism of 
socialism was done in subtle ways. After all, officials such as the minister of information 
had called upon all newspapers to play their patriotic role (Saunders 1991).  
                                                           




In the early months of independence characterised by mass exodus of the white 
population including highly skilled workers and business owners, the Financial Gazette 
played a ‘patriotic duty’ of allaying this group’s fears. Unlike the Business Herald, 
which was now in the hands of government, the Financial Gazette was white owned 
and very much a big part of the capitalist system. But it was more ‘vocal’ in highlighting 
that the brand of socialism adopted by Robert Mugabe’s government was not ruinous. 
It was in a better position to persuade those still sitting on the fence to stay because it 
was owned by private capital. While patriotic journalism has been associated more 
with post-2000 journalism (Ranger 2004; 2005; Chuma 2008), this study showed that 
in the financial and economic news category, this started right in the 1980s. The 
Financial Gazette voluntarily engaged in patriotic journalism while the Business Herald 
had to appease the government due to its ownership structure.  
 
Newspapers play an important role in the communication and sustenance of economic 
culture (Parsons 1989). The Financial Gazette played this role of communicating a 
new economic culture that provisioned for co-existence of capitalism and socialism. 
With a circulation of only 4000 copies, the majority of which were subscriptions by the 
business community, the Financial Gazette was nevertheless an important and 
authoritative newspaper due to its long history of financial reporting dating back to 
1969. Loyalty of the paper to capitalism was evident in many of its reports, and these 
were complimented by the ‘patriotic’ reports. Patriots in the early 80s were those who 
sided with government policies (Saunders 1991). In its loyalty to capitalism, the 
Financial Gazette played its watchdog role of warning the government about adopting 
radical socialism which would jeopardise economic health of the country. As the 
independence euphoria died and the government seemed to be failing to implement 
policies that would grow the economy, the Financial Gazette dropped all pretence of 
siding with the government and took a very critical approach towards economic 
policies. Thus, if one removes the early years of independence, the Financial Gazette 
largely reported the dual economy from a pro-capitalism perspective. The Financial 
Gazette was “introjective” (Geiber in Clausen 2003), that is, it espoused the values of 
its readers, majority of whom were businesses through subscriptions. On another level 




The economic identity crisis came to an end in the early 1990s when Zimbabwe 
adopted the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). The economy was 
full-blown capitalist. The Business Herald and the Financial Gazette took a celebratory 
approach in their reporting. They had been vindicated in their numerous reports that 
cautioned against socialist policies that were detrimental to the economy. There were 
differences in how they celebrated though. The Business Herald hailed the ESAP as 
panacea to the country’s economic challenges. A new form of ‘patriotic’ journalism 
emerged. Where it used to try to portray socialism as having some benefits, the 
Business Herald highlighted how the economy had suffered from its dual nature. 
Statistics were used to demonstrate how much the economy was suffering and 
therefore needed a new economic system, capitalism. Bretton Woods institutions 
became darlings of the paper as enablers of the new economic trajectory. In spite of 
failure of similar SAPs in other African countries before, the Business Herald did not 
raise any voice of caution. This was ‘patriotism’ the ZANU PF way.  
 
But at the same time there was relief as the paper was unshackled from having to 
portray socialism in good light. This was a paper born as a support institution as well 
as part of the Rhodesian capitalist venture as the British South Africa Company 
(BSAC) claimed the land between Limpopo and Zambezi rivers (Moyo 2003). As 
discussed in Chapter 5, the Business Herald could have chosen to subtly offer some 
caution as it did in the 1980s, subtly extolling the virtues of capitalism. Instead it offered 
cheerleader journalism and grooming journalism. Cheerleading the government as it 
went ‘all in’ into ESAP, and grooming readers to accept a liberal economy. Even when 
problems with how ESAP was implemented arose, these were underreported. When 
the problems became too glaring to ignore, the Business Herald started blaming 
government for poor implementation. Government was blamed for maintaining a high 
budget deficit, high interest rates, maintaining some control in the economy, among 
other reasons. The problem was government, not ESAP. This was however, done in 
a subtle way to avoid backlash from government officials. 
 
Caution was to be found in the Financial Gazette instead. Where it had worked to 
expose the folly of some socialist economic policies, after the immediate post-
independence efforts to sanitise Robert Mugabe’s brand of socialism, the Financial 
Gazette urged the government to take a more measured approach to the adoption of 
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ESAP. It warned its readers that ESAP was not a magic wand as government was 
making it look like. It offered scepticism where the Business Herald was celebrating. 
The Financial Gazette reported to debunk the notion that ESAP was prescribed by 
Bretton Woods institutions. It attributed the adoption of the programme to government, 
highlighting that it was government to be held to account for the success or failure of 
the programme. The Financial Gazette further ‘exposed’ government’s half-hearted 
adoption of ESAP, with instances such as the takeover of the Zimbabwe Iron and Steel 
Company (ZISCO) demonstrating that government’s hand was still visible in the 
market. 
The implementation of ESAP was characterised by government missing some targets 
set out in funding conditions, such as reducing the budget deficit. The Financial 
Gazette, playing an oppositional role, reported on such government failures 
highlighting that ESAP was being hampered by government’s lack of will. Government 
was not taking the hard decisions that could potentially alienate voters. The Financial 
Gazette blamed the government for failure of the structural adjustment programme. In 
its defence of the market, the Financial Gazette alerted its readers to excesses of the 
government such as the war veterans pay-outs and sending troops to the DRC, and 
more importantly, the economic consequences.  
 
The Zimbabwe crisis: architects and enablers 
From an economic point of view, the Zimbabwe crisis did not start after the country 
gained independence. The economy was already in crisis mode by the time the 
majority government took over. For instance, the country was over US$700 million in 
debt and was spending 47 percent of its budget on the military. The Business Herald, 
in what can be viewed as responsible journalism, reported the crisis state the country 
was in, in the immediate post-independence period. With government initiating plans 
to acquire the Argus Group’s majority shareholding in the renamed Zimpapers, the 
Business Herald tread a fine balance between informing readers of the crisis and 
avoiding reprimands from government. Betraying its link to the Rhodesian regime 
though, was the paper’s silence on the cause of the crisis.  
 
In keeping with Schudson’s (2000) assertion that there is need to scrutinise the role 
that news media play during social change, the study observed that the Business 
Herald not only reported to reassure the business community, but government officials 
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as well. Government officials were assured that the paper was patriotic. This was done 
through masking negative economic statistics with positively titled headlines. Thus, 
the business community which cared about statistics would understand that economy 
was not performing well, government officials would be happy that readers were 
getting positive headlines that painted government’s handling of the economy in good 
light. Sometimes it shifted the blame to exogenous factors, such as depressed world 
markets, rather than overtly implicate the government. While the Financial Gazette 
reported to reassure its readers that the crisis was short lived, it did not hold back in 
holding the government to account. It, however, did not adopt the ‘nothing-good-can-
ever-come-out-of-this-government’ (Mano 2008) approach to reporting the economic 
crisis. The Financial Gazette reported concerns of private capital as evidence of 
economic crisis persisted post independence. The study confirmed what was said by 
one of the Financial Gazette’s former senior editors, Rachel Stewart, that “the Gazette 
is the living printed existence of ‘white Zimbabwe’. We are the only newspaper that 
has the potential of reaching out to whites…” (cited in Saunders 1991: 357). Hence 
reportage of the crisis by the Financial Gazette was in terms of consequences to this 
market. In keeping with Stein’ (1975) argument that economic news reports require a 
villain, this study found that the Financial Gazette reported government as the villain 
due to its detrimental socialist policies. The crisis enabled the paper to grow its market 
as its economic stories began to resonate with even ordinary people living in townships 
who were beginning to see and feel effects of the crisis. 
 
Towards the end of the 1980s, the Business Herald began to overtly report that 
command economics was not working in Zimbabwe. It reported how the country was 
in a crisis because of the prevailing economic system. There was leeway to report this 
way because the government was moving towards adjusting the economic structure 
with help from Bretton Woods institutions. The Business Herald became the Trojan 
horse for the implementation of economic reforms. In this way it continued playing its 
patriotic role of supporting the government, but more in sync with its own worldview as 
a newspaper born in capitalism. Playing patriotic journalism led the Business Herald 
to become persuader-in-chief to its readers about the superior logic of economic 
reforms, even as the economy sunk deeper into crisis due to the same reforms. In 
reporting the ESAP-induced crisis, the paper blamed other factors such as 
government ineptitude, but not the programme itself. ESAP represents the capitalist 
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take-over of the country’s economy, and with newspapers being key institutions of 
capitalism (Parsons 1989), the Business Herald chose to be blind to possible defects 
in the programme itself. The Financial Gazette also did not highlight problems with the 
structure of ESAP but continued with its ‘government as villain’ reporting when ESAP, 
contrary to its touted benefits, increased the economic crisis in the country. The paper 
took on an increasingly political role as it reported government and Robert Mugabe’s 
‘unreasonable’ decisions that were the cause of the country’s economic crisis. Some 
of these economically irrational decisions included pay-outs to war veterans and 
sending troops to the DRC. In Chapter 5, the study argued that it was this way of 
reporting that helped sow the seeds of opposition politics in Zimbabwe’s urban areas, 
the main market for the Financial Gazette. 
 
The Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in 2000 exacerbated a crisis that 
had already taken an acute turn in the late 1990s. The study showed that while the 
two newspapers had some converging interests in their support for free market 
economy, there was marked divergence in their reportage post-2000. A policy versus 
consequences form of journalism arose during this period. For the Business Herald, 
reporters could write about policy pronouncements from government but shy away 
from elucidating the consequences of such policies. The Financial Gazette, on the 
other hand, interpreted the consequences for its readers. The policies included the 
FTLRP and those that increased government’s visible hand in the market. There was 
silence from the Business Herald when it came to reporting the FTLRP and its impact 
on the economy. As Breed (1955) argues, policy news is sometimes buried so that 
citizens are denied important information. Government had increased its control at 
Zimpapers, hence the Business Herald could not critique government policy. In a bid 
to maintain some form of credibility in the financial news sector, the paper left much of 
the reporting on FTLRP to the political sections of The Herald, the main paper. The 
silence would however be broken from time to time with news on the FTLRP as long 
as there was no implication of government in the ensuing crisis. When the USA and 
EU imposed sanctions on government officials and enabler organisations, the 
Business Herald parroted government mantra of sanctions as cause of economic 
crisis. As an obtrusive issue (Ju 2014), sanctions were reported as having 
consequences evidenced by the crisis. The Financial Gazette was under no such 
control, so it played its normative role of holding government to account. It increasingly 
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took on a political approach to reporting on the economy. It set out to expose 
government failures, policy missteps, corruption and hypocrisy. The Financial Gazette 
engaged in economic pessimism in its reportage, in contrast to the Business Herald’s 
economic patriotism. There was extensive coverage of sanctions, but unlike the 
Business Herald, the Financial Gazette reported these as targeted at a few individuals 
and entities either in government or linked to government and the ruling ZANU PF. 
The economic meltdown was, according to the Financial Gazette, of ZANU PF’s 
making. Hence even during the GNU, the paper took a binary approach to reporting, 
ZANU PF as evil, and MDC as good. The indigenisation programme supported by the 
ZANU PF side of the GNU, was reported in terms of continuation of primitive 
accumulation (Davies 2004), rather than a genuine drive to empower Zimbabweans. 
Such reportage has characterised the Financial Gazette’s coverage of the economic 
crisis post 2013 elections won by ZANU PF. The ZANU PF government has been 
reported as hopelessly incapable of leading the country to economic growth.  
 
Journalists’ motivations 
The study sought to find out why journalists at the Business Herald and Financial 
Gazette report issues the way they do. It found that both newspapers were established 
during colonial times where they were part of the capitalist system. True to the reason 
why business journalism originated, serving capitalist interests (Parsons 1989), the 
study found that journalists at both newspapers internalised this role and it has shown 
from 1980 to present. Journalists from both newspapers started off the immediate 
aftermath of independence with some cautious reporting, trying not to antagonise the 
majority government. However, their loyalty to capitalist cause led to some biased 
reporting against socialism. 
 
For journalists from the Business Herald in particular, capitalist loyalties saw them 
finding ways to portray capitalism as a superior economic system even when there 
was increasing government control over publicly owned media throughout the period 
under study. However, when the control intensified in the post 2000 period, they 
largely preferred to parrot government so as to safeguard their jobs in a difficult 
economic environment. Findings showed that most journalists from the Business 
Herald longed to report the truth of what was happening in the economy but found 
their hands tied by state control. Patriotic journalism (Ranger 2005; Chuma 2008), is 
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not internalised among most journalists from the Business Herald but is practised as 
a self-preservation strategy. After all who wants to lose their job in a country with an 
estimated 90 percent unemployment rate. However, there was evidence of some 
journalists, a minority, who believe that their duty is to defend government policy, not 
to expose its weaknesses. While motivations of this group could not be clearly 
established, possible genuine support for ZANU PF was noted in Chapter 6. 
Journalists from the Financial Gazette are more concerned about credibility. Credibility 
of the paper depends on journalists maintaining high standards of professionalism. 
They regard their market as one which can see through bad financial journal ism, so 
they try to uphold high standards. Loyalties are both to the free market and 
organisation which is in business to make profit. Journalists from both the Business 
Herald and the Financial Gazette are motivated by a desire to be professional which 
leads them to do innovative journalism (Mano 2005). Innovation is particularly evident 
at the Business Herald where journalists find subtle ways of reporting issues that 
otherwise government officials and other businesses would not approve.  For instance, 
one journalist mentioned that when he gets invitations to cover corporate events, he 
finds ways to evade officials to speak to general employees. His argument is that one 
is more likely to get a better story from such sources, something more satisfying from 
a professional point of view, than just writing from officials’ point of view.  
 
Directions in future research 
The corpus of EBF journalism in Zimbabwe remains underdeveloped and more still 
needs to be done. Research in EBF journalism in Zimbabwe can be broadened in 
several fascinating directions. For instance, future studies that conduct newsroom 
observation, perhaps of a longitudinal nature, might yield further and new insights into 
the practice of EBF journalism in Zimbabwe. There is need for rigorous and robust 
research that highlights organisational routines and how they influence journalists to 
report the way they do. Theoretically, such observation could help with understanding 
financial news production practices in Zimbabwe from a culturological perspective, 
something that proved elusive in this study. The other area of interest is digital 
technology. Online and digital information technologies are playing an increasing role 
in financial and business newsrooms in Zimbabwe, although the embrace and 
adoption is not yet total or dominant. General computer use is a common feature and 
online research is increasing, although hampered by the lack of economic data 
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accessible online. Most non-specialist content is however gathered online and online 
connectivity is ubiquitous. For instance, email is used widely, and journalists tweet 
their work and connect with readers online. Most journalists have Twitter handles and 
Facebook profiles, and the Financial Gazette and The Herald have online versions. 
However, sensitive sources seldom connect via email due to fear of hacking and 
malware. Also, although new media technologies have been widely adopted by all 
journalists, sources and the beat are still dependent on old style and old school 
sources and data gathering. As Garrison (2001: 221) notes, “Adoption of new ideas, 
technologies, and practices requires time in any social system, even a small and highly 
focused professional system such as journalism”. However, total and complete access 
to and use of online and digital technologies by journalists and news organizations is 
inevitable due to their convenience, ease of use, and increasingly low cost and faster 
bandwidth. As such, future studies can focus on this fascinating area of digital 
convergence and digital practices in EBF journalism in Zimbabwe. Finally, the fall of 
Mugabe has opened up new themes and new avenues of reseach that will certainly 
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